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The Yugoslav Armed Forces

1 October 1976


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The Yugoslav Armed Forces



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THE YUGOSLAV ARMED FORCES

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THE YUGOSLAV ARMED FORCES ¹

INTRODUCTION

The history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations suggests that the USSR is likely to place a high priority in the post-Tito period upon securing a government in Belgrade that is more friendly to Moscow and more cooperative in foreign policy than the current government. Soviet efforts toward that goal are likely, at least in the beginning, to take political, economic, or diplomatic forms. There remains a possibility, however, that the Kremlin will decide at some point to use force, or the threat of force. Because of this concern, there is a high level of interest in the capability of the Yugoslav armed forces to resist any such pressure. This paper attempts to assess that capability and the likely effectiveness of the strategy the Yugoslavs have developed to defend their country. It does not attempt to assess the likelihood of a Soviet invasion, or the political-military consequences of such an act.

A considerable portion of the information used in this report is derived from open sources—laws and regulations, press accounts of exercises or visits to military installations, reports on conferences or seminars on defense, articles by military officers, and, this year, a new textbook on national defense approved for use across the country in university-level courses. Much of this writing is so general that it provides little useful information, or is so ideological that significant information is obscured in rhetoric. But the substance to be found in it is often reliable.

¹ This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces. CIA, DIA, and State/INR participated in its production. The drafter of this memorandum for the NIO/CF was [redacted] of CIA.

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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

Yugoslavia's Nationwide Defense System, created following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, attempts to provide the most effective deterrent a small state of modest means can manage. For its credibility as a deterrent it relies upon the training and preparation of a substantial portion of the citizenry for protracted guerrilla warfare against an invader. The defensive capabilities of the relatively small standing army, navy, and air force—the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA)—are expected to be magnified in the eyes of an invader by the mobilization of the massive 3 million-man citizens army—the Territorial Defense Force (TDF)—and a civil defense force of more than 2 million.

While the Nationwide Defense System is theoretically directed against a military threat from any of Yugoslavia's neighbors or either of the great powers, there is little doubt that the Yugoslavs currently perceive the most dangerous threat to be that of a Warsaw Pact intervention designed to bring the country back into the Soviet fold.

Yugoslavia is unique among European nations in the attention, planning, and preparation it applies to the national defense. Federal, republic, and local laws and regulations cover the mobilization of every possible resource. Conferences are held to discuss all aspects of life under wartime conditions, and extensive efforts are made to prepare citizens for this eventuality. Articles on aspects of national defense tactics and preparation appear regularly in popular journals.

All of the Yugoslav forces—regular, territorial, and civil defense—are regularly trained. Young people receive premilitary training from

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elementary school through college. Joint YPA-TDF civil defense operations are rehearsed in major exercises, and mobilization procedures are frequently exercised in large and small call-ups. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the government fails to achieve the goal of universal military training it has set, and there is evidence that the effectiveness of the training varies widely. Problems with the national defense organization and procedures are uncovered during exercises and discussed openly in critiques. The Yugoslavs generally are far ahead of any other European country in the regular exercise and review of their mobilization procedures, tactics, and command and control organization.

There are, however, some notable weaknesses in the Yugoslav armed forces. In spite of an ambitious modernization program, the YPA continues to be short of modern armaments. Its inventory continues to include a wide variety of weapon types, many of which are old. An intensive effort is under way to improve domestic arms production capabilities and diversify its sources of foreign arms, but the YPA remains dependent upon the Soviet Union for most of its sophisticated armaments. Given the Yugoslavs' constrained defense budget and their shortage of hard currency combined with the advantageous terms offered by the USSR, this picture is not likely to change over the next few years. In the meantime, deficiencies in the quality and quantity of equipment will continue to affect the capabilities of most segments of the armed forces.

Other problems which may reduce the effectiveness of the Yugoslav defense strategy are limited transport resources, a decentralized command and control system that could slow operations during an initial phase of intense conventional warfare, and the generally uneven development of TDF units throughout the country. Financial constraints underlie most of these weak areas.

A vital, but largely unpredictable, factor in the effectiveness of the defense plans involves the elusive element of national will. Yugoslavia has been plagued throughout its brief history by conflict among the various national groups which make up its population. Should these groups dissolve into hostile factions, working at cross purposes, the Yugoslav defense effort would be seriously compromised. However, an external threat might well force unification of these competing groups.

Overall, Yugoslav plans seem realistic. The armed forces probably could successfully execute the Yugoslav strategy—namely, to delay the capture of the northern third of the country for several days to allow the national command structure and a large portion of the armed forces to

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regroup in the mountainous interior of the country, from which they could continue to fight. The performance of the Nationwide Defense System in past exercises gives some reason to expect that resistance activity would continue at least for some months in areas occupied by the enemy.

The ultimate success of the Yugoslav defense strategy would eventually depend upon outside support. Nevertheless, the inability to count upon a quick victory and an early end to Yugoslav resistance should greatly affect the cost calculations of a potential adversary. Thus the Nationwide Defense System is probably more effective as a deterrent than it would be in determining the final outcome of an invasion.

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DISCUSSION

I. YUGOSLAV DEFENSE DOCTRINE

1. Yugoslavia's current defense system is rooted in the country's experience with partisan warfare during World War II. It grew on the concern felt among the Yugoslav leadership following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 that their country would be next. That concept is expressed today in the Nationwide Defense System which requires the active involvement of every citizen in the country's defense.

The Nationwide Defense System

2. This defense doctrine applies to the military sphere the tenets of the country's unique approach to the organization of its social and economic life—"socialist self-management." The 1964 National Defense Law describes the Nationwide Defense System in these words:

It is the right and duty of all the working people and citizens to enable themselves, and organize themselves to defend the country and to wage combat for preservation of freedom and self-management rights and for defense and protection of its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and, should the country be attacked, to be the organizers and initiators of armed combat and other forms of resistance.

3. Under this system, all men 16 to 60 years of age and nearly all women from 16 to 55 are obligated to fill a role in one of the three principal organizations serving the national defense—the Yugoslav Peoples Army,² the Territorial Defense Force, or the Civil Defense Force. Yugoslav doctrine also emphasizes that even the very young and very old can participate—by carrying messages, serving as lookouts, or supplying misinformation to enemy soldiers.

² From *Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija*, in which the term *narodna* has been variously translated as "national," "popular," or "peoples."

4. The Yugoslavs have emphasized in their constitution the principle that no part of Yugoslavia will break off to make its peace with an invader. Article 217 states:

Nobody has a right to admit or to sign a capitulation, or to accept or admit an occupation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or any part thereof. Nobody has the right to prevent citizens of the SFRY from fighting against the enemy which has attacked the country. Such acts are unconstitutional and punishable according to the law as treason against the country.

The country is to become a "hedgehog," bristling with local defenses in order to prevent an invading or occupying power from gaining effective control.

5. The Nationwide Defense System is designed to be the most effective deterrent a small state of moderate means can manage. Yugoslavia's leaders clearly hope that any potential aggressor will be convinced that an invasion of Yugoslavia would involve the invader in a protracted and costly war. At the same time, these leaders appear ready to depend upon the system if necessary.

Yugoslavia's Perception of the Threat

6. Yugoslav doctrine postulates a threat of military incursion from all sides, by individual neighboring countries as well as by major powers. But recent press interviews with leading Yugoslav generals and private statements made over the years suggest that Belgrade views the Warsaw Pact as the only real military threat to Yugoslav independence. This is the case even though the demands of "social brotherhood" and a concern not to unduly anger the Soviets tend to dissuade Yugoslav leaders from openly identifying the USSR as a threat. In the immediate future, Yugoslav authorities almost certainly believe that the danger of subversion—from the West as well as from the East—is more immediate than any invasion threat.

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7. We do not know what specific Warsaw Pact forces the Yugoslavs believe might be used in an invasion. They assume, based on the Czechoslovak invasion and their own experience in World War II, that the Soviets would employ overwhelming force in an effort to take over the country and subdue local resistance as quickly as possible. One Yugoslav general has maintained that 50 divisions would be required to subdue the country, and another has calculated that an army of 2 million men would be required to achieve effective control. Yugoslav planners appear to expect that large-scale Warsaw Pact preparations would be required and that these would provide sufficient warning to allow Yugoslav forces to be mobilized before an invasion.

8. The Yugoslavs believe that, coincident with or just before launching a land invasion, the Warsaw Pact would undertake massive air strikes to suppress the Yugoslav air force, neutralize ground-based air defenses, and destroy major concentrations of ground forces. Military writings and exercise activity provide clear evidence that Yugoslav military planners expect to face massive tank assaults and airborne landings. Although the YPA emphasizes training in defensive techniques against chemical and nuclear warfare, the balance of evidence from Yugoslav writings suggests that Belgrade does not expect the Warsaw Pact to use nuclear weapons.

9. Although information on official Yugoslav defense plans is not available, troop deployment patterns and statements by Yugoslav officers suggest that Belgrade anticipates a Warsaw Pact armored attack from Hungary across the plains of northern Yugoslavia to seize and occupy the highly developed northern third of the country (see Figure 1). Another major attack is apparently expected from Bulgaria toward Skopje and Nis, probably with major Bulgarian involvement. Yugoslav military exercises along the Adriatic coast suggest that airborne or amphibious assaults are expected there. The Yugoslavs clearly hope—although they cannot be sure—that Romanian territory would not be made available to the Soviet forces and that Romanian forces would not participate.

Subversion

10. Yugoslav leaders and military planners are deeply concerned with the threat of political subver-

sion. Throughout its brief history, Yugoslavia has been plagued by conflict among the several national groups which comprise its population. While it appears that progress has been made under Tito in constructing a political framework within which the competing nationalisms can be contained and accommodated, the fundamental cohesiveness of the society remains problematic—a key question for the survival of the federation.

11. For this reason, the activities of anticommunist or ethnic separatist Yugoslav emigrés in Western Europe and the US are a continuing source of anxiety to the country's leaders, who profess not to understand why the Western governments cannot control these dissidents. From the east, the Yugoslavs perceive a growing danger of Soviet subversion, either independently or in support of a Warsaw Pact invasion.

