On
30 June 1999 the National Intelligence Council
and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence
and Research sponsored a conference that examined
the continuing challenges to Ukraine in its political
and economic transition from being a component
of a centrally planned, totalitarian state. The
conference consisted of 14 presentations from
experts outside the government, interspersed with
general discussion between the experts and government
participants. The agenda focused on four topics:
the evolution of Ukraine's political system, the
status of its economy and reforms, Ukraine's role
in the international system, and Ukrainian societal
dynamics.
Conference
participants did not endeavor to produce a coordinated
summary of findings. However, during the presentations
and discussions, there emerged a number of points
of both agreement and disagreement that seem particularly
salient in evaluating Ukraine's current condition.
These highlights summarize the areas of agreement
and disagreement as well as particularly noteworthy
points but, except as noted, should not be considered
as representing the views of the conference as
a whole.
Most
observers held generally gloomy views on Ukraine,
with the big question for its future being whether
the situation was likely to get worse after the
elections or remain stagnant for the next few
years.
A
relatively bright spot was Ukraine's consolidation
of itself as a state. One scholar suggested this
included six principles: acceptance of Russian
as an unofficial language but simultaneous gradual
Ukrainization; a unitary rather than federal state;
support for territorial integrity and for the
creation of a national legend about Ukraine's
historical antecedents; and the slow expulsion
of Moscow-based media as the main source of electronic
information. Participants noted that separatism
is no longer a serious challenge for Ukraine,
except perhaps in the far eastern region of Donets'k,
and some argued that even the previously most
serious case, Crimea, has diminished in salience.
The
main source of gloom were the characteristics
of the state that is being consolidated:
-
The economy is an unreformed "basket
case" with little progress toward the
creation of the institutions needed for an
efficient market economy. Bureaucrats are
stifling entrepreneurial activity through
overregulation; consequently, business is
protecting itself through corruption or going
underground.
-
The self-protective and insulated elite is
the linear descendant of the old nomenklatura
and cares only about its own power and enrichment.
-
Society is ignored except at election time,
when candidates vie with promises of generosity
rather than talk about creating conditions
under which society could prosper independently.
-
Independent sources of information and action
are still in a developmental phase. The press
is pluralistic but not wholly free. Nongovernmental
organizations--necessary but not sufficient
building blocks for developing a civil society--have
become more plentiful but not necessarily
more influential.
There
were differences of view about the prospects of
this state transforming itself for the better:
-
One scholar argued that the existing patrimonial
system, as he described it, was likely to
become more effective in running the state
and in the process, begin to serve society
and create rules that would bring an economic
upturn.
-
Other participants rather expected the self-preservation
of the current corrupt system at least until
a new generation came to power. However, one
scholar warned that the new generation was
adopting the ways of the old in order to rise
to the top.
-
One ray of hope was the openness of the debate
in Ukraine about its present and future, of
which this conference, which included Ukrainian
participants and Western scholars, was but
one example.
The
most marked disagreements came over the likely
consequences of this fall's presidential election:
-
Some participants worried that the election
of any presidential candidate other than Kuchma
would set Ukraine on even less attractive
and perhaps more dangerous paths, for instance,
seeking to recreate a union with Russia and
Belarus, which would also encourage like-minded
Moscow politicians in the runup to Russia's
own December Duma election as well. One speaker
characterized the coming elections not as
a struggle between present and future but
as a struggle between present and past.
-
Most participants in this discussion, however,
argued that the corporatist rules of the current
elite and other constraints (for instance,
Ukraine's financial dependence on the West)
would prevent any president from making significant
changes.
-
All participants agreed that the attractions
of power in Ukraine are such that the upcoming
elections may not be waged in a fully fair
fashion.
On
foreign policy matters, most discussants viewed
Ukraine as still oriented toward the West despite
unhappiness over NATO's war in Yugoslavia and
the European Union's longstanding aloofness toward
Kiev. Some saw the Kosovo crisis as strengthening
Ukraine's stance of neutrality.
Looking
at what the West can do to help Ukraine, some
argued that, while financial aid is important,
educational assistance aimed at creating a political
consciousness among the Ukrainian population is
even more so. They urged patience and avoidance
of overly high ambitions for the pace at which
changes can be expected.
-
Participants worried, however, about how long
the West would maintain even the current level
of assistance to and interest in Ukraine,
given that the most likely domestic prospect
was for more of the unsavory present.
Section
One
The Political
System
Andrew
Wilson, School
of Slavonic and East European Studies, London
"National Identity in Ukraine"
Competing
Models of Ukrainian National Identity
Several
models of Ukrainian national identity exist alongside
one another today.
-
The national-ethnocultural model,
backed by Rukh since its foundation in 1989,
includes a broad cluster of components:
--The privileged rights of "indigenous"
peoples over those of "national minorities."
--A repudiation of the east Slavic common
origin myth.
--A view that Ukraine had a "thousand-year
tradition of state-building," with short
interruptions.
--A negative attitude toward the Soviet era;
a vision of Ukraine as a post-colonial society,
with "Ukrainization" the reversal
of historical injustice.
--Occidentalism, or the belief that Ukraine
is historically a natural part of Western
civilization; the Ukrainians as the natural
titular majority (73 percent).
--With a belief in the natural coincidence
of ethnicity and language; Russophone Ukrainians
as an inherent part of that majority, once
they have been renationalized; and Russians
(22 percent of the population), to be given
the rights of a "national minority,"
but nothing more, as they have a homeland
elsewhere.
Most
elements of this model were supported at one time
or the other by the (often opaque or contradictory)
policies of the Kravchuk presidency, but also
found their way into the 1996 constitution.
-
Another model is the language group model.
A main dividing marker in the 1994 presidential
elections was language, the factor most politicized
by the ethnocultural model of Ukrainian identity.
According to this model, Kravchuk lost because
language divides Ukrainians among themselves,
and so many Ukrainians were preferentially
Russophone (just over 40 percent of the general
population were then preferentially Ukrainophone).
Reliable polls indicate that 70 percent of
Ukrainophones supported Kravchuk, and 72 percent
of Russophones backed Kuchma.
-
A third model is that of the "Other Ukraine,"
the dual identity model. Russophone Ukrainians
sealed Kravchuk's fate in 1994 by voting with
ethnic Russians for Kuchma. Clearly, there
is an "Other Ukraine," a very large
group of Ukrainians who do not believe in
some or all of the conceptual foundations
of the ethnocultural model of Ukrainian identity.
This dual identity model is defined partly
by language, partly by the idea of dual ethnicity.
It is also centered around a different set
of assumptions, including the persistence
of myths of common east Slavic origin and
subsequent voluntary interaction; the myth
of the voluntary adoption of Russian as a
lingua franca; and the idea of bluffed boundaries
(as one activist put it, "In terms of
national-cultural identification we belong
to a single Russian-Ukrainian cultural space"
and should not be forced to choose between
a mono- and a poly-cultural identity); residual
support for the key Soviet myths of "socialist
achievement" and the "friendship
of the peoples"; and uneasiness with
the depiction of the USSR as a Russian/Soviet
empire in which the Russian people colonized
or conquered Ukraine.
The
presence, even predominance, of the Russian language
is not just a "post-colonial" hangover,
and there is resistance to crude Ukrainization
pressures.
What
then are the alternatives to the "ethnocultural"
model
for the "Other Ukraine?"
-
One is a Eurasian identity. Kuchma's
controversial 1994 inauguration speech stated
that "Ukraine is historically part of
the (same) Eurasian economic and cultural
space" as Russia and Belarus. The strong
negative reaction to his speech from Ukrainophones
forced Kuchma to place the issue on the backburner,
but it has been reformulated in recent years
in terms that reflect the popular Pan (east)-Slavism
of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. The theme has also
been taken up strongly by the chairman of
parliament, Oleksandr Tkachenko. (There were,
in other words, already premonitions of the
line Ukraine would take in the Kosovo crisis.)
The dangers inherent in this model are its
obvious foreign policy implications and its
head-on confrontation with Ukrainian nationalist
"Occidentalism."
-
Since his 1994 inauguration speech Kuchma
has, therefore, taken a more subtle line,
which can be called a synthetic model. In
several speeches he has called for a combination
of the "best of both" the ethnocultural
and Soviet Ukrainian traditions, on a selective
basis venerating myths from pre-Soviet Ukraine
and Russia and the Soviet Union all at the
same time. Kuchma says different things to
different audiences--to Russia, to the West,
and at home. In many ways, this is perfectly
sensible, but the West needs to be aware that
the dialogue it has with Ukraine is context-specific.
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Politically, Kuchma is often described as
adopting a "civic" approach,
based on the idea of "a Ukrainian political
nation." There are, however, many different
formulations of this idea, including the "core
nation model" embodied in the 1996
constitution; a more "dualistic model,"
as endorsed by Communist Party leader Petr
Symonenko: Russians and Ukrainians as two
branches of the one people of Ukraine; a "consociational
model": the formation of a Ukrainian
political nation on the basis of the national
"blooming" of the Ukrainian people,
as well as of all remaining ethnic groups;
a "transcendent model,"
in which ethnicity no longer defines identity;
and a model combining the Rukh and transcendent
models, which refers to the constitution as
being enacted in the name of "the Ukrainian
people--citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities."
Conclusions
The
existence of the "Other Ukraine" is
what makes polarization of Ukrainian society difficult,
as does its amorphousness. The historical divides
between "original Soviet" (1921) and
western Ukraine, between ethnic and linguistic
groups, between the confessions, between regions,
and along supposed "civilizational"
faultlines are all different. It ought perhaps
to be borne in mind that, whereas many Ukrainian
critics deride the idea of the "Other Ukraine"
as having no cultural solidity, it is precisely
this lack of solidity that preserves the social
peace. If Ukrainian and/or Russian national identities
solidify over the medium term, then counter-reactions
and mobilizations would in fact be more likely.
External
stimuli are more likely to prompt a consolidation
of Ukrainian identity. The most obvious of these
is the simple fact of Ukrainian statehood. The
most powerful would be potential conflict with,
or perceived divergence from, Russia. The former
scenario is unhealthy; the latter has possibilities.
Many Ukrainians began to perceive a difference
in political culture with the onset of the Chechen
war. Different alignments with third parties are
also likely to produce long-term effects, potentially
reshaping some of the mythological boundaries
outlined above. Unfortunately, one of these has
been the Kosovo war, which has strengthened the
appeal of Pan-Slavic mythology.
Different
Models of Ukrainian Society
Victor Pasisnichenko,
Kharkiv Pedagogical University
"Civil Society and
Post-Communist Realities:
Some Lessons of a 'Rosy' Period"
Our
approaching the subject of civil society at the
end of the 1990s means some radical changes in
the way in which it was approached at the end
of the 1980s when civil society had captured the
imagination of democratic scholars, politicians,
observers, and activists more than other concepts.
These disputes about its appropriate role in the
postcommunist countries were encouraged by contradictory
far-reaching social changes that often were referred
to in terms of "civil society revival."
In addition, civil society has become a leitmotif
of the Western aid programs that distribute considerable
resources to the region.
Main
Features of the Current Stage of Civil Society
The
gap in the theoretical development of civil society
as well as a particular historical situation--the
unexpected failure of communism--led to two significant
consequences. On the one hand, the notion of civil
society was mainly used as a slogan that had little
to do with the previous grand theoretical debates.
It was both an attractive explanation of the fall
of communism in terms of the civil society revival
and a basis for hope concerning its future role
in democracy building. The revolutionary enthusiasm
about civil society (as a slogan) was also attractive
for the West, which was looking for the best way
to encourage the transformation process and to
support the relevant eastern
actors (NGOs) in the late 1980s. This way of thinking
about civil society was distinct from the previous
complex history of evolution of the civil society
concept. It is mainly the liberal version of civil
society distinct from the state that has been
found theoretically fruitful and has been wrongly
presented as the only valid one both by the theorists
of the "democratic opposition" in the
East and by radical left intellectuals in the
West. In a much less excusable and equally misguided
way, Western scholars produced a more narrow and
simplified model of civil society. This "nongovernmental
civil society" is reduced to the public sphere,
independent social movements, and voluntary associations
or NGOs as genuine democratic actors unspoiled
by the attraction of power, money, and conflicts.
This model is based mainly on an institutional
approach to civil society, locating its institutions
somewhere between the individual and the state.
Due to the sharp distinctions (civil society/state,
civil society/political society, civil society/market,
public sphere/individual), these institutions
are considered as opposed to the institutions
of state, market, and political spheres.
As
a result, the definition of civil society has
developed a negative nature both in its slogan
and theoretical forms: it is more about what it
is not than what it is. Except for the distinction
between civil society and the state, there does
not seem to be a good deal of agreement on what
constitutes civil society.
General
Lessons From the Current Stage of Civil Society
It
is above all postcommunist (and post-Soviet) realities
that revealed the weakness and limitations of
this model of civil society, both in terms of
the attractive slogan and the narrow vision of
the nongovernmental sphere. In its negative force,
this civil society has not survived its own victory
because it failed when its main enemy failed--the
totalitarian state--and it was unable to establish
constructive "border relationships"
with other spheres of society. The implications
of these crises are important also for the Western
liberal democracies, where a similar narrow understanding
of civil society in terms of "a separate
sphere composed of voluntary groups that act as
a buffer against government" is still popular.
A
crucial lesson of the bankruptcy of the narrow
and negative notion of civil society distinguishable
from the state encourages a search for a broad
vision of civil society. This approach seeks systemic
links among the different spheres of civil society
in its broadest sense, links that strengthen the
"boundary relations" between state,
political society, market, and nongovernmental
organizations (independent or third sector). It
adds to the institutional dimension of civil society
such factors as the role of actors and their relationships
in terms of the construction of cultural-identities
and codes as a precondition for the existence
of genuine civil (civilized) society. It is through
this broad concept that one can approach the sphere
of civil society in a narrow and more traditional
sense as a realm of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and voluntary associations.
