Global Humanitarian Emergencies:
Trends and Projections, 2001-2002

Intelligence Community Assessment
August 2001

This paper is based on the coordinated views of analysts and experts from agencies across the federal government. It was produced by the National Intelligence Council under the auspices of David F. Gordon, National Intelligence Officer for Economics and Global Issues.Queries should be addressed to Dr. Gordon at the National Intelligence Council.

Information available as of 15 August 2001 was used in preparing this report.

The photographs on the cover of this report are courtesy of the US Committee for Refugees. The photographs used in this report are not to be reproduced out of the context of this publication.

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This assessment focuses on humanitarian emergencies arising from manmade causes and major natural disasters.  We do not address situations in which the need for development assistance or food aid is due primarily to chronic poverty or environmental degradation.

• In this assessment “humanitarian emergencies” are defined as situations in which at least 300,000 civilians require international humanitarian assistance to avoid serious malnutrition or death.  Our definition includes those situations in which people need protection in order to facilitate access to humanitarian aid.

• The manmade causes we focus on primarily are armed, typically internal, conflict and repressive government policies.  Secondarily, we note sudden economic emergencies and major technological occurrences, such as a nuclear power plant meltdown, as potential causes of humanitarian emergencies. 

• All these situations can be exacerbated by sudden or persistent natural disasters or widespread outbreaks of infectious diseases.  

The timeframe for this assessment is through December 2002.

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The capacity and willingness of the international community to respond to humanitarian emergencies will continue to be stretched through December 2002.  The overall number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance—now approximately 42 million—is likely to increase:

• Five ongoing emergencies—in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, North Korea and Sudan—cause almost 20 million people to be in need of humanitarian assistance as internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, or others in need in their home locations.  All these emergencies show signs of worsening through 2002.

• In addition, humanitarian conditions may further deteriorate in populous countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) or Indonesia. 

The total number of humanitarian emergencies—20—is down from 25 in January 2000.  Of the current emergencies:

• Eleven are in countries experiencing internal conflict—Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, DROC, Indonesia, Russia/Chechnya, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda.

• Two—in Iraq and North Korea—are due largely to severe government repression.

• The remaining six—in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Yugoslavia—are humanitarian emergencies that have entered the transitional stage beyond prolonged conflict, repressive government policies, and/or major natural disasters.

• The primary cause of the emergency in Tajikistan is drought.  Several other countries currently experiencing humanitarian emergencies—Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, North Korea, Somalia, and Sudan—also are affected by major, persistent natural disasters. 

Current Emergencies of Greatest Concern
Four countries are of greatest concern because of the scale and persistence of their humanitarian emergencies; their significant impact upon continuing strategic interests of major outside powers, including the United States; and their importance for stability in their regions.

• In Afghanistan, the humanitarian situation, already serious, is likely to worsen.  Millions of people are at risk of famine as a result of a three-year-long drought and fighting, which has already forced some 3.6 million Afghans to flee to Pakistan and Iran.  The humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate due to a forecasted 1 million ton grain deficit, continued fighting between the Taliban and opposition forces, the Taliban’s sporadic resistance to Western humanitarian programs, formidable logistic challenges, and donor fatigue.

• In Colombia, additional IDPs—on the order of thousands per month—are adding to the existing roughly 1.5 million internally displaced persons.Attacks on civilians are likely to continue unabated and will likely increase, as paramilitary and insurgent groups fight for territory and control of the country’s resources.  Conditions are likely to deteriorate as a result of the absence of strong national programs to provide sustained assistance and the reticence of most international donors to provide funds. 

• Conditions in central and southern Iraq are unlikely to improve due to continued manipulation of the UN oil-for-food program by the government for political gain.  Humanitarian conditions in central and southern Iraq will degenerate to the extent that Saddam Husayn exercises greater control over oil revenues.  Conditions in northern Iraq are likely to continue to improve because UN management of the aid program will help ease the impact of any disruptions caused by Baghdad.

• North Korea will remain a significant humanitarian challenge due to the severity of the food deficit, restricted international access to those in need, its collapsed economy and weakened infrastructure, its exposure to frequent major natural disasters—both drought and flooding—and the large number of people affected.  Over eight million people—more than one-third of the country’s population—are in need of food aid.  Absent significant economic reform, North Korea will continue to depend on large-scale humanitarian aid, the bulk of which will be provided by the United States, South Korea, Japan and China through 2002. 