12. The Yugoslavs are well aware that the Soviets would like, by means short of military action, to see the installation of a Yugoslav government in the post-Tito period that is more cooperative and closer to the Soviet concept of socialism. The uncovering over the past two years of several well-organized "cominformist" associations in Yugoslavia with ties to the USSR and other East European countries has convinced the Yugoslavs that the Russians continue to harbor subversive intentions.

Role of the Armed Forces in Countersubversion

13. In a broad sense, the Nationwide Defense System may be directed as much against the internal security threat as it is against an external military threat. Yugoslav leaders see the system as a mechanism for building Yugoslav patriotism and imparting a sense of external threat which will encourage cohesive forces within the society.

14. President Tito views the YPA as the most reliable all-Yugoslav institution in the country. An army general has for two years held the post of Minister of the Interior, and the military has generally been given a predominant role in Yugoslavia's internal security apparatus. Military men have taken the lead in advocating the new mass counterintelligence system ("social self-protection") which Belgrade is introducing throughout the country.

15. Clearly, Tito believes in the loyalty and reliability of the army's current leaders, but there is a

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Figure 1

Disposition of Major YPA Ground Force Units



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continuing concern over maintaining political reliability at all levels and with making the YPA a more generally representative and popular instrument of governmental authority. What little is known about the views of top officers indicates that they are, as a group, loyal to the existing Yugoslav system. Virtually nothing is known, however, about the views of middle-level and junior officers or NCOs. Emigré reports indicate that there continues to be considerable interethnic rivalry and hostility among the YPA's recruits. In the past, the national make-up of the YPA officer corps has given rise to the criticism that the army represents an instrument of Serb hegemony. The army is trying hard to erase such an image with an ambitious program to establish a more equitable national balance at all levels.

II. THE FORCES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

16. The National Defense Law provides for two coequal branches of the armed forces, the Yugoslav Peoples Army—the regular military forces—and the Territorial Defense Force. The YPA is organized and controlled at the federal level. The TDF, although ultimately subject to national control, depends upon the various Yugoslav republics and smaller communities for its local organization and management.

17. This sharing of responsibility has resulted in complicated administrative and operational relationships at all echelons within and between the YPA and the TDF. These relationships—and their evolution in recent years—are addressed in Annex A on the command and control of the Yugoslav armed forces.

The Yugoslav Peoples Army

18. The Yugoslav Peoples Army is a unified military service composed of ground, air and air defense, and naval arms with an overall peacetime strength of about 275,000 men. Enlisted men in all three arms of the YPA are conscripted, most at age 19; and virtually all fit males serve for 15 months in the ground and air forces or for 18 months in the navy.

19. Enlisted men who elect to remain in the service following the single term of conscription may be promoted to NCO rank. Other candidates for NCO training are admitted on the basis of competitive examination. Most officers are graduates of four or five year courses in officer preparatory schools and hold regular commissions. However, students who

have completed two years at a qualified university are eligible for reserve commissions after six months of officer training and need serve only a total of one year.

20. In an effort to foster all Yugoslav loyalties among younger citizens, at least 75 percent of the conscripts are assigned to units outside their home republics. The enlisted men in any unit are likely, therefore, to be a mixture of Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, and other national minorities. Within the officer corps, a somewhat contradictory policy is evident. The YPA makes an effort to assign officers to their own republics in order to improve morale, retain trained specialists, and possibly to ease working relations with local TDF officials.

Ground Forces

21. The YPA ground forces total some 210,000 men, including a 14,000-man Frontier Guard and a 3,000 man paramilitary security force. Of the 193,000 in the regular ground forces, 50,000 are officers and NCOs. Major ground force units include eight infantry divisions and 25 independent brigades (11 infantry, three mechanized, eight tank, two mountain and one coastal defense) plus 14 independent combat regiments (infantry, artillery, and antitank). Ground force units are administered and controlled by seven military regions and one subregion (the Titograd Prodrucje). Major ground combat units are widely dispersed throughout the country with some concentration along the borders. Antiarmor units—independent tank brigades, antitank regiments and divisional antitank elements—are deployed near the Hungarian border and against the mountain passes connecting Yugoslavia with Italy and Bulgaria. (See Figure 1 for disposition of divisions and brigades, and military region boundaries and headquarters.)

22. There is no standard organization for units above the battalion level in the YPA ground forces. The organization and composition of divisions, brigades, and regiments vary according to their missions, the characteristics of the terrain where they are to fight, and the types of enemy forces likely to be engaged. We estimate that the divisions range in size from 11,500 to about 13,000 men, while the independent brigades contain 1,500 to 3,000 men. These same considerations—mission, terrain, and enemy—also affect the priorities by which various units receive new

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TABLE I
PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF YUGOSLAV
GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT

Armor	
	Medium tank T-34, 54, 54A, 55, 55A
	Medium tank M-47
	Medium tank M-4A3 Sherman
	Light amphibious tank PT 76
	Armored personnel carrier M-60, 64
	Armored personnel carrier BTR 50P
	Armored scout car Fiat M-3/8
Antitank Weapons	
	90-mm AT rocket launcher RB-49/57
	82/105-mm recoilless rifle
	76/90-mm SU-100 SP gun
	100-mm T-12 antitank gun
	AT-1 (Snapper) missile
	AT-3 (Sagger) missile
Air Defense Weapons	
	20-mm AA gun (HSS 804) (630-3)
	30-mm SP AA gun
	57-mm SP AA gun (ZSU 57-2)
	SA-2 missile
	SA-3 missile
	SA-6 missile
	SA-7 missile
Field Artillery and Rockets	
	76-mm howitzer (B1 Tito Gun)
	105-mm howitzers (towed and self-propelled)
	122-mm howitzer
	152-mm gun-howitzer
	155-mm howitzers
	203-mm howitzer
	128-mm rocket launcher M-63
	FROG tactical rocket *

* Two FROG-7 rockets carried on ZIL-35 transporter-launchers were observed in the May 1975 Victory Day parade, but they have not yet been detected in training or deployment with units. The Yugoslavs may have decided against procuring additional FROGs in the near future.

equipment. Table I shows the types of equipment held in Yugoslav ground force units. Information on the deployment of these systems is insufficient to support reliable estimates of their numbers.

23. The Frontier Guard is organized into nine brigades, each with four to eight companies. Each company occupies several border outposts; each

outpost covers a stretch of border which varies from three to ten miles, depending upon the terrain.

Air and Air Defense Forces

24. All of Yugoslavia's air and air defense forces, including ground force antiaircraft units,³ are operationally subordinate to the Commander of Air and Air Defense Forces. (See Figure 2 for location of air defense headquarters, zonal boundaries, and major air force units and airfields.) The combined personnel strength of these forces is about 46,000, including some 26,000 in ground attack, reconnaissance, and support roles, 5,000 in air surveillance and air defense aviation, and 15,000 in SAM and AAA units. Table II shows the types and numbers of equipment held by the Yugoslav air and air defense force.

25. For air defense, Yugoslavia relies primarily on 117 MIG-21 Fishbed interceptors, including 31 of the newer J export model and 86 older C, D, E, and F models. These aircraft are deployed in three air defense regiments located at Batajnica near Belgrade, Pristina Vrelo, and Bihac. At least some interceptors at two of the three airfields are sheltered in caves tunneled into the sides of mountains.

26. Surface-to-air missiles provide a growing contribution to Yugoslavia's air defenses. The SA-2, with a capability against aircraft flying at medium to high altitudes, was acquired from the USSR in about 1965 and deployed at four locations around each of the country's two largest cities, Belgrade and Zagreb. No further development of SAM defenses occurred until 1974-75, when the Soviets supplied unknown quantities of the SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 systems.

27. Troop training and deployment are now underway for the three newer SAM systems. One SA-3 regiment with three operational firing battalions has been identified at sites near Ljubljana, Yugoslavia's third largest city.

28. Ground-based antiaircraft units are fairly evenly distributed throughout the country, reflecting a belief that an air attack would probably be directed at targets all over Yugoslavia.

³AAA battalions subordinate to infantry divisions are operationally assigned to those divisions and carried in the ground forces order of battle. Thirteen independent AAA regiments and one independent AAA battalion are controlled by the Air and Air Defense Command.

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Disposition of Yugoslav Air, Air Defense and Naval Forces

Figure 2



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TABLE II
TYPES AND NUMBERS OF YUGOSLAV
MILITARY AIRCRAFT

Air Defense	
MIG-21 D/F.....	44
MIG-21 C/E.....	42
MIG-21 Jx.....	31
	117
Ground Attack	
Soko G-2 A/J-1 Galeb/Jastreb.....	119
Soko P-3 Kraguj.....	12
F-84 G Thunderjet.....	9
	140
Reconnaissance-ECM	
Soko G-2 A/J-1 Galeb/Jastreb.....	26
RT-33 Shooting Star.....	21
	47
Training (combat capable)	
MIG-21 Mongol.....	18
Soko G-2 A/J-1 Galeb/Jastreb.....	110
T-33 Shooting Star.....	3
	131
Transports	
Caravelle.....	1
Coot.....	2
Cub.....	2
Codling.....	4
C-47.....	37
Cab.....	4
Curl.....	9
	59
Helicopters	
ASW Hound.....	8
ASW Hormone A.....	4
Hound.....	11
Hip C.....	48
Gazelle.....	12
Hare-Hoplite.....	14
	97
Total Aircraft.....	591

29. For air defense purposes, Yugoslavia is divided into two zones which control and direct the activity of all of the air defense resources in their geographic area. The zones are subdivided into four air surveillance sectors, which control the country's 34 radar

sites and coordinate the flow of information from those sites.

