Northeast
Asia: Static but Stable
Conference Report
7 July 1999
This
memorandum was prepared by the National Intelligence
Officer for East Asia based on a meeting held
on 7 July 1999. The National Intelligence Council
(NIC) routinely sponsors meetings with outside
experts to gain knowledge and insights to sharpen
the level of debate on critical issues. The views
expressed in this meeting summary are those of
individuals and do not represent official US Government
positions or views.
Key
Points
On
7 July 1999, the National Intelligence Council
hosted eight non-government Asia specialists for
a broad-ranging discussion on trends in Northeast
Asia over the next five years, particularly what
will drive relationships among major powers. Discussion
focused on strategic issues, but also included
economic trends.
Discussants
characterized Northeast Asia as relatively stable
and increasingly integrated economically, even
though they acknowledged the possibility of major
shocks, such as collapse of the North Korean regime
or serious, prolonged friction in US-China relations.
Paradoxically, one factor contributing to this
stability is uncertainty over the future. Uncertainty
over China's direction, the regional impact of
a reunified Korea, and the continued relevance
of the US alliance structure has created an anxious
climate in which all countries have a stake in
maintaining the security status quo, or at least
avoiding its disruption. At the same time, all
countries are hedging against this uncertain future
by actively pursuing additional options and sources
of security in the event the status quo changes.
The result has been a marked increase in high-level
diplomatic and military interchange among regional
powers that arguably increases mutual understanding
but thus far does not provide sufficient common
ground for institutionalized multilateral security
mechanisms. Key discussion themes included:
-
the
centrality of and uncertainty over China's
direction;
-
relative
pessimism over progress in institutionalizing
multilateral security mechanisms;
-
relative
optimism over momentum in economic multilateralism;
-
increased
importance of powers flanking East Asia, particularly
Russia and India.
Stability
in the Face of Change
Despite
the possibility of significant discontinuities,
discussants viewed Northeast Asia as generally
stable over the next five years. For now, there
is little benefit and considerable risk to any
state deliberately disrupting the status quo,
like it or not. Neither China, Japan, nor the
Koreas feel well positioned for what might come
next, and need time to improve their position.
Meanwhile, economic equities and interdependence
among China, Japan, the Koreas and the US have
grown markedly in the 1990s and seem poised to
increase after a downturn during the Asian economic
crisis.
Discussion
touched on a number of potential shocks that could
shape--or reshape--the regional landscape in the
next five years. The most significant discontinuity
would be a North Korean collapse, which experts
agreed is clearly possible within the next five
years, although some viewed it as a near certainty
while others judged it improbable. The reunification
of the peninsula would be a significant catalyst
for strategic readjustments that would have profound
implications for most or all of the major powers
in nearly all conceivable circumstances. A China-Taiwan
conflict would also have major implications for
regional security, and would probably accelerate
regional states' growing interest in stronger
national defense capabilities. An abrupt shift
in Japan's role and posture is also possible.
Japan has a history of changing directions fairly
quickly and dramatically; the right stimulus could
generate a reorientation in Japan's approach to
the US, the region, and to national security,
though the speakers sharply disagreed over whether
such a change was possible over the next five
years.
With
or without major regional shocks, several longer-term
trends and factors will gradually alter regional
relationships, and, over the long-term, possibly
the balance of power. The most important factor
is what path China will take as it modernizes
and increases its power. Some specialists argued
that China will inevitably try to reshape the
region in ways more beneficial to China's interests,
although how it will try and its wherewithal to
succeed are uncertain. China's internal stability
and domestic politics could be an important element
in how it deals with the region. As the political
regime becomes increasingly irrelevant to China's
economy and China's civil society, some correction
can be expected, but we do not know if it will
be abrupt and dramatic or subtle and gradual,
nor can we foresee the end state. Nationalism
as a unifying political force looms large. This
uncertainty over China's future, more than any
other factor, is driving the regional states to
increasingly sophisticated and complex hedging
strategies.
The
US as Wild Card?
Uncertainty
over the US role also exists, but not in its previous
form of fear of US military disengagement. Current
doubts have more to do with the opaqueness of
US interests than with the US military presence,
and how this perceived unpredictability might
be manifested in various regional scenarios. Some
in the region, for example, see the potential
for US forces to become nuclear or WMD "hostages"
instead of deterrents, with the US prone to quickly
recalculate its national interests in the face
of potentially steep American casualties. Others
worry that a strong US effort to develop missile
defenses in the region could sharply exacerbate
differences, especially with China.
Specialists
were divided over the repercussions of Kosovo.
Most agreed that China has been profoundly affected;
the Kosovo air war has graphically illustrated
Chinese military weakness across the board, lending
to a sense of impotence and frustration. But lessons
being drawn by Japan and Korea are more speculative.