Other Current Emergencies
Other current humanitarian emergencies are of concern because of the scale and projected outlook for the crisis, as well as the likelihood that the emergency will spread and destabilize neighboring countries and regions.

• Humanitarian conditions in Burundi, Sudan, and Tajikistan are likely to deteriorate further.

• We expect current conditions in Angola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda either to remain about the same or deteriorate somewhat.

• Humanitarian concerns in Azerbaijan, Russia’s Chechnya region, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Indonesia are likely to remain at or near current levels.

• In Yugoslavia’s Kosovo region conditions among the ethnic Albanian majority are likely to improve, but conditions for Serb and Roma minorities may deteriorate.

• Conditions are likely to improve in the Republic of Serbia outside of Kosovo.

Potential Emergencies
Through 2002, seven potential emergencies are of greatest concern.  We list them in order of their probability of developing.

• An escalation of ethnic tensions leading to full-scale civil war in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would destabilize southeastern Europe by displacing tens of thousands of Slav Macedonians and sending hundreds of thousands of mostly ethnic Albanian refugees into neighboring countries. 

• In Zimbabwe, food shortages and political violence—fueled by high inflation, unemployment, racial tensions and land reform issues—in the run-up to the winter 2002 election could precipitate a humanitarian crisis by spring 2002, causing refugee flows into South Africa and elsewhere in southern Africa.

• In Haiti, continuing economic stagnation, political stalemate, and internal unrest, if left unchecked, will raise political tensions.  A severe economic downturn and a resurgence of serious human rights violations would lead to a renewed outflow of thousands of people.

• Kenya—already suffering one of its most serious droughts in a half-century—faces rising political and ethnic tensions in the run-up to presidential elections in December 2002, which could prompt large-scale refugee flows.  Because much of the humanitarian aid to Sudan and the Great Lakes region in Central Africa passes through the Kenyan port of Mombasa, instability in Kenya and any resulting deterioration of the infrastructure would affect the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout the region.

• Tens of thousands of economic migrants and foreign workers are likely to flee Côte d'Ivoire in the coming months if the government resorts to xenophobia as a tool to discredit its primary opposition, much of whose support comes from immigrants and Muslims.

• A renewed conflict between nuclear powers India and Pakistan over Kashmir could expand into a full-scale war, displacing over a million people.  The potential scale of a humanitarian emergency would be even greater in the unlikely event of a nuclear exchange.

• The probability of a humanitarian emergency in Nigeria is low through December 2002, but the impact of such an emergency would be significant.  The country’s challenges include poor economic performance and ethnic instability.

• The ability and willingness of Western donor countries to provide humanitarian aid will be constrained somewhat if the global economic slowdown worsens.

Consensual humanitarian responses will continue to be substantially more numerous than forceful humanitarian interventions against the will of a local government or local combatants.  Government and international humanitarian agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often will attempt to deliver relief to civilian groups at risk, but many governments will continue to be highly wary of forceful humanitarian interventions:

• Major Western donor countries will increasingly invest in a range of conflict prevention efforts as well as political and economic initiatives in post-conflict settings, rather than deploying military forces during the course of a conflict.

Despite some improvement in the responsiveness and capacity of humanitarian agencies in recent years, limits imposed by budgetary constraints and bureaucratic competition among the major UN agencies and international NGOs—as well as the problems associated with operating in conflict situations—will continue to hamper the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. 

• In the absence of adequate security, an increasing number of UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and NGOs will withdraw, at least temporarily, from particularly dangerous humanitarian operations.

Figure 1
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies, 2001-02

Figure 1 (continued)
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies, 2001-02

Figure 1 (continued)
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies, 2001-02

Figure 1 (continued)
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies, 2001-02

Figure 1 (continued)
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies, 2001-02

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The number of countries with current humanitarian emergencies in which at least 300,000 civilians require international humanitarian assistance to avoid serious malnutrition or death has dropped from 25 in January 2000 to 20 in mid-2001. 

• The decrease in the overall number of emergencies is attributable to improvement in Croatia and some reduction of emergency humanitarian need in Georgia, Haiti, Liberia[1] and Rwanda.  All these countries have transitioned out of an earlier emergency status so that fewer than 300,000 of their populations now are in need of emergency relief. 

