Contents

Introduction

Japanese Attitudes and Approaches Toward
US Policies and Presence in the Region

Trends in Chinese Assessments of the United States, 2000-2005

US-ROK Relations: Trends at the Opening of the 21st Century

Southeast Asian Perspectives

Convergence/Divergence in Political Interests, Values, and Policies

Economic Interests, Values, and Policies

The Perils of Being Number 1: East Asian Trends and
US Policies to 2025

Appendix A: Conference Schedule

Appendix B: Participants

Appendix C: References

Southeast Asia Map

The National Intelligence Council and the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress held a one-day unclassified conference on this topic on 17 February 2000, at the Thomas Jefferson Building of the Library of Congress. Seven papers by nongovernment specialists and 11 commentaries by Intelligence Community specialists examined:

• The likely development of greater divergence or convergence between key East Asian states and the United States over US policies and interests in the region.

• Whether divergence or convergence between East Asian states and the United States was more likely on security, economic, or political/values questions.

• In what ways East Asian states would be likely to collaborate in opposition to US policies and interests.

Sixty US Intelligence Community, other Executive Branch, congressional, and nongovernment experts participated actively in discussions following the formal papers and commentaries, reinforcing the findings presented below.

Overview

Conference participants judged that developing trends presage more divergence between the United States and key East Asian countries and more difficulties for US policy and interests.

This situation will come despite continued strong regional dependence on the US economy and general support for a continued US military presence in the region. Acknowledging US superpower status well into the 21st century, regional powers do not seek to confront the United States militarily or to cut off advantageous economic ties with the dynamic US economy. Regional states also will continue to conform to varying degrees with US-backed international norms and international organizations. Meanwhile, the ability of regional countries to work together against US policies and interests will be offset to some degree by intraregional rivalries (notably between China and Japan), and by diverging interests (for example, Southeast Asian agricultural exporters support US-backed efforts to open world farm markets while Japan and South Korea remain strongly opposed).

Nevertheless, growing regional resistance to US policies and interests is likely. It will be strong and uniform in resisting expected US unilateral actions, especially regarding political issues and values such as human rights and democracy, that will be seen to serve US interests at the expense of that national sovereignty of regional states. Greater friction will also arise as a result on an expected downturn in the US economy, anticipated difficulties in US-China relations, and greater debate between the United States and Japanese and South Korean allies over military bases, host nation support, and other alliance arrangements. Among possible developments that could seriously worsen the outlook for the United States, military crises over the Taiwan Strait or power arrangements in a newly reunified Korean peninsula are likely to polarize regional opinion, sharply reducing support for US security policy and regional military presence.

Determinants
East Asian policies toward the United States will be driven strongly by the uncertain regional security environment, the nascent revival of regional economies after the Asian economic crisis, and trends in international politics and norms that affect East Asian authoritarian and democratic governments differently but underline strong regional nationalistic pride and assertiveness.

Uncertainty Over Regional Security Trends
After the Cold War, many in the region feared a US withdrawal. While still present in some quarters, this concern has been superseded by regional angst over US unilateralism--the use of political, economic, and especially military coercion in unexpected ways to achieve goals that in the past East Asian observers would not have expected to warrant such a strong US effort. The 1999 US intervention in Kosovo reinforced this new regional view of US power and unpredictability.

Adding to uncertainty over the regional security environment are the rise of China as an economic and increasingly capable military power; the implications of Japan's stagnant economy for its regional leadership aspirations and capabilities; and continuing uncertainty over regional hot spots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and Indonesia.

In response, all regional powers are expected to continue actively "hedging"--using diplomacy, military preparations, and other means to ensure that their particular interests will be safeguarded in case the security situation should change for the worse. Thus, conference participants noted that they expect the United States to remain in the lead in this regard, pursuing a policy of engagement with China while fostering stronger alliances in Asia in case of Sino-US confrontation. China in turn will continue to pursue engagement with the United States but also will strive to develop ties with Russia and others useful in countering possible US pressure against it. Roughly similar patterns will develop in Japan's ambivalent relationship with China, emerging Japanese hedging efforts regarding the alliance with the United States, South Korea's dealing with North Korea and other powers concerned with the peninsula, and the dealings of Southeast Asian countries with China. While driven by regional security uncertainty, the active hedging is expected to continue to add to it.

Economic Recovery
The Asian economic crisis not only hit regional economies hard but also seriously undermined social stability, challenged the standing of political regimes whose legitimacy rests heavily on providing economic growth, and undermined national security. It prompted widespread popular and elite resentment over economic globalization and US-backed IMF rescue efforts. Nonetheless, regional governments have acknowledged the need to accommodate these trends. Conference participants expected these governments will continue to recognize the importance of the US market, investment, and technology for the economic growth of their nations. Their economic concerns are pragmatic, focusing on the consequences of a possible downturn in the US economy in the next few years, Japan's continued slow growth, and possible intensified competition between Chinese and Southeast Asian manufacturers looking to export to the same markets.

Political Issues and International Norms
Growing international pressures for freer flow of ideas and information, and the concurrent development of greater political pluralism, democracy, and respect for human rights will continue to challenge East Asian authoritarian regimes. They also will complicate the decision-making processes in democratic countries like Japan that previously had been dominated by political elites and now must take account of a broader array of interest and opinion groups.

Conference participants expect several regional authoritarian governments to continue to preserve their prerogatives of power and resist trends toward democracy. Regional states in general, however, are likely to accommodate international trends and norms regarding the freer flow of information, more open markets, and common efforts to improve the environment and fight international crime and disease. Their support for international organizations and regional organizations likewise probably will continue.

Implications for the United States

Conference participants judged that these regional security, economic, and political trends will cause regional states to diverge increasingly from US interests and policies in the future. They acknowledged that the importance of these differences for the United States will remain offset by the continuing strong convergence of US and regional interests in two key areas:

• Regional states generally support a continued active US security presence in the area. (China is likely to step up the pace of its efforts to encourage a US withdrawal over the longer term, while problems may develop regarding continuing US bases, notably in Japan.)

• Regional states want and depend on access to US markets, investment, and technology.

