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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT WASHINGTON, D.C.

FILED KAREN E. SUTTON, OLERK

U.S. Foreign Infulligence Surveillance Court

Docket No. PR/TT

GEORGE J. TEMET, DIMECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

- (C) I, GEORGE J. TENET, do hereby declare and state;
- 1. (U) I am the Director of Central Intelligence
 (DCI), a position I have held since 11 July 1997. Prior to
 serving as DCI, I served since 3 July 1995 as the Deputy
 Director of Central Intelligence. Sefore that, I served
 since January 1993 on the National Security Council (NSC)
 staff as Special Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs and Senior Director for Intelligence
 Programs. Prior to my service at the NSC, I spent more
 than seven years on the staff of the Senate Select
 Committee on Intelligence, Including as Staff Director from
 November 1988 through January 1993.

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established by the Mational Security Act of 1947, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. \$5 401, et seq. Pursuant to section 102(a) of the National Security Act. 30 U.S.C. \$ 403(a). I, as DCI, serve as head of the United States (US) intelligence community. act as the principal advisor to the President of the United States for intelligence matters related to the national security, and serve as the head of CIA. Pursuant to section 1.3(d)(5) of the Mational Security Act. 50 U.S.C. \$ 403-3(c)(6). I am further charged as DCI with establishing requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50 U.S.C. \$ 1801 et seq.

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Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, codified at 50 U.E.C. \$ 401a(4), defines the "intelligence community" to include the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Central Entelligence Agency; the Mational Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Mational Imagery and Happing Agency; the Sational Recognaissance Office; other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of apactalized national intelligence through recommaissance programs; the intelligence elements of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; the elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with the enalyses of foreign intelligence information; and such other elements of any other department or agency as may be designated by the Freeigent, or designated jointly by the DCI and the head of the department or agoncy concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.

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(U) Under section 102A of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. \$ 403-1, the function of the CIA is to assist me as DCT to carry out my responsibilities as set forth in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 103(d) of the National Security Act. Pursuant to section 103(d), codified at 50 0.8.C. \$ 403-3(d), as head of the CIA, I am charged with collecting intelligence through human sources and other appropriate means (excluding police, subposns, or law anforcement powers or internal security functions): providing overall direction for the collection of national intelligence through human sources by elements of the U.S. intelligence community; correlating and evaluating intelligence related to the national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence; performing such additional services as are of common concern to the elements of the U.S. intelligence community; and performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or National Security Council may direct. A more particularized statement of the authorities of the DCI and CIA is set forth in sections 1.5 and 1.8 of Executive Order

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12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. \$ 401 note, and as amended by Executive Order 13284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,073 (Jan. 28, 2003).

I am submitting this Declaration to provide the Court with my assessment of the current, and possibly imminent, threat to the national security of the United States of America posed by

to

perpetrate a large-scale terrorist attack or attacks on US

I understand that to counter this possible imminent threat, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is, among other things, seeking authority from this Court to install and use pen register and trap and trace devices to support FBI investigations to identify

, in the United States and abroad, by obtaining the metadata regarding their electronic communications. I intend in this Declaration to provide factual and threat assessment support for that DOJ request.

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5, (U) The representations set forth herein are based upon my personal review, appraisal, and consideration of the information discussed below and upon discussions with intelligence community personnel who are knowledgeable about the activities described herein.

	6.	As	descr	Lbed .	in	grea	ter	detail	below,
the	intelligence								

have reported on

efforts to develop

anthrax, acquire fissile material, and deploy chemical wespons. While we have no specific information regarding the exact times, targets, or tactics for these planned attacks, we have gathered and continue to gather intelligence that leads us to believe that the next terrorist attack or attacks on US soil could be imminent.

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the planned arrest to	attacks) on the US ho	
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	Judging from the information prov	rded
	, four kay factors will !	
ming month	to execute the US attack strike	in t
•	US Election Politics	

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judge —as the one who is to provide the execution order for the attack—will most likely refrain from launching the strike until he assesses the operation's chances of maximum impact, both in terms of casualties and the economic and political ripple effects.

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Underscoring the importance of

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Meziristan to the group's survival,

Significant Captures or Disruptions - The capture of key operatives involved in the US plot or the disruption of parallel plotting against other Western targets could lead the to move up the timetable for the US attack rather than risk losing the opportunity to strike. We continue to investigate whether the August 2001 arrest of Secarias Moussaoui may have accelerated the timetable for the S/11 attacks because he knew of al-Qa'ida's intention to use commercial aircraft as weapons. Arrests in Canada and the UK of key players in the UK bombing network could lead al-Qa'ida leaders to conclude that

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their plans and intentions have been compromised, spurring them to proceed with the US strike even before all the preferred operational pieces are in place.

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Reporting

does not provide specific information on the

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targets to be hit or	methods to be used in the US attack
attacks.	THE US ATTACK
	Our understanding of
strategic targeting	doctrine, gleaned from detainee
reporting and	public statements since 9/11,
suggests	selected targets for this operation
that come closest to	mosting the following criteria:
	ed with recognised symbols of US life
and power.	The state of the s
fear.	I result in mass casualties and spread
300000	
* Targets that Will	negatively impact the US economy.
20. Att	tacks against or in the host cities
for the Democratic and	Republican Party conventions would
be especially attracti	
Near simultaneous, mul	tipls attacks against critical US
infrastructurespecif	ically, systems of mass transit
	attacks-also have the potential to
meet all three targeti	ng goals.
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21.	
anners since 9/11, such a	operational
	liceraft as weapons and have
ilfied the operational co	excesse as weapons and have
lude using general	ncept of the 9/11 attacks to
-11d-paned	ion aircraft, the targeting of
co-cased commercial flig	ghts that enter US sirepace, an
methods to overpower the	flight crew:
	According to several
operatives believed to	be involved in the group's
operatives believed to	o be involved in the group's
operatives believed to	o be involved in the group's

23	The to obtaining a weapons-of-	nass-	also
smains committed	1000000	out a	
emains committed estruction capabi nemical/Biologics	to obtaining a weapons-of- lity, and we cannot rule o	out a	
emains committed	to obtaining a weapons-of- lity, and we cannot rule o	out a	
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emains committed estruction capabi nemical/Biologics	to obtaining a weapons-of- lity, and we cannot rule of 1/Radiological/Nuclear (Cr	out a	
emains committed estruction capabi nemical/Biologics	to obtaining a weapons-of- lity, and we cannot rule of 1/Radiological/Nuclear (Ci	out a	

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been detailed extensively by numerous

24. Moreover, a steady stream of threat reporting since 9/11 reveals al-Qa'ida's continued interest in attacking US nuclear power plants and reflects the group's recognition of the potential economic and political impact such an attack might have.

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North American-based cells involved in tectical planning offers the most direct path to stopping an attack or attacks against the US homeland. Numerous credible intelligence reports since 9/11 indicate has "sleepers" in North America. We judge that these "sleepers" have been in North America, and the US in general, for much of the past two years. We base our judgment, in part,

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on information	as well as
	that
had operatives here. We	also judge that multiple
disruptions overseas, such as th	e detentions of
post-9/11 aphanest	as well as
post-9/11 enhanced security meas	ores in the US, probably
delayed and/or altered operation	al planning by these
eleepers several times during the	past two years:
	The same of the sa
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reas to deny safe haven to	leaders.
	leaders.
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the requested pen

registers and trap and trace devices are critical because

they can

such attacks against our citizensy.

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(U) I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this

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GEORGE U. TENET. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTRALIGENCE

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