Some argued that it is dangerous to make too much
of foreign interpretations of Kosovo or any other
US military action--reactions are always mixed
and depend on a state's relationship with the
US. Others argued that Kosovo could be a catalytic
event, reinforcing uncertainty over US interests,
the perception that the US is fundamentally Eurocentric,
and accelerating opportunities for new alignments--most
immediately, between Russia and China.
Unilateral
Hedging--Yes
Although
US alliance relationships remain strong, participants
agreed that beneath the surface in Tokyo and Seoul,
questions are being raised over whether the 50
year old alliance structure is sufficient to meet
future challenges. Divergence in priorities and
strategy with the US over North Korea in both
capitals may have crystallized this questioning,
but deep-seated anxiety over China, and how the
US will deal with China, is the underlying driver.
None of the specialists forecast major ruptures
in either alliance relationship, but the collective
sentiment was that Tokyo and Seoul have probably
calculated they need options beyond Washington.
Japan is engaged in the most sophisticated hedging
strategy, strengthening security ties to the US
while building independent capabilities. South
Korea also feels the need for more independent
national defense capabilities over the long-term,
and has carefully balanced its close relations
with the US with improved ties with China, Japan,
and Russia, and a thus far unfruitful engagement
policy with North Korea. Meanwhile, China is securing
its borders, including possibly testing new ties
with India, while it grapples with the array of
internal challenges that will determine its future
power, status, and regional and global orientation.
Multilateral
Hedging--No
Most
of the specialists judged that the increased diplomatic
and military exchanges associated with regional
hedging efforts do not presage institutionalized
multilateral security institutions, although the
future of multilateralism was the subject of lively
debate. Except for ad hoc cooperation on immediate
situations of common concern or symbolic cooperation
on trivial issues, there appears to be little
momentum or genuine interest in using a formal
multilateral framework to address future uncertainties.
Most participants saw growing gaps between motives
of regional states over problems as North Korea
working against multilateral approaches to the
most pressing security issues. Some saw better
prospects for multilateralism over the long-term,
if not in the next five years, because of a sense
that the US alliance-based security structure
is becoming increasingly obsolete--largely because
it excludes big powers, notably China and Russia.
External
Actors
Specialists
agreed that the climate of hedging that will mark
the next five years increases the potential role
of extra-regional actors, particularly Russia
and India. Some cautioned that it is dangerous
to write off Sino-Russian cooperation as relatively
insignificant due to their fundamental differences
in national interests. The current environment
provides each state ample reasons to focus on
their common interests, not their differences.
Moreover, Russia will eventually pull out of its
current political chaos, and will re-establish
itself as a substantive, not simply symbolic regional
and global player. For now, the Russia card is
a useful and potentially lucrative card for China
(and others) to play politically and in terms
of defense acquisitions, despite well founded
concerns about Russian reliability.
India
as well is poised to play a growing role in East
Asia, and its relationship with China will be
an important factor in the region's security landscape.
China now takes India more seriously than in the
past, but the US has been slow to consider the
implications of a growing Indian role in East
Asia. Some experts believe that the rise of India,
combined with a recovered, active Russia, could
lead to a shift in the regional center of gravity
away from the traditional China-Japan-Korea axis
to a China-Russia-India focus. Russia and India
are potential flanking powers that could be pivotal
elements of a new balance of power structure over
the long-term.
Meanwhile,
the power vacuum in Southeast Asia caused by Indonesia's
political and economic crisis adds to uncertainty
in Northeast Asia, especially over the security
of sea lines of communication for the region's
energy supplies from the Middle East.
Economic
Linkages
The
economic picture is somewhat at odds with the
security trends. Economic integration is much
more advanced than political/security relations
in Northeast Asia. As a result of the Asian economic
crisis and continued US prosperity, the United
States in the near term has growing economic influence
in Northeast Asia. US influence is limited, however,
by restrained official engagement in regional
economic problems, especially in comparison to
Japan. Reflecting growing economic equities and
integration among regional powers, there is more
momentum for multilateral institutions than in
the security arena, particularly the WTO and the
implications for the "millennium round" of trade
talks. Two potential adverse macroeconomic factors
to watch are how Japan pulls out of its recession
(e.g., at the expense of South Korea and other
potential competitors); and economic trends in
China, particularly whether China becomes less
market-friendly. China's long-term energy needs
could also effect its strategic posture, and the
growing percentage of Middle East oil going to
East Asian consumers could also lead to shifts
in foreign policy priorities, especially given
the decline of ASEAN and the power vacuum in Southeast
Asia caused by Indonesia's protracted crisis.
