SARS Down But Still a Threat

Intelligence Community Assessment
August 2003

NIC ICA 2003-09
Prepared under the auspices of Karen Monaghan, Acting National Intelligence Officer for Economics and Global Issues.

Scope Note
This Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) was requested by Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson and Ambassador Jack Chow, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Health Affairs. It highlights the evolution of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the potential implications of the disease for the United States under several scenarios; this paper does not attempt to provide a scientific assessment of the epidemiology of SARS. Even though SARS has infected and killed far fewer people than other common infectious diseases such as influenza, malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS, it has had a disproportionately large economic and political impact because it spread in areas with broad international commercial links and received intense media attention as a mysterious new illness that seemed able to go anywhere and hit anyone.

As the first infectious disease to emerge as a new cause of human illness in the 21^st century, SARS underscores the growing importance of health issues in a globalized world. The December 1999 unclassified National Intelligence Estimate, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States, warned that new and reemerging diseases would pose increasing challenges to the United States and the rest of the world. The 1999 Estimate highlighted several key health trends which track with the emergence of SARS:

• The forces of globalization, which are speeding the spread of infectious diseases and amplifying the impact, also are giving us better tools to protect human health.

• Major infectious disease threats to the United States and the world, like HIV/AIDS, will continue to emerge, challenging our ability to diagnose, treat, and control them.

• Infectious diseases will loom larger in global interstate relations as related embargoes and boycotts to prevent their spread create trade frictions and controversy over culpability.

In addition to coordinating the draft within the Intelligence Community, the National Intelligence Council asked several health experts to review the paper as part of its effort to capitalize on expertise inside and outside the government. The experts included Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health; Dr. Steve Ostroff, Deputy Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); and Dr. Joshua Lederberg, Professor Emeritus at Rockefeller University and Nobel Laureate. The NIC also shared the draft with counterparts in Canada at the Privy Council Office, Intelligence Assessment Secretariat.

Key Judgments

The wave of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) has been overcome, but SARS has not been eradicated. Although the World Health Organization declared on 5 July that all transmission chains of SARS had been broken, many health experts fear it could return again in the fall when cooler temperatures return in temperate areas. We remain vulnerable.

• The possible presence of animal reservoirs of the coronavirus that causes SARS and the lack of a reliable diagnostic test or a vaccine preclude eradication.

• If a resurgence of SARS this winter coincides with the annual outbreak of influenza, identifying and isolating suspected SARS cases will be much more difficult. SARS also could mutate, altering the symptoms, transmissibility, or lethality of the disease.

• As the first line of defense, healthcare systems and workers are particularly vulnerable. Moreover, most wealthy countries have little recent experience implementing large-scale quarantine and isolation programs, and poor countries already have inadequate health surveillance and infection control procedures.

The emergence of SARS illustrates the challenge of battling infectious diseases in an increasingly globalized world. Global links have sped the geographic spread of the disease and amplified the economic and political impact.

• Although SARS has killed far fewer people than die each year from more common maladies such as pneumonia, influenza, malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS, it generated significant attention and created a sense of urgency to respond because it was a mysterious new illness that seemed able to go anywhere and hit anyone.

• SARS hit parts of Asia and Canada with extensive commercial links to the rest of the world. Although the economic impact, particularly in China, was less severe than initially forecast, SARS wreaked havoc on the tourism and travel industries, erasing revenues and jobs.

• The same forces of globalization that drove the spread of SARS also have been key to managing it. Modern advances in communication, science, and travel almost certainly helped alert people more quickly to the disease, facilitated a stronger national and international response, and sped research efforts to help contain the disease.

Political leadership has been a key variable in managing the epidemic. China’s efforts to hide the initial outbreak allowed SARS to build up dangerous momentum before Chinese officials became more open, while Vietnam’s willingness to promptly highlight the threat and seek international assistance helped offset the country’s weak healthcare system. The more SARS spread, the tougher countries became in implementing control measures, including quarantining and isolating people to stop its transmission.