Anticipated Problems for US Interests
Security Issues. China will work against US efforts to strengthen its position in the region. Notably, Beijing will press against and challenge US support for Taiwan, US efforts to build missile defenses in the region, and US efforts to strengthen the alliance with Japan. It probably will work against a US military presence in Korea after reunification and will continue to support South Korea's refusal to be part of the US theater missile defense efforts in the region. It will seek opportunities to work with Russia against US security interests in the region.

Japan and South Korea strongly support their respective alliances with the United States and are currently cooperating closely with Washington in trilateral efforts to deal with North Korea. Yet, like many other US allies, both Tokyo and Seoul chafe over the asymmetry in their alliance relationship with the US superpower. They seek adjustments in the US military presence that would accommodate their nationalistic or local concerns. Hedging in response to perceived US unilateralism and regional security unpredictability probably will prompt them to diverge from the United States over China and possibly North Korea.

Southeast Asian countries see the United States as being much less committed to Southeast Asia as opposed to Northeast Asia, and thus their main concern is that the United States might pull back from the region. They also become concerned when they perceive the United States and China are moving toward confrontation, as none of the states see their interests well served by choosing sides between these two key powers in such a standoff.

Economic Issues. Support in the region is broad to resist perceived self-serving US trade or other economic policies in international organizations or elsewhere that infringe on the interests of East Asian countries. Thus, President Clinton's efforts to promote labor and environmental standards during the Seattle WTO meeting last November found few endorsements in the region, while many gloated over the US embarrassment regarding the chaotic and inconclusive meeting. Meanwhile, longstanding differences over trade policies will persist and most likely worsen in the event a US economic downturn reduces US willingness to absorb large trade deficits with East Asian countries. Though most regional governments will go along with the greater economic opening supported by the United States, authoritarian states like China will endeavor to curb the free flow of information, and Japan, South Korea, and others will try to preserve their protected agricultural sectors despite US pressures.

Intra-Asian trade and investment is growing again after the economic crisis and is likely to promote more efforts at greater Asian economic integration that exclude the United States. Japan also can be expected to pursue more actively its interest in Asian economic mechanisms exclusive of the West. Japan and others will promote East Asian candidates for international economic organizations that heretofore were Western reserves--complicating US policy in these instances.

Political Issues and Values. East Asian authoritarian governments will resist US efforts to press for greater democracy and human rights in their countries. Such US efforts will also receive scant support from other regional powers--even other democracies. Their strong nationalistic sensitivities and concern over fragile regional stability will prompt them to eschew support for such "interventionism" except in extreme cases.

US efforts to promote its leadership in broader international efforts to foster US-backed political or other norms may also meet with resistance, even from US allies. Regional leaders probably will tacitly welcome failures of perceived overbearing US pressures in these areas in hopes that such comeuppance will cause the United States to be more consultative and collaborative in its policy toward the region.

How Will East Asian Countries Cooperate Against the United States?
Regional support for continued close economic ties to the United States and general support for the US military presence will limit interest in actively working against US policies in these areas. Moreover, regional powers probably will continue to be at cross purposes in their reaction to many US policies and interests. On US theater missile defense efforts, for example, Japan will continue support while China will strongly oppose and South Korea probably will remain on the sidelines in the debate. Japan's push for an Asian monetary fund and a seat on the UN Security Council seems to complicate US leadership in Asia--a broad Chinese objective, but they also work against China's concurrent objective to curb Japan's regional and global power and influence. South Korean and Japanese resistance to US-backed liberalization of agricultural trade is opposed by agricultural exporters in Southeast Asia.

Regional countries are most likely to find common ground against perceived US intervention in symbolic and political areas (for example, human rights and labor rights) that challenge the sovereignty and national dignity of East Asian countries. Regional leaders and commentators also are likely to gloat over US setbacks in other areas of perceived unilateralism, if only in the hope that such setbacks will prompt US policy makers to be more consultative and accommodating of regional interests in formulating future policies.

What Could Make Things Worse?

• A serious US recession would very likely strengthen intransigence on trade issues on both sides of the Pacific.

• An unmoving US stance on military bases and related issues would risk nationalistic backlash in Japan and perhaps South Korea.

• Heightened tensions in US-China relations would reduce public support for the United States by regional countries reluctant to choose between these two powers.

• A symbolic but highly visible US policy initiative that fails in the face of resistance from East Asian governments could prompt a backlash in the United States, further reducing US interest in working constructively with governments in the region.

Among possible developments that could seriously worsen the outlook for the United States, military crises over the Taiwan Strait or power arrangements in a newly reunified Korean peninsula most likely would polarize regional opinion, sharply reducing support for US security policy and regional military presence.

CONTENTS

by Susumu Awanohara

My task here is to examine the trends in Japanese attitudes toward US policies and presence in the region. During 1998-99, when I freelanced and helped a major Japanese business publication and a premier Japanese television station, I was struck by some preconceived notions held by editors and directors/producers about the situation in the United States or about American attitudes. Often the journalists came to the United States not to find out but to have people act out the prewritten script. These were journalists in the mainstream, not extremists of any kind. For example, editors of my publication once wanted me to do a "VIP interview" (meaning it had to be with someone who is a big name in Japan as well as in the United States) as a US angle for a special magazine issue on China. The interview was to demonstrate that, despite appearance of tension and friction, the United States and China were really good friends and were intending to establish a condominium in the region, isolating Japan. The editors had in mind a former secretary of state as an interviewee but I deliberately chose a former ambassador to Japan who I knew would patiently refute some of the editors' notions while showing a degree of understanding as to why President Clinton might have induced the Japanese to acquire them.

The TV station I was helping shot several major features on the financial crisis that gripped the world from 1997 through 1998. Like the editors of my publication, the TV directors and producers came with set notions. Clearly, they were more inclined to blame international liquidity movements--part of the "casino capitalism" of the West--rather than the "crony capitalism" of Asia for the Asian currency crisis. Many TV personnel saw Western conspiracy in the Asian crisis, although the extent of the conspiracy differed with each individual. In the extreme, directors and producers suspected that the US Treasury and the IMF represented Wall Street's interests:

• Wall Street--with its advance guard, the notorious hedge funds, leading the way--attacked currencies/stocks of emerging Asian economies for its own gain; the IMF, prodded by the US Treasury, moved in to rescue not so much the emerging governments and economies as the big US banks and investors who would otherwise suffer losses; and in the final cycle, vulture funds from the US swooped down to buy up the devalued assets of the emerging economies at bargain basement prices.