Some
Lessons for the Post-Soviet Countries
-
Being aware now that NGOs (the third sector)
have to be considered in the intersection
with other spheres of society and that all
of these spheres are grounded in a minimal
environment of cultural democratic values,
we have to hesitate in applying the term civil
society to the post-Soviet societies. After
all, such societies are lacking the relevant
state, politics, and market, as well as their
proper relationships with the newly emerging
third sector. It means that civil society
in the post-Soviet countries could develop
from scratch rather than through revival or
restoration of the previous civic-like organizations.
We should be prepared for it to be a long
and complicated process in which the appearance
of the third sector could play a considerable
role but should not be wrongly equated with
the development of real civil society.
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The concept of an "antipolitical"
character of civil society means that, in
the absence of an appropriately formulated
politics and political culture, civil society
simply will not exist. The excessive involvement
of some Ukrainian NGOs in politics could be
explained by the fact that political parties
are still in formation and there is ongoing
fighting for power in the country as well.
-
A new lesson--that a weak state, such as that
which exists in Ukraine, is a barrier to civil
society--must be added to the traditional
lesson of liberal democracy about the strong
and totalitarian state as an obstacle to civil
society.
-
Another addition to the same old liberal lesson
is that civil organizations could not only
be misused but also behave in an uncivil way.
Their development does not automatically lead
to democratic alternatives.
The
Third Sector in Ukraine
Although
it is pessimistic in terms of civil society building,
this proposed approach to analysis of Ukrainian
society still confirms as a new positive factor
the emergence and growth of numerous public organizations
(NGOs). At the same time, these organizations
signify the beginning of development of civil
society in Ukraine. However, the contradictory
processes in this sphere give no grounds to speak
about them as a force that has visible social
impact, represents the interests of the broad
public, or is free of internal conflicts.
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On the one hand, there is a considerable growth
in the number of NGOs (1991: 319; 1992: 356;
1993: 3257; 1996: 12,416, early 1998: 17,781.
City NGOs: 39 percent, regional: 33 percent,
national and international: 8 percent). They
are experiencing slower growth in industrial
cities, such as Zaporizhzhya.
-
On the other hand, due to various reasons,
primarily the economic crisis, the level of
participation in these organizations is rapidly
falling (1991: 30 percent; in 1996: 13 percent).
The
growth of Ukrainian NGOs in itself is not a proof
of civil society strengthening. An urgent problem
of the sector--to map the size and quality of
the NGOs--is too difficult to solve.
As
they gain rich experience, these advanced organizations
move to more professional work. They could play
a crucial role in the development of the third
sector as an important part of future Ukrainian
civil society. However, this is only possible
if the dangerous tendency of self-isolation and
internal prospering among these NGOs could be
overcome. The strong dependence of Ukrainian NGOs
on foreign resources is visible by the fact that
the majority of the organizations exist in big
cities, while in rural areas they are weak or
absent.
With
a lack of internal resources, there is a fight
for limited foreign funds, which creates an atmosphere
of competition between NGOs. It prevents their
communication and their vision of themselves within
a broader picture of the third sector. Meanwhile,
the regions that have more access to external
resources manifest "patron-client" and
"clan" types of relationships. Some
organizations are used for personal gain due to
a strong leadership and lack of democratic traditions.
There are also many examples of using NGOs to
evade taxes or to run a business. Finally, the
status of the public organizations is used by
some politicians as a way to pursue various goals
of mainly political character, in particular proposing
a candidate for election or gathering votes for
the candidates.
These
uses and abuses of NGOs in Ukraine confirm the
thesis that civil society is a complicated process
and phenomena and that the consequences of its
development are not a matter of some independent
sphere of society. They greatly depend upon civilized
individuals as active citizens in their everyday
practice. It is unclear whether a broad vision
of civil society is acceptable for many intellectuals
and practitioners today. Yet what is really challenged
is a sharp distinction between civil society,
the state, and other spheres of society. There
is a need to relativize the vision of civil society
as an independent sphere at least to an understanding
of its relative autonomy.
Victor Zablotsky, Independent Journalist,
Kiev, and Kennan Institute
"Center-Regional
Relations on the Eve of the Presidential Elections:
'Dances With Wolves'"
According
to research done by Ukrainian experts, a lasting
discussion of the interpretation and role of political
institutions in Ukraine has proven the total ineffectiveness
of legal or institutional approaches. It is not
a surprise that on the eve of future presidential
elections, Ukrainian elites still face the issue
of jurisdictional division of decisionmaking authority
between central and regional governments.
In
contrast to the first years of independence, the
constitutional debate now between the center and
the regions over the appropriate division of authority
is being complicated neither by strained relations
with Russia nor by growth of official nationalism.
Currently in Ukraine, there are growing trends
of the strengthening of regional elites (clans)
and the weakening of central power due to ineffective
economic policy of Kuchma's administration, as
well as by the preferences of both sides to solve
problems by informal means. As in Albania, Russia,
and Yugoslavia, in Ukraine center-regional relations
are built mainly on personal affiliations, bribes,
and murder. As a result, money and personal links
have been more important in Ukrainian politics
than ideology. For example, during the presidential
elections in 1994, current president Leonid Kuchma
was associated with liberal economic reforms as
well as favoring close ties to Russia. But, while
the Communist Party of Luhans'k supported Kuchma,
the probusiness Liberal Party of Ukraine in Donets'k
supported Kravchuk because LPU considered Kuchma
as a representative of the Dnipropetrovs'k clan.
Since
the first days of independence, Ukrainian elites
have lived for short-term interests. While the
concerns of the center deal mainly with retaining
political dominance over the regions, regional
elites concentrate primarily on instrumental interests
such as increasing personal wealth and fiscal
autonomy. In Ukraine, potential power resources
of regions are mainly economic: commodity exports
(minerals and metals) and tax revenue.
However,
in center-regional relations, local leaders do
not play such an important role as they did a
few years ago. The earlier Ukrainian shadow political
system was analyzed through the prism of clans.
Trying to avoid the potential growth of regional
separatism, during the Kravchuk presidency the
center quite often pacified regional elites by
budget injections, which then were successfully
stolen by periphery bosses. It seems that the
time when the center was weak and regional leaders
seized unlimited control over local economic power
resources has passed. Now the situation is different.
First
of all, in the current period the transition from
a regional clan system to a system of transregional
political oligarchy is worth mentioning. Current
political events--such as the establishment of
the President's Domestic Policy Coordinating Council;
the fission and multiplying of political parties;
the scandal concerning privatization of regional
energy companies, "oblenergos;" the
consolidation of Kiev's business groups against
Mr. Surkis and SDPU(u); the creation in parliament
of two business factions--"Labor Ukraine"
and "Revival of Regions")--have proven
that the political oligarchs and holding companies
have become real and most effective political
institutions in Ukraine's modern, but still shadowed,
political life.
These
hitherto unknown actors first gained publicity
last year during the parliamentary elections.
Having fought for places in parliament, the main
aims of business elites were to legitimize their
status, to defend themselves from criminal investigations,
to avoid political pressure, and to use the parliament
as a stock-exchange for personal business projects.
On the eve of the October 1999 presidential elections
these goals remain basically unchanged.
Because
of the paramount influence of the presidential
post in Ukraine, business and regional elites
now try to secure their status by simultaneously
supporting Leonid Kuchma and searching for a more
favorite candidate. Inasmuch as the Ukrainian
constitution has created an institutional structure
with a strong authoritarian presidency, democratic
means of interest representation--such as political
parties and the Verkhovna Rada--have provided
limited results for regional leaders and political
oligarchs. Through parliament and parties, new
Ukrainian business groups received a voice within
the political system. But they also found that
the establishment of informal ties between the
representative branch and presidential administration
and government is much better for gaining economic
capital.
Regional
elites still prefer to bargain with the center
informally. Despite the fact that Kuchma tends
to often shuffle the heads of oblast state administrators,
personal loyalty has been a main feature of his
subordinates, and the regional leaders have conformed
to the president's manner. For the acquisition
of legitimacy and independence from Kuchma's mood,
heads of oblast state administration do not appeal
to the public because their lot is not influenced
by voters but by the president administration
and a unitarian system of governance. Also, regional
bosses are scared to struggle for the gubernatorial
system because as representatives of the party
of stagnation they will hardly have chances in
an open electoral marathon.
The
key political oligarchs and many heads of regional
state administrations back the current president,
hoping that in the nearest future he will be a
guarantor of their business and public careers.
By supporting Leonid Kuchma in his struggle for
a second and final term in office, some oligarchs
believe they will get time and resources in order
to nominate their own candidate in 2004. On the
other hand, some business and regional elites
are searching for an agreement with Kuchma's competitor
Oleksandr Tkachenko--the speaker of the Verkhovna
Rada and, possibly, the only candidate from the
leftists.
However,
current trends in center-regional relations differ
radically from the previous presidential campaign
in 1994. Despite the reddening of the Ukrainian
electorate, it seems premature to make apocalyptic
warnings about Ukraine's regional separatism.
The forthcoming presidential elections will be
a struggle not between the past and the future
but between the present and the past. During the
electoral campaign, no candidate will concentrate
his agenda on the issue of the Russian threat.
The main battles will be held along ideological
lines, which now do not coincide with regional
borders. It seems that the elections will consolidate
the Ukrainian elites around parties and political
institutions and will weaken regional clans and
transregional holdings of political oligarchs.
Roman Solchanyk, RAND Corporation
"Ukraine's
Crimean Problems"
Regionalism--and
the related issues of national identity, state
building, and Ukrainian-Russian relations--is
a major factor impinging on politics and society
in Ukraine and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable
future. In this context, Crimea arguably poses
the most serious challenge for the Ukrainian leadership.
The
conventional wisdom is that Crimean separatism,
which was in the forefront of local politics in
1991-95, has its roots in the ethnic composition
of the peninsula. Crimea is the only political-administrative
subdivision of Ukraine with an ethnic Russian
majority (67 percent, according to the 1989 Soviet
census; 57.3 percent, according to a recent estimate).
Most Crimeans are drawn to Russia, so the argument
goes, because most Crimeans are Russians and even
more are Russian speakers. Clearly, the fact that
ethnic Russians are a majority in Crimea impacts
on the political situation. Nonetheless, it would
be misleading to focus on Crimea as a Ukrainian-Russian
ethnic problem. Indeed, insofar as ethnicity is
concerned, the major problem in the near and medium
term in Crimea is the growing dissatisfaction
of the Crimean Tatars both with regard to the
local administration and the political center
in Kiev.
What
makes Crimea different from all other regions
in Ukraine is that it has an international dimension--that
is, Crimea is not only a Kiev-Simferopol' problem,
but also a Kiev-Moscow problem. For the most part,
political elites in Moscow and the Russian public
as a whole feel that the peninsula is historically
Russian territory, that it has little or nothing
to do with Ukraine, that it should not have been
transferred to Ukraine, and that it should revert
to Russia. The problem is made more complex by
the more specific and convoluted issue of the
status of Sevastopol' and the related question
of the future of the Black Sea Fleet. Moreover,
the prevailing view in Moscow regarding Crimea's
status, Sevastopol', and the Black Sea Fleet is
shared by most Crimean political elites and the
local population. Crimea, therefore, is simultaneously
an international and a domestic problem and, in
some instances, the external and internal aspects
either fully overlap or, at a minimum, share a
common frame of reference.
Since
1995, the internal dimension has lost much of
its acuteness. It is perhaps ironic that the current
Crimean leader, Leonid Hrach, considers himself
a potential candidate for the Ukrainian presidency.
In Moscow, on the other hand, the Crimean issue
continues to remain on the agenda, as witnessed
by the debate over ratification of the Ukrainian-Russian
bilateral treaty and the statements of Moscow
mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, the frontrunner to succeed
Yel'tsin.
Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, Ukrainian Center
for Independent
Political Research, Kiev
"Political Dynamics in Ukraine"
The
current phase of democracy development in Ukraine
can be characterized by the existence of a party
system that is only in the formative stages of
development. The dynamics of growth of political
forces can be illustrated by the fact that by
the end of 1995, there were 41 political parties
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine,
while in October 1996, on the eve of the parliamentary
elections and after the new election laws had
been passed promulgating the election of half
the parliament on the basis of party lists, the
number grew to 51. Out of 30 parties and election
blocs participating in the elections only nine
made it to the parliament.
Ukrainian
parliamentary political parties can be classified
into three types:
-
The first type are classic political parties
with a stable electorate and more or less
stable regional organizations, that is, the
Communist Party and Rukh.
-
The second type are descendants of the three
"clans" within the former Communist
Party of Ukraine, that is, the Communist Party
of the USSR era. As we know, there were three
competing "clans," as they were
called, within the "old" Communist
Party of the USSR: the traditionally strong
Dnipropetrovs'k clan, the Donets'k clan, and
the Kharkiv clan. Of course, these party groups,
or clans, did not disappear with the collapse
of the Soviet Union; instead, they were transformed
into regional influence groups and subsequently,
with the adoption of the election laws, into
parties. An objective observer can quite easily
deduce that the former Donets'k Communist
Party officials, or nomenklatura, reorganized
themselves under the Liberal Party of Ukraine
(LPU); the Dnipropetrovs'k nomenklatura--under
Hromada; while the presence of the former
Kharkiv nomenklatura is perceptible in the
People's Democratic Party of Ukraine. It is
important to note that the new election laws
forced all the ex-clan parties to establish
organizations reaching beyond the territory
of a certain region. Therefore, they were
becoming national parties.
-
The third type is represented by the so-called
business parties formed as a result of the
confluence of the interests of businesses
and the ambitions of certain politicians.
Among these parties are first and foremost
the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (Unified)
and the Republican Christian Party. Both businessmen
and politicians coexisted side-by-side in
the election lists of both parties.