• The intense focus on SARS has opened a window of opportunity for the United States and the WHO to pursue longer-term bilateral and multilateral cooperation on health issues.

Three Scenarios

The future course of SARS will depend on a host of complex variables, making forecasting difficult. We constructed three scenarios to highlight various challenges that SARS might pose in the future. Complexity and uncertainty preclude assessing the relative likelihood of any one of the three.

SARS Simmers. SARS could resurface this fall but be limited to random outbreaks in a few countries, rendering it more of a public health nuisance than a crisis. Rapid activation of local and international surveillance systems would be key to containing the spread.

• Political and economic reverberations still would occur, with some companies and investors looking to reduce their exposure in East Asia, particularly China.

SARS Gains a Foothold in Poor Countries, Regions. SARS could spread to poor countries in Africa or Asia, potentially generating more infections and deaths than before but with relatively little international economic impact. The risk of spread would continue, however, even if SARS emerged in poor countries or isolated regions of Russia and China with weak healthcare systems.

• The World Health Organization and US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention probably would come under intense pressure to provide money and technical assistance to compensate for weak healthcare systems.

• Some isolated countries such as North Korea probably would resist outside assistance, even at the risk of putting their own citizens at risk. Some repressive regimes hit by SARS are likely to employ brutal tactics to quarantine and isolate people, possibly sowing division among outside countries and multilateral organizations over how to respond to apparent human rights violations.

SARS Resurges. SARS could come back this fall in the places it hit before—such as China, Taiwan, Canada, and Singapore—or hit harder in other well-connected places like the United States, Japan, Europe, India, or Brazil. Even if the number of infected persons were not significantly greater, the resurgence of the disease in globally linked countries probably would generate a significant impact again.

• The return of SARS to Asia is likely to cause somewhat less disruption the second time as citizens learn to live with the disease, but more multinational companies probably would reduce their exposure in the region if they concluded that SARS posed a long-term health challenge.

• Bigger outbreaks in Europe or the United States would hit a whole new set of business and government players, potentially doing serious damage to trade and growth.

Discussion

The Global Health Challenge
The emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) illustrates the challenge of battling infectious diseases in an increasingly globalized world. SARS is the latest of more than 35 new or reemerged infectious diseases over the last 30 years. Infectious diseases have long raged through human communities, but forces of globalization—including rapid growth in international trade and travel and increasing urbanization—have amplified their spread and impact. These same forces of globalization, however, also have led to significant advances in communication, travel, and technology, which have aided in the fight against infectious diseases.

• On balance, infectious disease pathogens have the upper hand because they constantly evolve new mechanisms that can exploit weak links in human defenses.

• SARS has subsided for now, but many health experts warn that it is likely to come back when cooler weather returns to temperate areas, bringing a resurgence of respiratory infections.

Downsides of Globalization. Population growth and development are bringing more people into contact with non-domesticated animals, introducing new diseases more frequently into the human population. The transmission of pathogens from animals to humans is a process called zoonosis (see map). Some researchers believe that SARS may have originated in China in animals such as wildcat species that were trapped and sold as food in exotic markets. In mid August 2003, China lifted the ban on the sale and consumption of exotic animals imposed during the SARS epidemic.

• HIV/AIDS, monkeypox, and hantavirus are other infectious diseases believed to have originated in animals.

Modern travel and labor migration patterns played a key role in spreading SARS after it emerged in November 2002 in Guangdong Province, China. From Guangdong, the disease made its way to Hong Kong and then to Vietnam, Singapore, and Taiwan as well as Europe and North America.

• Within China, as many as 180 million people are considered migrant labor, moving between rural areas, cities, and manufacturing centers in search of employment.

• Asia has become a major hub for business and tourist travel, putting millions of passengers within 24 hours of almost every major city in the world, providing little time to identify and isolate people infected with diseases that may take several days to show symptoms.

• More people also are migrating overseas to find jobs, and travel by workers and their families can spread diseases. For example, a Filipino nurse working in Toronto contracted SARS and transmitted it to family members on a visit to the Philippines.