Another popular economic theme among both the editors and directors/producers was that the Japanese financial bubble of the late 1980s had been touched off by the Plaza Accord of 1985, the implication being that Japan's "lost decade" was caused--intentionally or otherwise--by the United States. My editors subscribed to this view but had the sense to ask former Secretary of State James Baker to respond to such a view in another VIP interview. (Secretary Baker did a pretty convincing job of rebutting the allegation, while stressing that he was a friend of Japan who coined the term "global partnership.")

What struck me further was that Japanese "policymakers"--I include bureaucrats and politicians in this category--had notions quite similar to those of "opinionmakers" such as my journalistic colleagues. This is perhaps not surprising since former officials (notably Messrs. Hisahiko Okazaki and Yukio Okamoto) and even incumbent officials (Taichi Sakaiya, Ichizo Ohara, and of course, Shintaro Ishihara) are quite active in the media as opinionmakers, and conversely, in a new trend, some opinionmakers are becoming policymakers (Yuriko Koike and Nobuteru Ishihara). But bureaucrats and politicians form a group distinct from opinionmakers. The policymakers I spoke to tended to be less forthcoming with their honne (as opposed to tatemae) views. So, it was only from policymakers, whom I got to know quite well, that I heard of suspicions and conspiracy theories about US intentions. Operating in the real world, however, policymakers tend to be relatively pragmatic; even when their views of the United States no longer justify existing policy, they will take time changing that policy.

As I prepared myself mentally for the project, I had several questions to answer and hypotheses to test. My sense was that anti-American or America-defying rhetoric among opinion leaders was louder and more widespread than in the late-1970s when I followed Japanese opinions. Is this true? And if so why? America-defying attitude seemed more pronounced among officials now than it was a decade or so ago. Is this true, and does it matter? How do opinionmakers and policymakers influence each other? If we are interested ultimately in Japanese policy (rather than attitude), inertia among government officials is so strong that policy will not change easily in the short term. One notable domestic trend is that politicians are trying to make--and succeeding in making--greater input into policy, while the position of bureaucrats is diminishing. How does this affect Japanese policy generally and policy toward the United States?

Plan of the Paper

I set out to look for information on three groups: the general public, opinionmakers and policymakers. For the purposes of this paper, I will consider opinion makers and policymakers to belong to the "elite" in contrast to the "general public" (though there is some overlap in the two categories). Also, the two major subgroups among policymakers are politicians and bureaucrats as I have stated. I have not been all that successful in gathering the information and in answering the questions I posed for myself. But the intention was to examine the perceptions/attitudes of the three groups concerning the United States and US policy, focusing on three or four topics: economics, politics (diplomacy), security, and where relevant, culture.

To anticipate:

• Japanese public opinion about the United States has improved steadily since 1995.

• The opinionmakers seem less inhibited than they were in the past, generating a lot of revisionist history and anti-American (antiglobal)--as well as all sorts of other--opinion.

• Policymakers, while sharing opinionmakers' sentiments and being more America-defiant than previously, are more pragmatic than the other elite group, in the end trying to make things work with the United States.

In sum, I am reasonably optimistic in the sense that I see little chance of a major downturn in Japanese perceptions and attitudes toward the United States, although Washington--particularly the Democrats--could provoke this downturn. I am pessimistic if US expectations are higher and if the United States is wondering if Japan would all of a sudden become a staunch ally.

Public Opinion

After a big dip, public opinion is on the mend. Since late 1995, when Japanese public feelings toward the United States reached a nadir, those feelings have recovered considerably. Responses to key survey questions show similarity between 1999 and years when public sentiment toward the United States was most favorable.

In its 1995 survey on US-Japan relations (published in early 1996), those Japanese calling relations with the US "bad" (32 percent) exceeded those characterizing it as "good" or "very good" (23 percent) for the first time since the Yomiuri Shimbun, with help from Gallop, started its survey of public opinion on US-Japan relations in 1978. A graph drawn from Yomiuri surveys over the years shows that the curve indicating "good" has gradually declined from the peak of 53 percent in 1984, while the curve indicating "bad" has climbed gradually from the trough of 8.1 percent, also in 1984 (see graph published January 2000 with the 1999 survey results). Incidentally, the view of Japan from the United States showed similar trends of deterioration, although they were less extreme than on the Japanese side: Americans characterizing relations with Japan as bad were lower in proportion to the total than Japanese feeling negative about the relationship, while generally a higher proportion of respondents considered the relationship as good in the United States as in Japan. Clearly, the Japanese have been more concerned about the bilateral relationship than Americans were.

Commenting on the 1995 survey, the Yomiuri identified two "gaps" in the two nations' perceptions of the other side. One gap was caused by Japanese self-confidence, according to the Yomiuri. Many Japanese felt in 1995 that the United States had been Japan's "parent," "teacher," or "big brother/sister" in earlier postwar years but was now a "friend," "teammate," or most frequently, a "rival." Speaking of rivals, while the Japanese thought that China would emerge as their biggest economic rival, followed by the United States, the Americans said overwhelmingly that Japan would become--or already was--the biggest rival economically. In other words, Japan had caught up with the United States and had little to learn from it. The second gap was found in the Japanese attitude towards defense, the Yomiuri said. While the Japanese respondents wanted a reduction of US military presence in Japan and the region, at the same time they expressed their faith that the United States would come to their aid in case of an attack by another power on Japan. The Yomiuri saw this second gap as particularly naive: "Such a selfish argument does not pass muster in the cool and hard international community," the newspaper commented.