There
are a certain number of political parties outside
the parliament whose activities are quite vigorously
covered in national mass media. The per se division
of the parties into traditional, ex-clan, and
business parties is after all also quite tentative.
For instance, Hromada combines the characteristics
of an ex-clan party and a business party.
The
future of party organizations in Ukraine is fairly
uncertain. On the one hand, it will be a direct
consequence of whether these organizations set
out to work vigorously to establish regional divisions
and to assure their normal operations, or use
their existing capabilities only to lobby their
interests in the parliament. At the same time,
one cannot preclude the possibility of certain
business parties or ex-clans transforming into
"normal" political parties in the future,
along the lines of those accepted in the democratic
countries; however, it is feasible only if their
current parliamentary efforts do not become a
mere vehicle for the pursuit of their own interests
and instead promote the development of regional
party organizations. The development of political
parties is also a direct effect of whether the
election laws are going to change or not, and
if they are, in which way. If the election laws
are modified to establish a party-based elections
process, then they will promote the emergence
of strong political parties, a gradual reduction
in the number of various parties, and the growth
of party representation.
The
presidential elections later this year will undoubtedly
contribute to the process of internal expansion
of political parties in Ukraine. We are already
witnessing the expansion of the rightwing political
parties, such as one of the Rukhs, that of Yuri
Kostenko; the "Open Policy" Group of
A. Matviyenko; V. Shovkoshitniy's wing of the
Democratic Party of Ukraine; and V. Musiyaki's
"Forward, Ukraine!" Other examples are
the Rukh led by G. Udovenko; V. Pynzenyk's "Reforms
and Order" Party; and the Republican Christian
Party. At the same time, the presidential elections
will not have a significant effect on the consolidation
processes of the 12 parties that will support
Kuchma during the forthcoming elections; these
parties have achieved a temporary tactical union
out of different, often opposing political motives.
With
regard to informal influence groups, some Ukrainian
political parties could very well be viewed as
such. The term used to describe these parties
in Ukraine-- "oligarchies"--is probably
a misnomer. In reality, there is no oligarchy
problem. This term rather signifies an obvious
or, in most cases, not-so-obvious dependence of
businessmen on the executive authorities, on the
state of the "right field," and on the
rules of the business game. The conventional classification
of the influence groups into those led by Victor
Pinchuk (Intertype Concern), Grigoriy Surkis (Slavutich
Industrial and Financial Concern), Igor Bakai
(Ukraine Neftegaz Concern), and Oleksandr Volkov
(Gravis Television Company) and the categorization
as oligarchies of Anatoly Golubchenko's Ukraine
Metals Company, Andrei Derkach's Era Television
Company, Yuliya Tymoshenko's Integrated Power
Systems, and Oleksandr Tkachenko's Earth and People
Corporation demonstrate that included in the oligarchy
category quite arbitrarily are those who have
managed to create fairly successful businesses
in Ukraine with the use of certain political powers.
The
issue of informal influence groups is usually
linked to the ability to influence the decree-making
of President L. Kuchma, who was granted the authority
under the 1996 Constitution to issue decrees on
economic matters that have not been addressed
by Ukrainian law. The authority of the President
to issue decrees expired on 28 June 1999, or three
years after the Constitution had been adopted.
The critics of presidential decree-making maintain
that a significant portion of these decrees, namely
one half, was enacted under the influence of the
informal influence groups. Therefore, if we were
to assume that this opinion is correct, then about
one half of these decrees were after all positive.
The decree "On the Distribution of Goods"
is an example of a positive decree.
Informal
influence groups are also frequently thought to
have influence on the enactment of instructions
by the Cabinet of Ministers, that is, the government
of Ukraine. The granting of certain exclusive
rights to Yuliya Tymoshenko's Integrated Power
Systems Corporation with regard to gas trading
under Premier Pavel Lazarenko has become a classic
example of such instructions.
It
is quite difficult to determine with certainty
whether the decree-making authority of President
L. Kuchma and the practice of instructions enactment
by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine have been
something positive or something negative. The
mechanism of presidential decree-making has never
been transparent, and this is precisely to what
the activities of informal influence groups have
been attributed. Some of the President's initiatives,
such as his idea about the potential privatization
of Ukrtelecom, have been rejected by the parliament
as apparent election campaign moves. As far as
the President is concerned, this kind of influence
should never be overstated. Businessmen, some
of whom must undoubtedly have benefited from certain
presidential decrees, are another category of
informal influence groups. However, because of
the law enforcement authority of the executive
branch, each of these informal influence groups
was quite adequately aware of its limitations
in terms of its own ability to influence a particular
decision.
The
critics of President L. Kuchma assert that Kuchma's
decrees meddled with the already existing legislative
framework. Although this statement is indeed true,
the laws enacted by the parliament embody a compromise
between its market-opposed segments and are clearly
not in the interests of market reforms. One way
or the other, all economy-related bills from now
on where no party has a majority will go through
the parliament. The practice of instruction issuance
on the part of the Ukrainian Government continues
and most likely will continue to be followed in
the future.
Thus,
the influence of informal influence groups must
now shift from the administration of the President
to the parliament--a move that is certain to make
the decisionmaking mechanism more transparent.
A 100-percent concentration in the parliament
of economy-related legislation development will
not necessarily translate into a qualitative breakthrough
with the economic reforms. President L. Kuchma
has indeed violated the laws repeatedly, especially
with regard to the privatization decision. The
common register of state enterprises that are
not subject to privatization is a law enacted
by the parliament. Approximately 2,500 entities
most attractive to foreigners have been included
in this register. Therefore, if this law in not
revised, market reforms will be unattainable.
One
can conclude that the presidential elections in
Ukraine will not give final answers as to which
path the Ukrainian nation will take in its development
and whether the market reforms will continue.
If President L. Kuchma is reelected, it is quite
conceivable to expect the dissolution of the parliament
and arbitrary reforms with unpredictable results.
The election of Oleksandr Moroz as President can
potentially lead to the establishment of a leftist
parliamentary majority, to the blocking of reforms,
but hardly to any fundamental changes in the foreign
policy. If Oleksandr Tkachenko becomes President,
foreign policy might take a sharp turn, with Kiev
becoming the center of integrationist efforts
to restore the Soviet Union. The fate of market
reforms in this case will be quite unique: capitalism
for himself and those around him and socialism
for the rest of the society. Other options, such
as those involving Nataliya Vitrenko and Yevgeniy
Marchuk, are not currently contemplated in Ukraine
due to their low probability.
The
policy pursued by the United States toward Ukraine
must remain stable, similar to the one being implemented
today. At the same time, the West must exert a
certain influence on Ukraine immediately following
the elections so that the economic reforms in
Ukraine do not cease but continue.
General
Discussion
Several
participants questioned Wilson's diffidence regarding
nationbuilding. One scholar suggested that this
was being done around six principles: acceptance
of Russian as an unofficial language but simultaneous
gradual Ukrainization; a unitary rather than federal
state; support for territorial integrity and the
creation of a national legend about Ukraine's
historical antecedents; and the slow expulsion
of Moscow-based media as the main source of electronic
information. The rejoinder to this more positive
appraisal was that these principles were not tied
to a national democratic model. Rather, Kuchma
has been pursuing more of a "synthetic"
model, combining elements of both Russian-oriented
and national consolidation schemas and saying
different things to different audiences. One participant
claimed that the government had not been more
forceful about Ukrainization because it would
cost money that the state did not have.
Several
discussants touched on the impact of Kosovo. One
argued that it had resulted in aligning Ukrainian
foreign policy with Russia, but another countered
that there had always been differences between
the more pro-Russian population at large and the
Western-oriented executive. Returning to the nationbuilding
theme, one participant warned that Tatars in Crimea,
who had always wanted greater autonomy for themselves
(as opposed to the Russian autonomy movement),
were thinking that Western support for the Kosovars
might be a precedent for their own cause.
Alexander
Pivovarsky, Harvard Institute for International
Development
"The
Challenges of Ukraine's Economic Reforms"
Since
independence in 1991, the Government of Ukraine
has attempted to implement a standard reform package--stabilization,
privatization, and liberalization. Most of the
changes undertaken in the process have not been
a real success so far, in particular, the reforms
that were meant to affect the microeconomic foundations
of the Ukrainian economy.
In
recent years, economists and policy analysts have
been using the word "virtuality" to
describe the economic processes taking place in
Ukraine, Russia, and a number of other countries
of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, this concept
is appropriate for the analysis of the majority
of economic processes in Ukraine. This virtual
economy is pervasive and affects all levels of
economic activity. In this economy, most processes
have several meanings. Terms of exchange of goods
do not reflect their market values since almost
a half of all transactions take place in barter.
Book profits have little to do with firms' revenues
since most debts remain unpaid for many months.
Budget deficit does not reflect a balance between
planned revenues and expenditures since some of
the government commitments remain unfulfilled.
The virtual economy's lack of transparency is
the main reason why some interest groups are interested
in its sustainability.
On
the macroeconomic level, the government achieved
stabilization of the hryvnia and a moderate level
of inflation. In 1999, inflation was held at 20
percent despite the major pressures that emerged
after the hryvnia's devaluation. Until the fall
of 1998, the government was able to sustain the
monetary stability by holding the nominal level
of the budget deficit in line with the targets
agreed upon with the IMF. In order to achieve
those targets, the government delayed budgeted
expenditures and borrowed aggressively in the
domestic and international markets. As the sources
of financing dried up and the government de facto
defaulted on its obligations in the fall of 1998,
it was forced to adjust the budgeted expenditures
downward in the middle of the year by as much
as 3 percent of GDP. Significant obligations remained
unpaid, thus making the budget deficit a virtual
concept.
This
nominal financial stabilization was accompanied
by a rapid and sustained accumulation of enterprise
nonpayments to each other, to the state, and to
their workers. The total level of accumulated
nonpaid obligations reached 120 percent of GDP--more
than two-thirds of them overdue--a level much
greater than the level of regular trade credits
common in market economies. The government and
workers have been forced to accept a large share
of payments from the firms in goods rather than
in cash. In 1998, more than 20 percent of tax
obligation was paid with goods and services. The
system of barter has created immense opportunities
for corruption and theft.
Effective
privatization that would align control rights
over the firms' assets and cash-flow rights have
been only partially effective. Managers of privatized
firms exercise an almost complete control over
their firms, regardless of the formal ownership
arrangements, with the exception of firms privatized
with significant participation of multinational
entities. At the same time, local and central
government officials are still capable of securing
the firms' access to financial and real resources.
Given that banks ceased to perform their function
of financial intermediaries between the households
and the firms, the government remains the largest
single agent capable of providing financing to
firms (via subsidies, tax writeoffs, access to
energy inputs, and other forms of support). The
total assets of the banking sector in Ukraine
are less than 18 percent of GDP, the lowest level
of 59 countries included in the 1998 Global Competitiveness
Report survey in 1998
1
and one of the lowest in the world. The ability
to establish and maintain effective relationships
with the state is a more important quality for
enterprise managers to have than entrepreneurial
ability. The 1998 Global Competitiveness Report
survey of enterprise executives asked them whether
public officials in their countries favor people
with connections. Ukrainian executives strongly
agreed with this statement. Among 59 countries
included in the survey, only Russia and Indonesia
ranked above Ukraine in the executive's assessment
of the role of connections. Most importantly,
Ukraine ranked the lowest in the managers' assessment
of the amount of time spent dealing with the government.
Only Indonesia ranked ahead of Ukraine in the
speed of growth of the real level of informal
payments to government officials over the past
years.
The
majority of enterprise managers use the virtual
economy to their personal advantage. During my
recent interviews with enterprise managers and
barter traders in Ukraine, I found that most of
the barter transactions are accompanied by side
payments to those enterprise managers who agree
to accept terms of exchange that are unfavorable
to their firms. A recent report produced by the
State Tax Administration of Ukraine found that
the majority of Ukrainian coal mines (the most
heavily subsidized sector of the Ukrainian economy)
use financial intermediaries set up by the firms'
managers or their proxies to undertake both cash
and barter transactions. In such deals, the firms
accept inferior terms of exchange and divert a
significant part of their output's value to the
pockets of enterprise managers and their financial
intermediaries.
According
to official statistics, the energy sector (oil
and gas in particular) is the largest net creditor
to the rest of the branches of the Ukrainian economy.
At the same time, it is a sector commonly considered
to be the major source of rents and economic power
in Ukraine. A number of "famous" Ukrainians
(including very senior government officials) made
their fortunes by controlling the energy supplies--gas
supplies in particular. Historically, gas traders
have held monopolistic positions in distributing
gas to particular regions and thus exercised a
significant degree of power over enterprises that
depend on energy supplies for their survival.
At the same time, these gas traders continue supplying
gas to enterprises that may not be able to pay
for the energy consumed today or in the medium
term.
The
natural question is, why is the gas distribution
such a coveted business? Why is this officially
loss-making business perceived as so profitable?
The answer becomes clear when one discovers that
many enterprises pay for gas under the table.
Moreover, a mutually beneficial relationship between
industry and government has emerged. Since the
real value of bartered goods is difficult to calculate,
barter transactions, including tax payments via
mutual debt cancellations, create a good opportunity
for personal gain. In this way, the virtual profits
of enterprises turn into real income for corrupt
government officials as well as managers and owners
of businesses. Consequently, supplying gas without
payment or in exchange for in-kind payment becomes
a rather attractive transaction for all parties
involved. The exceptions are those people not
endowed with good connections. These individuals
have to pay real money for the energy consumed.
It is no wonder that introduction of mechanisms
that would increase transparency in gas, oil,
and electricity sectors is forcefully resisted.
The
real privatization in its broad sense--as a process
that stimulates entrepreneurial activity and triggers
the process of "creative destruction"--has
been slow so far. The number of officially registered
small businesses is still less than 200,000, a
number that is dwarfed in comparison with the
almost 2 million small businesses established
in Poland since the beginning of "shock therapy"
in 1989. Due to a poor bankruptcy system, substantial
assets of currently and formerly state-owned firms
remain tied up in inefficient activities or, sometimes,
remain practically unused. In most cases, revitalization
of those firms is impossible due to the "kartoteka
2" system that gives banks
effective authority over the indebted enterprises'
bank accounts. This system is the de facto equivalent
to imposing a 100-percent tax on their cash revenues.