In addition to spreading the disease geographically, global links also have amplified the economic and political impact of the disease. Even though SARS has killed far fewer people up to now—around 815—than those who die each year from more common maladies such as pneumonia, influenza, malaria, and tuberculosis, as a new disease it was more disruptive and generated more attention. The disease exhibited some characteristics of a potentially explosive epidemic in the early stages, and SARS hit countries that have extensive commercial links with other parts of the world, generating widespread economic disruptions and media attention.

• The outbreak of SARS in Asia and Canada disrupted a wide-ranging global network of businesses increasingly dependent on international trade and travel. Airlines were the highest profile economic victims, but service industries like tourism and supply chains in industries as diverse as seafood and microchips also were affected.

• Intense media attention and uncertainty about the disease fueled widespread fear, even in some areas without any cases, exacerbating economic disruptions.  

• The suspicion of Asians as carriers of the disease reduced patronage of Asian businesses and communities in the United States and sparked travel bans against Asian tourist groups and conference participants worldwide.

Benefits of Globalization. Intense international media coverage facilitated by global communication networks increased pressure on governments to respond effectively to SARS and prompted many citizens and healthcare workers to be vigilant in taking precautions, monitoring symptoms, and seeking early treatment.

• China initially tried to cover up SARS as it did with other diseases in the past, but international media scrutiny and leaks to the press led Beijing to publicly acknowledge and respond to the disease.

• The public has been able to track the evolution of the disease more closely with everything from text messaging on cell phones to publicly and privately run websites; Singaporeans could even watch a special public service television channel devoted to SARS.

Modern communications and medical technologies provided key tools to combat SARS.

• Health workers utilized the World Health Organization’s (WHO) global network of research facilities to share data and speed the identification of the virus causing SARS.

• International medical journals took the rare step of promptly publishing research on SARS on the Internet prior to hard copy publication.

• Thermal imaging equipment was acquired in numerous countries in an effort to screen large numbers of people for high fevers. Hong Kong employed software to track the spread of the disease in urban areas, and some countries employed cameras and electronic bracelets to help security officials enforce home quarantines.

Economic and Political Fallout of SARS

Government and private sector economists have had difficulty calculating the costs of the SARS epidemic. Early on, forecasters estimated that the macroeconomic impact would be negligible but hastily cut growth estimates for several economies, including China, as the disease spread, cases mounted, and the situation appeared to be out of control. Service industries, particularly airlines and tourism, were affected immediately. SARS began to threaten the retail and manufacturing sectors, particularly in China, when business trips and trade fairs were canceled, new orders were placed on hold, and investors delayed new expansion and constructions plans.

• In late April, the World Bank cut its growth forecast for East Asia to 5.0 percent—from 5.8 percent in 2002—due in part to SARS.

• In early May, the Asian Development Bank warned that East Asia could lose $US 28 billion in income and output if the disease continued until September.

• Several investment banks shaved up to one percentage point off China’s growth forecasts and cautioned that a more serious slowdown could occur if SARS were not brought under control by July.

• North Korea imposed tight border restrictions and quarantines, slowing trade flows and temporarily closing a lucrative new tourist resort.

Recent data suggest that growth in most countries plummeted in April and May but started to recover as the disease was brought under control, reports of new cases dwindled, and the WHO removed countries from its travel advisory list. Most notably, no major disruptions in trade and investment flows occurred. Moreover, most factories in China, including those in Guangdong where the disease originated, continued to operate even during the height of the epidemic. In some countries, monetary and fiscal stimulus packages also helped to cushion the blow.

Certain locales, notably Hong Kong, Beijing, and Toronto, were hurt more than others. Moreover, additional indirect costs—the so- called “SARS tax”—probably will be incurred by businesses consumers, governments, and nongovernment agencies.

• Collectively, the ASEAN countries—Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam—are estimated to have lost $US 25 billion to $US 30 billion, mostly in the tourism, service, aviation, and restaurant sectors.

• Although China is forecast to achieve growth of 7 to 8 percent this year, the economies of China and Hong Kong will take longer to recover because the tourism, transport, communication, food, and entertainment industries suffered substantial losses.