In a similar survey conducted in late 1999 and published early this year, sentiment in the two countries about the other continued to improve dramatically, showing remarkable resemblance to pre-1995 conditions. Japanese thinking that bilateral relations were good were back up to 52.2 percent, and those Japanese thinking they were bad accounted for only 9.8 percent. Judging from these numbers, 1999 was very much like 1984. A quick look at the 1999 questions and answers shows that Japanese respect for the United States--its economic as well as military might--has been restored. Questions and answers indicate clearly that the Japanese feel more exposed to, if not outright threatened by, hostile or potentially hostile neighbors (notably North Korea and China) and that they believe that the United States would come to their aid in case of trouble with these neighbors. Whether or not the Japanese are now willing to pay the cost of US protection in the form of a military presence in Japanese soil does not come out clearly in this survey.

A brief review of major recent events in the bilateral relations helps to explain the contrasting survey results in 1996 and 2000, at least superficially. As the Cold War ended at the turn of the decade and there was no longer need to maintain the anti-Soviet stance at all cost, economic friction between the two countries became more severe, with accusatory words at each other escalating. The Structural Impediments Initiative talks (under President Bush) were tough, but Japanese negotiators still used positive gaiatsu to fight their domestic nemeses. But the Framework talks (under President Clinton) had few positive aspects for the Japanese side; the Japanese argued rather successfully that the United States wanted "managed trade" and rebuffed US pressures. 1995 was a particularly trying year for US-Japan relations: difficult auto talks were concluded without making either party very happy. Led by then MITI chief Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Japanese negotiators got particularly tough, stiffing the US side when they thought its demands were unreasonable (rifujin). The word rifujin was much used by bureaucrats during this period and beyond; it carried the connotation that in earlier days, the Japanese side had caved in to US demands even if they were unreasonable. The rape incident in Okinawa involving a local schoolgirl and US servicemen stationed in the island prefecture poured gasoline on the smoldering relationship. In some ways it was also cathartic, however.

Improvements began in 1996. The bilateral security treaty was reaffirmed in a Clinton-Hashimoto summit in spring. The trimming of the US presence in Okinawa, including the return of the Futenma helicopter base, was announced just before the summit and had a noticeable positive effect on public opinion. Partly because of this focus on security ties and partly because the major trade issues had now been dealt with, economic issues went on the back burner.

Assessment of US-Japan Relations

The bilateral relations got considerable help from third parties, such as China and North Korea. China's firing of missiles across the Taiwan Strait in the spring of 1996 vindicated Tokyo's move to reaffirm and strengthen security ties to the United States. North Korea's shooting of missiles over Japan itself naturally had an even more positive effect on Japanese views of the alliance, although both cases left some Japanese unhappy with Washington (either because they feared having to take sides in the US-China conflict or because they felt that the US response to P'yongyang's missile threat was not sufficiently indignant). For the reasons already alluded to, the Asian currency crisis did not bring together the United States and Japan. In addition, Japan's proposal to set up an Asian Monetary Fund provoked a US reaction similar to one against Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's notion of an East Asian Economic Grouping. President Clinton's China trip in 1998 was a big minus in the Japanese mind. The US President termed China a strategic partner and, together with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, chastised Japan for its economic missteps. Furthermore, concurring with the Chinese, Clinton decided not to stop in Japan before or after his long stay in China. In 1999, the Diet passed bills needed to implement the new guidelines of US-Japan security relationship.

We now return to the 1999 survey to summarize what the Japanese public is thinking of the United States and its policies in the economic, political, and security spheres.

Economy
The US economy will remain strong (51.7 percent) or will get even stronger (25.5 percent), the Japanese public thinks. But somewhat more Japanese (55.7 percent) than Americans (52.8 percent) are afraid that the US stock market will fall in the near future. (My sense has been that among Japanese elites, the expectation of a US stock market crash is even stronger than among the general public.)

Politics
The United States will retain its superpower status and will remain the world's leader. (The survey was not detailed enough to capture the growing sense among the elites that the United States no longer transcends its narrow interests to lead.) The United States is the most trustworthy foreign nation (43.9 percent). The United States had the highest score, whereas only 15 percent of Americans trusted Japan the most, with Japan coming in the 7th place, after Canada, Britain, Australia, and others. The United States will remain the most important country for Japan, both politically and economically.

Security
Korean Peninsula (78.6 percent), China/Taiwan (25.1 percent) and Russia (18.6 percent) pose a military threat to Japan. In particular, North Korea's Taepo Dong missile is dangerous for Japan (86.7 percent). If Japan is attacked, the United States will come to its aid (77.3 percent). Against this, 66.9 percent of American respondents said that in case of an attack on Japan, the United States should provide help.

All in all, Japanese feelings appear favorable towards the United States. But as they are at historic highs, so they are unlikely to get much better.

Opinionmakers
"Opinionmakers are all over the map," said an academic I spoke to during a recent trip to Japan. The opinionmakers are saying anything they like, breaking all sorts of taboos, but, more likely than not, only to shock and provoke others. Often the proponents are not willing to stake a lot to turn their ideas into reality. The lifting of taboos seems to have accelerated with the criticism not only of politicians but also of bureaucrats, particularly Ministry of Finance bureaucrats--the cream of the crop in an earlier age. There is no more inhibition about attacking anybody. Nothing is sacred (except maybe the imperial family to some Japanese).

Does anything anybody says matter? Does it have a bearing on Japanese policy? Some experts I interviewed said "No" and "No." They felt there was no pattern or meaning. As one of them explained:

Opinionmakers have always said that America is arrogant, overbearing, etc. and that Japan should have a mind and a policy of its own, although the decibel level may be higher today. But policymakers operate in a world that is quite separate from that of opinion makers so there is not much point in studying the views of the latter. Policymakers--even one that were firebrands as opinionmakers--become realistic and say we must work it out with the Americans.

Other experts are less dismissive of the views of opinionmakers. They feel that there are some patterns in what opinionmakers say, and these are connected to both what the public is feeling/thinking and what the policymakers feel, think, and ultimately do. But I did not come across interesting and convincing views on how these elements are structurally connected. One observer thought that a major change, or "discontinuity," is taking place before our eyes, and that the multitude of revisionist books and Democrat leader Yukio Hatoyama calling for constitutional revision are signals of this. Citing John Dower's new book Embracing Defeat, this observer recalled that there had been a major discontinuity of Japanese attitude--a sudden leap from the wartime repulsion towards America to the embracing of everything American--after their defeat in 1945. Could what we are witnessing be a correction of this "embrace," and if so, should the United States respond in some way?