Of the current emergencies:

• Eleven are in countries experiencing internal conflict—Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC), Indonesia, Russia/ Chechnya, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda.

• Two—in Iraq and North Korea—are due largely to severe government repression.

• The remaining six—in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Yugoslavia—are humanitarian emergencies that have entered the transitional stage.

• The primary cause of the current emergency in Tajikistan is drought.  Several other countries currently experiencing humanitarian emergencies—Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, North Korea, Somalia and the Sudan—are also affected by major, persistent natural disasters. 

According to previous US Intelligence Community and other Government assessments, the number of ongoing humanitarian emergencies reached a high of 24 in 1994, declined somewhat in 1996-1997, and peaked again in 1999, before falling in 2000 to the current level of 20 (see figure 2).

The number of people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance worldwide—including internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and others in refugee-like situations—has increased from approximately 36 million as of December 31, 1998 to some 42 million as of December 31, 2000, according to the 2001 report of the US Committee for Refugees (USCR; see
figure 3).  The apparent contradiction between the roughly stable number of humanitarian emergencies in April 1998 and August 2001, on the one hand, and the increase by six million in the number of people in need, on the other hand, can be explained as follows: 

Figure 2
Humanitarian Emergencies, January 1995-August 2001

• The increasingly violent and long lasting character of internal conflicts—which makes them resistant to settlement—has generated a rapid increase in the number of IDPs in such countries as Angola, Colombia, DROC, and Sierra Leone.

The total number of IDPs continues to exceed the number of refugees, due to the persistence and violence of internal conflicts and severe government repression and to the growing unwillingness of many states to host long-standing refugee populations.

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The overall number of people in need is likely to increase by December 2002, especially if humanitarian conditions further deteriorate in populous countries such as DROC or Indonesia.  The total number of humanitarian emergencies could also increase if one or more potential emergencies occur (see
figure 4).

Figure 3
Estimated Number of the World's People Need of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance, 1984-2000^a

Defining and Estimating Populations “In Need” Definitions of populations “in need” of emergency humanitarian assistance used by the international relief community are inconsistent.  The figures used in this assessment for the total number of displaced people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance worldwide (as in figure 3) were provided by the US Committee for Refugees.  The USCR includes refugees from the named country, people in refugee-like situations, and internally displaced persons in its definition of displaced people “in need.” In addition to those included in USCR’s definition, the Intelligence Community’s definition of persons in need of emergency humanitarian assistance also includes others requiring humanitarian aid in their home locations due primarily to conflict and government repression, often exacerbated by natural disasters.  Because our assessment includes this additional population and focuses only on those emergencies in which 300,000 or more people are in need, the number of people in need listed for individual countries will not equal the worldwide total—and may not equal the individual totals—provided by USCR cited in this paper.  The numbers cited in this assessment for people in need in individual countries represent the Intelligence Community’s best estimate based on a review of information available from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, diplomatic reporting, nongovernmental organizations, and the media.  They should be treated as approximations, not precise numbers.  A change in the reported population in need does not necessarily reflect a change in circumstances but may be due to a change in access to reliable information.

• Humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, North Korea, Sudan, and Tajikistan are likely to deteriorate further.

• The current conditions in Angola, DROC, central and southern Iraq, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda are expected to either remain about the same or worsen.

• Humanitarian concerns in Azerbaijan, Russia’s Chechnya region, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Indonesia are likely to remain at or near current levels.

• In Yugoslavia’s Kosovo region, humanitarian conditions among the ethnic Albanian majority are likely to improve, but conditions for Serb and Roma minorities may worsen.

• Conditions are likely to improve in Bosnia and Herzegovina, northern Iraq, and the Republic of Serbia outside of Kosovo.

Current Emergencies Of Greatest Concern
Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and North Korea will be of greatest concern because of the scale and persistence of their humanitarian emergencies; their significance for continuing strategic interests of major outside powers, including the United States; and their importance for stability in their respective regions. 