• Most analysts forecast that SARS would shave a minimal amount off Canada’s 2003 growth but cut 1 percent off Toronto’s $200 billion economy.

SARS dealt a body blow to the travel and tourism industries, already facing a slowdown from post-9/11 terrorism concerns. They will be slow to recover. Business travel has resumed more rapidly as firms catch up on a backlog of deals, but tourist travel is far below last year’s levels. Hotels in Asia are cutting room rates in a bid to attract customers.

• An industry trade group estimates the tourist sector in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam will lose up to $US 10 billion and 3 million jobs this year because of SARS.

Airlines have restored most canceled flights, but carriers will have difficulty recouping lost revenues, and some may be forced into bankruptcy. The airline industry’s slow recovery will be a further drag on the aviation industry. Asian airlines were to account for one-quarter of Airbus deliveries and 30 percent of Boeing’s deliveries in 2003. Several Asia-Pacific carriers asked Airbus and Boeing to postpone deliveries of new aircraft. Both manufacturers have been counting on robust growth in the Asian travel market to boost revenues.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that some export-oriented industries, particularly clothing manufacturers, temporarily shifted some orders to Bangladesh, Turkey, India, and Pakistan. Foreign electronics manufacturers, including a large Japanese electronics firm, shifted some production to plants in Philippines and Malaysia with highly specialized sectors and relatively low costs. There is no evidence to suggest that foreign manufacturers pulled out investments or permanently shifted production outside China or East Asian production plants. Some multinationals probably have begun to rethink the costs and benefits of concentrating investment in one country or region, however.

• Over the last decade, China has attracted massive amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI)—$53 billion in 2002—thanks to its reputation as a low-cost and relatively low-risk manufacturing locale with a rapidly growing domestic market.

SARS has had minimal impact on global semiconductor production, even though nearly 80 percent of production in this $US 8 billion industry is located in Asia, largely in Taiwan and China.

• None of the semiconductor operations was forced to curtail production, although SARS disrupted some visits by foreign equipment suppliers and prompted the temporary closing of some Hong Kong sales and marketing offices.

Political Impact. SARS seriously tested the leadership skills of politicians and civil servants in every country affected. The public was quick to criticize leaders in China, Canada, Hong Kong, and Taiwan for failing to grasp the seriousness of the situation, to act quickly to contain the spread, and to accept responsibility for missteps. In some countries, public confidence in the ability of government leaders and state institutions to protect them may be permanently damaged.

• In China, SARS intensified behind-the-scenes jockeying between President Hu Jintao and his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who initially downplayed the disease. Hu publicly acknowledged the threat of SARS, allowed greater media coverage of the crisis, and sacked one of Jiang’s loyalists as Minister of Health.

• In Canada the Prime Minister, Premier of Ontario, and Mayor of Toronto drew fire from media and opposition party critics accusing them of failing to respond effectively and address public fears.

In contrast, the WHO and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lauded the Vietnamese government’s swift action and willingness to accept outside assistance, noting these factors were key to its success in containing the spread of SARS. In Singapore, the public expressed confidence and support for the government’s rigorous efforts to identify and isolate suspected SARS patients. An early April poll showed three out of four Singaporeans were confident that the government could stop SARS.

Tracking the Downturn in SARS

Since WHO first issued a global alert about SARS in March 2003, almost 8,500 probable cases have been reported from 29 countries around the world, with most cases (over 7,000) occurring in China. At one point in May, over 180 new infections were being reported daily, mostly in China.

The number of SARS cases peaked in May and steadily declined worldwide with the WHO declaring on 5 July that all transmission chains of the disease had been broken. The decline may reflect a seasonal retreat of the disease in warmer months, which is common for respiratory illnesses in temperate climates. Nonetheless, the downturn clearly illustrates that, even in a globalized world, the old-fashioned work of identifying and isolating suspected cases, tracing and quarantining others who might be exposed, and issuing travel advisories can control an emerging disease.  

