12. Major Conference Themes: An Integration and Summary

Conference Rapporteur: Richard Hundley

A Vision of the Information Revolution Future: "The Great Information Revolution Attractor"

• A rise in "information work" and "information workers," as an ever increasing fraction of economic activity and the overall workforce, with a broad range of consequences.

• New business models, for the internal organization and functioning of business enterprises, and for their external interactions with customers, suppliers, and competitors.

• The rise of electronic commerce, as a major form of economic activity, with accompanying changes in the nature and structure of markets and the elimination of a wide variety of "middlemen" heretofore facilitating economic transitions.

• Challenges to the power and authority of the nation state, for a variety of reasons (including the two immediately following).

• The creation of a wide variety of sub-national, trans-national and supra-national groupings, communities, organizations and enterprises, in the business, social, and political realms, often largely beyond the control of individual nation states.

• An ever increasing porosity of national borders, to trade and financial flows, to population flows, and to the flow of ideas, entertainment, and culture.

• Many new winners, and also many new losers. Some individuals, groups, localities, nations and regions will gain (in power, influence and material well being) as a result of the information revolution; others will lose. All will not share equally in the benefits.

• New fault lines, within and between nations. The widening gulfs between the educated, wealthy, and cyber-privileged of all nations, on the one hand, and the not-so-lucky of all nations on the other, will lead to fault lines within nations as well as between nations.

Some Recurring Concerns Regarding This Future

Increasing Disparities

As indicated above, this information revolution future (the "great IR attractor") brings with it many winners and many losers, thereby most probably increasing the disparities (economic, social, and political) that exist within societies and between nations. The adverse social and political consequences of these increased disparities are a frequently expressed concern.

These concerns manifest themselves in different forms in different regions of the world.

• In North America, in concerns regarding the disenfranchisement of the "information poor."

• In Europe, in a determination to alleviate such disparities insofar as possible.

• In some regions of the world (e.g., India), in a determination not to be left behind by the information revolution (i.e., to be one of the winners, not one of the losers).

• In other regions of the world (e.g., portions of the Middle East), in a possible reluctance to continuing playing a "losing game" supposedly imposed upon them by the West.[39]

Impacts on Individual Privacy

The impact of the information revolution on individual privacy is a concern shared widely throughout much (but not all) of the world. This concern stems initially from several factors:

• The strong desire of many individuals, primarily but not exclusively in Western cultures, to retain some control over who knows what about them.

• The transfer of more and more personal information into databases accessible over the Internet.

• The use of this personal information by burgeoning new service businesses, to tailor products to individual tastes, to handle secure electronic transactions, to offer streamlined payment and delivery, and to target advertising and promotion.

As "ubiquitous" sensor technology spreads throughout the world and increasingly couples physical space to cyberspace,[40] these privacy concerns are broadened to include possible "sinister" uses of such surveillance technology (by governments, etc.).

These privacy concerns are strongest today in Europe and North America, but present elsewhere as well. How various nations react to these concerns could also affect the course of the information revolution in different regions of the world.

Impact on National Cultures

The increasing porosity of national borders to the flow of ideas, entertainment, and culture has facilitated the spread of Western, and particularly U.S., culture throughout the world. Many people feel that the continued vitality and possibly even long-term existence of their national cultures may be threatened by this process. These concerns manifest themselves in many non-Western settings (e.g., throughout much of the Islamic world), and also in some Western settings (e.g., France, Canada, etc.)

These concerns are widespread but by no means universal. How various nations react to these concerns could also affect the course of the information revolution in their regions.

Governance in the Information Age

The information age changes both the character and distribution of political power, as well as reconfiguring the processes of governance.

Regarding the distribution of political power: The power of the state is being modified as new non-state actors are being empowered, including transnational business organizations, sub- and transnational special affinity groups (ranging across the religious, ethnic, professional, criminal, etc., spectra), and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

This leads to various concerns: What will the role and authority of national governments be vis-a-vis these emerging non-state actors. Will there be new allocations of power? Will power be shared in new and different ways? Who will be accountable in the future information age? Will more and more decisions affecting nation states be made by actors not accountable to the citizens of those states.

