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BRIEF NIC HISTORY

The National Intelligence Council has produced "estimative" intelligence—forward-looking assessments of national security issues—for senior US policy makers since 1979. Its origins, however, go back to the aftermath of World War II.

President Harry S. Truman and the Congress that passed the National Security Act of 1947 had vivid memories of the confusion and missed opportunities that had facilitated the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Truman created the new Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) position to ensure that all national security information held by government agencies was properly shared and evaluated, and Congress gave the DCI a permanent staff in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to ensure this function was performed well. Early CIA analyses, however, showed many of the flaws of pre-war assessments, and so in 1950 a new DCI, LTG Walter B. Smith, USA, created the Board of National Estimates and charged it with crafting and coordinating truly government-wide appraisals of foreign threats and trends.

The Board of National Estimates operated as a council of "wise men," overseeing the estimates processes and forwarding drafts to the DCI and a committee of intelligence agency chiefs for final approval. Staff and drafting support for the Board's "National Intelligence Estimates" was the duty of CIA's Office of National Estimates, while its companion Office of Research and Reports studied topical issues and problems that exceeded the competencies of the individual Intelligence Community agencies. In 1950 the first such "NIE" dealt with prospects for Communist armed action in the Philippines. Over the course of the 1950s, NIEs developed into something of an art form, with the process of producing them becoming an opportunity in which the organizations that comprised the US Intelligence Community pooled and assessed their knowledge on subjects of national security interest—particularly those relating to Soviet nuclear and missile programs—and then looking beyond the current situation to estimate likely outcomes.

A later DCI, William J. Colby, reformed the process of creating NIEs. Convinced that the Board of National Estimates had grown insular and remote, Colby sought to improve responsiveness to policymaker needs and to better engage the Intelligence Community in the drafting of estimates. In 1973 he did away with the Board and replaced its concept of a council of wise men with regional and functional specialists called National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), who would oversee the production and coordination of NIE drafts. Staff and research support would now come from CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the analytical offices of the Intelligence Community agencies according to their various areas of interest and expertise. The National Intelligence Officers became the National Intelligence Council, reporting to the Director of Central Intelligence, in 1979.

In accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Council reports directly to the Director of National Intelligence and represents the coordinated views of the Community as a whole. It draws on the best available expertise inside and outside of government to produce for US Government policy makers authoritative assessments addressing the complex international issues of today and identifying and illuminating those that lie ahead.

Want to Know More?

Two articles that shed light on National Intelligence Estimates were published in CIA's intelligence journal in 1991.

  • One, A Crucial Estimate Relived, was written in 1964 by Sherman Kent, who as head of the Office of National Estimates was directly involved in an NIE that, in mid-September 1962, reasoned that the Soviets would not put offensive intercontinental ballistic missiles in Cuba. In less than a month, photographic intelligence proved the estimate wrong. In reflecting on the lessons learned, Kent discusses the estimative process in general as well as that erroneous estimate in particular.


  • The other article, The Primary Purpose of National Estimating, was published in conjunction with the 50th anniversary of the Dec. 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and is a theoretical estimate that might have been issued three days before the Japanese attack occurred.