• Most countries hit by SARS had not used traditional public health tools such as quarantine and isolation on such a large scale for decades, which slowed the containment.

• Governments also had to mobilize enormous resources to implement large-scale quarantine operations.

Surveillance. The first line of defense in arresting the spread of SARS has been the success in identifying possible cases—despite the lack of a proven screening test and symptoms common to many respiratory ailments. Taking people’s temperature generally has been the simplest, most cost-effective means of initial screening for possible SARS cases, followed by clinical examination for respiratory symptoms in those with fevers.¹

• Singapore issued over a million SARS toolkits with thermometers and facemasks to every residence in the country. Residents were regularly stopped at office buildings, schools, and other public places for temperature checks.

• China mobilized local party and government officials, including 85 million family planning workers, to try to monitor citizens for symptoms. China also mobilized its large militia to provide the rural public with instructions on SARS prevention. The government distributed tens of thousands of thermometers to the provinces.  

• After WHO confirmed that SARS could be transmitted on airline flights, including 22 infections traced to a single flight in March, airlines have become more stringent at keeping people who might be infected off airplanes.

Even though checks of passengers at airports were relatively effective at keeping infected people off airplanes, some lapses did occur.

• Japan installed infrared thermometers to monitor passengers at Tokyo’s international airport after voluntary testing proved ineffective, but press reports indicate that the machines cannot keep up with all travelers at peak times.

• An Asian man suspected of having SARS boarded a flight to the United States in May because his flight left before lab results were received and he had no other symptoms.

Quarantines and Isolation.² As SARS spread and political and economic stakes rose, countries took tougher measures to contain it. Some countries resorted to strong steps, such as closing schools despite the low number of cases among children, probably to compensate for weaknesses in their health-care infrastructure. Open societies seemed to have trouble enforcing quarantine orders.

• Some Chinese citizens fled cities and industrial hubs in response to early government efforts to isolate suspected cases and quarantine their contacts. Subsequently, Beijing forcibly locked both patients and healthcare workers in hospitals during the peak of infections, and the government instituted fines for people violating isolation orders and employed citizens to keep outsiders out of various villages. Shanghai officials announced in late May they had quarantined nearly 29,000 people in the previous two months.

• Canada threatened those who violated quarantines with fines or court-ordered isolation after some people defied voluntary measures, but news reports indicate that some people violated quarantines when the SARS threat appeared to be fading.

• Singapore’s strict quarantines proved particularly effective in bringing the disease under control.

Sometimes the most effective isolation and quarantine policies raised concerns about political freedom and human rights. For example, India and Thailand at one point isolated foreign visitors from countries that had SARS outbreaks, even though they did not have symptoms or known exposures.

• North Korea, which has quarantined entire areas to deal with epidemics in the past, imposed such tight restrictions for SARS that it constrained some international aid flows.

Political Leadership. A key variable in managing the SARS epidemic was the willingness of political leaders to raise public awareness of the disease, focus resources, and speed the government response. As noted above, Vietnamese leaders promptly acknowledged the SARS threat at an early stage in the outbreak and sought international help. In contrast, China’s political leaders clearly exacerbated the situation by initially suppressing news of the disease.

Reasons to Stay on Guard
Despite the downturn in cases, SARS has not been eradicated and remains a significant potential threat. Senior WHO officials and many other noted medical experts believe it highly likely that SARS will return. SARS, like other respiratory diseases such as influenza, may have subsided in the northern hemisphere as summer temperatures rise, only to come back in the fall.

• Most infectious diseases follow a similar epidemiological curve, emerging, peaking, and declining over time to a steady state, but the number of infections, the lethality, and length of time can vary enormously.

• Even as WHO officials removed the last of its travel advisories for SARS early this summer, officers repeatedly emphasized the risk that the disease would be back.

• Some experts caution that SARS might even lay low for several years before reappearing, as diseases such as Ebola and Marburg have done.

• The apparent reservoir of the coronavirus in animals, Bejing’s decision to lift the ban on sales of exotic animals, and lack of a reliable diagnostic kit, vaccine, or antiviral drug are factors that preclude eradication.

