

Memo

The Yugoslav Succession Problem


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

10 March 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Yugoslav Succession Problem

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SUBJECT: The Yugoslav Succession Problem

SUMMARY

President Tito will be 77 in May. Both he and his countrymen have long been painfully aware that Yugoslavia's deep-seated political and economic problems could threaten the country's internal stability, and the continuation of its liberal course, once he leaves the scene. Following the fall of Rankovic in 1966, Tito moved to provide for an orderly succession through shaping Yugoslav institutions rather than individuals. He is now embarked on a series of changes in the political structure which are designed to modify the "commanding role" of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and considerably widen participation in the government's decision-making process. These political moves are closely linked with Tito's continued emphasis on economic decentralization and his decision to extend "self-management" into the military field through the formation and arming of locally-controlled and financed territorial defense units.

Yugoslavia's new political system will not assume operative form until after the Ninth LCY Congress (11-13 March) and the forthcoming Federal Assembly elections (13 and 23 April). Even then, it will not get a real test until after Tito's departure.

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At that juncture, it probably will permit the transfer (and diffusion) of power without immediate crisis. In the absence of Tito's unifying influence, political and regional antagonisms are, however, likely to increase. Conceivably, they could plunge Yugoslavia into a disastrous period of internal turmoil and even tempt the USSR to intervene. But on balance the chances are better than even that Yugoslavia's legally-elected post-Tito leadership will be able to establish reasonably effective control and to pursue its own version of Belgrade's current political and economic course.

* * * * *

BACKGROUND

1. For nearly two decades now, the Yugoslav internal scene has been in a state of flux. In an environment of innovation and experimentation, the constants have been the country's chronic problems -- national antagonisms, economic weaknesses and imbalances, and political factionalism -- and the stabilizing influence of President Tito's immense personal power and prestige. The problems give promise of remaining to plague the Yugoslavs for a long time to come. But Tito, now aged 76, could be removed from the political scene by death or disability at any time.

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
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2. Aware of the problems his departure will create, President Tito has brought considerable energy to bear on the question of ensuring an orderly succession. Profiting from the lessons of the Rankovic affair of 1966, he has discarded the simple expedient of designating an heir apparent and has sought a solution through constitutional and Party reforms. Complementing measures in the economic sphere, the political changes adopted or proposed under Tito's guidance are aimed at the prevention of the accumulation of too much power in the hands of any one individual or small group, a rebalance of interest groups and political factions, and the creation of an institutional framework --

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embodying certain checks and balances -- which will permit and facilitate the adoption of policy decisions by majority vote.*

3. Belgrade's programs of political and economic reform (both centered on the vaunted principle of "self-management") are, of course, closely interrelated. Indeed, the liberalization of the economy itself generates a need for political liberalization.

* These political reforms have affected the structure, operating procedures and general roles of nearly every major Party and governmental body at federal and lower levels. While various "landmark" documents have been supplemented by a host of supporting government and Party measures, the principal features of the reform to date are embodied in the decisions adopted at the Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Plenums of the Central Committee of the LCY (mid-1966 to mid-1967), in the republican Party Statutes adopted in late 1968 and early 1969, in the draft documents proposed for adoption at the Ninth LCY Congress, in the Constitutional Amendments of April 1967 and December 1968, and in the new electoral and national defense laws. The relative power of the republics and autonomous provinces has been increased. Steps have been taken to make operative the formerly purely theoretical controls granted to the federal and republican legislature over the executive organs of government. Power within the LCY has been decentralized, and both debate and advancement within the Party have been democratized. Though President Tito's continued dual role provides an obvious exception, the practice of permitting leading LCY functionaries also to hold key executive government posts has been severely restricted. Maximum terms of office for leadership posts in both Party and government have been fixed and are being enforced. These and the many other, lesser reforms are too complicated to be spelled out in detail here; however, the most important changes will be treated in general terms as they apply to specific problems and developments discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

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The results achieved in the two fields to date have, however, been uneven. There has been internal resistance to both; change has proceeded more swiftly in the economic sector. Following the removal of Rankovic, the economic reforms of 1965 have been pushed vigorously and have been supplemented by new measures. Excesses, born of overenthusiastic application of the principle of decentralization, have required retrenchment here and there, and further adjustments -- not always "liberal" in nature -- are to be expected. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav economy has been fully committed to the general course of the reforms, and Yugoslavia's economic leaders -- businessmen and officials alike -- are gaining experience in the operation of the new system and a vested interest in its continuation and success.*

* The enthusiasm for the economic reforms is not, of course, universal in Yugoslav business circles. They are viewed with a particularly jaundiced eye by many of the businessmen whose jobs or firms appear to be threatened.

