Preface

The National Intelligence Council is pleased to issue this collection of declassified national intelligence reports on Yugoslavia. They cover the period from Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 to 1990— the eve of Yugoslavia's collapse into secession and civil war. This material represents a valuable record for historians, intelligence specialists, and others with an interest in the story of Yugoslavia's break from the Soviet Bloc and its effort to strike an independent path to "national communism." It offers special insights into the thinking that helped shape Washington's responses to Yugoslavia's independent stance and into the Intelligence Community's appraisals later of the internal tensions that led to the country's ultimate collapse.

This is the third in a series of recent publications of declassified national intelligence products-the first, focusing on China, was released in 2004 and the next, on Vietnam, followed one year later. These documents on Yugoslavia, like those in the previous collections, are "estimative" in nature, representing forward-looking efforts to explain how events might unfold in the region and thereby alert policymakers to the opportunities and challenges they might confront.

These records, some of which reach back over five decades, represent the considered judgments of the best experts within the Intelligence Community at the time. The work of our intelligence analysts today reflects the best of this tradition—careful review of the evidence and a reasoned approach to arriving at judgments—but the estimative product itself has evolved, becoming much more concise and inclusive of divergent views and showing greater transparency in how we arrive at judgments. Also, today, we search for expertise wherever it can be found—whether it be within the Intelligence Community or the academic, business or think-tank worlds, around the corner or around the globe. Our goal is to bring together the best minds that can be found to consider the broadest spectrum of views and fully explore alternative hypotheses.

The National Intelligence Council is working to improve the readability, accessibility, and, of course, the utility of its estimative products for policymakers. Declassification, compilation, and study of earlier estimative products complement this effort. Publication of this volume affirms our continuing commitment—where feasible and appropriate—to tell the story of intelligence.

Putting this volume together required the efforts of a great number of people. John K. Allen and others on the staff of the Information Review Office for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency managed the task of identifying and declassifying the relevant documents. Marten van Heuven, a former National Intelligence Officer for Europe, who led the work that produced the final National Intelligence Estimate in the collection, wrote the introduction. Ambassador Richard Kauzlarich, our current NIO for Europe, offered valuable substantive guidance for this book. Mathew Burrows and his team in the Analysis and Production Staff of the National Intelligence Council performed the editing and developed the format, graphics, and all the details to bring it to publication.

I also would like to personally thank Lee Hamilton, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and his staff at the Cold War International History Project, who partnered with the National Intelligence Council to give scholars and practitioners an opportunity to take the measure of this analytic work and draw insights for the future. Finally, we should not forget the dedicated officers of the Intelligence Community themselves whose expertise forms this collection.

C. Thomas Fingar
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

TOP