30. To support the ground forces, the air force has six tactical air squadrons, composed mostly of Yugoslav-made Jastreb and Galeb ground attack aircraft, plus a few F-84G Thunderjets and domestically produced light attack aircraft. Some 318 jet aircraft, including 47 combat-capable reconnaissance planes and 131 combat-capable trainers, are available for ground attack operations. An additional 85 helicopters and 60 fixed-wing transport aircraft provide a modest airlift capability. Twelve helicopters support the navy in an ASW role.

Naval Forces

31. The Yugoslav navy has 18,000 men and an inventory of some 134 combatant vessels (including many small river patrol boats), plus 28 auxiliary and approximately 135 service craft. Combatants include one destroyer, five submarines, ten missile attack boats, and 19 sub chasers. The navy relies on small, fast, and maneuverable patrol boats for close-in protection of the country's irregular coastline. Table III shows the types and numbers of Yugoslav naval vessels.

32. The bulk of the naval forces and most combatants comprise the Adriatic Fleet, whose commander—an admiral—also commands the Maritime Military Region. As regional commander, he controls all of the ground force and tactical air units in the coastal area and directs a unified coastal defense. Commanders of the region's three zones supervise coastal defense artillery, amphibious assault forces,⁴ naval logistics, shore-based installations, and associated auxiliary ships within their zones (see Figure 2).

33. The remainder of Yugoslavia's naval forces comprise the River Flotilla, which is operationally controlled by the First Army Region in Belgrade. Its units operate on the Danube, Drava, and Sava Rivers. An additional 1,000 men and 49 small boats make up the Maritime Frontier Guard. A 300-man militia, operating 47 patrol boats, assists the Guard with port security.

⁴ Yugoslavia's "marines" are ground force personnel trained for amphibious assault and organized into some five coastal defense battalions.

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TABLE III
TYPES AND NUMBERS OF YUGOSLAV
NAVAL VESSELS

Adriatic Fleet	
Destroyer.....	1
Submarines.....	5
Coastal patrol types.....	58
Large subchasers.....	19
Missile attack boats (Osas).....	10
Motor torpedo boats (Shershens).....	15
Motor gunboats.....	14
Mine warfare types.....	14
Coastal minesweeper.....	4
Inshore minesweeper.....	10
Landing craft.....	37
Utility landing craft.....	29
Mechanized landing craft.....	3
Ramped personnel landing craft.....	2
Support landing craft.....	3
Auxiliaries.....	27
	142
River Flotilla	
River gunboat.....	1
Minesweeping boats.....	14
Utility landing craft.....	4
Barracks ship.....	1
	20
Maritime Frontier Guard	
Coastal patrol types.....	24
Motor gunboats.....	9
Patrol boats.....	15
River gunboats.....	6
River/roadstead patrol boats.....	19
	49
Militia	
Port security boat.....	42
Patrol boats.....	5
	47
Total Naval Vessels.....	258

Territorial Defense Force

Strength

34. There is little reliable information on the number of citizens actively involved in the Territorial Defense Force, but they probably number about 3 million. This was the goal set when the TDF was founded in its current form in 1969 and it appears

likely that it has been reached. On several occasions since 1971 top defense officials have mentioned TDF strengths of "one million," "millions strong," and "several million." A senior military official stated in January 1976 that the TDF had "surpassed its planned development, particularly in its quantitative elements." Some evidence suggests that the goal of 3 million may indeed have been surpassed.⁵ Only about 10,000 citizens serve full-time with the TDF.⁶

Organization, Mission, and Composition

35. There are two basic types of TDF units—relatively large, mobile units called "partisan" divisions or brigades and small, local defense units tied to their respective geographic areas. The size of the mobile units varies from some 500 to 3,000 men. They may be created by a republican command or by commands associated with the larger cities; smaller cities and towns often provide partisan detachments for inclusion in a brigade or division. All partisan units are controlled by the headquarters of the republic in which they are located. In wartime, partisan units are expected to link up and fight with the YPA or other partisan units, possibly far from their home territory. The partisan units enjoy priority over small TDF units in the assignment of both TDF recruits and those reservists assigned to the TDF.

36. The local defense units, although individually weaker than the partisan units, are fundamental to

⁵ In a town of 45,500 in Vojvodina, for example, some 18,000 persons are said to be trained and equipped for nationwide defense—a number which represents 39 percent of the commune's total population. Based on his experience in a TDF unit in Zagreb, a defector has stated that one sixth of all Yugoslavs participate. National Defense officials from Bosnia-Herzegovina, who seem to be more open concerning membership figures than those from other republics, claim that more than 780,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina have completed "basic training in national defense" while "580,000 have completed their supplementary training." The larger of these figures constitutes about 20 percent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If 17 to 39 percent of the entire Yugoslav population participated, as many as 3.5 to 8 million of the 21 million Yugoslavs would be TDF members. The development of the TDF has not been uniform throughout Yugoslavia, however, and it is not always clear when Yugoslavs speak of those involved in the national defense whether they are including Civil Defense personnel. Participation in some areas of the country is almost certainly less than 20 percent, and 3 million seems a reasonable rough estimate.

⁶ This figure is calculated on the basis of 50 persons serving with each of six republic and two provincial level staffs, an average of ten with the staffs of some 800 or more *opstinas* (local government units—see footnote 7), and five or fewer with major factories or enterprises.

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the territorial defense system. They apparently vary widely in size, from platoons or squads of a few men to companies and battalions of 150 or more, depending upon the mission of the unit and the size of the community or enterprise which organized it. Units formed by factories or local communities may act independently, but their plans must be coordinated with those of the *opstina*⁷ and they are ultimately subordinate to the *opstina* command. Yugoslav officials, in discussing the TDF, often draw a distinction between the partisan units, which are thought to have achieved a good level of preparedness, and the local defense units, whose development has been more spotty.

37. One important feature of the territorial defense system is its flexibility—smaller units must be able quickly to merge into larger ones, and larger units must be broken down easily when conditions, such as enemy occupation, require guerrilla action by small groups.

38. Detailed information on the disposition of the TDF throughout the country is fragmentary, but some conclusions may be drawn from the numerous articles which appear in popular Yugoslav journals and from defector reports concerning specific units and localities. All of the republics and autonomous provinces and many large cities appear to have fielded major partisan units. At the communal level, the emphasis seems to be on company-size units, and presumably, all of Yugoslavia's 800-plus *opstinas* have formed at least one company. Across the country there are more than 12,000 "local communities" within the *opstinas* and "tens of thousands" of the self-managing Basic Organs of Associated Labor in factories and enterprises, all of which are required by the National Defense Law to make plans and organize for their own defense.

39. The missions assigned to Territorial Defense units vary widely with the geography and nature of the area in which they serve. Evidence is accumulating that these missions may reflect the same pattern becoming apparent in the deployment of YPA ground force units—emphasis on antitank operations in the

⁷ The *opstina*, the basic organ of communal organization in Yugoslavia, is somewhat comparable to the US county. It may vary in geographic size and population and may comprise one population center, in the case of fairly large towns or cities, or several population centers, in areas where towns are smaller and dispersed. The city of Belgrade contains two *opstinas*.

flat country along Yugoslavia's borders and on antiaircraft and anti-airborne operations in the interior of the country.

40. The bulk of TDF manpower comes from YPA reservists, some 75 percent of whom are assigned to the TDF upon release from active duty. Most TDF soldiers probably are 21-40 year-old males. The National Defense Law provides also for voluntary service by youths under age 19, women, and men who have been exempted from YPA service. In general, women appear to be much less active in Territorial Defense activities than in Civil Defense. Yugoslav publications nevertheless contain numerous references to women in military units and national defense councils.⁸ In any case, the Yugoslav government appears to encourage involvement of women in the TDF.

41. Some problems are evident in the participation of young people. On the one hand, many students are unenthusiastic about military training and service. On the other, the older citizens who dominate many Territorial Defense units are often reluctant to accept the teenagers as full-fledged soldiers. It appears that young people usually are accepted as volunteers in regular TDF units, but in some localities special youth detachments have been formed to include school and university students not yet subject to conscription.

42. Special interest groups such as rifle clubs, ham radio operators, and flying clubs are required to undertake defense training and organize themselves so that their military-related skills and equipment will be at the service of the TDF in wartime. While it is not clear just how widespread or how well organized such efforts have been, or to what extent such associations are integral to the TDF, their participation in many military exercises has been singled out for commendation.

Leadership

43. Command positions in company-size and larger TDF units are usually filled by reserve YPA officers and NCOs. Moreover, associations of reserve commissioned and noncommissioned officers—by providing both professional and political leadership—have played a large role in developing the TDF. Within

⁸ A recent issue of FRONT, the Yugoslav army magazine, featured a highly enthusiastic women's antitank detachment from Maribor, near the Austrian border.

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TDF units, especially the smaller ones, relationships are said to be rather flexible; and informal leadership is sometimes assumed by persons with the requisite skills.

Civil Defense

44. Yugoslavia's defense concept and strategy also rest on the mobilization of a large body of civilians in a third major body, the Civil Defense Force. Some 2.5 million persons are reported to be trained for wartime assignments with 45,000 civil defense organizations through the country. These units regularly train with YPA and TDF units in major exercises. Yugoslav defense planners regard an efficient and well-organized civil defense as an essential component of an integrated national defense force. Further information on the organization and function of the Civil Defense Force appears in Annex B.

III. STRATEGY AND TACTICS—THE YUGOSLAV PLAN

Concept of the Defense

45. Yugoslav military planners appear confident that their regular armed forces could conduct a successful forward defense against an attack by any one of the countries bordering Yugoslavia. Against a massive Warsaw Pact attack, however, Yugoslav strategy calls for employing a two-phased defense that takes into account the vulnerability of the northern third of the country. All Yugoslav tactics are designed to deny the invader a quick victory. By employing sabotage, harassment, and raids against the invader's flanks, the Yugoslavs believe they can cut his lines of supply, tie up large numbers of troops, and subject him to an increasingly difficult and frustrating task in holding whatever territory he takes.