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4. In the field of political reform, however, the ultimate significance of a number of the changes in the Constitution and LCY Statutes adopted or proposed in recent years remains open to question. Ironically, so long as Tito remains in power, measures aimed at ending the "commanding role" of the LCY and at broadening and democratizing the political decision-making process can hardly be fully tested in practice. The evolving new system of political self-management still hinges on Tito, who -- as head of both Party and Government -- serves as supreme arbiter. There is more debate, more opportunity for various groups to inject their views at the national level, and less opportunity for extra-legal abuse of power. Nevertheless, when Tito is personally interested in an issue, formal channels and procedures can be -- and are -- by-passed.

5. To say that the system will not have been fully tested when Tito leaves the scene is not to imply that it appears unsound. Not only are there safeguards against tyranny of an individual or a minority group, but the sting of majority rule has been dulled by measures ensuring a full hearing of dissenting views and by careful attention to equitable representation of regional interests. Most important, perhaps, to the ultimate

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viability of the new system has been the concerted drive to rejuvenate the LCY and the government. This campaign has already brought a massive infusion of new blood into leading Party bodies and its impact on various central governmental bodies should soon be visible. Under the new system, few of these freshman politicians are likely to have the inclination or the opportunity to become wedded to their jobs. Most of them may be reasonably expected to entertain a constructive attitude toward the further improvement and liberalization of the political system. In addition, the stigma previously attached to the loss of a leading post -- particularly a Party position -- will gradually be lost as the newly inaugurated system of "vertical rotation" becomes the accepted norm. (The Yugoslavs use this term to stress that they do not intend a further swapping of high level positions among a small group of leaders, but rather a retirement or downgrading of older cadres in favor of dynamic, younger men.) New mobility, coupled with measures permitting the exercise of greater responsibility and initiative at lower echelons, should provide another helpful safety valve. Thus there are many positive features to the new machinery; yet its practical usefulness and durability must be weighed against the background of Yugoslavia's internal realities.

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THE PROBLEM AREAS

6. While economic crisis or subversion from abroad could serve as catalysts in precipitating internal upheaval, the basic threat to the orderly transition of power in Yugoslavia is posed by what may be broadly termed factionalism. This phenomenon includes not only the conflict between the liberal and hard-line elements within the LCY, but also national and regional rivalries and simple power struggles between personally ambitious leaders. The picture is confused: ideological convictions, national sympathies and personal loyalties are interwoven to such an extent that alignments shift on different issues and even generalizations about the strength and aims of what appear to be significant groupings are hazardous.

Political Factionalism

7. Meaningful opposition to Tito's internal policies and reforms began to crystalize within the LCY about 10 years ago. Since then, the terms "progressive" and "conservative" have been the ones most commonly used by the Yugoslavs themselves to categorize the general orientation of individual Party members,

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whatever their function in society.* Naturally, few individuals fit neatly into these molds. Any attempt to delimit either of the broad wings of the LCY must necessarily allow for a spectrum of views within each grouping on any given issue. In addition, a great many LCY members defy classification because they either consciously straddle the fence or keep to themselves such convictions as they have.

8. The progressives find their greatest support in Croatia and Slovenia and among the younger generation of LCY members in general. Nevertheless, their principal spokesmen include such veteran and nationally-diverse Party leaders as

* A "progressive" is generally understood to favor democratization of the Party; broad application of the principle of self-management (i.e., decentralization) in both the political and economic fields; either the establishment of a confederation or further strengthening of political and economic autonomy of the republics within the federation; and the maintenance of broad and cordial relations with the West. A "conservative" opposes democratization of the Party. He favors a centralized economy and government within the framework of a tight federation and advocates relatively close cooperation with the Soviet Union. He feels that his membership in the LCY should give him a privileged position of command over non-members and opposes any measures which might weaken his power in this respect.

