| Annual
Report to Congress on the
Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear
Facilities and Military Forces
December
2004
Scope
Note
Congress
has directed the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) to submit to the Congressional leadership
and intelligence committees an annual, unclassified
report assessing the safety and security of the
nuclear facilities and military forces in Russia.
Congress has requested that each report include
a discussion of the following:
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The ability of the Russian Government to maintain
its nuclear military forces.
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The security arrangements at Russia’s
civilian and military nuclear facilities.
-
The reliability of controls and safety systems
at Russia’s civilian nuclear facilities.
-
The reliability of command and control systems
and procedures of the nuclear military forces
in Russia.
This report is the fourth responding
to this Congressional request. The report addresses
facilities and forces of the Russian Ministry of
Defense, the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (formerly
the Ministry of Atomic Energy), and other Russian
institutes. It updates the February
2002 report to Congress.
This
paper has been prepared under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Proliferation.
(46 KB)
Key Points
The
United States continues to work cooperatively with
Moscow to increase the safety and security of nuclear-related
facilities, infrastructure, and personnel.
Russia is upgrading its physical, procedural,
and technical measures to secure its nuclear weapons against
both external and internal threats.
Russia’s nuclear security has been slowly
improving over the last several years, but risks
remain. We
remain concerned about vulnerabilities to an insider
who attempts unauthorized actions as well as potential
terrorist attacks.
·
An
unauthorized launch or accidental use of a Russian
nuclear weapon is highly unlikely as long as current
technical and procedural safeguards built into the
command and control system remain in place and are
effectively enforced. Our concerns about possible circumvention of
the system would rise if central political authority
broke down.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
States, President Putin and other Russian officials
have conducted a public campaign to provide assurances
that terrorists have not acquired Russian nuclear
weapons. Russian
officials have reported, however, that terrorists
have targeted Russian nuclear weapon storage sites.
Security was tightened in 2001 after Russian
authorities twice thwarted terrorist efforts to
reconnoiter nuclear weapon storage sites.
Russian facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material
vary from small research facilities and fuel cycle
facilities to those involved with nuclear weapons
research, development, and production. Small research facilities,
although typically under-funded, usually have smaller,
static inventories of weapons-usable nuclear material
and are easier to secure whereas large fuel fabrication
facilities have larger, varying inventories that
are more difficult to account for and are much harder
to secure.
We assess that progress on
security enhancements is most advanced at civilian
institutes and Russian Navy sites.
Progress is impeded at facilities within
the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy nuclear weapons complex, which
contain most of the material of proliferation interest
because Russian security concerns prevent direct
US access to sensitive materials.
Russia’s nuclear material protection, control,
and accounting practices have been slowly improving
over the last several years, but risks remain.
We find it highly unlikely
that Russian authorities would have been able to
recover all the material reportedly stolen.
We assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, and we are concerned
about the total amount of material that could have
been diverted or stolen in the last 13 years.
As for security at nuclear
power plants, the commander-in-chief of the Interior
Ministry Force said in November 2003 that Russia
would set up a special-purpose unit tasked to protect
nuclear energy industry installations.
The unit would be established to counter
terrorists and augment existing security.
Even with increased security, however, Russian
nuclear power plants almost certainly will remain
vulnerable to a well-planned and executed terrorist
attack.
Discussion
The United States is working
cooperatively with Moscow to increase the safety
and security of nuclear-related facilities, infrastructure,
and personnel. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible
for the nuclear military forces and its nuclear
weapon storage system.
The Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom),
formerly known as the Ministry of Atomic Energy, operates the national nuclear
weapons complex, conducts weapons-related tests
at the MOD nuclear test site, and controls most
nuclear-related institutes and industrial facilities.
·
Rosatom
and Rosenergoatom, a state-owned nuclear power
concern, operate Russia’s nuclear power reactors.
We are concerned that Russia
may not be able to sustain US-provided security
upgrades of facilities over the long-term given
the cost and technical sophistication of at least
some of the equipment involved.
Ministry of Defense
Nuclear Weapons Inventory
Russia
is upgrading its physical, procedural, and technical
measures to secure its weapons against both external
and internal threats, and Russia’s nuclear security
has been slowly but unevenly improving over the last
several years.
Risks remain, however, and we continue
to be concerned about vulnerabilities to an insider
who attempts unauthorized actions as well as potential
terrorist attacks.
·
An unauthorized launch or accidental use of a
Russian nuclear weapon is highly unlikely as long
as current technical and procedural safeguards
built into the command and control system remain
in place and are effectively enforced.
Our concerns about possible circumvention
of the system would rise if central political
authority broke down.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has
consolidated the former Soviet stockpile into
storage sites in Russia. Russian officials have stated that thousands
of nuclear warheads from the former Soviet stockpile
have been dismantled since 1991; reportedly over
10,000 warheads have been eliminated. Moscow relies on nuclear weapons
as its primary means of deterrence, however, and
will continue to have thousands of nuclear warheads
in its inventory for the foreseeable future.