The pattern that some experts see is that there is the big middle (bigger than it used to be), and the left and the right. This is not a great surprise (and may not even be the most interesting framework to analyze Japanese opinions today). The middle has grown and the left has shrunk after the virtual disappearance of the Socialist Party, while the right is active and noisy albeit lacking in common themes and unity. (The term right is probably much too general, but I am not familiar enough with people and groups that tend to come under this heading to offer more precise typology and analysis).

Whereas until a decade ago the center of gravity of opinionmakers was in the left and the LDP government was to the right of (a vaguely defined) center, today the government and its supporters among opinionmakers (say, the Yomiuri Shimbun) seem to be part of a bloated center, taking criticism from the left and the right. On the left you have the traditional left--the communists and the socialists--and the liberals (Asahi Shimbun). The left has a sense of crisis that there is a general societal drift toward the right, that the political center is moving toward the right (as exemplified by passage of laws on the national anthem, on eavesdropping, on the new US-Japan guidelines). Major Leftist fears are that the recent rewriting of the security treaty--particularly provisions on Japan's response to regional contingencies--will drag Japan into America's wars in the region, and that rewriting of the constitution by the Japanese in the near future would put the country on a warlike path once again.

While the left is fighting a rear-guard action, the right is on the offensive. The right is made up of not only the Sankei Shimbun and its commentators, but of all sorts of other groups--the Bungei Shunju group, particularly the opinion journal Shokun, and Sapio of Shogakukan. There are also individual writers who would be classified under the right. In terms of substance, the right ranges from pro-American/proalliance elements to anti-American/proindependence elements. Proindependence does not necessarily mean anti-American, although in fact it often does. Generally, resentment at American hubris is not limited to the right or, for that matter, to Japan. Resentment also stems from persistent Asian reminders of past Japanese wrongdoing, and a desire to determine Japan's own course. In doing so, there is at least a desire to be rational, not emotional--a sense that Japan should pursue its own national interests, that may (or may not) coincide with US interests but are at any rate defined by the Japanese themselves. "Japan is in search of a capitalism with Japanese characteristics," as one writer put it. The younger generation generally has little sense of debt to the United States, which translated into the acquiescence of older generations to American demands and whims because "we owed them" even when the United States was seen as making unreasonable demands. One commentator captured these trends when he pointed out that the Japanese today were more interested in kokueki (national interests) than in giri (obligation).

I could not read enough pieces by opinionmakers to attempt a genuine survey of the vast collection of opinions (a la Ken Pyle or Mike Mochizuki). What follows are my impressions of a small sampling of current opinion. I have taken some samples from Nihon no Ronten 2000 (Japanese Debates 2000) published by the Bungei Shunju group. The perceptions of opinion makers about and attitudes to economic, political, security, and other issues are listed below.

Economy
On the strength of American economy, there is a whole spectrum of opinion; there is little unique in the Japanese analysis, but the Japanese tend to focus on the US current account deficit and the "illusion of the dollar," predicting an end to the robust GDP growth and the stockmarket boom based on the wealth effect. Another popular theme is the tension between globalization (which to many is really Americanization) and national institutions and practices in Japan and Asia generally. While some champion global standards, many demand room for national variances. Some even hope and predict that nativist reaction would defeat hegemonic dominance of global (that is, American) standards.

Politics
"Neo-nationalists" on the right such as Kanji Nishio are busy revising history, "removing distortions." From the little I have read/heard, the alleged distortions are found in the more negative accounts of facts and Japanese intentions and positive accounts of the intentions of others in mainstream history books. Denying that the Nanking massacre happened is part of removing distortions. Another theme of neo-nationalists is Japan's continuing subservience to the United States for which the domestic political establishment (more than the United States) is lambasted. General constitutional revision--not just of Article 9 but of the entire basic law--is seen as a necessary step toward independence. China is a popular theme. US-Japan and US-China relations make a zero-sum game, so China's gain is Japan's loss and vice versa.

Security
The taboo on criticizing China or North Korea has been lifted (basically the left's pacifist argument has been blown away by China and North Korea's actions) so the debate has shifted to the right. The defense debate now centers on whether the new guidelines of US-Japan security ties are useful for Japan or only increases the danger of Japan being embroiled in America's wars; whether or not Japanese participation in the development of TMD is a good idea; whether or not the concept of participating in regional contingencies is constitutional; and whether or not the constitution should be revised for national security (and other) reasons.

There is little direct anti-Americanism in the security debate. The left no longer argues that US imperialism is trying to dominate the world on behalf of monopoly capital. I'm not sure whether there is raw anti-Americanism on the right such as we had from Jun Eto-- who died recently. Perhaps, Susumu Nishibe demonstrates his anti-Americanism when he mocks the United States for thinking foolishly that "American justice is universal justice." Nishibe finds the single-minded American pursuit of deregulation and competition undescribably vulgar.

Other
A major debate on "the private" and "the public" was touched off by a comic book On Wars by cartoonist Yoshinori Kobayashi, which I have not had time to study. Kobayashi argued that the private has become dominant in the postwar period; people now reject the notion of the public, particularly the notion that the public IS the State. He affirms the public impulse--which is associated with patriotism--that he says exists in each individual along with the private impulse. Kobayashi's book provoked virulent reactions from the left as well as others who saw it as rationalization/justification of the Second World War. Some new material here may affect Japanese attitudes toward the United States and Asia.

Mikie Kiyoi of the Foreign Ministry became a celebrity through her attacks on foreign journalists who don't bother to study the Japanese language and misreport Japan with impunity, taking advantage of the fact that "indulgence, swallowing insults and bearing pain are virtues, while complaining and blaming others is juvenile" in Japan. She strikes a chord with Japanese opinion leaders as well as the public who think that Japan is misunderstood, or misrepresented deliberately. The neo-nationalist slogan iubeki kotowaiu (saying to the world what needs to be said) from a while back is still strongly supported in some quarters. Kiyoi is in solidarity with a group of private Japanese citizens living in New York who compiled a volume criticizing Japan coverage by the New York Times's Nick Kristoff and Sheryl WuDunn.