An effectively functioning bankruptcy system would
enable the transfer of those assets, promises
being the most valuable of them, for use by the
emerging class of entrepreneurs. Of course, such
policy would lead to the managers' loss of control
of the firms, something they would like to prevent
at any cost. Despite the "kartoteka 2"
system--a system established to enforce financial
discipline--formal contract enforcement mechanisms
function poorly. A recent survey found that the
majority of Ukrainian private firms do not believe
that courts could be used effectively to enforce
contracts. The majority of disputes between enterprises
are resolved outside the courts, and firms have
to rely on informal mechanisms of contract enforcement
associated with high transaction costs.
High
taxes and government corruption are responsible
for the poor development of small and medium enterprises.
Several research groups estimate that more than
30 percent of Ukraine's real output is produced
in the shadow economy, one of the highest levels
among the transition economies. The majority of
the population is employed in both sectors of
the economy, official and informal. In as early
as 1994, a household survey found that more than
90 percent of randomly selected households were
producing in more than one economy. More recent
surveys of enterprise workers found that more
than 70 percent of households are involved in
different survival strategies in the natural and
informal sectors of the economy.
The
roots of Ukraine's slow progress in economic reforms
lie in the political economy, not in the innate
inability of Ukrainian society to establish an
effectively functioning market economy. While
the majority of the Ukrainian population is highly
risk-averse and is not interested in further dislocations
associated with economic reforms, the small group
of people that benefits from the current status
quo is able to control the key policy decisions
and sustain the system of the virtual economy.
Managers of enterprises and government officials
controlling financial and other resources benefit
from the sustainability of the system of barter,
nonpayments, and mutual cancellation of debts.
The virtual economy creates an attractive facade
for the international finance community, which
believes that economic reforms actually have taken
place in Ukraine. It also deceives the Ukrainian
public since the key economic processes remain
nontransparent and thus poorly understood.
Raphael Shen, University of Detroit
"The
States of Ukraine's Economy Today"
Ukraine's
productive forces were of strategic importance
to Moscow's long-term objectives. Ukraine, therefore,
was the most tightly controlled and regulated
regional entity among the former USSR's republics.
Its uniquely inherited economic structure thus
sets it apart from other NIS countries of the
region. The mainstay of Ukraine's industrial output
consisted of machine parts and semifinished products.
Distribution was controlled by Moscow, restricting
Ukraine's exchange activities to either with other
republics of the Union or with select members
of the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA). More than seven decades of integration
into the former USSR's system has left distinct
hurdles and uncommon difficulties for the newly
independent Ukraine.
Overview
Ukraine's overall economy has been on the decline
every year since independence. Industrial production
fell from 100 for 1990 to 45.7 for 1997. Gross
agricultural product decreased by 44.3 percent
during the same seven year period. Real GDP declined
by 62.5 percent between 1990 and 1997. Analysts
expected Ukraine's 1998 real GDP to grow and its
budget to balance, both for the first time since
independence. Instead, GDP fell by another 1.2
percent, and there was another budgetary deficit
in 1998. Gross investment as a percent of GDP
has also been decreasing, falling from 36.3 percent
for 1993 to an estimated 18.5 percent for 1998.
Production and productivity gains in the near
future, therefore, will be modest at best.
Production
Hyperinflation of the early 1990s wiped out the
retirees' lifelong savings. Low real wages have
likewise curtailed the purchasing power of those
still employed. Quality imports rise; demand for
domestically produced low-quality goods and services
falls. The need for maintaining capital assets
falls, justifying decapitalization rather than
capital accumulation. The scenario materializes
in industry. It takes place on farms. Productivity
and production continue contracting, with one
vicious cycle feeding into another, prolonging
the economy's sustained downward spiral.
Enterprises
Reduced consumer demand translates into reduced
sales. Enterprise income falls. A short-term solution
to an enterprise's declining financial position
and its rising unused capacity has been the sale
of its fixed assets. Workers also began appropriating
an enterprise's moveable assets, supplementing
their reduced real incomes. Decapitalization from
within and the depressed market from without combine
forces to further compromise an enterprise's productivity/production.
Financial insolvency deepens.
Farms
All farmland was supposed to be distributed to
collective members by July 1996. Only one half
of the collectives' land was distributed a year
after the target date. Many farmers do not leave
collectives. They have no farm equipment, no savings,
no knowledge, and no experience securing inputs/marketing
outputs on their own. They subsist instead on
whatever the collectives can produce and sell,
supplementing household needs with food produced
on private plots.
Wages
Real wage decreases have been stabilized in recent
years. However, by the end of the second quarter
of 1998 real wages had declined by more than 50
percent when compared with the same period six
years earlier. Most of the working-age population
seeks a second job or a combination of odd jobs.
An increasing share of family income now goes
to food purchases. The decrease in meat, dairy
products, and egg consumption is in part compensated
for by increased consumption of bread, potatoes,
cabbage, and animal fats. For acclimatizing to
and for coping with the drastically changed social
and economic conditions, the average Ukrainian
retreats into a defensive posture passively coping
with, instead of actively confronting, adversities.
Social and cultural conditioning during the Czarist
era and economic and political deprivation of
the Soviet decades have severely compromised the
average Ukrainian's ability to be responsive to
systemic transformation.
Social
Aspects
Since independence, income differentiation has
risen, the birth rate has fallen, death and suicide
rates have increased, and the number of divorces
and single-parent families has grown. The availability
and quality of health care have fallen. So has
the morale of teachers and public servants.
There
are successful entrepreneurs. Many of them were
Party officials having connections with either
those still in power or with the Mafia, or both.
The rise of the private sector is slow. The formation
of a middle-income class is slower. Structural
rigidity and functional efficiency persist. Ukraine's
economy still awaits bottoming out. When the economy
does begin climbing back up, it will be years
before it can regain its preindependence level
of production and consumption.
There
are other bright spots in Ukraine. There is free
mobility of labor resources. Well-connected enterprising
individuals may also initiate private endeavors
that were not permitted before. Goods and services
are now plentiful, though a significant portion
is imported and affordable only by the newly rich.
Consumers no longer stand in line to buy daily
necessities. There is free access to information
and freedom of expression that was inconceivable
under the Communists.
Social,
political, and cultural freedom would be more
palpable, however, if the average Ukrainian citizen
were to experience more successes.
Vitalij Garber, Garber International
Associates
"An
Investor's Perspective"
Ukraine
has moved from a centrally planned economy to
one that is still centrally controlled--the planning
portion has been removed, but the bureaucracy
has grown, and the amount of process has been
increased. Although the Ukrainian state started
with a relatively small bureaucracy, it has grown
exponentially. One way to control one's own projects
is to do big ones--little projects are at the
mercy of low-level corruption. While it is difficult
to be too critical of minor corruption, given
the low level of Ukrainian salaries, some of the
larger corruption is truly disturbing. Ukraine
also has totally unreasonable taxes.
So
how can Western investors deal in this environment?
First,
we need to stop expecting Ukraine to use US practices--no
other country uses these. We have to understand
that Ukraine has its own practices--it is not
all saunas and vodka there! And we should take
greater care to use the Ukrainian language instead
of simply assuming Russian will do.
Second,
it is important to recognize that there are two
separate Ukrainian business cultures.
-
One, a very entrepreneurial business culture
is generally found in smaller businesses.
These, unfortunately, are most often choked
out by corruption and taxes.
-
The other, the culture of larger businesses,
is the attitude that "someone will take
care of us." This culture also includes
a tendency to look to the center for direction
and pervasive micromanagement. It is particularly
prevalent in the state-owned enterprises,
and especially in the military-industrial
complex, which ironically had the best people
and resources.
A
third factor for investors to consider is the
special difficulties in dealing with big projects,
for example, on the order of the An-70 military
transport or the Sea Start rocket launch project.
Decisions on larger projects such as these are
made with the knowledge of the president, and
politics and internal benefits play a key role.
In dealing with big projects one should deal directly
with the top.
Smaller
projects--for instance, those entailing the export
of Ukrainian goods--are frequently easier. Still,
it is important even with these to have Ukrainian
partners, and one frequently has to close one's
eyes as to how the Ukrainian partners obtain their
approvals.
Looking
to the future, the promising startup of several
projects, particularly in agro-business and in
the steel sector, gives a lot of room for hope.
The need for tax reforms and corruption are the
biggest problems. Corruption is a phenomenon that
can be overcome fairly simply, but it will take
the concerted effort of a brave leadership. Overcoming
corruption will not happen from the bottom up,
at least no time in the near future. If the leadership
does make this effort, the investment climate
will improve. Ukraine also requires restructuring,
streamlining, and the development of a greater
sense of national identity. Ukraine has tremendous
human resources, which will bring it prosperity
when the circumstances are right. This will happen.
It is just a question of how quickly.
General
Discussion
The
presentations and discussion thus far have raised
several key questions: Is the Western economic
model becoming discredited? How does one create
a critical mass for effective change? How much
time does Ukraine have? The answers to these questions
are important for the West in trying to deal with
a country that has such problems as Ukraine.
A
participant recollected that, when the Marshall
Plan was launched, there had been opponents of
foreign aid in the United States who said we were
pouring money down a rat hole. He wondered whether
that might be the case with Ukraine today. Speakers
agreed that money is not the solution, although
it helps. Another argued that the United States
should focus on helping Ukraine develop a constituency
for reform by making use of media, establishing
regular contacts with the Rada, and so forth.
Then, we can assist in formulating a comprehensive
reform package. Assistance can then take the form
of direct or long-term credits and finding markets
for Ukrainian products.
Another
participant noted that Ukraine, and particularly
western Ukraine, has enjoyed fairly unrestricted
economic interchange with its neighbors to the
West since the breakup of the Soviet Union and
expressed concern that these trade relations might
be damaged when those neighbors join the EU. Millions
of shuttle traders who currently go to Poland
and Hungary could be hurt, particularly if those
countries introduce visa requirements. The effects
could go beyond the economic sphere: those traveling
to the West are exposed to European ways of life
that they have brought back. Increased restrictions
will have social and cultural implications as
well.
Much
discussion focused on the overwhelming number
of administrative obstacles to small businesses
in Ukraine, an environment that greatly hinders
their development. The small number of such businesses
there--roughly 200,000 at present--allows tax
inspectors, regulatory inspectors, and so forth
in the bloated Ukrainian bureaucracy to hit on
each enterprise many times during the course of
a year. The tax rate, on the other hand, is moving
in the right direction, even though it remains
high.
Participants
noted that there are many measures that the government
could take to improve conditions for small business
development: for example, it should document regulatory
measures and pare back those not really needed;
and it should find alternative employment opportunities
for those in the over-staffed bureaucracy so that
the system can change. But neither the government
nor the Rada has shown leadership on this front
because the existing structure benefits people
at various levels of executive power. Change will
require strong leadership: both the Ukrainian
people and international governments should keep
the executive branch's feet to the fire.
Section
Three
Ukraine and the International
System
Sherman
W. Garnett, The Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
"Kiev
and Moscow"
Three
stubborn facts influence Ukraine's place in the
world at large:
The
first is that Ukraine is a new state. Its state
institutions are still relatively weak, especially
in promoting the basic laws and policies required
to establish long-term economic, political, and
social well-being. Politically, Ukraine is in
fact a highly competitive oligarchy, mitigated
by important democratic and pluralistic features
such as elections and a diverse (but not fully
free) press. The competing factions in this oligarchy
are primarily concerned about the division of
wealth and power, not overall economic or social
good. Like other post-Soviet states, this kind
of politics is highly personal and corrupt. Ukrainian
civil society is weak, permitting the state to
function as it does without a reliable check on
its actions. Only at election time is this state
of affairs subject to overhauling from below,
which is why the past parliamentary and forthcoming
presidential elections are times of high anxiety
for the Ukrainian establishment. This preoccupation
with state-building and elite competition pushes
even basic foreign and security policy considerations
to the back burner, as well as delays the reforms
needed to ensure that Western-oriented policy
inclinations have deep roots in Ukraine at large.
The
second fact is that Ukraine is a divided society.
The source of this division is not (as many analysts
feared) the ethnic divisions between Russians
and Ukrainians. Rather, the main sources of division
are political, economic, and regional. Only Ukrainian
sovereignty is securely established throughout
the country. For some, this sovereignty is the
realization of a lifelong dream. For others, it
is simply an established fact to be reckoned with,
like the weather. Most other basic issues about
state and society in Ukraine remain unsettled,
from private property and basic social issues
to cultural and geopolitical orientation. Mercifully,
these divisions do not mirror ethnic ones, and
many of them also reflect not deep conviction
but a high degree of uncertainty and misunderstanding
in the population at large. These
divisions reveal that the squabbling that goes
on among factions in the Ukrainian foreign policy
community over NATO or CIS integration takes place
against a still unformed national, political,
and geopolitical identity for the country as a
whole.
A
third fact is that Ukraine remains "in-between"
geographically. The enormous geopolitical changes
that helped to give birth to an independent Ukraine
have nevertheless left it as a key state in between
Russia and NATO or the European Union. This geography
matters a lot. Consider what Poland's post-1989
fate might now be if the Soviet Union had not
fallen or Belarus and Ukraine did not become independent.
No doubt, the Poles would still have found ways
to reform internally and to move westward, but
Poland's ambitions were aided greatly by the disappearance
of a significant border with a strong eastern
neighbor opposed to Poland's integration with
the West. Ukraine, potentially, has such a neighbor.
This geographic link should not require the West
to treat Ukraine and Russia as linked in all matters,
but some sort of link exists and does matter.