·
Moscow
maintains roughly 4,000 operational strategic
nuclear warheads in its strategic nuclear triad,
which is composed of ICBMs, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers carrying
nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missiles.
Moscow has agreed under the Moscow Treaty
to reduce its strategic forces so that on 31 December
2012 Russia would have no more than 1,700 to 2,200
warheads.
·
Although
Russia has reduced its nonstrategic nuclear stockpile,
it probably will retain several thousand nonstrategic
nuclear warheads. In accordance with a 1991 unilateral pledge, Moscow consolidated
most of its nonstrategic nuclear warheads in central
depots and eliminated a major portion of them
as a response to a US presidential initiative.
The Defense Ministry’s 12th Main Directorate
(GUMO) is responsible for the physical protection
and safety of nuclear weapons.
Specialists from the 12th GUMO
carry out all maintenance work in close collaboration
with the warhead designers.
The 12th GUMO also is responsible
for nuclear warhead shipments throughout Russia.
·
All
nuclear weapons storage sites, except
those subordinate to the strategic missile
troops, fall under the 12th GUMO’s
responsibility, thus facilitating a uniform policy
in matters of operation and physical security.
·
In peacetime all nuclear munitions except those
on ICBMs and SLBMs on alert status are stored
in nuclear weapons storage sites.
·
The
Russians employ a multi-layered approach that
includes physical, procedural, and technical measures
to secure their weapons.
Since
the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
States, President Putin and other Russian officials
have conducted a public campaign to provide assurances
that terrorists have not acquired Russian nuclear
weapons.
·
In
October 2002, former Minister of Atomic Energy
Adamov stated, “Neither Bin Ladin nor anyone else
could steal a nuclear warhead from anywhere in
the former Soviet Union.
During my time as minister, I carried out
a comprehensive stock-taking of everything we
had and had had, and traced the history of all
the warheads ever produced. So, everything there was on the territories
of the former USSR republics was returned to Russia.
…Nothing was stolen from us.
So, neither Bin Ladin, nor Iraq nor Iran
could make use of these explosive devices.”
·
Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said publicly during
a visit to Washington in April 2004 that it is
impossible for Moscow’s stockpiles of nuclear
weapons and nuclear fuels to fall into the hands
of terrorists.
In September 2002, then First Deputy Chief of the General
Staff, Colonel-General Baluyevskiy, stated that
the security of Russian nuclear weapon storage
sites “is important not only for our country but
for the whole world.
This is why they are heavily guarded. …We
have taken all measures to ensure the security
of these facilities, from technical to physical
ones.”
Russian officials, however, have reported that terrorists have targeted Russian nuclear weapon
storage sites.
According to the chief of the 12th
GUMO, Russian authorities twice thwarted terrorist
efforts to reconnoiter nuclear weapon storage
sites in 2002.
·
In
addition, two Chechen sabotage and reconnaissance
groups reportedly showed a suspicious amount of
interest in the transportation of nuclear munitions.
The groups were spotted at several major railroad
stations in the Moscow region, apparently interested
in a special train used for transporting nuclear
“bombs.”
Federal Agency for Atomic Energy
Nuclear Materials Security
| Russian facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material
vary from small research
facilities and fuel cycle facilities
to those involved with nuclear weapons research,
development, and production.
·
Small
research facilities, although typically
under-funded, usually have smaller, static
inventories of weapons-usable nuclear material
and are easier to secure; large fuel fabrication
facilities have larger, varying inventories
that are more difficult to account for and
much harder to secure. |
|
Weapons-Usable
Nuclear Material
Weapons-usable nuclear material is defined
as uranium enriched to 20 percent or greater
in the uranium-235 or uranium-233 isotopes
(highly enriched uranium, HEU) and any plutonium
containing less than 80 percent of the isotope
plutonium-238.
Weapons-grade material is typically defined
as uranium enriched to about 90 percent
or greater uranium-235 or uranium-233, or
plutonium containing about 90 percent or
greater plutonium-239. |
We
assess that progress on security enhancements
is most advanced at civilian institutes and Russian
Navy sites. Progress
is impeded at facilities within the Federal Agency
for Atomic Energy nuclear weapons complex, which
contain most of the material of proliferation
interest, because Russian security concerns prevent
direct US access to sensitive materials.
·
Russia’s
nuclear material protection, control, and accounting
(MPC&A) practices have been slowly improving
over the last several years, but risks of undetected
theft remain.
In November
2002, Yuri Vishnevskiy, the head of the Russian
Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation
Safety, Gosatomnadzor (GAN), told a news conference that
there have been documented instances of nuclear
materials, including grams of weapons-grade uranium,
disappearing from Russian nuclear facilities.