No Reliable Screening Tests. Diagnosis remains almost as much an art as a science as long as no proven screening test has been developed. Diagnostic kits currently under development can catch only about 70 percent of SARS cases, and their utility for widespread deployment is not yet known. SARS is difficult to detect, particularly in the early stages, even for countries with the most modern medical capabilities, raising the risk that healthcare workers will miss mild cases. Moreover, there is little prospect of a vaccine in the short-term.

• Various countries have different definitions of suspected and probable cases and have changed the definitions over time.

SARS Could Mutate. Natural mutations in the coronavirus which causes SARS could alter basic characteristics of the disease, but whether a mutation would make SARS more or less dangerous is impossible to predict. A significant increase in the transmissibility or lethality of SARS obviously would pose greater health risks and raise fears around the globe.

• Mutations could be particularly problematic if they alter the symptoms associated with SARS, making it harder to identify suspected cases.

• Researchers are studying a group of Canadians who tested positive for the SARS virus last spring but never got sick in order to see if they still might have infected others.

• Mutations also would complicate the development of a treatment or vaccine, which already probably is several years away.

Difficult to Maintain Vigilance. The willingness of healthcare workers to serve in the face of significant infection risks has been a key variable in the battle against SARS and other emerging diseases. Most healthcare workers in countries hit by SARS toiled long hours under dangerous conditions. The rate of infection among hospital workers was much higher than among the general public, underscoring the difficulty even professionals had in maintaining stringent infection control procedures.

• At one point 20 percent of those infected in Hong Kong were nurses, and over 300 healthcare workers were infected within a 17-day period in China during April.

Some health workers refused to work in SARS wards. This problem is likely to grow in both rich and poor countries if the disease resurges.

• In Taiwan, where over 90 percent of SARS infections occurred in hospitals, over 160 health workers quit or refused to work on SARS wards. The government threatened to revoke their professional licenses.

• The Chinese government fired at least six doctors who refused to treat SARS patients and barred them from practicing for life. China also tried to encourage healthcare workers by launching public relations campaigns hailing the work of the Angels in White, and Beijing offered bonus pay and staffed SARS hospitals with Army medical staff.

• Press reports in Canada indicate that some nurses refused to work in SARS wards in Toronto despite a doubling of their wages and lobbied for an official government inquiry on the handling of the epidemic.

Shortages in trained healthcare personnel were exacerbated when many healthcare workers fell ill to SARS and were replaced by workers with less training.

• Taiwan appeared so eager to declare victory over SARS that it relaxed its standards before the disease was brought under control. Press reports suggest that some healthcare workers were so fatigued from the crisis that they cut corners.

• Canadian officials acknowledge that the second outbreak in Toronto resulted from hospitals relaxing infection control regimes too quickly.

SARS Scenarios

Faced with these uncertainties, we have constructed three scenarios to consider potential trajectories for the disease and the implications for the United States. We have not attempted to identify a most likely scenario because the future course of SARS will depend on a host of complex variables, including the scope of present infections, mutations in the virus, the vulnerability of host populations, how individuals and governments respond, and chance.

Scenario One: SARS Simmers
SARS could resurface this fall but be limited to random outbreaks in a few countries. Rapid activation of local and international surveillance systems and isolation procedures would be key to identifying suspect cases and containing the spread. Initially, some cases might elude detection by hospital workers and airport personnel, who have relaxed screening procedures since the disease ebbed. Smaller, poorly-funded transit facilities would remain vulnerable because they lacked trained staff and equipment to effectively monitor all passengers.

• In most affected countries, the small number of cases and transmission would render SARS more of a public health nuisance than a crisis.

Some countries would be tempted to hide a resurgence. China’s experience demonstrated that hiding an outbreak is increasingly difficult and costly in a globalized world, but some governments still probably calculate that transparency also has drawbacks. Indeed, the economic repercussions of WHO travel advisories for SARS probably reinforce the incentives countries have to hide or underreport cases.

• The WHO had to lean on Beijing throughout the crisis to share data.