The West's Ukrainian policy cannot be conceived
without regard for geography. Ukraine cannot act
without taking Russia into account; Poland no
longer has to.
These
stubborn facts suggest several conclusions about
Ukraine as an international actor in the next
decade: first and foremost, that Ukraine is embarked
on a long and potentially unstable transition.
This transition stretches out the timeline for
defining Ukraine's place in Central Europe, or
the former USSR, or Europe as a whole. Ukraine
will remain a state likely to muddle through,
unable and unwilling to define itself once and
for all as either a European or Eurasian state.
The great danger is that these facts and the West's
indifference could result over the next several
years in Ukraine's peripheralization from the
European mainstream. Indeed, many politicians
in Ukraine and in the EU are glad of a situation
in which Ukraine is not qualified for membership
in Europe's main institutions. It relieves both
sides from
serious policy decisions. Yet the constraints
and delays affect both ambitious Western-oriented
policies and leftist visions of deep integration
with Russia or the CIS. Indeed, the notion that
any drift away from Europe is necessarily a movement
toward Russia is wrong. The left, various economic,
political and ethnic interests in the east and
south, and other groups constrain Ukraine's European
choice, but other economic, regional, and ethnic
interests equally constrain efforts to pursue
an "Eastern" or "Russian"
choice.
The
major factors affecting Ukrainian foreign policy
are internal ones. Internal divisions and economic
problems become more urgent than any foreign policy
problem short of major war. These factors also
rob Ukraine of the ability to bring real resources
to the table. They are more important in the making
and sustaining of a European-oriented policy because
this policy requires sustained Ukrainian political
and economic reforms. Sustained Europeanization
requires sacrifice. A small, Western-oriented
foreign policy elite cannot "sneak"
the country into the EU.
Russia
remains Ukraine's most important external influence.
The need for normalization of Russian-Ukrainian
relations is obvious, both for Ukraine itself
and for European stability. Significant progress
has been made toward this end with the 1997 Friendship
Treaty and Black Sea Fleet Agreement. Yet this
work is unfinished. Without such a normalization,
given the basic political, economic, and military
advantages Russia enjoys, a fairly significant
power gap is likely to emerge, one based on Russia's
size, natural resources, economic potential, and
military power. Such a gap has, in the past, been
fatal to Ukraine's independence. Yet, so far,
Russia's own internal economic and political troubles
have made it difficult for Moscow to use its economic,
political, ethnic, or military influence in a
productive way. To date, this basic incapacity
of the Russian state has been as much of a factor
in Russia's Ukrainian policy as the pragmatism
of the Yel'tsin government. Yet, long-term Russian
incapacity is neither likely nor a stable basis
for normalized Russian-Ukrainian relations. Russian-Ukrainian
relations cannot simply continue down the same
road without a more thorough normalization of
national identities and ambitions on both sides
and the prospect of at least some serious integration
into the European and global systems.
Ukraine's
relations with its neighbors, Poland, Romania,
and its partners in the GUUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova)
group play an increasingly important role in the
region. These relations are part of the larger
pattern of fragmentation within the former USSR
and diversification of ties to states outside
the former USSR. GUUAM initially brought four
CIS states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and
Moldova) together to oppose revisions to the flank
limitations in the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe. Now joined by Uzbekistan, it
seeks deeper cooperation on security and energy
issues. Polish-Ukrainian relations have blossomed
into a full-blown strategic partnership. Romania
and Ukraine have eliminated or at least mitigated
potential sources of conflict in the bilateral
relationship, opening the way to genuine cooperation
in this part of East Central Europe. These new
diplomatic patterns provide a counterweight to
pressures from Russia, but their real test is
whether they can act positively together on a
more ambitious agenda.
Ukraine's
relations with the West have entered a difficult
stage. Though the notion of Ukraine's strategic
importance is more widespread than ever, many
in the West have turned to other criteria--political
and economic reforms, investment conditions, the
death penalty, or the treatment of individual
Western businesses--as the measuring stick for
judging Ukraine and its long-term place in the
West. And by such measures, Ukraine's progress
is not substantial. Ukraine's basic success in
muddling along and its failure to inspire Western
confidence in near-term improvement create in
major Western countries a view that current conditions
inside the country and between Russia and Ukraine
will somehow remain as they are without substantial
Western efforts. There is comfort in this notion
because it means the West can postpone hard decisions
about Ukraine's place in core Western institutions.
Yet, such an approach ignores the positive role
Western engagement has played in sustaining positive
trends within Ukraine and between Ukraine and
Russia. Though the West played no formal mediating
role in issues other than denuclearization, the
shadow of the West continues to fall directly
on Ukrainian internal and foreign policy. Both
Russia and Ukraine understand their actions have
consequences for Europe and the West as a whole.
If the West signals to both countries that they
are permanently assigned to the periphery, it
would surely remove an important prop for the
muddling through that many in the West now take
for granted. An extended cycle of Ukrainian internal
economic and political stagnation and Western
neglect of Ukraine would alter the factors that
make the current situation tolerable within Ukraine
and less dangerous for Ukraine's neighbors. It
would exacerbate economic deprivation in the country
as a whole, particularly along crucial ethnic
and regional faultlines, such as Crimea. Western
disengagement from Ukraine would also remove a
support for stable Ukrainian-Russian relations.
A peripheral and stagnant Ukraine would increase
the danger that NATO and EU would find themselves
facing an uncertain and unstable frontier.
Given
these facts, what is lacking is a Western strategic
consensus on Ukraine that recognizes both a common
interest in Ukrainian stability and independence
and fashions a transitional strategy that recognizes
this interest and the reality of Ukraine's current
shortcomings. Such a strategy would recognize
that Ukraine currently falls short of making a
serious claim on membership in either NATO or
the EU. Yet, it should not close the door to long-term
membership. It should not decide now, once and
for all, Ukraine's (or Russia's) place in Europe.
Indeed, it should recognize that the deepening
of the existing lines of division within Europe
is a sign of failure. A Western strategy for a
Ukraine in transition ought to concentrate on
ensuring the free movement of goods, ideas, and
people. It should extend some genuine
security benefits to nonmember states, including
providing support and encouragement for the normalization
of Russian-Ukrainian relations.
It
is crucial that the West find a way to knit Ukraine,
Poland, and Romania to it and each other: some
by membership over time, others by increasingly
beneficial ties of mutual advantage to the EU,
NATO, and key Western powers. Instead, a Western
strategy should concentrate on coordinating disparate
Western economic and technical assistance; expanding
aid to Ukrainian civil organizations and political
parties, especially in the center; encouraging
military reform and security integration; and
sustaining Western engagement in Ukraine and Ukrainian-Russian
relations.
The
West needs to realize that, with regard to Ukraine,
it is still riding the wave of events that occurred
in 1989-91. These events gave the West the unprecedented
opportunity to refashion a security order in Europe
that has at least the chance to eliminate the
sources of major war on the continent, but this
opportunity also imposes the heavy responsibility
of seeing this work through to the end. And that
work is unfinished as long as Ukraine is adrift.
Dr. Taras Kuzio, University of North
London
"Ukraine
in its Regional Context"
Foreign
policy orientations in Ukraine are divided into
two main groups: the Westernizers and the Slavophiles,
each of which has its own radical and pragmatist
wings. When investigating foreign policy preferences
in Ukraine, we can largely rule out both radical
camps as having decisive influences. These hostile
camps support either a rapid drive to NATO, EU,
and Western European Union (WEU) membership or
the revival of the former USSR through membership
of the Russian-Belarusian union. The two key foreign
policy camps are, therefore, the two pragmatic
wings. This signifies that Ukraine is likely to
steer a middle, neutral, nonbloc course between
two "extremes"--that followed by either
Estonia or Belarus. These pragmatists incorporate
the majority of Ukraine's elite from within the
Leonid Kuchma-Leonid Kravchuk camps (the pragmatic
Westernizers) and the Oleksandr Moroz-Oleksandr
Tkachenko camps (the pragmatic Slavophiles).
-
The four leading presidential candidates in
the 31 October elections are from the two
pragmatic wings--Kuchma-Marchuk and Moroz-Tkachenko.
Of these four candidates two represent the
pro-Western, reform (Kuchma) and pan-Slavic
(Tkachenko) orientations. The second round
of the presidential elections is likely to
be a contest between a pragmatic Westernizer
(Kuchma) and a pragmatic Slavophile (Moroz
or Tkachenko).
Ukraine
and the CIS
Ukrainian
policies toward the CIS have continued to be based
upon the following objectives:
-
Preference for bilateral, economic relations.
-
Opposition to political or military integration.
-
Support for the CIS as a loose discussion
club (rather than a new geopolitical entity).
-
Opposition to membership in the CIS (Ukraine
remains only a "participant").
-
Good relations with Russia but different definitions
as to their "strategic partnership."
Ukraine
is also playing a key role in developing the GUUAM
group that unites pragmatic Westernizers (that
is, like Kuchma in Ukraine). GUUAM has de facto
split the CIS into two equal camps with their
opponents grouped around the Russian-Belarusian
union and, therefore, prevents Russia from becoming
the hegemon over the CIS. GUUAM opposes the transformation
of the CIS with supranational structures. Its
members are united by their search for alternate
energy sources, hostility to Russian-backed separatism,
integration outside the CIS, and close cooperation
with NATO. Without Ukraine (that is, if Tkachenko
or Moroz won the October elections), GUUAM would
not survive, and the Russophile camp in the CIS
would grow.
Ukraine
and the West
Ukraine's
four key Western allies are the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Turkey
can also be added to this list. The least interested
in Ukraine is France. The attitude of the remaining
Western countries lies between France and the
four partners.
NATO-Ukraine
relations are far more advanced than EU-Ukraine,
partly as a consequence of the strong North American
interest in Ukraine. NATO still lacks a comprehensive
strategy toward Ukraine; currently individual
directorates pursue independent programs.
The
EU is unwilling to treat Ukraine as a potential
future member (it is not included in the "slow
track" list) since it is unwilling to treat
Ukraine as separate from Russia. The inclusion
of Ukraine in the "slow track" group
would be a political decision and dependent upon
Ukraine's fulfilling certain criteria in economic-political
reform.
Strategic
Options
Ukraine's
options are limited due to its geographic location,
poor record of reform, domestic constraints, and
unlikelihood of early EU, WEU, or NATO membership.
Although the West supports a more robust reform
process in Ukraine, it cannot offer Ukraine the
ultimate "carrot"--EU, WEU, and NATO
membership. The West is clear that it does not
want Ukraine to help revive a new eastern Slavic
or post-Soviet union. But the West remains unclear
as to where Ukraine is to fit into the new European
security architecture.
Ian Brzezinski, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
"Ukraine
and the West"
As
Ukraine approaches its October presidential election,
it finds itself part of a continent of dynamic
change and competing priorities. In the last decade
alone, Europe has been transformed by the collapse
of the Soviet empire and the subsequent emergence
of Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
as independent states. Unprecedented political
and economic integration in Western Europe has
been initiated by the EU, and these processes
are now being extended to Central Europe. Last
March, NATO brought itself to Ukraine's western
frontier by granting membership to Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary.
These
events and processes are important steps toward
a Europe that is undivided, democratic, and secure.
Nonetheless, Europe's future remains volatile.
EU and NATO enlargement has only just begun. Their
continuation will require great political and
economic effort. Russia's transformation to a
genuinely post-imperial democracy is far from
assured. Bringing peace to the Balkans will pose
significant military and financial challenges
to NATO and the EU for the foreseeable future.
Just
as important as any of the above to Europe's future
is the future of Ukraine, a state whose resurgent
national identity was no small factor in the Soviet
Union's demise. During the 1990s, the West expended
great effort and resources to assist the consolidation
of Ukrainian independence. However, today Ukraine's
chronic political and economic crises now undercut
Kiev's potential to compete with the West's other
priorities in Europe. They make uncertain what
kind of state Ukraine will become, what sort of
relationship it will have with the West, and ultimately
what role it will play in this evolving continent.
The
Ambiguity of Ukraine's Relationship With the West
After
nearly eight years of independence, Ukraine is
now an enduring reality in European affairs. It
will not disappear from the map of Europe as it
did earlier this century. The peaceful way Ukraine
has consolidated its political independence has
been Ukraine's most important contribution to
post-Cold War Europe. In light of its geographic
size--nearly equal to that of the Visegrad Four
combined--and its difficult history with Russia,
this is a remarkable accomplishment, one essential
to ensuring Russia's emergence as a democratic,
postimperial state. These factors helped generate
great Western interest and hope for Ukraine.
Ukraine's
relationship with the West has always been beleaguered
with ambiguity. It lacks the clarity of direction
and goals that distinguishes the West's relationship
with other Central European countries. Whereas
the Visegrad and Baltic countries have had their
strongly voiced aspirations for NATO and EU membership
endorsed by the West, Ukraine's future as a European
state is an issue that both sides have great difficulty
addressing.
One
cause of this ambiguity has been the absence of
consensus in Kiev. It is true that over the last
two years, President Leonid Kuchma's government
has more assertively voiced its pro-Western orientation.
It has declared Ukraine's aspiration to join the
EU, and its officials now publicly signal that
sometime in the future Ukraine will seek NATO
membership. In contrast, the leftist leadership
of Ukraine's parliament, the Supreme Rada, vocally
advocates economic integration into the Commonwealth
of Independent States or a Slavic Union with Belarus
and Russia. (Attitudes of the Ukrainian public
fluctuate between those of the government and
Supreme Rada's dominant clique.)
The
West's response to Ukrainian aspirations to join
its core institutions has ranged from cool to
indifferent. The EU responds dismissively to Ukraine's
application for associate membership--a critical
step toward full membership. This response has
been disillusioning for those in Kiev who support
reform and close relations with the West. And
it is easy to understand why many Ukrainians fear
that the EU is consciously excluding their country
from Europe.
Today,
Ukraine has a treaty on Partnership and Cooperation
with the EU. The only other countries with such
an agreement are Russia, Belarus, and Moldova.