Such concerns are just beginning to manifest themselves.[41] How they play out could also affect the course of the information revolution.

Regarding the process of governance: Traditional mechanisms are becoming increasingly problematic, as the information revolution allows action beyond the reach of national governments. For example:

• E-commerce will make transaction taxes (e.g., sales taxes) more difficult to collect. This could lead to more reliance on other types of taxes.

• Regulation and licensing will become increasingly difficult when service providers are beyond national jurisdictions.

• Limits on offensive or dangerous information (.e.g., pornography, hate literature, bomb-making instructions) will not always be honored by others.

Inability of Nations/Societies to Go Their Own Ways

Economies of scale in information-rich activities are potentially very large. For this reason, nations/societies will pay an increasing price for being different. For example:

• It will be hard for western Europe and the United States to maintain different standards for data privacy and protection.

• Widely disseminated content -- video, text, etc. -- will have a big cost advantage over content tailored to a specific small market. For this reason, nations such as Canada will find it difficult to maintain "Canadian content."

• A handful of technical standards (regarding information and communication formats, etc.) will likely dominate throughout the world, even if these are less than ideal in certain settings.

Some Key Uncertainties Regarding the Future

All is not clear regarding this information revolution future. Key uncertainties include:

The Future Course of IT Penetration

How deeply and quickly will the Internet and the accompanying information revolution penetrate, in various regions of the world? How many of the information-poor will it reach in the advanced nations? How fully will it reach into the less developed nations?

How IT penetration plays out will affect the balance of winners and losers in the new information age, both within nations and between nations.

Uncertainties Regarding "Proximity" in the Information Age

In principle, information technology can be used to replace physical proximity with functional proximity, for many human activities. In practice, however, face-to-face interactions still seem to be needed in many circumstances.

This leads to a number of questions: What constitutes effective "proximity" in the information age? When are face-to-face interactions still needed? When will interactions via cyberspace suffice?

In addressing these questions, some find it useful to draw a distinction between "explicit knowledge" and "tacit knowledge."[42] In this view, physical proximity is not required for the exchange of explicit knowledge; it is required, however, for the effective sharing of tacit knowledge.

How this question plays out will affect the geographic dispersion or clustering of many different types of economic activity, as the information age progresses. Will various activities be dispersed widely (e.g., through out-sourcing or "off-shoring"), or concentrated in geographical clusters?

The Future Evolution of "The Great IR Attractor"

The future world described by "the great information revolution attractor" is not a static world, with characteristics fixed forever in time. Rather, it changes as new technology developments occur. It is a "moving target" towards which the world is being drawn.

This leads to several related questions: How will the current technology drivers of the information revolution evolve over the next 10-20 years? What new technology drivers may emerge during that period of time? What new characteristics might "the great IR attractor" assume over the next 10-20 years?

These questions will be the subject of a future conference.

Differences in Regional Emphasis Regarding The Future

There are differing emphases in various regions around the world, insofar as the information revolution future is concerned. As reflected in the breakout group discussions during the conference, these differing emphases appear to be as follows:

North America

The predominant North American attitude could be characterized as "information revolution determinism." The information revolution is viewed as being inevitable. It will run its course no matter what. Backlashes of various forms are expected to occur, but these are not considered likely to sufficiently retard or modify the process.

Concerns are expressed regarding the disenfranchisement of the "information poor," leading to increased social stress and stratification. Conflicts over privacy are also expected.

But in the end, the information revolution is expected to prevail. North America is in the camp that accepts the information revolution as being more or less irresistible and socially beneficial.

Europe

In Europe there is much more of a focus on realizing (economic) value from the information revolution while at the same time maintaining and protecting existing cultural and social values. Europeans believe that they can and must actively shape the course of the information revolution to achieve these ends.

