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BRIEF NIC HISTORY
The National Intelligence Council has produced "estimative"
intelligence—forward-looking assessments of
national security issues—for senior US policy
makers since 1979. Its origins, however, go back
to the aftermath of World War II.
President Harry S. Truman and the Congress that passed the National Security Act of 1947 had vivid memories of the confusion and missed opportunities that had facilitated the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Truman created the new Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) position to ensure that all national security information held by government agencies was properly shared and evaluated, and Congress gave the DCI a permanent staff in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to ensure this function was performed well. Early CIA analyses, however, showed many of the flaws of pre-war assessments, and so in 1950 a new DCI, LTG Walter B. Smith, USA, created the Board of National Estimates and charged it with crafting and coordinating truly government-wide appraisals of foreign threats and trends.
The
Board of National Estimates operated as a council
of "wise men," overseeing the estimates
processes and forwarding drafts to the DCI and a
committee of intelligence agency chiefs for final
approval. Staff and drafting support for the Board's
"National Intelligence Estimates" was the duty of
CIA's Office of National Estimates, while its companion
Office of Research and Reports studied topical issues
and problems that exceeded the competencies of the
individual Intelligence Community agencies. In 1950
the first such "NIE" dealt with prospects
for Communist armed action in the Philippines. Over
the course of the 1950s, NIEs developed into something
of an art form, with the process of producing them
becoming an opportunity in which the organizations
that comprised the US Intelligence Community pooled
and assessed their knowledge on subjects of national
security interest—particularly those relating
to Soviet nuclear and missile programs—and
then looking beyond the current situation to estimate
likely outcomes.
A
later DCI, William J. Colby, reformed the process
of creating NIEs. Convinced that the Board of National
Estimates had grown insular and remote, Colby sought
to improve responsiveness to policymaker needs and
to better engage the Intelligence Community in the
drafting of estimates. In 1973 he did away with
the Board and replaced its concept of a council
of wise men with regional and functional specialists
called National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), who
would oversee the production and coordination of
NIE drafts. Staff and research support would now
come from CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and
the analytical offices of the Intelligence Community
agencies according to their various areas of interest
and expertise. The National Intelligence Officers
became the National Intelligence Council, reporting
to the Director of Central Intelligence, in 1979.
In accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Council reports directly to the Director of National Intelligence and represents the coordinated views of the Community as a whole. It draws on the best available expertise inside and outside of government to produce for US Government policy makers authoritative assessments addressing the complex international issues of today and identifying and illuminating those that lie ahead.
Want to Know More?
Two articles that shed light on National Intelligence Estimates were published
in CIA's intelligence journal in 1991.
- One, A
Crucial Estimate Relived, was
written in 1964 by Sherman Kent, who as head of
the Office of National Estimates was directly
involved in an NIE that, in mid-September 1962,
reasoned that the Soviets would not put offensive
intercontinental ballistic missiles in Cuba. In
less than a month, photographic intelligence proved
the estimate wrong. In reflecting on the lessons
learned, Kent discusses the estimative process
in general as well as that erroneous estimate
in particular.
- The other article, The
Primary Purpose of National Estimating,
was published in conjunction with the 50th anniversary
of the Dec. 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and
is a theoretical estimate that might have been
issued three days before the Japanese attack occurred.
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