While a PC agreement broadens market access, it
is essentially a static document compared to associate
membership treaties, whose preambles explicitly
declare that their purpose is to facilitate EU
membership.
Associate
members include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland,
Romania, Macedonia, and Albania. The political
and economic shortcomings of some of these countries
exceed those of Kiev. Moreover, the EU's implementation
of association agreements is making it difficult
for countries, such as Poland, to sustain their
efforts to deepen social and economic relations
with Ukraine.
NATO,
on the other hand, has energetically engaged Ukraine.
An aggressive program of consultation was initiated
through the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter. Allied
and Partner forces now regularly exercise on Ukrainian
territory and waters under the auspices of the
Partnership for Peace Program. However, like the
EU--albeit more tactfully--the Alliance refuses
to address the issue of whether or not Ukrainian
membership is a plausible objective.
Ukraine's
Internal Stagnation
Contributing
significantly to the West's unenthusiastic response
to Kiev's European aspirations is Ukraine's failing
internal situation. Over the last decade, Ukraine's
GDP has steadily declined, and growth for 1999
is predicted to be negative four percent. Nearly
40 percent of the population is said to live at
or below the poverty level. Most Ukrainians live
at a standard below that which they experienced
during the Soviet era. Decisive government action
to turn around the economy is stymied by chronic
corruption and a paralyzing political standoff
between old-guard leftists and a center-right
nomenklatura from the Soviet era whose commitment
to real political and economic reform has yet
to be proven.
After
a decade of billions of dollars of assistance,
loans, and credits, Western governments are growing
impatient with Ukraine's lack of progress. The
Council of Europe is now considering suspending
Ukraine's membership due to the latter's unfulfilled
commitment to abolish capital punishment and its
declining press freedoms. Suspension or expulsion
from the Council of Europe would deny Kiev an
important means to mitigate the now isolating
effects of EU enlargement.
High
levels of frustration with Ukraine are also very
palpable in the US Congress, one of Ukraine's
most generous and ardent supporters. While Congress
continues to assure Ukraine high levels of US
assistance ($195 million for FY 1999), appropriations
now include the unusual condition that assistance
to Ukraine can only be released upon certification
that Kiev is making tangible progress in economic
reform and combating corruption.
Three
Futures
Considering
these circumstances, one can visualize three near-term
futures for Ukraine after its fall presidential
elections:
-
The first is for a politically and economically
failing Ukraine to turn eastward and seek
economic reintegration into Russia. While
this path has been rejected by President Kuchma,
it has been vociferously advocated by the
Speaker of the Supreme Rada and other leftist
candidates challenging Kuchma in this October's
presidential elections. If Kiev were to adopt
this policy, it could lead to a deeply divided
and unstable Ukraine and would prompt the
reanimation of the worst elements of past
Russian foreign policy.
-
A second future that one cannot dismiss is
a Ukraine that is a politically unstable economic
basket case. (This is how a growing number
in the West perceive Ukraine today.) This
future would likely prompt the West to curtail
its economic assistance to Kiev. A decline
in such engagement from the West would exacerbate
Ukraine's internal divisions and weaknesses,
rendering it more vulnerable to pressures
from an assertive Russia.
-
A third, and unfortunately unlikely, near-term
future is for Ukraine to emerge as a stable,
pro-Western democracy, one that meets the
political and economic requirements necessary
to integrate into NATO and the EU. However,
for that to happen, Ukraine will have to make,
on its own, the difficult internal decisions
necessary to overcome its economic stagnation,
its rampant corruption, and its polarized
politics.
Until
the components of the third scenario develop,
it will be increasingly difficult for Kiev to
compete with the priorities now dominating the
West's European agenda: Russia, EU and NATO enlargement,
and the Balkans. Kiev's mixed signals and disillusioning
domestic realities reinforce the West's exaggerated
fear of antagonizing Russia by expressly endorsing
Ukrainian aspirations to join NATO and the EU.
They undercut significantly, in Western eyes,
the legitimacy and relevance of those aspirations.
As long as Kiev's reforms remain in low gear,
Ukraine will be increasingly seen--albeit wrongfully--as
a liability rather than an asset in the West's
effort to prompt a genuine reform in Russia.
Ukraine
should be a central component of the West's strategy
for Europe, and it would serve the West's interest
to encourage Ukrainian aspirations to join the
EU and NATO. However, after a decade of billions
of dollars of Western assistance, the initiative
must now come foremost from a Ukraine characterized
by aggressive reform.
General
Discussion
Participants
agreed that Ukraine's integration into Europe
would greatly support stability on the continent
and within Ukraine itself. They noted, however,
that unlike the countries of Central Europe, Ukraine
itself is taking a meandering path toward European
integration. Is this because of Ukraine's poor
domestic reform record or the West's reluctance?
Discussants felt that it is probably a bit of
both. Ukraine is just too big to digest as a country
for the EU. But the crucial question is whether
Ukraine can develop a coherent reform program,
and the prospects for that are dubious because
Kiev's radical reformers are too small a force
to propel it in that direction.
EU
membership would be a unifying factor for Ukraine,
but when the EU first approached Ukraine about
a relationship, it raised debate there. Nevertheless,
according to one speaker, Kuchma focused on the
EU both because he recognized that the EU is beginning
to lock down on which countries can join and because
he knew that NATO membership could create difficulties
in Ukraine's relationship with Russia. Given the
long path to joining the EU, Kuchma's indications
that he wants Ukraine to join the EU are really
his way of waving the flag about his Western orientation
without having to seriously pursue it.
The
same speaker noted that the different historical
paths of Central and Eastern Europe on the one
hand and Western Europe on the other over the
past century cannot be overcome in just a few
years, but claimed that the differences can be
mitigated. He opined that growing divisions would
reflect a failure of Western policy.
Section
Four
Society and Ukraine's
Future
Volodimyr
Polokhalo, Editor-in-Chief,
Ukranian Scholarly Journal Politychna dumka (Political
Thought)
"Ukraine
in the Electoral Context"
The
political scene in Ukraine is stirring in anticipation
of the presidential elections, which are to be
held for the third time since independence. Unlike
the cases in 1991 and 1994, the preparation of
major political actors for the forthcoming elections
began well in advance, practically right after
the elections to the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament)
of Ukraine in March last year.
In
Ukraine, as in many other post-Soviet countries,
the presidency is a new institution in the system
of power but it is undoubtedly the apex of political
life. The elections themselves make it possible
to uncover the logic and trends of political developments
without waiting for the moment when the formation
of the political system and the consolidation
of the political regime and major political forces
take on more or less clear-cut forms.
The
majority of most influential parties and political
leaders of present-day Ukraine are direct descendants
of the Communist Party of Ukraine of Soviet times
(obviously, except for the Rukh People's Movement
of Ukraine, which was established during perestroyka).
The point is that the regime's liberalization
in the second half of the 1980s led to, among
other things, a rather rapid transmogrification
of the value system and world outlook among functionaries
of the top and medium echelons of the USSR Communist
Party and Soviet apparatus. As a result, by the
early 1990s the Party and its republican components
enjoyed a rather heterogeneous ideological structure.
In
August 1991 an orthodox group of the top leadership
attempted to restore the Party's (and society's)
ideological unity by staging a putsch, but instead,
only accelerated centrifugal processes. The ban
on activities of the republican Communist Party
in Ukraine and, later, the lifting of the ban
and the emergence of a number of Left-oriented
parties, as well as the subsequent behavior of
a portion of Ukraine's Communist Party apparatchiks,
fail to obscure the original structure of the
party and Soviet elite. One can discern at least
five different groups, trends, or even "parties"
within that structure, which was earlier referred
to as the "Communist Party of Ukraine"
and which in the first half of the 1990s formed
a certain segment of the "pluralist political
reality."
-
First are those who took up business during
the perestroyka period, making use of the
property and funds of the Communist Party
as well as solid connections with influential
managers of the national economy. In the second
half of the 1990s they joined various parties
claiming to represent center-left and centrist
orientations (the Agrarian Party, the People's
Democratic Party, and so forth) or openly
supported some of them. It is precisely they
who are most often called the party of power.
They either directly make decisions on behalf
of the state or essentially influence the
decision-making process.
-
Second are those who tried to combine the
orthodox Communist idea and an assemblage
of Marxist-Leninist ideals with market-economy
realities. Private ownership was already recognized
by them as an agent of economic and political
life, but exploitation of man by man was considered
unacceptable. They formed a renewed Communist
Party of Ukraine, whose party ticket at the
1998 elections to the Verkhovna Rada evinced
this evolution in the formulation about "private
producers who do not exploit other people's
labor." Common to them also was a nostalgia
for the "union of equal peoples"
as the most attractive form of coexistence
of nations.
-
Third are those who have gradually but steadfastly
drifted to social-democratic positions, breaking
off with Communist sloganeering and orienting
on the values of popular solidarity, justice,
sovereignty, and independence. A significant
portion of them joined the Socialist Party,
which was formed during the ban on the Communist
Party as its substitute, but consciously distanced
itself after the ban was lifted from the classical
dogmas of the Communist doctrine and tried
to develop its own ideological foundation
and slogans.
-
The fourth are the bearers of radical, strictly
Bolshevik views, advocates of restoring collectivist
relations who articulate the interests of
the poorest layers of the population; they
are uncompromising critics of the authorities
who speak for economic liberalization and
act in accordance with liberal ideas. In Ukraine,
they are represented by the Progressive Socialist
Party (PSP) and by a number of public organizations
that are less aggressively disposed to the
powers that be but which wield little influence.
-
Fifth are those who, for reasons of age or
other reasons, failed or did not essay to
make their political career during Soviet
times. They are present in politics and have
consciously disassociated themselves from
the Leftist past, but basically have failed
to clearly define their political orientations.
They would support a charismatic leader if
there was one, but instead they join forces
in short-lived coalitions with politicians
who now, to varying degree, control the main
public resources and, hence, are capable of
ensuring that the former realize their private
interests or the interests of narrow interest
groups, which are usually referred to in the
press as "clans" or "oligarchies."
The
above-mentioned political courses are most adequately
reflected in and personified by the most likely
candidates for the presidency--Natalia Vitrenko,
Leonid Kuchma, Yevhen Marchuk, Oleksandr Moroz
, Petro Symonenko and Oleksandr Tkachenko.
The
future will be easily recognizable since it will
probably look a lot like the present. Certain
realities have formed in the national economy
and the political life of society, either spontaneously
or as a result of intentional actions of the authorities,
which remain either to be augmented or transformed
or even pulled down. Today these realities manifest
themselves as:
-
The concentration of the greatest amount of
capital with the central and local authorities
and the transformation of governance into
a profitmaking business.
-
The federalization of the country, which has
gone very far, as a result of the transaction
exchanging a portion of the powers of the
central authorities for the loyalty of regional
elites.
-
The politicization of public administration
bodies, as a result of which appointments
to major posts and removals from posts are
carried out on the basis of political favoritism
rather than professional competence and expertise.
-
The loss of real economic manageability, the
subjection of economic matters to fleeting
political circumstances, the disregard for
laws, and overall corruption.
It
is not difficult to notice that, when theoretical
concepts are formulated or new realities considered,
political scientists do not always take into regard
those changes taking place in Ukraine that have
already been described. What are the changes occurring
in the nonpolitical and, particularly, the sociocultural
realm? Do the changes in these areas mean that
the democratic prospects for post-Communist development
and civil society formation are predetermined
for us? Or is a totally different historical alternative
more realistic to a number of societies, including
Ukraine?
It
seems that there is no direct dependence between
institutional changes in the political and legal
area (as in the economic area), on the one hand,
and phenomena inherent in the social and cultural
sphere of post-Communist societies, on the other.
These divergent and manifold changes obviously
differ significantly in character, parameters,
scale, and time.
Moreover,
a considerable gap is apparent today in Ukraine
between the sociocultural world, the actual state
of social integration (social norms and values,
mentality, thinking and attitude of citizens to
life realities, standards of behavior and socialization,
moral and practical communicative experience),
and between the officially declared general goals
("democracy," "lawful state,"
"civil society," and so forth).
Ukrainian
society stepped out of a 70-year period spent
in the former USSR without any preconditions for
civilized democratic development: no features
of civil society, no pro-democratic national elite,
no fully developed national culture or national
thinking. Therefore, the Ukrainian type of post-Communism
emerges not as a transition to democracy, but
as an evolutionary effect of the former Soviet
political system, as a certain logical and natural
inertia of Communist history. It is not strange
that the Ukrainian post-Soviet society (in contrast
to the Polish one, for instance) retains a good
deal of essential features inherited from the
past, which has a decisive impact on today's changes.
This "past" will probably determine
the tendencies of post-Communist development both
in the nearest and distant future.
In
their majority, the post-Soviet population in
Ukraine remains indifferent to the inclusion of
democratic standards and principles--in fact,
the values of the civil society--into the sphere
of their sociocultural life. This is a case of
the "dead reaching out to drag down the living":
the sprouts of civil society are pushed out to
the periphery by the non-civil society.
In
the end, we are apparently dealing with a hybrid
type of social order and political regime, a modern
variety of totalitarianism, under which the comprehensive
control, systematic coercion, and violence (or
the threat) is legitimately carried out by the
post-Communist oligarchical power with respect
to the majority of the people, with exploitation
of democratic technologies. In contrast to "classical"
totalitarianism, this variety of totalitarianism
is implemented not in strict but in relatively
mild forms through a variety of many-dimensional
and stable dependencies (both overt and covert:
sociocultural, legal, economic, and so forth).
The
present situation in Ukraine four months before
the presidential election--with the left political
spectrum of all shades against the incumbent President--has
determined the two basic factors influencing the
mood of the electorate: (a) their current socioeconomic
status and (b) their foreign political leanings
(toward Europe, toward Russia and the "Slavic
Union," or a balanced foreign policy without
expressly defined priorities). These, in turn,
imply particular concepts of the future state
system and its membership in political and nonpolitical
unions. Both factors may supplement or prevail
over each other.
