·
Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile
capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in
building specialized facilities, including a test
stand for engines more powerful than those in its
current missile force.
We
have low confidence in our ability to assess when
Saddam would use WMD.
·
Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological
warfare (CBW) preemptively against US forces, friends,
and allies in the region in an attempt to disrupt
US war preparations and undermine the political will
of the Coalition.
*[Corrected
per Errata sheet issued in October 2002]
End
Page 7
·
Saddam might use CBW after an initial advance into
Iraqi territory, but early use of WMD could foreclose
diplomatic options for stalling the US advance.
·
He probably would use CBW when he perceived he irretrievably
had lost control of the military and security situation,
but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches that
point.
·
We judge that Saddam would be more likely to use chemical
weapons than biological weapons on the battlefield.
·
Saddam historically has maintained tight control over
the use of WMD; however, he probably has provided
contingency instructions to his commanders to use
CBW in specific circumstances.
Baghdad
for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting
terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against
the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi
involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause
for making war.
Iraq
probably would attempt clandestine attacks against
the US Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened
the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable,
or possibly for revenge. Such attacks-more likely
with biological than chemical agents-probably would
be carried out by special forces or intelligence operatives.
·
The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has
been directed to conduct clandestine attacks against
US and Allied interests in the Middle East in the
event the United States takes action against Iraq.
The IIS probably would be the primary means by which
Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW attacks on the
US Homeland, although we have no specific intelligence
information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks
against US territory.
Saddam,
if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only
an organization such as al-Qa'ida-with worldwide reach
and extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already
engaged in a life-or-death struggle against the United
States-could perpetrate the type of terrorist attack
that he would hope to conduct.
·
In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme
step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting
a CBW attack against the United States would be his
last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number
of victims with him.
State/INR
Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program
The
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research (INR) believes that Saddam continues to
want nuclear weapons and that available evidence
indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited
effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related
capabilities. The activities we have detected do
not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq
is currently pursuing what INR would consider to
be an integrated and comprehensive approach to
(continued
on next page ...)
End Page 8
(continued
...) State/INR
Alternative View
acquire
nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers
the available evidence inadequate to support such
a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad
has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its
nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate
that such an effort began soon after the departure
of UN inspectors or to project a timeline for the
completion of activities it does not now see happening.
As a result, INR is unable to predict when Iraq
could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.
In
INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes
is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting
its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded
that the tubes in question are intended for use
as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of
technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks
to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges
to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive
the arguments advanced by others to make the case
that they are intended for that purpose. INR considers
it far more likely that the tubes are intended for
another purpose, most likely the production of artillery
rockets. The very large quantities being sought,
the way the tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and
the atypical lack of attention to operational security
in the procurement efforts are among the factors,
in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR
to conclude that the tubes are not intended for
use in Iraq's nuclear weapon program.
Confidence
Levels for Selected Key Judgments in This Estimate
High
Confidence:
·
Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding,
its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs
contrary to UN resolutions.
·
We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.
·
Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological
weapons and missiles.
·
Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a
year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile
material.
Moderate
Confidence:
·
Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient
material to make one but is likely to have a weapon
by 2007 to 2009. (See INR alternative view, page
84).
Low
Confidence:
·
When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction.
·
Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks
against the US Homeland.
·
Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical
or biological weapons with al-Qa'ida.
End Page 9
Uranium
Acquisition
Iraq
retains approximately two-and-a-half tons of 2.5 percent
enriched uranium oxide, which the IAEA permits. This
low-enriched material could be used as feed material
to produce enough HEU for about two nuclear weapons.
The use of enriched feed material also would reduce
the initial number of centrifuges that Baghdad would
need by about half. Iraq could divert this material-the
IAEA inspects it only once a year-and enrich it to
weapons
Excerpt from Page 24
grade
before a subsequent inspection discovered it was missing.
The IAEA last inspected this material in late January
2002.
Iraq
has about 550 metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched
uranium at Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by
the IAEA. Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure
uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would
shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear
weapons.
·
A foreign government service reported that as of early
2001, Niger planned to send several tons of "pure
uranium" (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early
2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working
out arrangements for this deal, which could be for
up to 500 tons of yellowcake1. We do not
know the status of this arrangement.
·
Reports indicate Iraq also has sought uranium ore
from Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
We
cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring
uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources.
Reports suggest Iraq is shifting from domestic mining
and milling of uranium to foreign acquisition. Iraq
possesses significant phosphate deposits, from which
uranium had been chemically extracted before Operation
Desert Storm. Intelligence information on whether
nuclear-related phosphate mining and/or processing
has been reestablished is inconclusive, however.
1
A refined form of natural uranium.
Excerpt from Page 25
Annex
A
Iraq's
Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes
[This
excerpt from a longer view includes INR's position
on the African uranium issue]
INR's
Alternative View: Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum
Tubes
Some
of the specialized but dual-use items being sought
are, by all indications, bound for Iraq's missile
program. Other cases are ambiguous, such as that
of a planned magnet-production line whose suitability
for centrifuge operations remains unknown. Some
efforts involve non-controlled industrial material
and equipment-including a variety of machine tools-and
are troubling because they would help establish
the infrastructure for a renewed nuclear program.
But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors
departed) are not clearly linked to a nuclear end-use.
Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural
uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly
dubious.