46. During the first phase of the defense, the YPA would fight a delaying action close to the northern borders for several days, to allow for the full activation and preparation of the territorial and civil defense organizations. At the end of that time, a large invading force would probably control much of the northern third of the country, although several of the major cities could probably continue resistance for a time. The country's High Command, having moved upon mobilization to well-bunkered command posts

in the mountainous center of the country, would have been joined by the YPA and many of the larger territorial units.

47. The second and decisive phase of the war would be waged by YPA and territorial units that had retreated from the northern areas. As they moved southward into the interior, these units would continue to engage enemy forces and guerrilla style hit-and-run resistance would continue throughout the area temporarily occupied by the invader.

48. While they continue to rely on in-depth defense against a major attack, Yugoslav authorities apparently have begun to plan for a stronger forward defense and one that more actively opposes the enemy at every stage of an invasion. This evolution toward a more conventional defense stems from the growing effectiveness of the TDF and from an assessment that precision guided munitions, such as the antitank and antiaircraft missiles used in the 1973 Middle East war and in the Vietnam conflict, might offer Yugoslavia a much improved defense capability.

Role of Territorial Forces

49. The TDF is expected to play a major part in countering a major invasion, even in its early stages. Antitank units have been formed in border regions, and minelaying is emphasized as a technique for delaying the advance and channeling enemy tanks into corridors where they may be more effectively engaged by antitank units.

50. TDF antiaircraft and field artillery units defend major towns and cities and the coast. Territorial units along the broken Adriatic coastline are being prepared, together with regular naval and infantry units deployed in the Maritime Military Region, to resist amphibious landings and the seizure of harbors. Much attention also is devoted to countering enemy airborne and heliborne landings, which could carry an invasion deep into the interior of the country.

51. Relatively few people will be evacuated from areas being overrun by an aggressor. Cities and populated places are to be stubbornly defended, and plans have been made for continued resistance under enemy occupation.

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Air and Naval Forces

52. The Yugoslavs use protective shelters and dispersal of aircraft to increase the survivability of the air force against large enemy air strikes that are expected at the beginning of an invasion. Most military aircraft that are deployed at airfields in the vulnerable northern part of the country in peacetime would be dispersed on warning to more secure air bases in the mountainous interior. This dispersal and the availability of many hardened shelters—enough for more than half of Yugoslavia's combat aircraft—probably would frustrate an attempt to destroy many aircraft on the ground.

53. The Yugoslavs also are prepared to defend their airfields against airborne landings. YPA and TDF assault battalions and AAA units are prepared to counter enemy attempts to occupy civilian and military airfields.

54. Yugoslavia plans to employ its small air defense interceptor force to destroy as many attacking aircraft as possible. The ground attack aircraft will be used initially to strike invading ground forces and, later, to harass any occupying enemy forces.

55. The Adriatic Fleet, about 90 percent of which is stationed in Split harbor, will move to wartime positions in the islands along the Adriatic coastline, from which the vessels would cooperate with regular infantry units and the Territorial Defense Forces in small-scale actions against an invading navy.

Foreign Assistance

56. Although Yugoslav military leaders downplay their dependence on outside help, they nevertheless claim to believe that it will be forthcoming. They hope that a stubborn Yugoslav defense will create political pressure on Western governments to provide material support. Yugoslav sources in the past have referred only confidentially to this prospect. In recent months, however, the Yugoslav press has speculated that an attack on Yugoslavia by one of the major alliances would bring an almost automatic response from the other because it would threaten the balance of power in Europe. We do not know to what extent Yugoslav strategists actually plan upon such support.

IV. MOBILIZATION PLANS

57. [redacted] the Yugoslav mobilization of August-September 1968, following the Czechoslovak invasion, reported that it was extremely slow, confused, and ineffective, a judgment which was confirmed by Yugoslav actions following the mobilization. The invasion and Yugoslavia's inadequate response apparently led to an overall reassessment of Yugoslav defense strategy, including mobilization plans.

Mobilized Manpower

58. In 1972 Yugoslav Defense Secretary Ljubicic stated the country's mobilization philosophy in these words:

"If our concept gives the modern world anything new, then this new thing is that we are not preparing merely a few million armed men for a possible aggression, but that we are preparing and organizing all the 20 million inhabitants for defense."

Accordingly, every able man, woman and child is supposed to have a mobilization assignment either with the YPA, the TDF, Civil Defense units, or wartime production enterprises.

YPA

59. The authorized wartime strength of the YPA is not known, nor are strength goals within given periods of time after mobilization begins. Enough evidence is available on the anticipated expansion of the ground forces to allow gross calculations concerning their mobilized strength, but virtually nothing is known about the potential growth of the air force and navy. It appears that the ground forces strength would be increased from 210,000 to about 350,000 after mobilization. After expansion of the navy and air force, the regular Yugoslav forces may number nearly 500,000 at wartime authorized strength.

60. Some 90,000 ground force and frontier guard recruits are released from active duty each year. Those separated from active duty during the past five years—some 450,000 men—are the main source of reserve manpower to fill YPA and TDF partisan units.⁹ A small percentage of defense personnel would be assigned to fill out the eight YPA divisions, which are apparently manned at levels between 75 and 85

⁹ Specialists are retained in the YPA reserves for longer periods.

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percent in peacetime and therefore could be committed to combat before receiving mobilized personnel. Most YPA reservists would be used to fill out or expand units which have only a small cadre of officers and NCOs in peacetime. The Yugoslavs also plan to form a number of new units and integrate these with existing ones to form larger units—such as additional battalions to form a regiment, and additional regiments to form a brigade.

61. Some 2,000 navy enlisted men enter the reserves annually; with reserve officers and NCOs, the naval reserve is estimated to number about 43,000 men. The number of recruits sent to or released from the air force is unknown, as is the size of the air force reserves; however, three reserve YAF squadrons are known to exist with designated reserve aircraft.

TDF and Others

62. Components of Territorial and Civil Defense forces are seen in part by Yugoslav strategists as flexible and interchangeable reserves. To satisfy priority requirements, for example, partisan units or personnel may be called to fill gaps in regular army units, and personnel from static TDF units may be used as replacements for casualties in YPA or maneuvering TDF units. Civil Defense personnel also may be required to take up arms in defense of their communities, and young people with pre-military training are a back-up reserve for all of the armed forces.

63. The local militia, or police, would become a part of the TDF in wartime, staying in place and attending to public security. The republic and federal level militia—internal security personnel normally under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior—would be controlled by the YPA in war.

64. There has been a concerted effort since 1968 to simplify mobilization by applying, wherever possible, the "territorial principle." YPA reservists other than specialists are assigned to units near their homes, and most TDF and Civil Defense personnel live near the units to which they are assigned. Yugoslavs working far from their homes are usually given mobilization assignments in the area where they work, although if their families continue to reside in another republic, they may be assigned to return there.

65. The most serious problem involves the many military eligibles—at least 300,000 of them—who

work abroad in Western Europe. Some of these men have been called up for reserve training or participation in exercises, and many have apparently reported. But YPA authorities are greatly concerned that so many eligibles are allowed to leave the country, and in some localities there are few men in the 21-40 age bracket available for service. The Yugoslav government reportedly has concluded agreements with some West European governments on arrangements for transporting the guest workers home if needed, but they would be unlikely to be available on short notice.

Testing of Mobilization Procedures

66. Because they must be able to prepare quickly for an initial phase of intense warfare, the Yugoslavs plan to mobilize within hours rather than days or weeks. Accordingly, they regularly test the mobilization system, both in small local exercises and in major exercises involving all elements of the national defense forces. A courier system is often used to notify reservists of an unexpected call-up, though post cards are used for regular training exercises, and presumably radio and TV would be employed in an emergency. Descriptions of numerous exercises indicate that the bulk of the TDF can be mobilized very quickly—within one to six hours. A large percentage of YPA reservists can probably be called up almost as quickly, but their full integration into operational units would likely take longer.

V. TRAINING

67. The commitment of Yugoslavia's military leadership to the Nationwide Defense System can be clearly seen in the training program administered throughout the armed forces. While the Yugoslav government almost certainly falls short of its stated goal—regular military training for all citizens—a substantial proportion of the population is involved. The training includes routine military drill, major military exercises, and the moral and political indoctrination which is expected to supply the foundation for a spirited defense.

YPA Regular Forces

68. Ground force recruits undergo seven and one-half months of basic training. The training duty is normally rotated among the three battalions of a regiment, so that two battalions are completely operational at any time. Basic training culminates in a

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series of field exercises, each lasting for several days. The exercises often are conducted in extreme weather conditions, [redacted]

69. Although the evidence is meager, US analysts believe that air force personnel—particularly air defense pilots—are well trained and proficient. In general, the YAF has abandoned training methods learned from the USSR in the 1944-49 period, and has patterned its training system after that of the United States Air Force. Training for air defense pilots emphasizes procedures for ground-controlled intercept and the coordination of all air defense forces. Interceptor pilots exercise under a variety of flying conditions, practicing intercepts against YAF fighter-bombers and, occasionally, against civilian airliners traveling through Yugoslavia. Tactical air pilots concentrate on ground support activities, including air-to-ground rocketry, gunnery, bombing, and reconnaissance; they also train in low-altitude air-to-air operations against helicopters and transports. The techniques for landing at badly damaged runways also are rehearsed. Air force units regularly participate in joint exercises with ground, naval, and territorial defense units.

70. Yugoslav naval vessels operate on training missions continually, with an emphasis on guerrilla tactics, dispersion to protective shelters, hit-and-run attacks, small-scale landings, and operations at night and in poor weather conditions. Major exercises, in which virtually the whole navy is involved, are seen at approximately two-year intervals, but the Adriatic fleet regularly trains in conjunction with other elements of the coastal defense forces—naval helicopters, air force planes from nearby bases, coastal radar, coastal artillery, and ground forces of both the YPA and the TDF.

YPA Reserves

71. YPA reservists generally are not called up for training during the three years following release from active duty. Thereafter, Yugoslav planning calls for them to report for five to 15 days of annual service with their assigned unit, during which they are to receive refresher training and often participate in a field training exercise. Reserve officers and NCOs with a wartime assignment to a YPA unit are also subject to recall yearly for field training or for a 15- to 30-day course in a YPA school.