The
foreign political geography of contemporary Ukraine
has been developing since its independence. According
to data obtained through the monitoring survey
conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Sociology
at the National Academy of Sciences and the Foundation
for Democratic Initiatives in 1998, almost 48
percent of the population were oriented toward
the CIS countries and a union with Russia and
Belarus (5 percent for Russia alone), 13 percent
believed it was necessary to integrate into European
organizations and NATO, and 23 percent were insisting
on keeping a similar distance from both these
centers of influence and relying on our own resources
(another 11 percent were uncertain or had other
opinions). The above figures remained almost the
same for the last five years; it means that this
factor is stable in its effect on the mood of
the electorate.
The
results of the presidential elections in Ukraine
may significantly reveal the real structure of
the electorate. At the same time, some provisional
conclusions can possibly be made on the basis
of preferences expressed by respondents in surveys
arranged by sociology centers and services with
regard to the candidates.
One
can distinguish five major categories of voters:
-
Those who will be primarily concerned with
their own economic status in making their
choice and who adapted to the existing economy
and feel themselves quite confident within
it. These voters amount to 15 to 18 percent
of the voting population. They sympathize
with Kuchma and Marchuk; Tkachenko is also
acceptable for some of them.
-
Those who will be primarily concerned with
their own economic status in making their
choice but who failed to adapt and suffered
the most from the redistribution of property
and who see no prospects under the present
state of affairs. These voters amount to some
20 percent, and Vitrenko is the mouthpiece
of their despair and hopes.
-
Those who are both concerned with their own
economic status and are committed to the Communist
idea, which traditionally presupposes the
orientation towards certain unions. They comprise
10 to 15 percent of the voters and support
Symonenko and Tkachenko.
-
Ten to15 percent of the voting population
are concerned with their own economic status
and support a "soft" socialist idea
associated with Moroz.
-
Fifteen to 20 percent is composed of those
for whom the idea of statehood and European
choice is more important than their economic
status. This means, for example, that even
officially unemployed people in western Ukraine
and other oblasts will vote for a nonleft
candidate. Only Kuchma and Marchuk can compete
for these votes.
Among
the five major categories of voters, two are mostly
"economic," another two are mostly "economic
and ideological," and one is mostly "statehood-oriented
and patriotic." There is no absolute leader
in the presidential campaign, and all candidates
have some chances, for the political market has
not yet been structured once and for all. There
are two playing fields that do not overlap, where
different candidates will compete for the vote.
In one of the fields (30 to 35 percent of electors)
Kuchma and Marchuk are major competitors. (It
is too late for other candidates of the right
and centrist parties to jump in, and even if are
nominated they will only be able to play for the
sake of participation itself, in order to "warm
up" themselves and the parties and blocs
they represent. Another field, where the electorate
of left parties is concentrated (no more than
40 percent), will be shared by a minimum of three
to maximum four nominees. One of them will certainly
pass on to the second round.
The
following perspective on the situation is now
also quite clear: the President of Ukraine will
be elected by only one-third of the electorate.
Dominique Arel, Brown University, Watson
Institute
"Political
Parties in Ukraine"
When
one examines the current state of the Ukrainian
political system, three words come to mind: regionalization,
fragmentation and, to a lesser, yet increasingly
significant extent, polarization.
All
the parties that were relatively successful electorally,
with the exception of the rather disingenuous
Greens, have their main constituency in one particular
region of Ukraine. The Communists, although they
did fairly well throughout Ukraine outside of
the Western provinces, still get their most concentrated
support in the industrial Donbas. The two Socialist
parties have their base in lesser urban areas
of the Left Bank, while the two agrarian parties
(one of which is not represented in parliament)
obviously appeal to rural voters, yet are split
along a south-west axis. Nationalist parties continue
to capture the vote in Galicia and Volyn' (Volhynia)
and to fall just about everywhere else. And three
party lists, hurriedly put together at the last
election around current or former high governmental
officials, barely made it to parliament thanks
to their popularity in one or a few oblasts--Dnipropetrovs'ka
for Lazarenko's Hromada, Zakarpats'ka and Chernivets'ka
for the Kravchuk-Marchuk coalition, and central
Ukrainian oblasts for the governing party of Pustovoytenko.
Regionalization
per se can breed fragmentation, as with the case
of the two agrarian parties. Yet an important
trend in Ukrainian politics is the extent to which
rival parties born out of splits attempt to capture
the same constituency. The trend began during
the 1994 parliamentary elections, in what was
then the most politically structured region of
western Ukraine, with several nationalist parties
intensely competing for seats. It hit the small,
yet determined core of reformers whose leaders
(Pynzenyk and Holovatyi) shot themselves in the
foot by running on different lists in the 1998
election and both striking out. It then spread
to the east with the firebrand Vitrenko breaking
away from the Socialists. It has accelerated in
the past year with almost one third of parliamentary
deputies joining new factions: the nationalist
Rukh split in two shortly before Chornovil's death;
the Socialist and Peasant parties, which shared
the same party list, are now divided in their
loyalty to Moroz or Tkachenko; Lazarenko's sidekick
Tymoshenko brought two-third of Hromada's deputies
with her in her Fatherland faction after the former
Prime Minister fled the country, and even the
governing party, NDP, spawned a new faction called
"Revival of Regions."
Polarization
can occur when ideologically opposed parties are
powerful enough to render a political compromise
over a highly charged issue elusive or very fragile.
In the 1994-98 parliament, even though the neo-Communist
Left and the nationalist Right were rhetorically
poles apart, parliament was rarely polarized on
actual votes. This has changed since the last
election for two main reasons. First, even though
the overall balance between left and right had
not been significantly affected by the results
of the 1998 elections, it changed sufficiently
at the margin to allow the Left to carry extremely
close votes on defining issues. The votes to join
the CIS Inter-Parliamentary
Assembly, to denounce the bombing of Serbia as
an "aggressive" act and to support the
renuclearization of Ukraine, were all obtained
with the barest of majorities, sometimes with
the very minimum of 225 votes. (Very close votes
can have very significant long-term impact. Yel'tsin,
after all, was elected Chairman of the Russian
Parliament with a majority of two votes in 1990).
Second,
the new speaker of parliament, Tkachenko, has
been much more willing than his predecessor Moroz
to push forward divisive votes. In Ukraine, although
economic issues dominate debates, the most divisive
questions pertain to Russia. Disagreements over
the symbolic aspect of the Russian question (state
emblems and status of languages) came to a head
during the adoption of the Constitution in 1996.
A compromise was arrived at, thanks to the almost
herculean efforts of Marchuk and Moroz, whereby
the Communists conceded the "nationalist"
state emblems and the sole official status of
Ukrainian in return for vagueness over the legal
usage of Russian and the maintenance of Crimea's
political autonomy. In the 1994-97 parliament,
there were no votes over the foreign policy orientation
of Ukraine. With Tkachenko at the helm, however,
they have become a regular feature, a shift further
crystallized by the precedent-breaking NATO war
in Yugoslavia. For four years, Ukraine had been
pursuing an increasingly pro-Western, pro-"European"
foreign policy, getting progressively closer to
NATO, over Russia's objections. The Ukrainian
parliament, itself divided down the middle, is
now increasingly objecting.
What
are the chances for reform in the current political
party landscape? With the hard Left fixated on
the past and the Right fixated on the Russian
threat (with its more pragmatic, economy-focused
subset sabotaging its own electoral chances due
to infighting), the hope in 1998 was for a new
wave of businessmen to lead parliament in making
hard choices. However, it is becoming increasingly
clear that the so-called centrist deputies are
interested in playing the patronage game, which
means currying favor with the state to obtain
regional monopolies or privileged access to sources
of revenues, and remaining uninterested in streamlining
tax laws or, on the whole, in making more transparent
and equitable the rule of law.
The
tragedy of the past four years in Ukraine, considering
the expectations generated early on in his mandate,
is how little interested Kuchma has become in
establishing the true foundations of reform in
Ukraine, despite the empty rhetoric of supporting
IMF-mandated reforms (whose efficacy, in any case,
are increasingly called into question in the West).
Kuchma's power rests increasingly on the politics
of personal enrichment by beneficiaries of the
state at the expense of the state's capacity to
address very serious socio-economic problems.
The financial impudence of Lazarenko and Volkov
do not appear to be deviations from the prevailing
norm. In the current state
of party politics, the initiative to break the
current norm can only emanate from the presidential
office, a likelihood that, four months before
the election, does not appear quite plausible
with the increasing possibility that Kuchma will
be involved in a runoff with a leader of the hard
(Symonenko, Vitrenko) or corrupt (Tkachenko) Left.
Dmytro Vydrin, European Institute of
Integration and Development, Kiev
"Issues
in Ukraine's Forthcoming Presidential Election"
Several
postulates underlie an analysis of the possible
future development of the foreign and regional
policy of Ukraine after the presidential elections.
-
Postulate 1.
In what concerns the shaping of the foreign
and domestic policies of their nation, the
Ukrainian community, the so-called people,
have no more influence than they have, say,
in the shaping of the foreign and domestic
policies of the United States or Japan. First
of all, that is because no civic society has
been formed in Ukraine as of yet, with its
traditional institutions and mechanisms of
people's response to political challenges.
Secondly, because the specifics of Ukrainian
democracy reside in the nation being governed,
within a closed circle and virtually without
any control, by an absolute minority that
is referred to as the national elite. Thus,
the elite, and not the people, serve as the
societal system-building factor in our country.
-
Postulate 2. In order to understand
the Ukrainian elite, including its official
leaders (the presidents), and to project their
potential actions, decisions or deeds which
determine the fate of the country, it is more
important to know not their political orientation,
beliefs or convictions, but their personal
characteristics: the intellectual level, integrity,
fairness, individual interests and predilections.
These personal characteristics are considered
more stable and significant in their effects
on the conditions in Ukraine and on the course
taken by the country than the ideological
image of the leaders, which is prone to swift
changes.
-
Postulate 3.
To understand the Ukrainian elite and to project
what kind of influence it is going to exert
on the country, even more important than to
know their personal characteristics would
be to know the typology of these people, that
is, the social type to which they belong,
and to learn the specifics of the "corporate
string" onto which they are threaded
and which basically defines the personal,
private characteristics of its individual
representatives.
Assuming
that these postulates are really true, it would
be fairly easy to project the future of Ukraine,
including its potential relations with the East
and the West, between the center and the regions,
between the leaders and the people, between the
ruling government and the opposition, and so on.
For example, let us take a look at the present-day
situation. Currently Ukraine is dominated by the
post-Soviet bureaucratic elite. Like any other
elite (political, military, religious, or economic),
this elite has its own positive features as well
as drawbacks, its own generic specifics. Several
of its typical features and stereotypes include:
-
Power and hierarchy are of the absolute and
highest worth (higher than money, higher than
even life itself).
-
The country, state, people, common citizens
are the tools of the power, the means for
attaining the power and authority.
-
The current objectives of the government officials
are more important than the long-term strategic
objectives of the country.
-
Dignity, pride, and free thinking are those
features that prevent people from being good
performers and specialists.
-
The opposition are those who obstruct the
elite in being effective rulers.
-
Stability is a situation when nobody criticizes
the authority.
-
Strategic foreign partners are the countries
who extend credits and ask no questions as
to how those credits are expended.
-
Potential foreign enemies are the countries
who either do not extend credits or demand
that they are paid back.
-
Reforms are the recommendations of the IMF
that do not have to be implemented, but for
which money can be obtained.
-
Regions are places inhabited by second-grade
people, who lack either the brains or the
money to live in the capital.
These
attitudes and stereotypes are not openly declared
but are tacitly taken into account by the present-day
establishment and determine the directions, type,
and nature of Ukrainian foreign and domestic policies.
Is it possible to foresee a radical change, akin
to a revolution, in these stereotypes? And, consequently,
is it possible to foresee a revolution or simply
a reform in the policies? It seems that the answer
is no. So far, one may say: "The revolution
has ended--forget about it!" The reason is
because the present-day Ukrainian elite is all-through
monochromatic and uniform, the opposition included.
Whoever among the potential presidential candidates
comes to power, all the said attitudes and, therefore,
the underlying policy foundations would be retained.
Today,
there are four real presidential contenders in
the country: Kuchma, Moroz, Marchuk, and Tkachenko.
They are worthy and respected persons, and influential
politicians--if anything, because they have undergone
a rigorous real-life screening and selection process.
As of today, each of these politicians in my opinion
has about an equal chance of becoming the next
President. We know that there are ratings according
to which Kuchma's supporters, for instance, are
estimated at 16 to 18 percent, and Tkachenko's
supporters, at 2 to 3 percent. However, advance
ratings are of little worth in Ukraine, because
the electorate in Ukraine is virtually devoid
of the political momentum that would make their
voting predictable. The existence of this kind
of momentum is mainly inherent in democracies
with a solid voting experience, in the countries
where a substantial proportion of the population
has some property, which forces the people to
attach great importance to their choice so as
not to put their property in jeopardy. In the
case of Ukraine, as experience shows, the situation
with the elections can dramatically change within
but two or three weeks. This is why the chances
of all of these contenders appear so far to be
equal. It may sound paradoxical, but in a situation
of such random or slipshod voting, a mistake or
a misstep committed by one of the candidates may
not dramatically diminish but increase his chances,
as it might coincide with a random change in the
opinions or preferences of a significant portion
of the electorate. One of our humorists has coined
a famous phrase: "One awkward movement--and
you are a father." Today's Ukraine is capable
of generating a situation that could be characterized
by a phrase: "One awkward movement--and you
are the father of the nation."