• Some countries over the past decade have not acknowledged HIV/AIDS cases in the military for security reasons, suggesting they would withhold information on other diseases that might affect readiness.

Even if new SARS outbreaks were sporadic and small-scale, economic, political, and psychological ripples would occur. China faces the biggest risks. Although foreign investors are unlikely to withdraw substantial amounts of FDI, firms with considerable exposure to China might redirect a percentage of new investment to other locations to diversify their manufacturing operations. Companies that already have temporarily shifted some production outside China probably would establish more permanent arrangements.

• Companies and governments outside China probably would attempt to exploit these concerns by more aggressively trying to turn temporary production into longer-term investments.

Multinationals also are likely to become more concerned about the “SARS tax” on their businesses, including increased healthcare expenditures for expatriate employees and expanded insurance to cover the risk to operations and personnel from infectious diseases. Some firms probably would calculate that the risks of frequent business travel outweighed the costs and switch to teleconferencing, telecommuting, and
e-commerce.

• SARS has alerted companies to the potential operational disruptions caused by a contagious disease, risks that are rarely priced into business costs or considered in contingency planning.

• Whereas previous business continuity plans focused on data protection and recovery, businesses probably will begin to consider plans that involve protection of human resources, backup teams, and alternate locations for operation.

Paradoxically, keeping SARS out of the United States might become more difficult as fewer cases are seen, because health, transportation, and security workers are more likely to drop their guard in monitoring for infected people if only a few cases pop up now and then.

• The US status as a major hub for international travel increases the statistical risk that lapses in surveillance abroad could facilitate the spread of SARS to American cities.

• It is difficult for many visitors to acquire visas for travel to the United States; thus they probably would be inclined to withhold information that could complicate their visit.

Scenario Two: SARS Spreads to Poor Countries, Regions
SARS could gain a foothold in one or more poor countries, potentially generating more infections and deaths than before but with relatively little international economic impact. Few poor countries have had SARS appear on their doorstep up to now because most have relatively few links to the affected regions, but the longer the disease persists the more likely it is that SARS will spread more widely.

• Impoverished areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America remain at potential risk for SARS because of weak healthcare systems and vulnerable populations. Even a small number of cases in large, under-developed cities such as Dhaka, Kinshasa, or Lagos could generate a large number of victims in a short period.

• No evidence thus far suggests that people with malaria or HIV/AIDS are more susceptible to becoming infected by SARS, but experience indicates that diseases are more lethal among sick and malnourished populations. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest concentration of HIV-infected people in the world, and those with full-blown AIDS have severely deficient immune response.

Most poor countries would have trouble organizing control measures against SARS, especially if the disease gained momentum before it was identified by healthcare workers. Most countries have inadequate hospital facilities to effectively isolate large numbers of patients, and most hospitals even lack the resources to provide food and care to patients.

• Voluntary home quarantine might not be viable in crowded urban slums, where large families might share small dwellings and people might have to go out each day for food or work.

• Identifying and tracking down people who might have been exposed probably would be substantially more difficult in countries with poor infrastructure and underfunded local security services.

• Repressive countries, fearful that the disease could spark political upheaval, probably would quarantine entire towns or villages with military force or incarcerate quarantine violators. Outside countries and international organizations providing assistance are likely to split over how much to condemn or withhold aid over apparent human rights violations.

The spread of SARS into various poor countries is likely to significantly disrupt local economies while having relatively little impact on broader international markets.

• The local impact could be worse than in places like Taiwan and Canada, because people in poor countries are living closer to the margin and governments have less resources for emergencies. In countries with a much smaller pool of skilled workers, the loss of key personnel can have a relatively large effect on society—as HIV/AIDS has illustrated in Africa.

• Even poor countries like Bangladesh have at least some global trade and business links that could be disrupted if they were hit by SARS, but the more isolated the country, the smaller the global economic impact probably would be.

The spread of SARS to poor countries also would complicate international efforts to control the disease.

• Diagnosing SARS is likely to be more difficult among populations with many preexisting health problems.