72. Interviews with large numbers of Yugoslav emigrés indicate that reserve training is not as universal as YPA planning specifies—some reservists receive no active duty training for many years. On the other hand, reserve training appears to be more regular and comprehensive in Yugoslavia than it is in most other European countries—especially when training programs provided by the Territorial Defense Force, the Civil Defense Force, the reserve officers associations, and other organizations are taken into account.

Training in the TDF

73. Preparation of the Territorial Defense Force for full participation in the national defense effort involves both the training of the TDF forces and the training of leadership personnel—commanders, staffs, and community leaders. The General Staff sets standards for training in consultation with the republic TDF commands, but the *opstinas* themselves develop the training programs for their units. Although the amount of time spent by TDF units in training undoubtedly varies, evidence from a variety of sources suggests that it probably exceeds 100 hours per year in many units. Most of the training is accomplished on weekends, but an additional three-to ten-day field training exercise once a year is fairly common in TDF combat units. Training may take the form of seminars and lectures, target practice with personal and crew-served weapons, physical conditioning, terrain familiarization, and practice in sabotage, reconnaissance, ambush, chemical decontamination, and other military skills. Field exercises are generally conducted in YPA training areas and the YPA provides training in the handling of complex weapons and equipment. Many *opstinas* have, however, developed their own training centers; the first republic National Defense Training Center was opened in Croatia in 1975.

74. Yugoslav military leaders attach crucial importance to the development of effective TDF commanders. Lectures, courses, and seminars are provided throughout the year at all levels of the TDF structure, and TDF officers are sent to YPA-sponsored courses at military school centers and academies. Command and staff exercises are conducted to familiarize TDF officers with new developments and equipment and to provide training in handling tactical problems. Special training sessions for command and staff personnel

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are usually held in preparation for major TDF field exercises. According to republic officials, tens of thousands of TDF reserve officers and hundreds of thousands of TDF soldiers receive such training each year. The comments of YPA officers on TDF training make it clear that the effectiveness of this training varies widely from area to area. Nevertheless, it appears that reservists sent to the Territorial Defense Force may actually receive better and more frequent training than those with wartime assignments to YPA units.

Major YPA-TDF Exercises

75. Joint training exercises involving YPA and TDF units are increasingly emphasized. The first practical demonstration of the Nationwide Defense System was the well-publicized Freedom '71, which involved some 30,000 YPA ground force troops, helicopters, and transport planes carrying 600 paratroops, and 30,000 TDF and Civil Defense personnel. For financial reasons, it is not possible to hold an exercise of this magnitude every year. A number of major joint exercises are held annually, however, in most military regions. According to the YPA Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, every exercise at regimental level or above now involves the participation of the TDF. Hundreds of smaller, local joint exercises are held each year.

76. In a typical joint exercise, YPA units equipped with artillery and armored vehicles and supported by air attacks and an airborne assault advance on the exercise area. The defenders consist of TDF units from the local area, assisted by additional YPA units and Civil Defense teams. Alternative scenarios involve defense against amphibious and heliborne assaults on the coastal region or the protection of urban areas. The aggressors often employ simulated nuclear or chemical weapons. Many of these exercises—both major and minor—are critiqued by YPA officers in articles in military journals and the popular press.

Youth Training

77. Yugoslav leaders appear concerned that the young—those under the YPA's draft age of 19—are not sufficiently prepared, either physically or psychologically, for the arduous conditions of a partisan war. Efforts are currently underway to improve and intensify the military training provided to Yugoslav students from elementary school to university. New

textbooks have been issued in each of Yugoslavia's official languages and nationwide standards have been promulgated for training at each educational level. Classroom instruction will continue to predominate, but boys age 16 and older are to undergo a summer session of up to 25 days of practical field training. Girls apparently continue to be exempt from field training.

78. In 1975, separate defense faculties were established at five Yugoslav universities to prepare a cadre of instructors qualified to teach military courses in the civilian school system, TDF training centers, and large factories. The instructors' training culminates in four and one-half months active service with the YPA. Women are to be admitted to this program on an equal basis with men. Graduates will be eligible for reserve commissions in the YPA. Some 10,000 teaching posts are expected to be available throughout the country, and those currently teaching national defense without the necessary qualifications are being given an opportunity to obtain on a part-time basis the university credits they need.

Political Training

79. Yugoslav leaders are convinced that loyalty to the fundamentals of the Yugoslav political system is absolutely essential for an effective national defense. They see the Nationwide Defense System as a tool for building a consensus and loyalty to that system. Political indoctrination is an important part of military training in the YPA, TDF, Civil Defense, and youth programs. A minimum of 10-15 percent of the training hours are devoted to political orientation, and all services foster communist party membership.

VI. LOGISTICS

Supply, Maintenance, and Repair of Equipment

80. The Yugoslav equipment inventory is of diverse origin and of widely varying age. It contains Soviet, German, and Italian armament of World War II vintage, US- and British-supplied equipment obtained during the 1950s, newer Soviet armament, and a growing number of domestically produced items, some of them built under licenses from the USSR and West European countries. The statement of Col. Gen. Victor Bujan, a former chief of staff, that "there is no such thing as an obsolete weapon—just some newer

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than others" constitutes a fundamental tenet of Yugoslav doctrine. The oldest weapons and equipment are generally used for training, as war reserves, or to equip the TDF.

81. Common-use equipment items are supplied to all three services through ground force channels. Ground force maintenance and repair facilities exist at each command level, and mobile workshops accompany troops on field training exercises. Evidence on the effectiveness of the ground force program is fragmentary. The importance of proper maintenance procedures and efficient use of resources is emphasized at every level of training, but defectors sometimes mention poorly maintained, ineffective equipment.

82. Both the air force and navy appear to have fairly effective supply, maintenance, and repair programs. The air force has a decentralized logistics system; each major air base has all of the basic equipment and facilities necessary to receive and support all of the aircraft in service. Only a few kinds of sophisticated repair equipment are maintained at centralized locations. Jet engines are serviced at a central facility. Major naval repairs are carried out both in merchant and naval shipyards. Most of the technicians who work for both services are civilian and appear to be highly skilled. The Yugoslavs repair or rebuild worn parts wherever possible instead of replacing them.

83. While spare parts do not currently appear to be a serious problem, they are a potential source of difficulty should tensions rise with the USSR. Chief of Staff Stane Potocar has maintained that Yugoslav policy on equipment procurement avoids any such dependency:

"With all weapon items we buy a sufficient quantity of spare parts to last for the duration of the item's useful life. Everything is paid for and there are no other obligations."

Such a policy has practical limitations, and some evidence indicates that it is not uniformly followed. But the Yugoslavs are skilled at fabricating substitute parts, and they have demonstrated a capability to keep equipment functioning long past its normal lifetime.

84. The heterogeneity of the Yugoslav inventory is another problem. Although the YPA is making some headway in standardizing equipment in first-line

units, it must still deal with items ranging from mule haulers to guided missiles. Air defense radars, which are mainly Soviet but include old US, French, British, and Yugoslav models, pose a particular problem. Long-range radar systems, for example, are reported to be frequently "down," presumably for repair.

TDF Equipment

85. The TDF has been fairly well equipped, primarily with light, mobile equipment declared surplus by the YPA. It is the declared goal of Yugoslav defense officials that the TDF be as well armed for its responsibilities as is the YPA. It appears that both the SA-7 and the man-pack AT-3 Sagger antitank missiles either are or will be deployed with territorial units. Semiautomatic and automatic weapons have replaced most of the TDF's decades-old rifles, modern communications equipment is being substituted for the non-standard radio sets which plagued early exercises, and items of equipment such as machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, and antitank grenade launchers are also being replaced by newer, more effective weapons. The TDF units which participated in the May 1975 Victory Day parade impressed observers as being sharply turned out and were equipped similarly to YPA infantry troops.

86. During the TDF's formative years, YPA ground force units apparently had to maintain and repair major TDF equipment. This became impractical as the TDF expanded, however, and TDF personnel are now trained to maintain and repair their own equipment. In some cases, military eligibles appear to be assigned such duties with the TDF after six months of YPA training. In others, civilian technicians assigned to the TDF are given brief courses in maintenance and then serve at TDF storage centers.

Transportation

87. In case of emergency, both the YPA and TDF would depend upon extensive mobilization of civilian transport. Rapid movement of YPA units and equipment to defensive positions near the border would depend, as in past mobilizations, on extensive use of railway transportation. The Yugoslavs probably do not depend upon their limited and vulnerable air transport assets to significantly affect the movement of troops and materiel.

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88. All motor vehicles—personal and firm-owned—must be registered with the commune secretariat and made available for mobilization. Military authorities check the registration and maintenance of vehicles at major firms twice yearly, and drivers and their vehicles sometimes are called up for brief tours of reserve duty.

89. Merchant ships, fishing vessels, and civil aircraft—together with most of the personnel associated with them—would be mobilized in wartime to support the navy and air force. Sport planes and boats are also registered for service with the TDF, as are bicycles, motorcycles, beasts of burden, and animal-drawn vehicles.

90. In general, Yugoslavia's transportation network (like most other aspects of the national infrastructure) is much more highly developed in the northern third of the country than in the southern two thirds, much of which is extremely rugged, mountainous, and economically underdeveloped. The northern area, however, is expected to fall relatively quickly in a massive invasion, and the Yugoslav defense strategy is based in part upon the conviction that the defenders will be able to function better in difficult terrain than will a heavily armored invader. This situation tends to minimize Yugoslavia's need for extensive modern military transport.

Stockpiling and Other Preparations for Protracted War

91. Emigré reporting provides limited information on the types and amounts of stocked equipment for YPA units—but almost none on levels of supplies for TDF and civil defense units. Financial constraints almost certainly restrict quantities of many important items. To speed mobilization, reservists keep uniforms and individual equipment (except personal weapons) at home. Reserves of fuel, equipment, ammunition, and other supplies for YPA units have been stocked at mobilization centers in all areas of the country. Supplies for territorial and civil defense forces are stored close to the users, sometimes in YPA supply centers, but increasingly in *opstina* or factory storage areas.