Policymakers
By policymakers I mean politicians and bureaucrats. Further, I have in mind policymakers who have some dealings with the United States. So, our policymakers are constrained by the realities of the US-Japan relationship while at the same time having a degree of direct input into Japanese policy toward the United States. At one level, the policymakers may have abstract ideas about American power, traits, or culture, but on another level, they are dealing with practical issues that involve the United States. The latter makes policymakers more pragmatic/realistic as a group than the opinionmakers. (I have not done enough work to distinguish politicians from bureaucrats. Clearly, power to formulate and implement policies is shifting from bureaucrats to politicians--albeit slowly--and questions arise: how do the two groups differ in their views of America and the world, and how does the power shift influence the policy outcome? I'm afraid I do not have enough data to answer these questions at this point.)

To understand the trends in Japanese policymakers' attitudes, I have tried to engage those I was interviewing for another purpose (that is, discussing the state of the Japanese economy as well as fiscal and monetary policies for Medley Global Advisers) on questions concerning US-Japan relations. My interviews were mostly with economic officials (from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Economic Planning Agency, and the Bank of Japan) and LDP officials who have an interest in economic issues. I saw some Foreign Ministry officials but no one from the Japan Defense Agency.

Following these meetings, I conclude tentatively that, for now, policymakers are more or less satisfied with the bilateral relationship, and no major changes in policy are likely in the near term. In the microeconomic sphere, Japanese trade negotiators have become tougher, refusing to give in to "unreasonable" US demands, while in macroeconomics, there is the nagging suspicion that US demands on Japan or the positions the United States takes in international negotiations are a lot more self-serving than they purport to be. Yet, the Japanese admire (often grudgingly) the US economic performance and lament their own. The strong sense Japanese policymakers had some years ago that they had discovered/invented an alternative model of economic development and of capitalism has taken a beating through domestic and Asian economic difficulties. But some say it will be back, particularly now that the Asian crisis economies are recovering quickly.

Policymakers' attitudes in political and security areas have perhaps changed less than in the economic areas. My assumption (without having interviewed extensively) is that those dealing with North America and security are still at the mainstream of the Foreign Ministry (though the "Asia school" of the ministry is apparently rising) and that this mainstream remains close and favorably disposed to Washington, despite a feeling that the Clinton administration has treated Japan shabbily. In this connection, news that Rust Demming at State and Kurt Campbell at Defense--Japan's best friends in the current administration and a good combo--are leaving the US Government is received with great concern in some policy circles.

Policymakers' perceptions about and attitudes toward economic, political, security, and other issues are presented below.

Economy
In microeconomic (or sectoral trade) negotiations, there was a clear shift between Prime Ministers Kiichi Miyazawa and Morihiro Hosokawa. The Miyazawa-Clinton summit in July 1993 followed the traditional pattern: the Japanese gave in at the end although they thought US demands were unreasonable; the summit was the culmination of a cycle of talks; there were ambiguities in the agreement language so that each side could interpret it in its own way, up to a point. The Hosokawa-Clinton summit in February 1994 was in stark contrast with the earlier summit: the talks broke down because the two sides agreed to disagree (for Japan it was a major departure from the past pattern in that it did not bend and was willing accept failure of highest level talks); Japan took the moral high ground, accusing the US side of pushing "managed trade." The auto talks that ended in June 1995, led by then MITI chief Hashimoto (under Prime Minister Murayama), was another landmark. The Japanese appealed successfully to world opinion (notably the WTO and Asian countries afraid that if Japan caved, the United States would attack them next) that the United States was forcing "managed trade" and "quantitative targets" in the talks and refused to bend. Japanese agencies that feel the brunt of micro pressures are of course resentful. A recent complaint is that the US Government, and in particular USTR and Commerce, has become an agent of specific US companies, extracting concession for these companies.

In addition, many Japanese officials acknowledge their deliberate use of US gaiatsu in mircoeconomic areas in removing domestic microeconomic barriers. In particular, MOF and EPA, which are more concerned about macro policies, tend to use US pressure to overcome domestic resistance (to, say, the big stores law or equalization of tax on farm and residential land) which they cannot handle by themselves. There is a cost to using foreign pressure, however, in the form of strained bilateral relations. The Foreign Ministry tends to worry about such costs. Some at the ministry even feel that Japanese economic officials are resisting US pressure/advice only because it comes from the Americans and that there will be a backlash against Japanese trade negotiators' rude treatment of their US counterparts.

While welcoming US pressures on macroeconomic issues, MOF and EPA tend to resent macroeconomic pressures by the United States, perhaps because they are at the receiving end of such pressure but also because officials honestly think that the US pressure is misplaced. Many officials argue that macro pressures are sometimes really for US interests and not good for Japan. The Plaza accord is often mentioned as an example of how the United States made Japan reflate (to counteract the deflationary effects of a higher yen), while it neglected to do its own homework of reducing the budget deficit and raising the saving rate. The bubble was thus created, many say. The recent pressure from Treasury Secretary Summers to boost Japan's GDP growth from the current 1 percent or less to 3 percent is seen in similar light: Summers wants Japan to do the heavy lifting while the United States seeks to pull off a triple soft landing of the economy, the stockmarket, and the dollar, and avert a crisis.

As the Asian crisis economies recover--some of them quickly--some Japanese officials are feeling that the crisis governments had been wrongly blamed for "crony capitalism" (because the crisis was precipitated more by the uncontrolled flow of global speculative capital than by "corruption" and "relationship-based finance"), and that the Asian Monetary Fund idea--of demonstrating a determination to protect currencies under assault with a huge reserve of funds (as the United States had indeed done for Mexico in the mid-1990s)--was essentially correct. According to one American scholar, Japanese are asking: "Why can't we have a capitalism which is not the same as American capitalism? Why can't we do it our way? Japanese--and other Asians--want to pursue the legitimate alternative way." This sentiment is amplified when the United States fails (or appears to fail) to lead and acts in parochial and self-serving ways--a la Seattle WTO, or as in the case of the CTBT.