The Changing Character of Internal Conflicts Post-Cold War internal conflicts tend to be struggles over control of exploitable resources and access to wealth and political power more generally.  Ethnic and religious differences often exacerbate or underlie such conflicts, making them even more volatile.  Under such conditions, civilians are viewed either as threats, in case they support the “other” side—or as a potential source of new supporters.  Thus, civilians often are key targets for combatants on all sides. Combatants have little compunction about employing vicious techniques of warfare, including torture, demonstration killings and maiming (as in Sierra Leone), or the wholesale expulsion of civilians (as in Kosovo).  The violence of internal conflicts is facilitated by the wide availability, at modest prices, of an array of light and medium weapons. Armed groups are increasingly forcing child soldiers to fight.  The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that in 2000 about 10 percent of all combatants worldwide were under age 18—a trend that is likely to increase in coming years. Refugee and IDP camps have been used as bases for operations by combatants in countries such as Burundi, DROC, Liberia, and Pakistan, increasing the risks for camp populations and relief workers alike. Contending forces in a number of conflicts are using relief as a weapon of war.  In Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan, and Sierra Leone, warring factions have systematically regulated the flow of food into specific areas to weaken public support for their opponents or strengthen support for their own side.  Genocidal conflicts aimed at annihilating all or part of a racial, religious, or ethnic group, and conflicts caused by other crimes against humanity—such as forced, large-scale expulsions of populations—are particularly likely to generate massive and intractable humanitarian needs: Humanitarian emergencies generated by such conflicts typically produce sudden and especially large movements of refugees and IDPs, with accompanying emergency needs for food and shelter, as in Kosovo and Rwanda. Such conflicts evoke the most visceral emotional responses from victims and perpetrators alike; thus, the political, economic, and social conditions that provoke such conflicts are likely to be unusually persistent. Most countries experiencing such conflicts in the last decade have yet to restore their pre-conflict growth, while reconciliation between antagonists has proven elusive.

IDP camp. Herat, Afghanistan, January 2001

• In Afghanistan, the humanitarian situation, already serious, is likely to worsen.  Millions of people are at risk of famine as a result of a three-year-long drought and fighting, which have forced some 3.6 million Afghans to flee to Pakistan and Iran.  Afghans will require emergency food assistance until probably the next wheat harvest in June 2002.  A better harvest next year would improve the outlook for the humanitarian situation somewhat, but it will not be sufficient to offset increased fighting between the Taliban and opposition forces or possible shifts in the front lines, the Taliban’s attempts to link sporadic resistance to Western humanitarian aid programs to political opportunity, formidable logistic challenges, and donor fatigue.

Internally displaced Colombian. May 2000

• In Colombia, additional IDPs—on the order of thousands per month—are adding to the roughly 1.5 million internally displaced persons.Attacks on civilians are likely to continue unabated and probably will increase, as paramilitary and insurgent groups fight for territory and control of the country’s resources.  Many cities will struggle to cope with the thousands of internally displaced persons living in slums with little access to water, sanitation, and health services.  Conditions are likely to worsen due to the absence of strong national programs to provide sustained assistance and the reticence of most international donors to provide funds.  Bogota will have to rely on a small number of nongovernmental organizations for assistance.

• In Iraq, under the oil-for-food program, per capita food imports have increased, malnutrition among children under age five has fallen, and health-care services have improved.  Conditions in central and southern Iraq are unlikely to improve due to continued manipulation of the UN oil-for-food program by the government for political gain.  Humanitarian conditions in central and southern Iraq will worsen to the extent that Saddam Husayn exercises greater control over oil revenues.  Conditions in northern Iraq are likely to continue to improve, since UN management of the aid program will help ease the impact of any disruptions caused by Baghdad.

• North Korea will remain a significant humanitarian challenge due to the severity of the food deficit, restricted international access to those in need, its collapsed economy and weakened infrastructure, its exposure to frequent major natural disasters—both drought and flooding—and the large number of people affected.  More than eight million people—more than one-third of the country’s population—are in need of food aid.  The infusion of massive international food aid, combined with North Korea’s 2000 harvest of 3.0 million metric tons, is expected to meet Pyongyang’s basic subsistence needs of 4.7 million metric tons from November 2000 through at least March 2002.  Even with this aid, however, widespread malnutrition will persist.  Absent significant reform, North Korea will depend on large-scale humanitarian aid, the bulk of which will continue to be provided by the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China through 2002. 