92. To prepare to fight under conditions of extended occupation, the Yugoslavs have planned to provide enough food stocks, stores of raw materials for factory production, and other supplies for a three- to

six-month period. The financial plan for 1974, for example, contained an item for the establishment, over five years, of a meat reserve in mountainous areas. We do not know what progress has been made in building such stockpiles, however.

93. The Yugoslavs expect that their forces will be partly replenished during wartime from enemy stocks, as they were during World War II. And they also anticipate that the static units—the wartime community structure—will both support maneuvering units logistically and relieve them of any booty which would weigh them down.

94. Major armaments plants and storage facilities are concentrated in mountainous areas. Other vital defense industries still located in vulnerable areas would move to preplanned locations in the mountains in case of war. Plans reportedly exist for the production of small weapons, ammunition, and other equipment, by cottage industry if necessary, in every commune of Yugoslavia. Each enterprise is charged both with defending its facilities and with continuing production under wartime conditions.

VII. DOMESTIC ARMS PRODUCTION AND FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY

95. The Yugoslavs are making a great effort to achieve a measure of independence from foreign arms sources. Where it is economically feasible, they design and build major equipment themselves; where this cannot be done for technical or economic reasons, they seek licensing or co-production agreements. Among the systems currently produced under license are French Gazelle helicopters, Hispano-Suiza engines for mechanized infantry combat vehicles (MICVs), Italian Fiat vehicles of many types, and Soviet missiles. Further, several cooperative efforts have been undertaken with Romania.

96. In 1975 several new items of domestically developed equipment appeared: a new MICV, a truck mounted 128-mm multiple rocket launcher, a new guided missile patrol boat, and the jointly-developed Yugoslav-Romanian Orao jet fighter aircraft. The appearance of these and other items indicates a growing sophistication on the part of the national R&D establishment, the ability to adapt and improve upon foreign technology, and the technical ability to produce increasingly complex equipment. Military leaders claim that Yugoslav industry can produce as

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much as 85 percent of the YPA's equipment needs. The Yugoslavs nevertheless continue to depend upon outside sources—primarily the Soviet Union—for technically complex arms such as high-performance aircraft, tanks and other heavy combat vehicles, and missiles.¹⁰

97. Yugoslav leaders are trying hard to locate new weapon sources, both in the US and in a number of West European countries. Although most of these countries are interested in providing military equipment and in strengthening relationships with the Yugoslavs, serious constraints exist. Some concern persists on the part of Western governments that technology provided to the Yugoslavs will end up in Soviet hands, but the fundamental problem seems to be financial. The Yugoslav defense budget is constrained. Western equipment is generally more expensive than Soviet equipment, and must be purchased with hard currency. The Soviets offer more attractive financing arrangements. Despite the Yugoslavs' interest in diversifying their sources of arms, financial constraints probably will continue to dictate a highly selective approach in the procurement of Western weapon systems.

Modernization Efforts

98. The study by Yugoslav military leaders of the "lessons to be learned" from recent conflicts has had a far-reaching effect on equipment plans and purchases for both YPA and TDF. Modernization of antitank and antiaircraft capabilities is taking place as fast as financial resources allow. Other high priority areas for improvement include mechanization of infantry units, the procurement of an advanced jet engine for a planned supersonic fighter-bomber, and automation of command-and-control networks—especially for air defense.

99. All of the Yugoslav services have set a high priority on upgrading communications equipment and command-and-control procedures. A domestically produced field mobile multichannel communications system is being introduced in YPA units. The mobile system can be connected with a new national

¹⁰A number of Soviet technicians serve temporarily in Yugoslavia from time to time to assist in introducing modern Soviet equipment. Similarly, the Yugoslavs send specialists to the USSR for training. All evidence indicates that the Yugoslavs retain close control over this assistance and carefully restrict the activities and influence of all foreign personnel in Yugoslavia.

microwave network to provide communications between national authorities and units in the field.

better communications among ships, shore stations, and aircraft together with improved procedures for coordination of naval, ground, and air elements of the coastal defense forces have recently upgraded command and control in the Maritime Military Region. A new communications network being installed in Croatia will link the republic TDF Headquarters with subordinate headquarters, Croatian political authorities, and the commands of the two YPA military regions in Croatia. Nevertheless, there is still a shortage of modern equipment and existing systems are not completely interoperable.

YPA Ground Forces

100. The capabilities of antitank units have been upgraded by the introduction of three Soviet systems—AT-1 Snapper anti-tank missiles, T-12 100-mm guns, and SU-100 assault guns. These systems have largely replaced the old 76- and 100-mm guns which were the standard antitank weapons in battalions and regiments. The Yugoslavs produce under license the man-pack AT-3 Sagger, which has been in the YPA inventory for some years. We have not identified its pattern of deployment, but given the importance attached to antitank firepower within both the regular and territorial forces, it seems likely that the Sagger is deployed at battalion and lower levels both in YPA and TDF units. Among the Western antitank systems in which the Yugoslavs have shown considerable interest are the M-72 LAW rocket and the TOW guided missile.

101. The Yugoslavs appear to be looking into a variety of options for eventual replacement of their inventory of T-54/55 tanks, which was seriously depleted in 1973 by shipments to the Middle East.¹¹ Acquisition of more modern tanks, however, does not appear to be a high-priority objective. According to recent information, the Yugoslavs are negotiating with a Canadian firm to repower 600-1,000 M-47 tanks with diesel engines, which suggests that the YPA will continue for the present to use its old equipment. We estimate that 1,500 or so T-54s, T-55s, and US-built

¹¹Analysts have watched in vain for evidence of replacement of the tanks by T-54/55s or by the introduction of T-62s. One armored battalion which was stripped of tanks in 1973 is apparently being used as an infantry unit.

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M-47s are in service, with additional tanks in storage as wartime reserves.

Air and Air Defense Force

102. The acquisition of the Soviet SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 surface-to-air missile systems represents a significant improvement in the modernization of Yugoslav air defense. The full extent of the deployment of these SAM systems is not yet clear. The presence of one SA-3 regiment has been confirmed (see Figure 2); eight SA-6 launchers and 24 missiles were displayed in a parade in Belgrade in May 1975,

[redacted] Acquisition and deployment of the shoulder-fired SA-7 is especially difficult to trace, but some 72 launchers were carried by regular and territorial troops in the May 1975 parade and photographs in an army magazine have shown antiaircraft units training with it. We expect the Yugoslavs to acquire more of these systems over the next several years.

103. The basic weapon of the YPA antiaircraft units is the triple-tube Hispano-Suiza 20-mm AA gun produced in Yugoslavia under Swiss license since the 1950s. Large numbers of these guns entered the YPA inventory during the 1960s, making possible both the transfer of older US- and UK-built weapons to TDF factory defense units and a substantial increase in the numbers of guns deployed with each AAA unit.

104. Procurement of other major items of air and air defense equipment appears to be temporarily stalled. The Orao jet fighter will not enter series production before 1977. Although Yugoslav officials consider the plane a major advance for the domestic arms industry, there are serious problems with its engine and, possibly, with some of its flight characteristics. The Orao is intended to replace the Galeb and Jastreb fighters. The Yugoslavs are also looking ahead to a much improved or totally new aircraft to replace the MIG-21s as they leave service in the 1980s. The Yugoslavs have talked to the US, France, Sweden, and others about air force equipment—advanced helicopters, replacement aircraft for the MIG-21, and a jet engine for the Orao or its successor. But there is no evidence that the air force has yet made detailed decisions about its future equipment needs.

105. The air force has, however, been actively pursuing the improvement of facilities at nearly all major airfields—lengthening runways, constructing

additional revetted hardstands for parked aircraft and, possibly, building a third underground hangar near Split.

Navy

106. In 1975 the Yugoslavs announced a substantial new naval construction program, to include missile attack boats, 960-ton submarines, minesweepers, tank landing craft, motor torpedo boats, mines, and other devices. These items are to be produced in the 1976-80 period. Early planning evidently called for eight missile patrol boats, but a number of difficulties may result in an adjustment to this program. The missile boats' propulsion, electronics, and gun armament systems are being purchased from Western countries. The missiles are to be supplied by the USSR, after unsuccessful efforts by the Yugoslavs to purchase such weapons in the West. The navy is also modifying vessels to fit dispersal tunnels constructed in the coastal islands.

VIII. FINANCING OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

107. The Nationwide Defense System generally represents an attempt to provide a large and capable military establishment as inexpensively as possible, in order to accommodate high priority requirements for economic development. This effort is made possible by a reliance on a relatively inexpensive pool of manpower. YPA personnel costs are low in comparison to Western armies, and the TDF costs even less to maintain. Despite these advantages, however, the financial pressures on both the YPA and TDF are great.

108. Defense expenditures occur at all levels—federal, republic, and local. At the federal level, defense expenditures are expected to be about the equivalent of \$1.8 billion¹² in 1976, representing some 41 percent of total federal expenditures¹³ but only an estimated 4.5 percent of projected 1976 GNP. Fragmentary information suggests that defense spending by various local authorities—republics, provinces, *opstinas*, factories, and other enterprises—amounts to no more than another 0.5 percent or so of GNP. A

¹²At January 1976 exchange rates (\$1.00 = 17.79 dinars).

¹³Because of its decentralized system, Yugoslavia's federal budget covers very few of the areas normally funded by central governments. Most social welfare spending, for example, has been transferred to the republican and provincial governments.

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revised social plan passed in July 1976 projects only a slight increase in the defense share of the GNP through 1981.