There is much more of a determination to alleviate disparities (between winners and losers) insofar as possible, than appears to be the case in the U.S.[43] There are also major concerns about maintaining privacy.[44]

Europe is in the camp that wants to shape the course of the information revolution, to suit its own ends. To what extent it can do this remains to be seen.

Asia Pacific Region

The emphasis in the Asia Pacific region is on realizing value from the information revolution -- primarily economic value. There is less concern with disparities, and less concern about privacy (possibly because of the "communal" nature of Asian culture). The prevailing attitude appears to be: "Don't worry about losers; concentrate on becoming a winner." There appears to be widespread confidence that many/most Asian countries can become winners.

The Asia Pacific region appears to be in the camp that is striving to achieve the information revolution, striving to reach "the great IR attractor," and is generally confident that it can do so.

Middle East, Africa, and South Asia

This part of the world is often characterized by strong differences in focus between leadership/elite groups and mass citizenry. Many leaders/elites want, and use, the benefits of information technology -- but are wary of its influences on the citizenry.

In some major nations (e.g., India), there is a determination not to be left behind by the information revolution (i.e., to be one of the winners, not one of the losers). As one conference participant from this part of the world said: "We missed out on the industrial revolution; we don't want to miss out on the information revolution." In these nations, there is much discussion of what it takes to get access to and successfully exploit information technology, to raise the nation/region (economically, socially, etc.) But it often proves difficult to expand "islands" of information-revolution expertise, both within nations and to the rest of the countries in the region.

Some other nations' leaders/elites in the region may already anticipate losing, and may be starting to imagine dire consequences. But many citizens are unaffected and unconcerned now, and will be into the indefinite future.

Especially in this region, much of the information revolution emphasis may be on non-Internet technologies: e.g., wireless telephony, accessible satellite TV broadcasts, photo copier and fax machines, audio and video cassettes, etc.

Many in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia want to use the information revolution to better themselves and their countries, but with widely varying abilities to do so.

Some Interesting Analytic Constructs

A number of interesting analytic constructs were proposed during the conference, including:

The Technology, Artifact, Roles/Usage Model

This model, illustrated schematically in Figure 12.1, is being developed by Crosby (2000) to describe the development and application of technology in various cultures. In this model: "technology" denotes an organized body of knowledge (e.g., information technology); "artifact" denotes the products of a technology (e.g., the desktop computer); "roles and usage" denotes applications of an artifact (e.g., desktop publishing).

This model was used by the Asia Pacific breakout group in discussing the course of the information revolution in its region. We intend applying it more broadly during our future efforts to chart the worldwide course of the information revolution.

Figure 12.1 The Technology, Artifact, Roles/Usage Model

The Four C's

The Middle East, Africa, and South Asia breakout group identified four factors that, acting as drivers or impediments of change, determine the adoption of, and substantial access to, information and communication technologies (ICT):[45]

• Culture, which includes as sub-factors language, nationalism, stratification, legal framework, vertical authority relationships, trust, meritocracy, and the concept of information (within the society).

• Competence, which includes as sub-factors education, training, and the sophistication of ICT use.

• Capital, which includes as sub-factors internal capital sources, external capital sources, and physical infrastructures (e.g., electric power, telecommunications).

• Control, which includes as sub-factors agency of control and form of control.

Driving Factors and Stunting Factors

The Asia Pacific breakout group used a set of "driving" and "stunting" factors, shown in Table 12.1, to characterize the capability of the region as a whole and of individual nations across the technology-artifacts-roles/usage space: i.e., the capability to develop new information technology or new IR artifacts, or to use technology and artifacts developed by others.

The driving and stunting factors identified by the Asia Pacific group appear to be a subset of the "Four Cs" enumerated by the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia group. Our intent is to combine these constructs during our future efforts, using the "Four Cs"(or an expanded set thereof) as an assessment device across the technology-artifacts-roles/usage space.