Other Current Emergencies of Concern
Humanitarian emergencies in other countries are of concern because of the scale and projected outlook for the humanitarian crisis, as well as the likelihood that the emergency will spill over and adversely affect neighboring countries.

• In Angola, humanitarian conditions will remain about the same or worsen through 2002.  The re-establishment of government administration in long-abandoned areas of the country in recent months has not markedly improved relief agency access to more than three million IDPs.  An all-out victory or negotiated settlement is unlikely through December 2002.  Thus, violence stemming from UNITA guerrilla attacks and government counter-insurgency operations will continue to displace people from their homes, prevent large-scale resettlement efforts, and hinder relief operations.  Given the intractability of this crisis, which has now lasted since 1975, donor fatigue is likely to exact a heavier toll on relief operations.  Contributions to UN and World Food Program (WFP) appeals for Angola regularly fall short, undermining food pipelines and forcing cutbacks in relief distribution.

• In Burundi, the continuing struggle between Bujumbura, Tutsi hardliners and the Hutu rebel groups over power sharing and other transition issues is likely to lead to increased violence and a deteriorating humanitarian situation through 2002.Relief agency access to affected areas of the country is likely to be hindered, and thousands more Burundians are likely to be internally displaced or flee to neighboring countries.  Persistent attacks on Tutsis by rebel forces also could compel Bujumbura to revive its policy of forcing Hutu civilians into regroupment centers as a means to deprive the rebels of their support base. 

• The emergency in DROC has resulted in the displacement of some 2 million people, either as IDPs or as refugees in surrounding countries—all of whom are in need of emergency aid.  Thus, even if the nascent peace negotiations continue, humanitarian conditions will not improve dramatically due to the sheer scope of the crisis.  The current ceasefire has not stopped Rwandan counterinsurgency efforts in eastern DROC, and intense fighting between the Rwandan Army and Rwandan Hutu rebels will complicate humanitarian assistance efforts.  Political missteps by either the government or rebel forces could rekindle the three-year-old civil war.  Neighboring countries have managed to absorb most refugees generated by the fighting so far, but a massive push by any of the forces toward populated areas would be likely to send tens of thousands of people across DROC’s borders, destabilizing the entire Great Lakes region and severely straining relief agency resources.

• Indonesia will face continued humanitarian challenges over the coming year.  Some 900,000 persons throughout the archipelago are now internally displaced; this number could increase by several hundred thousand IDPs as new flare-ups of communal or secessionist tension further strain Jakarta’s financial and military resources.  Nationalist tendencies in the new government could spur ethnic violence and increase support for separatist movements.  Patterns of past violence and other socioeconomic factors point to the possibility of ethnic or religious violence in at least twelve provinces.  Intensified fighting may also temporarily block relief agency access to IDP camps or lead international aid workers to pare back relief efforts as they have in western Timor.

• Humanitarian conditions in Russia’s breakaway republic of Chechnya will not improve substantially over the next year, although recent support from the European Commission has eased problems associated with irregular food supplies, lack of potable water, and access to medical care.  Other consequences of the conflict, including destruction of infrastructure and environmental degradation, are long-term issues and not easily resolved.  Violence between Russian forces and Chechen rebels will deter most displaced from returning to their homes and will impede aid efforts to mitigate hardship.  Should the conflict escalate sharply or expand beyond Chechnya, relief agencies would be quickly overwhelmed, and the UN would be forced to seek substantial funding increases.

Destruction in Groznyy. Chechnya, December 2000

• In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has begun to cooperate with UN Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) forces and currently appears to be attempting to pursue a political deal with Freetown.  The RUF, however, has abrogated numerous peace accords in the past and probably will resume terror tactics if its political strategy falters, curtailing relief agency access and jeopardizing the safety of resettled IDPs and returned refugees from Guinea and Liberia.  Either a deterioration of security or a massive influx of returning refugees would severely strain relief agency resources.

• In Sri Lanka, fighting between government forces and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels may lead to a further deterioration in humanitarian conditions.  Regular rounds of fighting will repeatedly trigger further population displacements.  NGOs have access to affected populations, but movement of people and supplies is—and will likely remain—controlled by the government.  Peace talks, if held, are unlikely to produce an end to the conflict.