109. The federal defense budget provides the primary funding for the YPA, which receives some additional funds for construction projects and other services and may also receive income from the foreign sales of Yugoslav arms. Although the military budget is about 10 percent higher in 1976 than in 1975, a 24 percent inflation rate (in 1975) has taken a toll of real YPA spending power. About half of this year's defense budget is earmarked for replacement and modernization of equipment; but the roughly \$260 million allotted for arms purchases abroad appears to be far less than needed to acquire many of the expensive weapons desired. An austerity theme has been evident in the speeches and writings of YPA officers during the past year.

110. Funding of the TDF, largely accomplished at the republic and lower levels, is subject to equal or even greater constraints. Local communities and organizations not only must finance TDF equipment, training, and administrative expenses, but factories and other enterprises must pay their personnel for time spent in national defense activities. Defense spending is far from uniform across the country. Rich communities and enterprises spend the most, while the poorest communities are said to be constantly in arrears in their obligations. Some republics are assisting underdeveloped *opstinas*, and one of the major purposes of the new republic national defense laws currently being considered is to regulate the funding of the TDF more equitably and to require a minimum level of defense expenditure.

IX. ASSESSMENTS

Strengths and Weaknesses

111. The basic strength of the Yugoslav defense system is the depth and breadth of the preparation which characterizes it. The Yugoslavs have attempted to plan for the effective involvement of every element of their society and economy in the defense of the country; every contingency they can envision is covered in federal and republic laws and considered at continual conferences and meetings on the national defense. Virtually every organization in Yugoslavia—the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the communist party), the Socialist Alliance of Working

People of Yugoslavia (the massive front organization for political unity), the Youth Alliance, and all veterans organizations—has a committee on national defense which regularly discusses military issues and recommends action on them.

112. The strongest features of Yugoslav defense preparations are the careful attention to military training and to the testing—regularly and at all levels—of the mobilization system, tactics, and organization for command and control. While the amount and effectiveness of training are not uniform, the armed forces and civil defense forces are regularly exercised and reviewed despite financial pressures as severe as those affecting any government in Europe. As a result, the Yugoslavs generally are far ahead of other European nations in preparing their population for survival and resistance in wartime.

113. Articles in Yugoslav journals make it clear that there are weaknesses in the Territorial Defense Force. These articles identify problems with the organization and personnel of the TDF, coordination between the YPA and the TDF, and the tactics used to counter specific enemy actions. Problems with poorly maintained equipment, supply failures, and deficiencies in leadership are openly discussed; sometimes units are identified by name in criticism as well as in commendation. The fact that these deficiencies have been identified is important, however; the Yugoslavs are working on ways to resolve them.

114. Yugoslavia's most serious problem probably continues to be a lack of modern equipment, even though Yugoslav strategy does not require a vast supply of major offensive weapons and the country's difficult terrain should partially make up for this disadvantage. The YPA inventory continues to be deficient, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Air defense resources are likely to be inadequate to counter a massive air attack. Antiaircraft and antitank resources are numerous and widely dispersed, but for the most part they are not first-line equipment. Substantial numbers of new armored infantry vehicles are needed. Low altitude radar coverage generally remains poor, due both to inadequate equipment and to mountainous terrain.

115. Problems with command and control could also detract from Yugoslav military capabilities (see discussion in Annex A) both because of the complexity of the defense organization and a lack of modern communications equipment and incomplete intero-



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perability between the existing systems. A command and control failure would likely have a more serious impact on fast moving conventional operations in the initial phase of a war than it would during a prolonged phase of guerrilla warfare. The Yugoslav defense system was designed, however, to function independently in an emergency. The Territorial Defense Force and the flexible principles of command and control which have developed in Yugoslavia are seen as insurance against a "knock-out blow" at the top.

116. Finally, the ethnic rivalries and tensions which characterize Yugoslav national life could undermine an effective defense. Emigrés continually report low morale, poor motivation and ethnic resentments among enlisted elements of the YPA and in the TDF. Many emigrés claim that the various national groups will not fight for one another or for Yugoslavia; and high level YPA officials are clearly concerned about this problem. There is even the danger—in spite of tightened YPA controls over the TDF—that TDF units could form the armed cadre for separatist regional groups.

117. On the other hand, the Yugoslav leadership appears to be pleased with the overall progress of the Territorial Defense Force and convinced of the basic loyalty of the citizenry. What little Western observers have been able to observe of TDF exercises and training appears to support their faith; during some major exercises, civilian participants have become so aroused that they have had to be warned not to rough up "enemy" soldiers or damage their equipment.

The Prospects for an Effective Defense

118. The effectiveness of Yugoslav defense strategy depends largely on the nature of the Soviet force to be brought against Yugoslavia and the political circumstances surrounding the conflict—whether national tensions within Yugoslavia are sharpened or subdued by the events preceding an attack. Other major factors include the amount of warning time available—hours or days—to the Yugoslavs to mobilize and the willingness of Western countries to provide assistance.

119. The general consensus among US analysts as to the scenario and the kind of forces the Soviets would be likely to field against the Yugoslavs should they invade is shown in the box. It largely accords with the Yugoslavs' own assumptions described in paragraphs 7-9 above.

The US View of a Probable Invasion Scenario

US analysts generally see a Pact invasion as likely to occur in two phases. An initial invasion force consisting of some 30 Soviet, Bulgarian, and Hungarian (it is assumed here that Romania would not be involved) motorized rifle and tank divisions would mount thrusts from at least two directions—across the Hungarian border toward Belgrade and Zagreb, and through the passes on the Bulgarian border toward Nis and Skopje. An early objective would be to seal off supply routes from neighboring countries. The preparations for an invasion of this size would likely give the Yugoslavs sufficient time—at least several days—in which to mobilize.

About 680 fighters and reconnaissance aircraft are available in Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Odessa Military District to support the ground forces and to attempt to establish air superiority. (For a more extensive breakout of strengths and roles of Warsaw Pact combat aircraft see NIE 11-14-75 "Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO," 4 September 1975.) Soviet bombers from as far away as the Urals could be used for air strikes against key targets. A reinforced Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would almost certainly be used to attempt a blockade of Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast, and might additionally mount small amphibious assaults against one or two points along the coast. After attaining their initial objectives, the Soviets would probably plan to deploy additional ground force divisions to Yugoslavia, to secure the territory already won and to wear down pockets of continued resistance. The number of divisions required for this second force would be determined by the success of the Nationwide Defense strategy.

120. In the face of an assault by Warsaw Pact forces, a united Yugoslavia would fight. Even if competing nationality groups dissolved into hostile factions, most of the armed forces and some guerrilla groups would probably continue to resist. Thus, it is difficult to envision a replay of the Czechoslovak invasion. Unless Yugoslavia was truly fractured by interethnic hostilities, it should maintain a strong general will to resist an invading force.

121. Judging from the experience of regular mobilization exercises, we believe the Yugoslavs could achieve full mobilization of all units and a good level

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of readiness within the armed forces and the citizenry at large within a few days. The YPA main force and TDF maneuvering units probably could do no more than slow the advance of the invading force, and delay the capture of the northern third of the country for several days. Enemy progress would likely be slower from Bulgaria into southeastern Yugoslavia, and Yugoslav ground forces might hold a line not far from the border. In general, however, limited mobility and firepower and the probable early loss of air cover would limit YPA and TDF capabilities in conventional combat.

122. Air defense resources would be severely taxed. The air force might manage to hide some helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for continued support of ground forces and guerrilla activities, but without air superiority such operations would be difficult and dangerous.

123. Yugoslavia's coastal defense organization is a capable, well-integrated organization, and the navy is well suited for operating in the shallow waters along the broken Adriatic coastline. The coastline defense effort might be reasonably successful. Nevertheless, because of the vital importance of closing off

communications and supply lines between Yugoslavia and Italy, it seems likely that the Soviets would make every effort to do so.

124. Under these conditions, a great deal would depend upon the attitude of Western nations—the US and, perhaps more important, Yugoslavia's neighbors Italy, Greece, and Austria. Should they wish to assist the resistance, two factors would be vital—the existence of an organized, functioning Yugoslav government which controlled some territory and could claim to speak for all Yugoslavs, and the continuing ability to transport supplies and personnel by sea, air, or over mountain passes into Yugoslavia. The Nationwide Defense System shows some promise of providing these. With some assistance from outside (and possibly without it) Yugoslav guerrillas probably would be able to continue major resistance at least for some months.

125. On balance, it appears that the Nationwide Defense System is much more effective as a deterrent than it would be in determining the ultimate outcome of a full-scale invasion. The Soviets could not count upon a quick victory and an early end to Yugoslav resistance, which will greatly affect their calculations on "settling the Yugoslav problem."

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ANNEX A

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF YUGOSLAVIA

1. The Commander in Chief of the Yugoslav armed forces is the President of the Republic, Josip Broz Tito, who exercises a strong personal control over the defense policy and organization of the country. After his death, the Presidency and the Commander in Chief function will pass legally to the person who heads the nine-man collective Presidency, Yugoslavia's chief executive organ. That office will rotate annually among the members of the Presidency, who represent all of Yugoslavia's constituent republics and provinces. Under these conditions, decisions are likely to emerge from a consultative process within the Presidency, and the President clearly will depend heavily upon the other institutions with authority in the national defense field, not only for advice, but to share power and responsibility as well.

2. Chief among these institutions is the National Defense Council, a 32-man body which comprises all of the chief military and political figures in the Yugoslav government (see box). In peacetime it provides advice to the Presidency on questions of internal security, top defense appointments, defense preparations, the determination of a state of war, and imposition of martial law. In wartime, it appears likely that this body would constitute the country's high command.