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Edvard Kardelj (a Slovene), Vladimir Bakaric (a Croat), Milentije Popovic (a Serb) and Krste Crvenkovski (a Macedonian). The Macedonian Party is reported to be about evenly divided, while the conservatives appear to hold a strong numerical edge in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Represented in high Party and government bodies by such individuals as Mika Spiljak, President of the Federal Executive Council, the conservatives apparently enjoy considerable support among veteran bureaucrats and Party cadre and within the Yugoslav military establishment.

9. Although the heated exchanges at a stormy Party plenum in March 1962 underscored the seriousness of the situation, Tito tolerated the sharpening progressive-conservative split within the LCY for another four years. Drawing on the talents of the leaders of both groupings, he sought to exploit the rift and control its consequences by throwing his weight into the balance as necessary. Finally, however, the full implications of the Rankovic challenge spurred him to clip the wings of the conservatives and to take measures which seem to have tipped the scale decisively in favor of the progressives. Since the opening months of 1966, retirement -- voluntary and involuntary -- and rotation have thinned the ranks of the conservatives in key

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republican and Federal bodies and organizational changes have curbed their power. The results of the recent republican Party conferences have confirmed the current ascendancy of progressive forces within the LCY.

10. Nevertheless, the conservatives remain a force to be reckoned with. Some of the measures which were aimed at preventing a recurrence of a Rankovic-type situation make it as difficult for the progressives as for the conservatives to gain a firm and permanent grip on all the principal levers of political power. Moreover, the proposed LCY Statutes actually encourage a democratic confrontation of differing views within Party bodies. Those conservatively-inclined LCY members who behave themselves (i.e., who do not individually or collectively attack the general Party line or attempt to hamper the implementation of legally adopted decisions) may well -- age permitting -- escape the rejuvenation scythe for a while. Those that are sidelined need not necessarily remain politically inactive. While the passage of time would appear to work against the conservatives, the erosion of their potential strength is likely to be a slow process. Even if Yugoslavia is not faced with the succession problem for a number of years, conservative elements -- active

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and inactive -- within the LCY will probably be on hand in no small number. Unless passions have cooled by then, they could play a significant disruptive role in the post-Tito transition period.*

National and Regional Antagonisms

11. Yugoslavia's chronic and serious nationalities problem is, of course, closely intertwined with the progressive-conservative conflict discussed above. Rooted deep in history, the focus of these national antagonisms has come to center more and more on economic issues. This phenomenon, while reflecting the existence of sharp regional differences in stages of economic development in a modernizing society, appears also to be attributable to the nationality and economic policies pursued by

* There are recent examples of emotions running high. Take the situation in Croatia on the eve of the LCC (League of Communists of Croatia) Congress last December. In seeking election as one of the five LCC candidates for membership in the LCY Presidium, one prominent conservative (a Serb by family origin) attacked his opponents as NATO-lovers and national chauvinists. Prior to his rather resounding defeat, he is said to have declared that if the progressives won the Party elections in Slovenia and Croatia, the Serbs would ask for independent statehood under Soviet protection.

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the Tito regime over the past two decades. There is now a complex intermix of national sensitivities and purely regional interests (in pejorative Yugoslav jargon, national chauvinism and regional particularism). The wedding of these two factors has added new dimensions and a sharper geographic focus to the more traditional aspects of Yugoslavia's nationalities problem. Though actual separatist sentiment appears to be limited -- even in the ethnically Albanian Kosovo area -- national rivalries seem to have become more, rather than less, acute in recent years.

12. Yugoslavia's nationality difficulties can be grouped into two general categories: the refurbished but traditional rivalry aligning Croatia and Slovenia against Serbia and Montenegro; and the special situations created by the existence of large national minority groups having blood or historical ties with neighboring states (particularly the Albanians in the Kosovo area (Kosmet), the Hungarians in the Vojvodina region and the Macedonians in their home republic). Since the amount and employment of Federal subsidies and other financial assistance has become an important issue, one might expect to see all the underdeveloped republics and autonomous provinces aligning themselves with conservative Serbia against progressive

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Croatia and Slovenia. Indeed, a number of observers have commented on what they perceive as a widening split between the "haves" of the Northwest and the "have-nots" of the Southeast.