Most
intriguing, however, is that no matter which of
the aforementioned candidates wins, there would
be no fundamental changes either in the foreign
policy or in the domestic policy. Why do I have
no doubts that one of this foursome is going to
win? Because all of them are blazing representatives
of the bureaucratic populism on which our people
have been brought up. The essence of this bureaucratic
populism resides in the similar opening statements
of the programs proposed by the candidates of
this kind: "I (the State, the Government)
will give you (wages, pensions, freedom)."
And it is exactly for this populism that at least
70 percent of the population are willing to vote
today because, according to the statistics, exactly
thus many individuals receive their money from
the state and only 7 percent get their income
from private businesses. Why do I believe that
policy would not undergo a radical change under
any of these candidates? With all due respect
for them as individuals, they are all similar
in that they possess the same generic common feature:
they are all representatives of the bureaucratic
nomenklatura. This generic feature resides in
the motto: "Any ideology for power, but not
power for any ideology!" This is why upon
coming to power they, same as the establishment
that rules today, would take only those actions
that, in their belief, would reinforce their ruling
power. Thus, today we consider Tkachenko to be
a pro-Slav politician. But if he finds out that
in order to reinforce his power, Ukraine will
have to join NATO or have a fine relationship
with the IMF, he would become best friends with
NATO and the IMF--the objects of his present-day
sharp criticism. Marchuk is seen as a pro-Western
politician. But if he feels that his power depends
on the Russian oil and gas, he would demonstrate
his friendship with the eastern neighbor in every
way possible. This is why I assert that:
-
Firstly, for objective reasons, the immortal
bureaucratic elite will remain in power in
Ukraine.
-
Secondly, fundamental changes in Ukrainian
foreign and domestic policy are impossible.
To
be more precise, a fundamental, robust domestic
and foreign policy has not been feasible for some
time. I do not consider this conclusion pessimistic,
firstly, because such is the natural course of
events; and secondly, because a new kind of elite
is already growing in Ukraine--an economic elite
raised on the laws of private business and entrepreneurship.
The
motto of the new elite as addressed to the people
would most probably be not "I will give you"
but "You will be able to get." I count
among this new elite, for example, one of our
most prominent politicians, Yuliya Tymoshenko,
Head of the Budget Committee of the Ukrainian
Parliament. However, the time for such politicians
has not yet come, although it is rapidly growing
nearer.
General
Discussion
The
general commentator noted that he took away from
the discussion that, despite its many problems,
Ukraine ironically has become inherently stable,
its society firmly balanced among big interests.
Some participants expressed confidence that Kiev
would manage to balance its relations with Russia
and avoid the fate of a Yugoslavia.
But
Ukraine's is a bleak stability. One speaker claimed
that Kiev has built a classic patrimonial system,
such as those seen in Latin America. Kiev may
have achieved a degree of permanence, therefore,
he claimed, but nonetheless there can be substantial
variation in patrimonial systems. From that perspective,
the coming election is not a null set or a zero
sum game, but rather has a lot riding on it. If
one discounts society having no influence, one
has to look at what candidates represent. In this
regard, participants disagreed as to whether the
slate of presidential candidates represent a series
of sharply drawn choices or various shades on
the same spectrum; whether a continuation of present
leadership would preserve possibilities for reform
and transformation or simply preserve the present
distribution of wealth and prerogative.
Participants
generally agreed that a radical shift is not on
the near term agenda because the current elites--whom
they see as a cynical product of the Brezhnev
stagnation--would fear the loss of power. But,
one argued, one should not count on the ameliorating
influence of a new generation either because they
too are becoming corrupted. Several participants
urged that the West not be too ambitious in terms
of objectives and keep in mind the politics of
the possible.
Appendix
A
Conference
Agenda
Meridian
International Center
1630 Crescent Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
Wednesday, 30 June 1999
8:30
a.m.
Registration
and Coffee
9:00
a.m.
Introductory
Remarks
Ellen Laipson, National Intelligence
Council
George Kolt, National Intelligence
Council
9:15
a.m.
The
Political System
How is the Ukrainian national identity evolving?;
the development of civil society; center/regional
relations; the case of Crimea; dynamics of national
decisionmaking.
Chair: Wayne Limberg, US Department
of State
Andrew Wilson, School of Slavonic
and East European Studies, London
Victor Pasisnichenko, Kharkiv
Pedagogical University and Kennan Institute
Viktor Zablotsky, Independent
Journalist (Kiev) and Kennan Institute
Roman Solchanyk, Rand Corporation
Vyacheslav Pikhovshek, Ukrainian
Center for Independent Political Research (Kiev)
11:00
a.m.
Break
11:15
a.m.
The
Economy
Status of economic reforms; how is the average
Ukrainian faring?; how is
the economy working?; an investor's view.
Chair: John Danylyk, US Department
of State
Alexander Pivovarsky, Harvard
Institute for International Development
Raphael Shen, University of Detroit
Vitalij Garber, Garber International
Associates
12:30
p.m.
Lunch
1:30
Ukraine
and the International System
Kiev and Moscow, Kiev in its
regional context; Kiev and the West.
Chair: Thomas Zamostny, Central
Intelligence Agency
Sherman Garnett, Carnegie Endowment
Taras Kuzio, University of North
London
Ian Brzezinski, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee
2:45
Break
3:00
Society
and Ukraine's Future
State and society; political parties, issues in
the election.
Chair: George Kolt, National
Intelligence Council
Volodimyr Polokhalo, Editor-in-Chief,
Political Thought
Dominique Arel, Brown University
Dmytro Vydrin, European Institute
of Integration and Development (Kiev)
General Commentator: Adrian Karatnycky,
Freedom House
4:30
Closing Remarks
4:45
Adjournment
Appendix
B
Speaker
Biographies
Ellen
Laipson was appointed Vice Chairman for
Estimates at the National Intelligence Council
in July 1997. She previously served as Special
Assistant to US Permanent Representative Madeleine
Albright at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
From 1993 to 1995 she was Director for Near East
and South Asian Affairs on the staff of the National
Security Council. Dr. Laipson also served from
1990-93 as the National Intelligence Officer for
Near East and South Asia.
George
Kolt has served since 1992 as National
Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia in
the National Intelligence Council. Early in his
career, he specialized in Soviet and European
Affairs while serving in politico-military, intelligence
and academic assignments in the Air Force. He
was detailed to the National Intelligence Council
in 1981 as the Assistant National Intelligence
Officer for the USSR, and then served from 1984
to 1986 as the National Intelligence Officer for
Europe. After retiring from the Air Force, he
headed the Directorate of Intelligence's Office
of Soviet and then Slavic and Eurasian Analysis
from 1986 to 1989.
Wayne
Limberg is Chief of the Foreign Policy
and Western Republics Division in the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research's Office of Russian
and European Analysis at the US Department of
State. Dr. Limberg has taught at Georgetown and
American Universities, the National War College,
and the University of London. He has traveled
extensively in the former Soviet Union and has
represented the United States at various NATO
talks.
Andrew
Wilson is a Lecturer in Ukrainian Studies
at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies
in London. He is also a former Senior Research
Fellow at Sidney Sussex, Cambridge. Dr. Wilson
has published many books concerning Ukrainian
affairs and is currently working on a publication
entitled The Ukrainians: The Unexpected Nation.
Victor
Pasisnichenko is currently a Scholar
at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson
Center. He is Associate Professor in the Politics
and Sociology Department at Kharkiv Pedagogical
University, as well as International Programs
Director of the Kharkiv Foundation's Center for
Educational Initiatives. He has done extensive
research on culture and civil society and contributed
to numerous publications and reports.
Viktor
Zablotsky is a journalist for the Ukrainian
Independent TV corporation "Inter."
Mr. Zablotsky is visiting the United States as
a
USIA Regional Exchange Scholar at the Kennan Institute
of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars. He has taught
political history at the Kiev National University
of Economics and is currently working on a project
entitled, "The Ukrainian Intellectuals
and the Fall of Communism: Invention of the National
Discourse."
Roman
Solchanyk is a consultant at the Rand
Corporation in Santa Monica, CA, where he specializes
in Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian affairs. Before
joining RAND in 1994, he worked for many years
as an analyst at the Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty
Research Institute in Munich. Mr. Solchanyk has
published widely on Ukraine's domestic and foreign
policies and has recently completed a book on
Ukrainian-Russian relations.
Vyacheslav
Pikhovshek is the Founder and Director
of the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political
Research. Mr. Pikhovshek hosts a political talk-show,
the "Fifth Corner," in addition to organizing
information exchange activities and international
conferences on political parties, parliamentarism,
foreign defense and security policies. He has
also made numerous contributions to the Ukrainian
national press on domestic and foreign policy
issues.
John
Danylyk is Chief of the Economies in
Transition Division in the Office of Economic
Analysis of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) of the US State Department. He is also the
Bureau's Senior Economic Analyst on the former
Soviet Union. Mr. Danylyk began his analytical
career in 1965 at the Central Intelligence Agency,
where he spent 14 years in the Office of Economic
Research. In June 1979, he was detailed to INR's
Office of Economic Analysis, where he served as
the Chief of the Communist Economic Relations
Division. He transferred permanently to the Department
of State in February 1982.
Alexander
Pivovarsky is a Development Associate
at the Harvard Institute for International Development.
His work has focused on the problems of economic
transition in Ukraine, and he has been instrumental
in establishing the HIID Macroeconomic Advisory
Project in Kiev. Mr. Pivovarsky has taught courses
on investment appraisal at Harvard's Program on
Investment Appraisal and Management as well as
management and public finance courses at Harvard
designed for tax policy officials from Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. He also
served as economic policy adviser to a Deputy
Prime Minister of Ukraine in 1997.
Raphael
Shen is a Professor of Economics at the
University of Detroit/Mercy, where he has taught
since 1977. Dr. Shen is a former Senior Research
Fellow at Georgetown University's Kennedy Institute
and has done extensive research on the economies
of the former Soviet Union and China. He is the
author of Ukraine's Economic Reform: Obstacles,
Errors, Lessons.
Vitalij
Garber is Chairman and CEO of Garber
International Associates, Inc. He has extensive
industrial experience in forming partnerships
and joint ventures. He has been the principal
advisor on privatization and defense conversion
to the Minister of Engineering, Military-Industrial
Complex and Conversion and the Government of Ukraine.
Dr. Garber was an Assistant Secretary General
at NATO from 1981 to 1985. He was also the Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for International Programs
and Technology from 1977 to 1981, where he was
responsible for all international activities in
research, development, and acquisition.
Thomas
Zamostny is Manager of the Transitioning
States Issue in the Office of Russian and European
Analysis at the Central Intelligence Agency. He
has served in Senior Analyst positions in the
Directorate of Intelligence, the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, the National Intelligence
Council, and as a member of the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff.
Sherman
Garnett is Senior Associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, specializing
in the foreign and security policies of Russia,
Ukraine and other states of the former USSR. He
directs the Project for Security and National
Identity in the Former USSR, a project focusing
on the dilemmas of statehood, integration, ethnic
identity, and security in the former USSR. Prior
to joining the Endowment in 1994, he spent 11
years in the US Government, most recently as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia,
Ukraine, and Eurasia. His most recent book was
Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the New Political
Geography of Central and Eastern Europe, published
in 1997.
Taras
Kuzio is an Honorary Visiting Research
Fellow at the Ukraine Center of the University
of North London. In 1998, Dr. Kuzio was appointed
Head of Mission at the NATO Information and Documentation
Center in Kiev. Dr. Kuzio is also the author of
numerous articles in academic journals on Ukrainian
and post-Soviet questions and a regular contributor
to Oxford Analytica and Jane's Intelligence Review
on Ukraine.
Ian
Brzezinski is Legislative Assistant for
National Security Affairs in the Office of Senator
William Roth (R-DE). As such he drafts and coordinates
legislation on defense and foreign policy and
related articles and speeches for the Senator.
He also manages the NATO Observer Group and is
the Secretary of the US Senate Delegation to the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Prior to joining
Senator Roth's office, Mr. Brzezinski was Director
for International Security Programs at the Council
of Advisors to the Parliament of Ukraine in Kiev.
While in Ukraine, he also served as the Executive
Director of the CSIS American-Ukrainian Advisory
Committee.
Volodimyr
Polokhalo is Editor-in-Chief of the scholarly
journal, Politychna dumka (Political Thought),
an international political science journal published
in three languages and distributed in 32 countries.
He is also President of the Institute of Postcommunist
Society, an all-Ukrainian governmental organization
for socio-political scholars. Mr. Polokhalo is
currently researching the political process in
Central European countries, political power in
postcommunist societies, nongovernmental organizations,
and the problem of civil society-making in Ukraine.
Dominique
Arel is an Assistant Professor at Brown
University's Watson Institute for International
Studies, as well as Research Scholar on the Project
on Integration and Disintegration in the Former
Soviet Union Implications for Regional and Global
Security. His areas of interest include national
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, specifically regional and linguistic problems
in Ukraine since the breakup of the USSR and their
implications for regional security. Dr. Arel also
has taught at Wesleyan, Columbia, McGill, and
Duke Universities.
Dmytro
Vydrin, a political scientist who specializes
in Ukrainian domestic political affairs, is currently
Director of the European Institute of Integration
and Development. In the past, he has served as
a political adviser to President Kuchma and to
former Prime Minister Marchuk and also as Director
of the International Institute of Global and Regional
Security.
Adrian
Karatnycky is President of Freedom House,
a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that promotes
democracy, civil society, and the rule of law
and monitors democratic change, political rights,
and civil liberties around the world. He is Editor
and Director of Freedom in the World, the annual
survey of political rights and civil liberties.
Prior to becoming President of Freedom House in
1993, Mr. Karatnycky served as Assistant to the
President of the AFL-CIO from 1991 to 1993. From
1986 to 1991, he was Director of Research at the
AFL-CIO Department of International Affairs. He
is coauthor of three books and has written numerous
articles on democracy and East European and post-Soviet
affairs.
Footnotes
1
This survey is undertaken every
year by the World Economics Forum and Harvard
Institute for International Development.