Politics
My sense is that the United States has its best friends in the Foreign Ministry, friends who are convinced that the two countries share goals and even values in dealing with bilateral as well as regional/global issues. But just as it is not enough for foreign governments to convince the US State Department alone, ignoring other departments and the Congress, the United States will need to send messages not just to the Foreign Ministry but increasingly to nonfriendly Kasumiga-seki mandarins and Japanese politicians. Although the United States may welcome the powershift from bureaucrats to politicians, in specific instances the pragmatism of bureaucrats that support US interests may come to be missed if politicians act in a different way.

On China and "Japan passing," Japanese officials closest to the State and Defense departments (that is, the Foreign Ministry and the JDA) have heard the US administration's repeated assurances but that is not the same thing as convincing the Japanese opinionmakers or the public, or Japanese politicians. Fear of a US-China condominium has existed and was unnecessarily intensified by President Clinton's refusal to stop in Tokyo at the time of his China visit. On whether Japan would take the lead in establishing/fortifying Asian organizations excluding the United States such as ASEAN+3, and the Asian Monetary Fund and its variants, I think it is possible particularly after the Seattle WTO. But internal constraints on such organizations are so great that the United States should not overreact. The coming constitutional debate should be watched, especially because it is not just about Article 9 but about the very origin of the basic law; the Japanese are coming to a consensus (although the left is resisting) that Japanese did not write the constitution, and that they need a document written by themselves. The taboo on constitutional revision has been lifted decisively by Democrat leader Hatoyama's advocacy of this cause.

Security
In a general sense, policymakers are moving toward Japan as a normal nation, but there are nuances even within the conservative establishment (for example, between Ichiro Ozawa and Koichi Kato).

As earlier suggested, North Korea's Taepo Dong missile launch increased the Japanese sense of insecurity and their support for the alliance (more specifically, for the guidelines legislation and TMD participation). But at the same time, many Japanese felt that the United States was not sufficiently concerned about the threat from North Korea, which raised the further question of whether the United States was a reliable ally and would come to Japan's aid if it were attacked. But the contradictory attitude that the Yomiuri lamented in 1996 is still prevalent: Japan wants-- expects--US protection but wants the US presence to decline and is threatening to cut Host-Nation Support, which they deliberately call omoiyari yosan (compassion budget). Against this background, Okinawa and the bases will remain an issue--real and potentially explosive--in coming years. In case Democrats prevail in the coming election (which appears less and less likely in early 2000 as Hatoyama stumbles along), there could be a major shift in Japanese attitude toward "alliance without bases," a more autonomous, inward-looking Japanese defense posture.

Other
"Will America continue to lead?" many officials asked. If America is too blatantly parochial and/or self-serving as in Seattle (the Japanese have heard the view that President Clinton was willing to sacrifice multilateral negotiations to help Vice President Al Gore in his bid to succeed him), it will lose credibility as a hegemon. "You can command confidence and respect only when you are seen as transcending your own interests to act in the general interest," one economic official said.

Is attitudinal change related to a generational shift in Japan? One economic official commented: "The cabinet-level people are in their 60s and above--they're the ones that experienced defeat and would follow the US lead even when they think Americans are unreasonable and selfish. Our generation, in the 50s or late 40s, are similar, but slightly more assertive, wanting to make Americans understand in cases differences develop. Many of the elite had a good experience studying/working in the United States and have positive feelings about the United States. We sense that younger people are much cooler towards the United States and are more assertive of Japan's own national interests, etc. They don't have a sense of debt."

Conclusion
Conditions surrounding the bilateral relationship are favorable, as compared to several years ago, and Japanese perceptions of and attitude toward the United States are generally benign.

The sense is that in the next year or two, there won't be major changes in Japanese attitudes or major surprises in Japanese policy. Major domestic events coming up in the next year or two include:

• The G-7 summit in Okinawa (with slight risk of it becoming Seattle II).

• The lower house election sometime before late October this year (low risk of Democratic victory).

• The move of Futemma base to Nago and accompanying issues.

• The upper house election next year.

• The constitutional debate taking several years.

External events that may impact on US-Japan relations include:

• China/Taiwan conflagration.

• More North Korean provocation against Japan.

• Korean unification.

Domestic events are not likely to have a major influence on the bilateral relationship with the possible exception of the constitutional debate. External events may be more significant and although some of these events may in fact work to strengthen US-Japan ties, they also could alienate the allies from each other. And because they are external, the United States and Japan will have less control over these events.

Although the bilateral relationship looks stable--implying that no surprising improvement or deterioration from the US point of view is likely--the United States may wish to listen carefully to the opinionmakers to see if there are important messages amidst the cacophony. The United States also may want to ponder whether it is necessary to talk to Japanese politicians more as they gain influence in policy formulation and implementation (although US diplomats have done a much better job of touching all the bases than have Japanese diplomats). Another topic of study is how generational shift changes Japanese perceptions and attitudes. The "postwar" period is ending in that those of a generation which does not remember the war or the impact of the war are coming into positions of responsibility.

Finally, the US side should ponder the fact that Japanese perceptions and attitudes are related to US perceptions, attitudes, and actions. The Japanese policymakers have not developed a fondness for the Clinton administration and particularly on the political-security side, demonstrate a great nostalgia for American individuals who dealt with Japan and Asia during earlier Republican administrations. This is an American as well as a Japanese problem.

CONTENTS

by Bonnie S. Glaser

No country presents such vexing contradictions for China as the United States. The maintenance of good Sino-American relations is indispensable for China's continued economic growth. Without sustained high levels of US direct investment and an open US market for Chinese goods, China's aspiration to become a middle-level developed country by 2050 will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize. The preservation of a favorable security environment for China and the achievement of reunification with Taiwan also are, in part, contingent on the state of Chinese ties with the United States.

Yet, at the opening of the 21st century, Beijing is uncertain about the feasibility of securing a stable Sino-US relationship. Chinese leaders harbor strong suspicions about US intentions globally as well as toward China. The Chinese fear that Washington is determined to prevent the rise of a strong China that could pose a challenge to American supremacy in the new century. They also worry about US resolve to spread American values and transform China and other remaining socialist and authoritarian governments into Western-style democracies. Beijing is especially uneasy about the advent of an extremely imbalanced global pattern of power in which America's might vastly outstrips other nations and provides the United States with the unilateral means to advance its interests as it sees fit. Chinese complaints are targeted at fundamental American foreign and defense policies such as post-Cold War NATO strategy, the deepening of security ties to Japan and plans to develop and deploy missile defense systems on the continental United States as well as around China's periphery to protect American forward-deployed forces and possibly American friends and allies in Asia from ballistic missile threats.