13. Yet local calculations seem to be more complex than this. Macedonia, already the recipient of some direct Croatian and Slovene investment and currently under the leadership of the progressive Krste Crvenkovski, appears to have elected to align itself with the northern republics on many issues. For the Albanians and Hungarians in the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, aspirations for greater independence from Serbian tutelage are an important factor. The industrially-advanced Croats have been most vigorous in their defense of the Macedonians against the Bulgarian menace and have recently emerged as leading champions of Albanian minority rights. Naturally, Zagreb's motives are assessed as something less than pure in Belgrade; the national sensitivities of the Serbs -- never known as a particularly humble people -- have been aroused by what they perceive as a whole series of assaults on their basic interests. And so the circle is complete.

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14. Despite all its efforts, the Tito regime has so far been unable to establish -- much less enforce -- a clear dividing line between the legitimate exercise of self-management and self-determination, on the one hand, and harmful manifestations of narrow chauvinism on the other. It remains to be seen whether recent Party guidance and the latest Constitutional amendments will serve to set forth such a boundary or otherwise alleviate national tensions. On paper, at least, these measures appear promising. A careful effort has been made to satisfy regional sensitivities. The Chamber of Nationalities, formerly technically subordinate to the now-abolished Federal Chamber of the Federal Assembly, has been given independent status with powers and functions approximating those of the US Senate. The constitutional rights of the newly named "socialist autonomous provinces" have been expanded, but the Serbs have been soothed by the LCY Central Committee's firm rejection of republican status for these areas. The right of dissent within the Party has been greatly liberalized, but at the same time clear limits have been established as to its permissible forms. In a move of perhaps no less importance, the competent and progressive Marko Nikezic has been selected to head -- and, if possible, to straighten out -- the potentially factious Serbian Party.

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Intervention from Abroad

15. Factionalism and national antagonisms have rendered Belgrade particularly sensitive to activities on the part of foreign states. The most immediate danger at present is posed by the potential vulnerability of certain nationality groups to foreign agitation and subversion. The Yugoslavs have reacted sharply to Bulgaria's reopening of the Macedonian question and have denounced foreign intervention and propaganda in the Kosovo and Vojvodina areas. Belgrade's problems with Tirana and Sofia are unlikely to be soon resolved, but the Hungarian Government has shown signs that it may adopt a more cooperative attitude toward the matter of the Vojvodina. Even in the past, of course, the Hungarians probably did not bear sole responsibility for the propaganda aimed at their kin in Yugoslavia. The Soviets have welcomed -- and perhaps have participated in -- actions aimed at fanning internal unrest in Yugoslavia. But so long as Tito remains on the scene, the influence of any of these governments on the course of Yugoslav internal affairs would appear to be fairly limited.

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16. This situation may change, of course, depending on the degree of internal turbulence in the post-Tito period. If opportunities afford, the Soviet Union may be expected to make a determined effort to exploit Yugoslavia's factional struggles to its own ends. Covert assistance to particular Yugoslav groups would be most likely. If this proved ineffective and if internal disorders were not quickly brought under control, the possibility that Moscow might resort to more open measures -- including military intervention -- could not be excluded. With the nation badly torn, it is conceivable that the Soviets might be able to wangle some sort of "semi-official" request for their fraternal assistance.

Economic Difficulties

17. It is clear that major economic reverses would weaken the position of the progressive forces. While the performance of the Yugoslav economy in 1968 was, in many respects, encouraging, serious weaknesses and imbalances remain to threaten the ultimate viability of Belgrade's experimental system of "market socialism." Many of these problems are directly related to regional rivalries and to the highly decentralized form of the self-management system.

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Thus, they could be sharply aggravated by any further increase in nationalistic or particularistic tendencies. In addition, serious dislocations in some sectors of the Yugoslav economy, albeit some of relatively short term nature, would result if economic sanctions were to be applied by the Soviet Union and its allies.*

* The Yugoslav economy has for years been subject to regional and sectoral imbalances. Recently these have been compounded by strong inflationary pressures (involving investments as well as wages) generated under the system of decentralized self-management. Efforts to restrain these pressures and otherwise to rationalize the economy have slowed growth and resulted in heavy unemployment. Belgrade has permitted sizable labor emigration as a temporary solution to the latter problem, but even so, the number of jobless remaining in Yugoslavia may be as high as ten percent of the industrial labor force. Recently graduated technicians and engineers are finding it especially difficult to obtain jobs. The situation is not yet critical but could become so if unemployment is further increased by economic reverses and further concentrated in particular regions of the country. Unless countered by Western action, economic sanctions against Yugoslavia presently within the capabilities of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) countries could have a harmful effect on certain sectors of the Yugoslav economy and thus aggravate Belgrade's problems. COMECON countries account for about one third of Yugoslavia's total foreign trade and constitute the major market for Yugoslav exports of machinery and manufactures. In addition, cancellation of Eastern credits affecting the Iron Gates project and other major ventures would have significant adverse repercussions.