Some Inferred Candidate National Models of the Information Revolution Future

The conference discussions did not explicitly develop a comprehensive set of models of what the information revolution future might be like in various nations and regions throughout the world. However, from those discussions it is possible to infer the following candidate set of national models of the information revolution future:

• IR Achievers. These are nations that have substantially attained most/all of the characteristics of "the great IR attractor." Information work and information workers represent an ever increasing fraction of the economy and the workforce; new, information-based business models and electronic commerce are spreading throughout the business and financial communities; many/most segments of society are well into the information age, and substantially "wired" into the global arena. Australia is one example (among several) of a nation that is today an IR Achiever.[46]

• IR Drivers. These are nations that go well beyond being merely an IR Achiever. They not only have attained most/all of the (then) existing characteristics of "the great IR attractor," but go well beyond this to create new characteristics, new manifestations of the information revolution. The U.S. is the best, but not the only, example of an IR Driver nation today.

• IR Strivers. These are nations that are working very hard to reach" the great IR attractor," but still have a considerable way to go, with the final result still in some doubt. Taiwan is an example of a nation that today is an IR Striver.

• IR Modifiers. These are nations that are not satisfied with one or more characteristics of "the great IR attractor" towards which they are being drawn, and wish to actively shape and modify those characteristics to suit their own ends. They are trying to change the course of the information revolution, insofar as it applies to them. Singapore is a clear example today of an IR Modifier. It is trying to realize all of the benefits of the information revolution in the economic sphere, while at the same time strictly controlling developments in the social/cultural sphere.[47]

• IR Veneer Societies. These are nations in which a small fraction of the society is participating in the information revolution and well into the information age, with the vast bulk of the population still in the industrial or even the agricultural age. India is a clear example today of an IR Veneer Society. It has geographical clusters of high technology (e.g., around Bangalore), with software (and other) companies fully participating in the global information economy and some even on the NASDAQ stock exchange. At the same time, the vast majority of Indian citizens (probably 95% or more) are uninvolved in and unaffected by the information revolution.

• IR Left-Behinds. These are nations that have been more or less totally left behind by the information revolution. It has passed them by, for whatever reasons (most often socioeconomic). They are not involved, and largely unaware. Zaire is once such example, today, of an IR Left-Behind.

• IR Luddites. These are nations that, for whatever reason, actively oppose the course of the information revolution. They want to opt out. They don't want to participate. They don't want it happening in their society. They are more or less totally opposed to the changes being brought on by the information revolution. North Korea may be an example today of an IR Luddite.

• Sore IR Losers. These are nations that are unhappy left-behinds. They feel themselves losing out, as the information revolution progresses, and they are not happy with this outcome. It is not clear that any nation fits into this category today. But some could in the future.

In addition to this set of models, the European breakout group developed a set of four more specialized models -- atomisation, corporatisation, regionalisation, and dynamic conservatism - to describe that nature of the societal interactions in an information-revolution society. These models are described in Section 8.

[39] What such nations could do to get out of this "losing game" remains to be seen.

[40] See p. 9 for examples of such ubiquitous sensors.

[41] The demonstrations at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in early December 1999 (after this conference was over) may be an early manifestation of such concerns.

[42] Roughly speaking, in this context explicit knowledge is knowledge that is clear cut, unambiguous, and well understood by all. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is implied or inferred, and is not generally understood by all. Explicit knowledge is generally available. Tacit knowledge rests in the minds and creative behaviors of individuals and teams, both within and between organizations. See Porter (1998).

[43] Canada may be closer to Europe than to the U.S. on this issue.

[44] Currently, these concerns regarding privacy are greater in Europe than in the U.S.

[45] More details of this model are given in Section 11.

[46] This country assignment, as well as the others that follow, is very preliminary and meant merely to be illustrative.

[47] Many doubt that Singapore can achieve its aims in this regard. Whether it ultimately succeeds or fails is immaterial to its present-day designation as an IR Modifier.

[48] At any given time, some of these models could be empty sets, and some nations could be in more than one category.

[49] During these future efforts, this set of models will most likely evolve and change.