Preface

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is delighted to publish this historic collection of intelligence documents related to the Vietnam War. The documents— 38 in this book and 174 in the companion CD— show how the US intelligence Community viewed critical developments over a 27-year period, ranging from analysis of the implications of the post-World War II breakup of colonial empires to the Communist takeover of Saigon in 1975. A number of these documents were declassified and published in other circumstances, but many are being made public here for the first time. As such, they undoubtedly will be of immense interest and value to historians and scholars, academics and diplomats, and comprise in sum a unique historical record of a challenging and controversial chapter in US foreign relations.

The documents are estimative intelligence products, that is, reports that projected the impact of current trends into the future to give policymakers and military commanders a heads-up about where events were likely to lead and their probable impact on US security interests. Because they reflected the careful scrutiny and final agreement on conclusions by various Intelligence Community analysts and agencies, they were considered the most authoritative assessments of the Intelligence Community.

Any collection of this magnitude can only be the product of extensive collaboration. Work started in September 2004 under the auspices of NIC Chairman Robert Hutchings and the Information Review Office team of the Director of Central Intelligence. We are particularly grateful to the editors and their advisors for their selection of the documents. The same professional team performed similar functions for the publication of Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China During the Era of Mao, 1948-1976. We thank Professor Lloyd Gardner of Rutgers University, a renowned academic authority on the Vietnam War, for his masterful introduction to this volume. Within the NIC, Mathew Burrows and his analytic and production staff helped turn the documents into a professionally finished book, and the CIA's Imaging and Publishing Support Service provided the usual high-quality printing.

Finally, we wish to recognize with this publication the signal contributions of a generation of senior officers and analysts from the various agencies of the US Intelligence Community.

 

David F. Gordon
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

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