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It is not surprising, therefore, that Belgrade has emphasized that the West can best contribute to Yugoslav security and stability through generous arrangements for trade, credit and economic cooperation.

THE SUPPORTING ACTORS: BIT AND NOT SO BIT ROLES

18. The Party and the higher echelons of the civilian government bureaucracy will, of course, be key arenas in any power struggle which may emerge in the post-Tito period, but the outcome will also be affected by organizations and groups which are now some distance from the center of power. These include, but are not restricted to, the organizations disposing of coercive force.

Defense and Security Forces

19. The Regular Armed Forces. Belgrade has consistently bent every effort to insulate the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) -- and particularly its higher ranking officers -- from the divisive influences of national and political rivalries. In this it has been only partly successful. The wounds opened up by the Rankovic affair have been only partially healed and have

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contributed to what appears to be an increase in factionalism and unrest within the military establishment since Belgrade took its strong stand against the Czech invasion. Sensitive to the implications of such a development to the succession question, the Tito regime has taken steps to meet some of the grievances attributed to the military. In addition, such measures as the formation of the independent territorial defense units and the divorce of the military Party organization from the tutelage of the LCY Central Committee appear to lessen the possibility that the conservatives could use the regular military establishment as a power base in a post-Tito political struggle. While divisions among Yugoslavia's top military leaders will undoubtedly surface when Tito leaves the scene, it now seems likely that the JNA will initially -- at least -- play a stabilizing role in support of the duly elected government and Party leaders. With an autonomous Party structure and a greater voice in the LCY Presidium, its direct influence on the political scene is likely to be significant. In the longer term, the consequences of these changes favoring the development of the military as a relatively independent political force will depend upon the course of other internal events in Yugoslavia.

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20. Territorial Defense Units. The new National Defense Law, approved by the Federal Assembly on 11 February 1969, provides for the formation of armed units of citizens and workers in all enterprises, communes, provinces and republics. Although these units have their own headquarters, and are -- as far as logistics and command are concerned -- completely decentralized, they constitute an integral part of the armed forces. Depending on the circumstances, they can act independently or under the command of the JNA. The arming of largely autonomous regional forces raises obvious questions with respect to Yugoslavia's internal stability. The dangers may be less than they would appear at first glance. While whipped into final form and enacted under pressures generated by the Czech crisis, the new Defense Law was not hastily conceived. Efforts were made to lessen some of the risks involved. Primary control over most of the units will lie at the commune, rather than the republican, level. Reserve officers will command and train the units. Their activities are to be "coordinated" with the communes and the JNA commands, and the Federation of Army Reserve Officers is slated to play a key role in this respect. Given the present arrangements for the organization and control of the territorial defense forces,

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it seems relatively unlikely they will become a significant disruptive factor -- except under the most extreme circumstances -- in the immediate post-Tito period. The wide dispersal of arms under this decentralized system will, however, continue to pose a potential threat to Yugoslavia's internal stability so long as regional and national antagonisms remain strong.

21. The Secret Police. The State Security Service (SDB) was one of the principal instruments exploited by Aleksandar Rankovic in his bid for power. Purged, reorganized and thoroughly demoralized in the wake of its patron's ouster, the SDB is now closely monitored by both the Party and a special Federal Assembly commission. While some secretly conservative elements probably remain within the organization, it is doubtful that the SDB could soon serve as a power base for any oppositionist group or personally ambitious leader in the post-Tito period. The longer range forecast is more problematical. Similar organizations elsewhere -- for example, in Poland -- have shown remarkable recuperative powers.