3. Authority over the armed forces is delegated by the Commander in Chief to the Federal State Secretary for National Defense (FSSND). He is assisted by several Assistant State Secretaries of National Defense who advise him and administer areas such as logistics, political affairs, personnel, and finance. The ASSND for Military Economy directs the country's munitions industry and plans the use of

Composition of the National Defense Council

Legally designated members are:

- The President of the Republic (Chairman)
- Members of the collective Presidency (8)
- President of the Assembly of the SFRY
- Chairman of the Federal Executive Council
- Presidents of the Presidencies of the Republics (6)
- Presidents of the Presidencies of the Autonomous Provinces (2)
- Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs
- Federal Secretary for National Defense
- Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs
- Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces

The President may also appoint such other members as he deems appropriate. The nine additional members currently serving include:

- Secretary of the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)
- Vice State Secretary for National Defense
- Secretary of the LCY in the YPA
- Assistant State Secretary for National Defense (named Secretary of the National Defense Council)
- YPA Colonel General, Member of the Executive Committee of the LCY Presidium, and Chairman of the Presidium's Nationwide Defense Commission

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economic resources to support the national defense effort in peace and war. The Assistant State Secretaries for Naval Affairs and Air and Air Defense have dual responsibilities as commanders of the navy and the air and air defense force, respectively. (See Figure 3 for organization of the national defense system.)

4. In activities coordinated by the directorates of the General Staff—Operations, Training, Mobilization, Materiel, Land Forces, and Territorial and Civil Defense—operational control over all forces is delegated by the FSSND through the General Staff. In functions such as administrative discipline and unit training—most day-to-day activities—authority flows from the Secretary directly to the subordinate commanders. These are the commanders of Yugoslavia's six military regions, one maritime region, and one subregion (the Titograd *područje*), the Commander of the Frontier Guard, and the Commander of Air and Air Defense forces. The military region commanders control all regular ground and naval forces within their regions.

Unified Versus Decentralized Control

5. The two co-equal branches of the armed forces—YPA and TDF—are separately organized, yet maintain extensive interrelationships. The YPA is organized and controlled strictly at the national level. The TDF, although subject to strong national direction, is organized and managed by the various Yugoslav republics and communal level authorities. This sharing of responsibility for the TDF among national and local authorities is an attempt to resolve two requirements of the Yugoslav defense system which have proven difficult to reconcile:

- A need to provide for enough authority and initiative at local levels to ensure that major resistance would continue no matter what happened to the national leadership; and
- The need for an effective central authority to provide overall direction of Yugoslav defense efforts and to coordinate the operations of TDF units.

6. The Yugoslav National Defense Law of 1969 created ambiguities in responsibility between national and local leaders by providing for the ultimate authority of the Yugoslav Commander in Chief (the President) over all military forces—including the TDF—while at the same time seeming to make

individual Yugoslav republics responsible for military operations within their jurisdictions. To the extent that these ambiguities were resolved in practice and by interpretation of the Law from 1969-71, a trend developed toward inadequate central authority over local military affairs.

7. Beginning in 1972, the Yugoslav leadership acted to halt the drift toward local military autonomy. Some administrative changes were made in 1972-73 and a new National Defense Law was enacted in 1974 that together were designed to: (1) provide legally for direct national control over the TDF, (2) redefine the relationship between the YPA and TDF to strengthen YPA authority, and (3) clarify and standardize the responsibilities of various national and local military authorities. As a result, the TDF for the first time was brought under the direct operational control of the General Staff, and command of the TDF now passes from the FSSND through the Chief of the General Staff and the General Staff Directorate for Territorial and Civil Defense to the TDF commanders within republics and autonomous provinces.

Organization of the Territorial Defense Force

8. Although each of Yugoslavia's six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) enjoys considerable autonomy in the administration of the TDF, the requirements of the National Defense Law impose some uniformity in the territorial defense system throughout the country.

9. At each governmental level—republic or province, *opstina*, and "local community"¹—there are a council, secretariat, and headquarters staff which together provide for political and financial control, administration, and operational planning for territorial defense at that level. (See Figure 4 for the organization of the TDF and for an illustration of the extensive coordination required both within the TDF hierarchy and between the TDF and the YPA.)


10. From the republic (or provincial) authority, control of TDF units passes to the authority at the *opstina* or communal level and from there to the

¹A "local community" or "local association" may comprise a neighborhood, a city district, or a group of hamlets.

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Chain of Command, Yugoslav Armed Forces

Figure 3



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
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Figure 4

Organization of the Yugoslav Territorial Defense Force



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commanders of the staffs of the "local communities" which make up the *opstina* and of the sociopolitical organizations and workers associations having Territorial Defense units.

11. Extensive coordination of plans is undertaken between various political and military authorities at each echelon, and smaller political subdivisions and organizations must coordinate their defense plans with those of the next higher authority.

Coordination Between the YPA and the TDF

12. At the republic and lower levels the TDF system is in peacetime separate from the YPA chain of command and control. At the same time, however, TDF authorities are under obligation to "bring their plans and combat operations into conformity with those of the YPA and also with the territorial defense plans and operations of the neighboring sociopolitical communities."² Accordingly, TDF military staffs at the republic or provincial levels coordinate their defense plans with the YPA military region commands, and TDF communal staffs coordinate with local YPA headquarters and units. The boundaries of the YPA military regions were redrawn in 1969 to coincide more nearly with those of the six republics, in an effort to facilitate such coordination between the YPA and the TDF.

13. There are, moreover, indications that several administrative and legal changes undertaken since 1972 to strengthen national control of the TDF have effectively established the preeminent role of the YPA in matters which concern both the YPA and TDF. Originally, for example, it was anticipated that the republic territorial defense commanders would be senior reserve officers. In fact, these commanders are now all active-duty YPA generals. The YPA apparently has the power to resolve disagreements between YPA and TDF authorities at republic and lower levels. In joint exercises involving TDF and YPA units, command is exercised by the senior YPA commander on the scene. And in wartime, the YPA would direct all joint YPA-TDF combat actions, at least in areas controlled by the Yugoslav government.

14. It is on what Yugoslavs term "temporarily occupied territory" that the command relationships between YPA and TDF remain unclear. Articles in military journals provide evidence that the Yugoslavs

² National Defense Law, 1974, Article 28.

themselves find this area confusing. The general rule is that territorial defense commands are to take over operations in temporarily occupied territory. An individual soldier or YPA unit caught behind enemy lines is obliged to join with TDF units to continue the fight in the enemy's rear. Circumstances may dictate exceptions to this rule, however; in the opinion of at least two Yugoslav colonels, any lawful commander of a YPA unit caught behind enemy lines may elect to retain that unit under his own command.³

15. The amount of attention devoted by military journals to such questions is evidence that the new National Defense Law has not succeeded totally in defining the relationships between the two forces and of the concern that is felt for the smooth operation of this complicated system under all possible conditions.

Capabilities and Vulnerabilities of the Command and Control System

16. The complex network of relationships within the command and control system could pose difficulties for controlling Yugoslav military forces in wartime. The joint responsibility of secretariats, councils, and staffs for the management of TDF units at various levels could prolong the time needed to make plans and reach decisions. Additionally, the requirement for careful coordination between TDF units and between YPA and TDF headquarters and units could delay and disorganize the implementation of military plans.

17. These potential difficulties appear to be lessened by careful Yugoslav attention to defense planning and the conduct of military exercises in peacetime. Joint training exercises involving YPA and TDF units demonstrate that coordinated operations by regular and territorial forces are feasible, at least under controlled conditions. The Yugoslavs also have taken steps over the past several years to streamline the decisionmaking process within the YPA. And providing for unified control of TDF and YPA units under the General Staff has improved the prospects for effective control of all military forces. Nevertheless, any plans made in peacetime could require rapid modification during the early stages of an invasion, and that eventuality would severely test the Yugoslav decisionmaking process.

18. Another question is whether the Yugoslavs have adequate communications facilities to support com-

³ Colonels Milan Saric and Marinko Stojkovic in *Odbrana I Zastita* No. 5, September-October 1975.

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mand and control. Yugoslavia has placed a high priority both on developing and on importing modern military communications equipment, and some significant improvements are evident (see Chapter VII, p.20). Still, some weaknesses continue to exist, including a lack of secure voice communications and what may be a continuing lack of interoperability between some of the older radio equipment still in use by TDF units. Unit to headquarters communications appear to be adequate, but communications between field units may be limited by restriction in the low

VHF ranges to line-of-sight broadcasting, especially in mountainous terrain.

19. The major Yugoslav communications systems, like those of all countries, could be severely degraded in a large-scale attack. The loss of communications between the national authorities and TDF units could reduce the efficiency of operations. Control of the Yugoslav defense system, however, is designed to revert to local authorities if communications from above are cut off.

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ANNEX B

CIVIL DEFENSE

1. The Czechoslovak invasion, which led after 1968 to the definition of a new defense concept, also led to a major reorganization and revitalization of the civil defense program. Yugoslav leaders recognize that a massive invasion of their country would inevitably endanger civilians more than ever before, both because of the destructive nature of modern warfare and because of the Nationwide Defense System employed by Yugoslavia. Moreover, more than half of the population of Yugoslavia now lives in urban areas. These cities and their inhabitants must be protected from the ravages of war, and damage must be limited and quickly repaired if the country's armed struggle is to succeed. According to Yugoslav doctrine and law, civil defense should involve every citizen who does not already have a wartime assignment in the YPA or the TDF—in practice, most women and older males.

2. The *opstina* national defense councils organize and train units for civil defense, in accordance with overall standards set at the federal and republic levels. Local communities and organs of associated labor create units and coordinate their civil defense plans with the *opstina* council.

3. Every factory and enterprise must have personnel trained and equipped for civil defense. In small

workplaces this may simply mean first aid training and provision of supplies. Larger enterprises are likely to have units trained in medical services, evacuation, security, nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare protection, fire-fighting, sanitation, engineering and construction, courier service, and the like. Cities are divided into various zones which establish civil defense units commensurate with the size and resources of the zone. Construction of shelters is emphasized in cities and is required in all new buildings.

4. Defense officials seem to be less pleased with the progress of civil defense than with the TDF. Some civil defense units have received commendation for successful exercises or their response to natural disasters, but one republic official recently stated that civil defense had been lagging considerably behind the other components of nationwide defense in his republic. Many local officials evidently have given higher priority to TDF affairs; and community defense councils have been ordered to correct this by organizing courses intended to better educate all Yugoslav citizens in civil defense.



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