Although debates in China are ongoing about US foreign policy and intentions toward China, the parameters of those debates have narrowed substantially over the past year. There is now greater agreement among Chinese America specialists than previously existed in their analysis of the overall international situation as well as specific elements such as US strategy and objectives toward China. Minority positions are still held, but they seem to carry little weight in the policymaking process. Thus, this paper presents primarily mainstream perspectives on the United States, which currently dominate the formulation of Chinese policy.

The task of predicting how Chinese attitudes toward the US policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific region will change over the next five years is a challenging one. This situation is in part because Chinese assessments of the United States and its intentions toward China are primarily reactive, and US policies as well as other external events influencing Beijing's estimates in the next five years cannot be predicted with certainty. We can forecast with a degree of confidence, however, that Chinese ambivalence about American power will endure. Moreover, Chinese suspicions about US intentions toward China probably will not be significantly assuaged and may even intensify during this period. This paper attempts to present current circumstances and trends in Chinese evaluations of US policy and identify key variables that may influence Chinese attitudes and approaches toward the United States between 2000 and 2005. The conclusion draws implications for Chinese foreign policy and US interests.

Current Trends in Chinese Attitudes Toward
the United States

Chinese assessments of US policy and presence in the Asia-Pacific region flow from Beijing's estimates of US comprehensive national power relative to other major states, US global strategy and economic role, and American intentions toward China. Therefore, analysis of Chinese estimates of these broad, yet fundamental issues must precede consideration of their evaluation of US regionally based policies. Chinese perspectives on the US-Japan alliance, US policy toward Taiwan, the regional security architecture, and the Korean Peninsula are presented in turn.

US Reign as Sole Superpower
After the events of 1999, China reached the conclusion that the United States will continue to occupy the position of sole superpower in a global pattern of one superpower and several major powers for at least the next two decades.⁽¹⁾ Beijing had hoped that this power structure, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would be short-lived and be supplanted by a multipolar pattern of power in which a core group of countries that are relatively equal in comprehensive national strength would engage in bounded competition and cooperation, effectively checking the ambitions of any single power. The prevailing imbalance of power is objectionable to China because it provides the US with an opportunity to advance a global security and ideological agenda that benefits American and broader Western interests. In Chinese parlance, the US can pursue "power politics and hegemony." At the same time, China's room to maneuver and its ability to defend its own interests are severely constrained in a unipolar international system. A multipolar global pattern that the Chinese hope will provide greater opportunities to promote and defend Chinese interests is expected to take shape gradually, but little progress is expected before 2005.

During the next five years, and even for several decades, as the world transitions from a bipolar to a multipolar power structure, the Chinese forecast that China will lag significantly behind the United States in key indexes of power, including economic, technological, scientific and military might. Chinese analyses of the bases of US strength stress the critical importance of America's lead in the development and application of high technology and predict that the US technological edge will enable a further consolidation of the US advantage over other powers. Two specialists on the American economy at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, which writes annual assessments of the international situation and the global balance of power for the Chinese leadership, forecast "the US will take the lead to enter the information world and keep its absolute superiority in developing the knowledge economy."⁽²⁾ They and other Chinese experts emphasize the links between technological prowess, economic strength, and military power. Comparative assessments of the technological and economic level of potential competitors have convinced most Chinese analysts that no power is likely to rival the US position in the early part of the 21st century.

US Global Strategy and Intentions
The main strategic objective of the United States, from China's perspective, is to exploit the opportunity presented by its unprecedented favorable global position to further consolidate American supremacy and shape the world according to US interests and values. The United States is frequently described by Chinese analysts as in pursuit of a strategy of global "hegemony" and absolute superiority over potential rival states. US plans to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system are viewed as an integral part of this strategy, aimed at preventing other powers from having a reliable retaliatory capability against a US first strike. PLA officers reject the US contention that concern about a missile launch by North Korea is the driving force behind consideration of the C-3 system, the more ambitious of two NMD configurations under deliberation, which envisions the emplacement of 200-250 interceptors in Alaska and North Dakota. They insist that Washington's true goal is to degrade or nullify China's nuclear deterrent.

The NATO military operation in Kosovo in 1999 alarmed Beijing--even before the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade--because it demonstrated US willingness to circumvent the United Nations and employ military force to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations to advance American strategic aims. The military intervention also represented a test of NATO's "new strategic concept," which the Chinese view as intended to globalize NATO's role. The purported Clinton doctrine of "new interventionism" has been widely criticized by China for putting issues of human rights above state sovereignty.

During the Kosovo war and in its immediate aftermath, many Chinese feared that the United States might use similar means to interfere in states on China's periphery or even on the Chinese mainland. The possibility of US military intervention in North Korea, the South China Sea, and in the Taiwan Strait was judged to be greater than in the past. Active American interference in Tibet and Xinjiang also was considered more likely, although most Chinese researchers expected that the US would rely on political means to stir up ethnic unrest, for example, rather than use military force to meddle in Chinese minority areas. Subsequent US decisions to limit its involvement in East Timor and refrain from intervention in Chechnya, along with US reassurances that Kosovo was not a model for future US intervention abroad, alleviated the urgency of Chinese concerns, but did not eliminate them completely. The Chinese remain wary of what they see as an increased proclivity of the US to rely on military means to advance American interests.

More fundamentally, however, the Kosovo war served as a catalyst for a reassessment in China of US global strategy and intentions. The United States could no longer be depicted as a relatively benign world policeman whose policies in many areas served to promote regional and international stability--a view that was not universally accepted, but was actively promoted by an influential group of Chinese think tank experts and officials as the rationale for building a constructive strategic partnership with the United States. Instead, the US came to be seen by the majority as a destabilizing and unpredictable hegemon determined to use all possible means to pursue its interests and spread Western values with impunity.

US Economic Role and Power
Beijing recognizes that the global economy is a major factor that increasingly influences China's security. The Chinese are acutely