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Other Significant Groups and Organizations

22. Youth and Student Groups. While recent events suggest that national and regional antagonisms have made some inroads among Yugoslavia's youth, the single Yugoslav nation concept probably enjoys its greatest support among citizens under thirty-five. Furthermore, it would appear that the overwhelming majority of these young people favor progressive efforts to decentralize and democratize their system. Youth and student groups thus represent a potentially positive factor in the post-Tito period. Nevertheless, the passions of the young present certain dangers as well. Overly radical agitation on the part of the students could produce a reaction increasing the strength and resistance powers of the conservatives. On the other hand, if a determined and potentially successful bid for a conservative take-over should take place, it might produce the type of explosive unrest among young Yugoslav students, workers and professionals which could give the Soviets a justification for intervention.

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23. The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY). Despite recurrent speculation over this subject, the possibility that SAWPY might develop into a virtual second political party is remote at best. Currently headed by a veteran and high-ranking party functionary (Rato Dugonjic), SAWPY is essential to the exercise of the LCY's new "guiding role" over local elections and political activity. Under its present leadership, SAWPY has exhibited no proclivity for deviating from this combination transmission belt/monitor role. While SAWPY's top leaders are currently responsive to LCY discipline, this unwieldy mass organization could be vulnerable to conservative exploitation in the post-Tito period.

24. The Federal Economic Chamber (SPK). Frequently called Yugoslavia's Chamber of Commerce, the powerful SPK has generally acted as a leading champion of progressive views and as a key body in facilitating the operation of the decentralized economic system. While such a development does not at present seem likely, passage of control of the SPK into conservative hands in the post-Tito period could have serious consequences. Not only could the SPK be used to sabotage the functioning of the self-management system, but with very little modification, the organization's

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existing structure and rules could serve as effective mechanisms for the de facto recentralization of the economy.

25. The Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (CTUY).

No longer headed by the once politically ambitious Szetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, the trade union movement presently seems somewhat unsure of its role under the self-management system. While recent events suggest that the CTUY and its component unions may assume an increasingly independent and worker-oriented character, they have yet to overcome the stigma and entrenched beliefs associated with their former transmission belt role. Until much more progress is made toward strengthening the independence and reputation of the CTUY, it seems unlikely that it will play a part of much importance in any post-Tito power struggle.

THE GENERAL OUTLOOK

26. Despite the array of unsolved and interrelated problems facing Yugoslavia and despite the number of actually or potentially antagonistic forces, Tito's departure probably will not produce an immediate crisis. Most Yugoslavs, whatever their political views, are concerned over the possible repercussions of an

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all-out political struggle. Moreover, the legal and administrative arrangements which Tito is now making seem to be essentially promising. Thus the top government and Party posts will probably be obtained by leading progressives who enjoy support outside their own republics -- men like Milentije Popovic and Krste Crvenkovski. While Edvard Kardelj and Mijalko Todorovic enjoy Tito's confidence and will probably play important roles in the succession leadership, a number of considerations suggest that they may be passed over for the top positions. Ivan Gosnjak's influence seems to be waning, but it is possible that he could emerge as a compromise candidate for President of the Republic. On the other hand, Marko Nikezic's political star appears to be on the rise, and even if he remains for a while in his current Serbian Party post, his influence is likely to be strong on the federal level. The conservatives for their part, will presumably continue to be represented in the LCY Presidium, the Federal Assembly, and perhaps in the Federal Executive Council as well.

27. But the unifying force of the great national hero, the strong leader, the supreme arbiter will be gone. Various combinations of Yugoslavia's basic and perplexing problems will quickly

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and inevitably confront the new leadership, producing strong divisive pressures. It is possible that a new round of infighting will be generated, both within the Party and among other interest groups. There would be danger of a resurgence of regionalism, and, in this context, the territorial defense units could become ominously significant. Conceivably, the situation could so deteriorate as to invite a military take-over, provide a ready opportunity for direct Soviet intervention, or otherwise threaten the integrity of the country.

28. All these things are possible. Any of them could spell the end of Yugoslavia's liberal course, some of them even of the nation itself. Such black events, however, need not -- and probably will not -- come to pass. There will almost certainly be serious and recurring difficulties, and some turbulence, but these are not likely to reach uncontrollable proportions. Providing that Yugoslavia receives timely economic assistance from the West and barring direct Soviet intervention, there is a better than even chance that the progressives will establish reasonably effective control and that they will prevail for the foreseeable future.

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