• In Sudan, either a breakthrough in negotiations or a major shift in the military balance between Khartoum and Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) forces is unlikely through December 2002.  Humanitarian conditions are likely to worsen for more than four million IDPs and others in need throughout the country.  Consecutive droughts have put at least 420,000 people in the west and 200,000 in the south in dire need of food aid.  Future fighting is likely to intensify in the oil regions and move south and west, further curtailing delivery of emergency food aid to affected areas by relief organizations.  

Opposition soldier. Eastern Sudan, May 2000

• Although many of the humanitarian difficulties in Tajikistan wrought by the five-year civil war have dissipated, the UN World Food Program assesses that drought has severely damaged the country’s fragile agricultural sector and could force some one million people to require some sort of food assistance through mid-2002.

• In Uganda, the security situation will improve, provided that Kampala maintains its current vigorous military campaign against the insurgents.  This would improve the humanitarian situation insofar as relief agencies could work more freely in areas that experience chronic instability.  Improved climatic conditions should also reduce the number of people requiring drought assistance, but insurgency and insecurity probably will continue, at least in the north, perpetuating instability and possibly restricting relief programs.

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Transitioning situations are those that have moved beyond either prolonged conflict, repressive government policies, or major natural or other types of disasters that create large-scale humanitarian needs.  However, countries with such problems may still have at least 300,000 people in need of targeted humanitarian aid.  They also will require other types of political and economic assistance as they move into a more “normal” state, whether continuing chronic poverty or long-term development.  Two transitioning situations are of greatest concern because of their effects on strategic interests of major outside powers, including the United States; stability in their regions; and the scale of outside assistance provided, including in these cases the deployment of US military forces to meet their remaining humanitarian and other needs.

• In Bosnia and Herzegovina, aggressive oversight of national property law implementation, increases in interethnic police, and strengthened communal ties in 2000 led to improved conditions for ethnic minority returns—the strongest barometer of humanitarian conditions.  Some 69,000 people—primarily Bosniaks, but also Croats and Serbs—returned home in 2000, representing a 50 percent increase over 1999.  However, some 800,000 remain unable to return home—550,000 displaced within Bosnia and Herzegovina and 250,000 abroad.  Local resistance, sporadic violence against minority returnees, and poor economic conditions will most likely continue to complicate—but as long as the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) are deployed, not derail—continued ethnic minority returns.

• Vojislav Kostunica’s victory in the 2000 Yugoslav federal presidential election suggests likely overall improvement in the political environment and humanitarian conditions in Yugoslavia. 

—  In Serbia, greater access by aid organizations in 2001 will bring more assistance to some 480,000 internally displaced persons in the country.  Despite this gain, however, progress in returning the displaced, as well as the roughly 190,000 refugees still outside Yugoslavia, to their homes is expected to be slow through 2002.  Thus, continued international assistance will be required.

Figure 4 (Foldout)
Ongoing, Transitionong, and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies

—  In the Kosovo region, focused international aid and reconstruction efforts will continue to improve humanitarian conditions for the ethnic Albanian majority, but existing ethnic tensions—further enflamed by nearby ethnic Albanian insurgencies in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—suggest security and humanitarian conditions for Kosovo’s ethnic Serb and Roma minorities will remain poor.  Most of Kosovo’s 225,000 displaced people probably will remain elsewhere in Yugoslavia well into 2002. 

Other transitioning situations are of concern because of their potential for adversely affecting neighboring countries and stability in their regions; the scale of their remaining humanitarian and other needs; and the existence of at least some opportunities for an effective transition.

• In Azerbaijan, conditions among the approximately 800,000 IDPs generated by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia are poor, with IDPs living in make-shift shacks and railroad cars.  Azerbaijan is unlikely to reach a formal peace agreement with Armenia by December 2002.  Thus, the humanitarian situation is unlikely to improve.  Should a peace formula be found, the international community appears ready to provide financial and logistical assistance to resettle IDPs.

• Eritrea’s humanitarian situation has improved somewhat as a result of the peace agreement with Ethiopia and the presence of UN monitoring forces.  Such progress, however, will be offset by the persistent effects of the severe multi-year drought and the poor state of the Eritrean economy.  Eritrean grain production in 2000 was approximately one-fourth of normal levels, ensuring that an estimated 1.8 million people will need food assistance well into 2002.