He stated that losses most frequently occurred
at nuclear materials processing facilities, including
Elektrostal near Moscow and the Chemical Concentrates
Plant in Novosibirsk.
·
Subsequently
Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev acknowledged
missing material but claimed that “Everything
that was lost was subsequently traced and returned
to the relevant arsenals.
It may not have been instantly, it may
have taken several years, but all these thefts
were carefully investigated and prevented.”
·
We
find it highly unlikely that Russian authorities
would have been able to recover all the stolen
material.
Last year GAN continued to
find inadequacies in the accounting system for
Russian nuclear materials. Its press release in August 2003 said, “In
connection with the lack of development in creation
of a system of state accounting and control of
nuclear materials, a significant number of deviations
from the normative requirements have been noted,
there are anomalies in accounting for nuclear
materials, and shortcomings of an organizational
nature in the operating organizations have been
noted.”
·
In
March 2003, a memorandum issued by GAN and circulated
in the Duma, stated that “The analysis of inspections
carried out last year shows that there are serious
flaws in the physical protection of nuclear risky
facilities in the industry.…The system of accounting,
control, storage and transportation of radioactive
materials is not fully operational yet. As a result, the unauthorized use of radioactive materials and their
theft cannot be ruled out.”
Detected
Diversions. Russian institutes have lost weapons-grade
and weapons-usable nuclear materials in thefts
in amounts greater than a few milligrams, contrary
to claims by Minatom officials. In each case that we know about, however, the diverted material
eventually was seized by government authorities. For example,
·
In
1992, 1.5 kilograms of 90-percent-enriched weapons-grade
uranium were stolen from the Luch Production Association.
·
In
1994, approximately 3.0 kilograms of 90-percent-enriched
weapons-grade uranium were stolen in Moscow.
·
In
1999, the US Government confirmed that a Bulgarian
seizure of nuclear material was weapons-usable.
The material—approximately four grams of
HEU—probably originated in Russia.
Although
not independently confirmed, reports of a theft
in 1998 from an unnamed enterprise in Chelyabinsk
Oblast are of concern.
The chief of the Federal Security Service
department in the Chelyabinsk region reported
the prevention of the theft of 18.5 kilograms
of radioactive materials. Viktor Yerastov, then chief of Minatom’s Nuclear
Materials Accounting and Control Department, without
admitting to an amount being stolen, said that
“if” that amount had been stolen, it was "quite
sufficient material to produce an atomic bomb"—the
only nuclear theft that has been so described.
There have been other press reports about materials
seized in Russia about which we have no further
information because Russia typically does not
reveal the results of its investigations. Press reports generally overstate the impact
of stolen material, often referring to or implying
that depleted, natural, or low-enriched uranium
are weapons-grade or weapons-usable material.
The number
of seizures of stolen material and reported theft
attempts over the last several years has declined
as a result of several possible factors:
US assistance to improve security at Russian
facilities, a possible decrease in smuggling,
or smugglers more knowledgeable about evading
detection. Nevertheless, we assess that undetected smuggling
has occurred, and we are concerned about the total
amount of material that could have been diverted
over the last 13 years.
Safety and Security at Russian
Civilian Nuclear Power Plants
Russia has announced plans to begin construction of
reactors with enhanced safety features, but the
funding has not yet been allocated.
Consequently Russia will have to extend
the lives of the first-generation plants, presenting
some risk to the safety of individuals living
near them.
·
Seven first-generation Russian nuclear power reactors will
reach the end of their service lives within the
next four years.
·
A major continuing problem for the Russian nuclear power industry
is the failure of its customers to pay for electricity,
which has contributed to a lack of resources for
maintenance, spare parts, and salaries.
Western assistance has been improving the safety systems
and operating procedures at Soviet-designed nuclear
reactors. However, inherent design deficiencies in RBMK
and older model VVER reactors will prevent them
from ever meeting Western safety standards.
·
The most notable design flaw in these reactors is the lack
of a Western-style containment structure to prevent
the release of fission products in the event of
a serious accident
In
March 2003, Atomic Energy Minster Rumyantsev stated
that since September 2001 “We have drawn up and
implemented a number of measures which guarantee
the necessary safety of our installations.”
·
Even with increased security, however, Russian
nuclear power plants almost certainly will remain
vulnerable to a well-planned and executed terrorist
attack, which could cause significant damage or
even a radiological release.
Footnotes
In contrast, non-weapons-grade
nuclear material thefts, particularly containers
of such radionuclides as cesium-137, cobalt-60,
or strontium-90, have been frequent and well documented.
Although terrorists could use these radionuclides
to build a radiological dispersal device—designed
to disperse radioactive material to cause injury
and contamination by means of the radiation—we assess
that in the majority of these cases thieves were
seeking the metal used in the container shielding
rather than the radioisotope.
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