• In Ethiopia, recent rains and a favorable harvest in spring 2001 will help relieve short-term food insecurity for some 4 million drought-affected and IDPs in the north.  More than 6 million others—especially pastoralists in hard-hit southern and eastern areas—will continue to require food aid.  Internal distribution problems will complicate marketing of grain from surplus areas in the central, western and northwestern regions to deficit areas in the north, south, and east.  The three-year drought has depleted household assets of large segments of the population.  Agricultural production along the border with Eritrea cannot resume until landmines are cleared.

• Somalia will need little emergency food assistance in 2001 because of its bumper 2000 grain harvest, but access to food may be limited in regions that did not benefit from favorable weather in 2001.  Poor rainfall in spring 2001 could result in a 30 percent reduction of the Fall 2001 grain harvest, forcing tens of thousands of people to require food aid in 2002.  Additionally, a surge in violence between warring factions probably would lead to further population displacement and the reemergence of crisis conditions countrywide as aid operations are disrupted.

Sub-Saharan Africa:  Region at Risk Sub-Saharan Africa is the region of greatest risk of a major new or significantly worse humanitarian emergency through December 2002.  In no other region is such a confluence of factors likely to produce both manmade emergencies and the inability to deal effectively with natural disasters.  Although there are pockets of stability—South Africa is the most notable—most of Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from abject poverty, intense ethnic rivalries, grossly inadequate communications and transportation infrastructure, and extremely weak governmental institutions.  Moreover, the impact of these negative factors is exacerbated by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, which affects the region more than any other area of the world.

Eritrean IDP camp; June 2000

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In addition to the current emergencies cited above, several other major countries and regions may experience conflict or government repression that will lead to new or renewed humanitarian emergencies.  We estimate the probability of these situations becoming major humanitarian emergencies in which at least 300,000 people are at risk through 2002.  We also estimate their potential impact on strategic interests of major outside powers, including the United States, on stability in their respective regions, and on humanitarian conditions in the affected country. 

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Probability:  Medium/High
Potential Impact:  Very High

An escalation of ethnic conflict in western Macedonia leading to full-scale civil war would be likely to destabilize southeastern Europe by displacing tens of thousands of Slavic Macedonians and sending hundreds of thousands of mostly ethnic Albanian refugees into neighboring countries.

Zimbabwe
Probability:  Medium/High
Potential Impact:  High

In Zimbabwe, drought and mounting civil unrest—fueled by high inflation, unemployment, racial tensions, disrupted agricultural production and land reform issues—are likely to precipitate a humanitarian crisis by spring 2002.  Widespread food shortages are likely—particularly of corn, the primary food staple—and it is doubtful that Harare will be able to compensate for the deficit with imports.  A surge in political violence could spur significant refugee flows into South Africa and elsewhere in southern Africa.

Haiti
Probability:  Medium
Potential Impact:  High

In Haiti, continuing economic stagnation, political stalemate, and internal unrest, if left unchecked, are likely to raise political tensions.  A severe economic downturn and a resurgence of serious human rights violations would lead to a renewed outflow of thousands of people.  The size of the outflow would depend to some extent on Haitian perceptions of the likelihood that they would be able to reach US shores.

Kenya
Probability:  Low-Medium
Potential Impact:  High-Very High

Although subsequent rains have eased the situation somewhat, Kenya remains affected by one of the worst droughts of the past half-century, a deteriorating economy, and internal unrest.  President Moi’s second term expires in December 2002, and ethnic violence is likely to accompany the presidential election.  Despite constitutional prohibition to a third term, Moi has hinted that he may remain in power.  Any combination of these elements could lead to political instability, significant loss of life, and large-scale refugee flows. Much of the humanitarian aid to Sudan and the Great Lakes region in Central Africa passes through the Kenyan port of Mombasa; thus, deteriorating infrastructure and instability in Kenya would also affect the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout the region. 

Côte d’Ivoire:
Probability:  Low/Medium
Potential Impact:  High

Tens of thousands of economic migrants and foreign workers are likely to flee Côte d'Ivoire in the coming months if the government resumes its attempts to marginalize the opposition, much of whose support comes from immigrants and Muslims.  Even with outside assistance, poor infrastructure and minimal economic development would prevent neighboring countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger