THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

SEMIANNUAL REPORT

1 April 2025 - 30 September 2025

Report Availability

The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shares reports, news releases, and information about ongoing work on its website at www.DNI.gov/ICIG.

Contents

Message from the Inspector General

I am honored to present this unclassified version of our Semiannual Report on behalf of the Intelligence Community Office of the Inspector General (IC OIG). As Inspector General, I am responsible for the independent oversight of programs and activities under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence. We have a legal duty to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness across the Intelligence Community, and to investigate and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and misconduct. We are also entrusted with protecting whistleblowers and providing policymakers actionable information to strengthen national security and increase trust with the American people.

The activities in this report, covering 1 April to 30 September 2025, reflect the strategies and budgetary decisions made by previous IC OIG leadership and the prior presidential administration. Highlights from the reporting period include an audit yielding recommendations to strengthen information security, a joint evaluation of certain sensitive facilities, and investigations leading to the recovery of funds. IC OIG also handled an unprecedented volume of complaints via the IC IG Hotline, highlighting the importance of secure, independent reporting channels.

For the past three years, IC OIG has prioritized congressionally directed actions at the expense of equally important discretionary work due to personnel and budget constraints. However, balancing these priorities is crucial to intelligence oversight. Discretionary activities are uniquely responsive and adaptable for addressing evolving risks and threats before they become crises. The Inspector General framework was established by statute in 1978, while this office was created more recently in 2010. To make our best better, it is imperative that we question previous assumptions and modernize to enhance our impact.

For these reasons, I launched “IC OIG 2.0” in December 2025. This update consolidated our six divisions into four offices, increasing operational capacity, streamlining processes, reducing stovepipes, and providing for additional discretionary activities. I extend my sincere appreciation to our workforce, partner OIGs, Director Gabbard, the President, and the Congress for the support we have received as we implement these long-needed reforms. My vision is to ensure this office is an independent vanguard of integrity, fortitude, and excellence. It is my privilege to serve, and I am committed to a relentless pursuit of the truth that empowers the Intelligence Community to secure America’s future.

CHRISTOPHER R. FOX

Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community

Highlights

Monetary Impact

$289,312.48 In potential recoveries identified

IC OIG Recommendations

- **24** New Recommendations
- **22** Closed Recommendations
- **77** Open Recommendations

External Review Panels

- **19** New Requests
- **13** Closed Requests
- **34** Under Evaluation

Urgent Concerns

- **10** New Complaints
- **3** Transmitted to Congress

Investigations

- **35** Open Investigations
- **7** Completed Investigations
- **5** Joint Investigations
- **8** Preliminary Reviews

Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

	COMPLETED PROJECTS	ONGOING PROJECTS
Audit Division	3	4*
Inspections and Evaluations Division	1	4

*One project will result in several reports.

Suspicious Activity Report Referrals by Fiscal Year



*Includes data for a 3-month reporting period, July - September 2022.

IC IG Hotline Contacts by Fiscal Year



About Us

Unclassified Version of this Report

We are committed to increasing the transparency of our office. However, a significant portion of our oversight activities relate to sensitive intelligence programs and activities. Consequently, certain information must be reported separately. That information is available exclusively in the classified version of this report.

Authority

In 2010, Congress amended the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., to establish IC OIG within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). This establishment is codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3033. IC OIG has the statutory duty and responsibility to independently conduct, and issue reports on, audits, inspections, investigations, and reviews relating to the programs or activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). IC OIG is also authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information from whistleblowers and whistleblower reprisal claims. This oversight advances economy, efficiency, and effectiveness across the Intelligence Community (IC) and strengthens national security. Furthermore, the core duties and responsibilities of IC OIG align with the President's priorities for improving government accountability and performance.

Under 50 U.S.C. § 3033, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) serves as the statutory Chairman of the IC Inspectors General Forum (the Forum), comprised of all Inspectors General with oversight responsibility for an IC element. The Forum provides a mechanism for coordination, deconfliction, and collaboration regarding matters of common interest, questions of jurisdiction, and access to personnel and information that may affect more than one OIG.

IC OIG promoted fraud awareness at ODNI.

Mission

To promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and activities within the DNI's responsibility and authority.

Vision

A premier workforce that exemplifies core values and strengthens the IC and Nation.

Core Values

INTEGRITY: Do the right thing for the right reasons and the right way.

INDEPENDENCE: Do our jobs impartially without fear or favor.

TRANSPARENCY: Foster trust and confidence through openness and honesty.

ACCOUNTABILITY: Be responsible at every level and in every direction.

Statement of Independence

The IC IG is appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. By statute, the IC IG must be nominated based on integrity, experience, and demonstrated ability, and without regard to political affiliation. Accordingly, IC OIG conducts its duties with unwavering independence, objectivity, and impartiality. Our findings and conclusions remain free from bias or external interference, grounded solely in facts, applicable law, and established standards.

Oversight Standards

All IC OIG inspection and investigation activities conform to standards adopted by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). IC OIG audit activities are conducted in accordance with standards set by the Government Accountability Office, to include generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS), or other applicable professional standards.

Note: The above statements reflect those of the office as of 30 September 2025. Updated information will be available in the next Semiannual Report.

Organizational Structure

As of 30 September 2025, IC OIG was comprised of six divisions, as shown below in Figure 1. The senior leadership team included the Inspector General, Principal Deputy Inspector General, Counsel to the Inspector General, Director of the Center for Protected Disclosures, and Assistant Inspectors General.

IC OIG Divisions



Figure 1: IC OIG Divisions

Audit Division

The Audit Division conducts independent and objective audits and reviews of ODNI and IC programs and activities to ensure the accuracy and integrity of financial information, enhance operational efficiency, promote transparency, and build trust among stakeholders. These efforts empower the DNI and Congress to evaluate ODNI expenditures, drive improvements in operations, identify vulnerabilities in information technology and other systems, prevent wasteful practices, and swiftly address them when they arise. Ultimately, the Audit Division strengthens business practices to support the IC's mission, foster economy, efficiency, and effectiveness across ODNI and IC programs, and minimize fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

During the reporting period, the Audit Division completed three projects, issued four reports, and made 17 new recommendations. Once implemented, these recommendations will bolster the ODNI's information security program across all six National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 function areas: Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. The Audit Division completed a review of ODNI's compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 to strengthen efforts in identifying and reducing government-wide improper payments. Additionally, IC OIG validated ODNI's implementation of two prior recommendations to enhance its information security program, officially closing them.

Inspections and Evaluations Division

The Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) Division equips the IC IG with a capability to oversee ODNI and IC programs and activities distinct from traditional audit and investigative functions. The I&E Division conducts inspections, evaluations, and special reviews to issue evidence-based findings and actionable recommendations. These efforts enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of procedures and operations, foster interagency collaboration, and provide independent oversight of highly sensitive classified programs.

During the reporting period, the I&E Division led and supported joint efforts with other OIGs. These efforts yielded two recommendations and one observation. Key impacts included identifying and addressing security vulnerabilities in sensitive programs to enhance synchronization and execution of IC and agency functions. They also included recommending enhancements to agency governance that fortified the integrity of key security processes protecting Department of Energy (DOE) national security information. Another impact was expanding OIG oversight capabilities by increasing opportunities and expertise for monitoring research security activities. Additionally, the I&E Division validated ODNI's implementation of nine prior IC OIG recommendations and officially closed them.

Investigations Division

The mission of the Investigations Division is to identify and prevent misconduct and malfeasance within the ODNI and the broader IC by holding individuals and programs accountable. IC OIG investigators conduct proactive and reactive investigations of violations of law and policy across the IC, and play a significant role in coordinating with IC partners to ensure that interagency criminal matters are addressed appropriately. The Division also leads the Unauthorized Disclosure Task Force to ensure compliance with reporting requirements.

During the reporting period, IC OIG investigators reviewed hundreds of suspicious activity reports of potential financial crimes,[1] conducted eight preliminary reviews,[2] participated in five joint investigations, and issued seven investigative reports. IC OIG investigations identified $289,312.48 in potential recoveries. IC OIG had 35 open criminal and administrative investigations as of 30 September 2025. One investigative report led to an update of ODNI Instruction 77.01, requiring annual training for ODNI managers on the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.

[1] IC OIG participates in Suspicious Activity Report Review Teams led by Assistant United States Attorneys in the Eastern District of Virginia, District of Columbia, and Maryland. These three teams of personnel from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies leverage Bank Secrecy Act data to prevent terrorist attacks, disrupt criminal activities, and improve cooperation among agencies and the financial community.

[2] Preliminary reviews are narrowly focused investigative actions to determine whether the allegation(s) have merit as expeditiously as possible before proceeding with a formal investigation. Preliminary reviews often resolve allegations via more efficient, less intrusive means.

Center for Protected Disclosures

The Center for Protected Disclosures (CPD) manages whistleblower complaints and information submitted to the IC IG Hotline, providing a confidential channel for employees, contractors, and the public to report fraud, waste, abuse, and misconduct within the IC. CPD analysts assist complainants by explaining reporting options and legal protections. The Hotline is accessible via classified and unclassified email, phone lines, USPS mail, fax, secure web submissions, walk-ins, and drop boxes at select ODNI facilities (see Figure 2). During the reporting period, CPD handled 240 new complaints, a significant increase from prior periods (see Figure 3).

Figure 2: Six Ways to Report Concerns



Figure 3: New IC IG Hotline Complaints by Quarter (FY 2023-2025)

CPD also processes External Review Panel (ERP) requests under Presidential Policy Directive-19 (PPD-19), *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information*, from IC employees and contractors seeking review of reprisal allegations after exhausting their home IC element's whistleblower protection processes. In appropriate cases, IC OIG may convene an ERP under 50 U.S.C. §§ 3234 and 3341(j). During the reporting period, CPD processed 19 new ERP requests, closed 13, and continued reviewing 34 (see Figure 4). Two external OIGs provided new decisions after ERP remands from IC OIG. One ERP remains open, pending panel-member assignment notification.

External Review Panels: 1 April 2025 - 30 September 2025	
New Requests	19
Requests Closed	13
Requests Under Evaluation	34

Figure 4: External Review Panels

CPD is the office of primary responsibility for receiving and processing "urgent concern complaints" under the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA), 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5). The ICWPA ensures congressional intelligence committees are informed of serious abuses, law violations, or deficiencies related to intelligence activities (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). During the reporting period, IC OIG received ten ICWPA "urgent concern" complaints. The Acting IC IG determined that allegations in three of these complaints, if true, met the statutory definition of an "urgent concern." IC OIG transmitted two of these complaints to the DNI and to the congressional intelligence committees, and the third was pending security guidance at the end of the reporting period. The remaining seven complaints did not meet the definition of an "urgent concern." CPD also manages the Whistleblower Complaint Notification System, as required by Section 5334 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92; 50 U.S.C. § 3033 note), facilitating monthly notifications of whistleblower complaints related to DNI-jurisdiction programs and actions by IC element Inspectors General.

ICWPA "Urgent Concern" Complaints: 1 April 2025 - 30 September 2025			
Determination	**No Further Action Required Under the ICWPA***	**Transmitted to the DNI**	**Transmitted to the Congressional Intelligence Committees**
Urgent; Apparently Credible	0	0	0
Urgent; Not Apparently Credible	0	3	2**
Not Urgent; Not Apparently Credible	7	0	0
* Complaints determined to be neither "urgent" nor apparently credible under the ICWPA may still be subject to other oversight activities. ** One complaint was pending security guidance for transmittal to Congress at the end of the reporting period.			

Figure 5: ICWPA "Urgent Concern" Complaints, 1 April 2025 – 30 September 2025



Figure 6: ICWPA "Urgent Concern" Complaint Process

IC OIG Staffing Overview

IC OIG employs an elite workforce of cadre, detailees, and contractors. During the reporting period, departures outpaced hiring. As of 30 September, IC OIG had several hiring actions in progress. Many of these candidates had already cleared security but their onboarding was on hold due to a federal hiring freeze. Other candidates were pending security.

Additional personnel details are available in the classified version of this report.

Statutory Reporting Requirements

Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(1)(A), the IC IG shall, not later than 31 October and 30 April of each year, prepare and submit to the DNI a classified, and, as appropriate, an unclassified semiannual report summarizing IC OIG's activities during the immediately preceding six-month period ending 30 September and 31 March, respectively.[3]

As part of IC OIG's semiannual reporting requirements, the IC IG is required to assess whether the office received adequate funding during the preceding six months and unrestricted access to information. IC OIG must also report whether it issued any subpoena or handled any unauthorized disclosures requiring a criminal referral.

Not later than 30 days after receiving the report, the DNI shall transmit the report to the congressional intelligence committees, together with any comments the DNI considers appropriate.[4] Due to the lapse in appropriations from 1 October to 12 November 2025, and other factors to include staff turnover and the confirmation of a new IC IG, this report was completed and submitted as soon as practicable following the return to normal operations.

Resources

During the reporting period, IC OIG did not receive adequate funding to fulfill all of its mission requirements. Previous IC OIG leadership had conveyed this need for additional resources to the prior DNI and to Congress in the 2023 and 2024 semiannual reports, and in various briefings and engagements.

Congressionally directed actions (CDAs) reflect important legislative priorities. However, the high volume and complexity of CDAs have required the delay or cancellation of most IC OIG discretionary work. Discretionary work includes risk-based audits, forward-looking inspections, and systemic reviews. The IC IG sets the scope and priorities for discretionary work, in consultation with key stakeholders such as ODNI leadership, component offices, the Forum, and Congress. Discretionary projects often target the highest risks and intelligence priorities, providing timely answers to urgent questions, and reducing the need for subsequent, resource-intensive oversight.

Over the past three fiscal years, IC OIG work has consisted of at least 75 percent CDAs, whereas CDAs only constituted between 25 and 35 percent of peer OIG work. During the reporting period, IC OIG was unable to complete any discretionary projects. Furthermore, the IC IG Hotline has faced a growing volume of complaints due to additional IC-wide responsibilities imposed by Section 5334 of the classified annex of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act without a commensurate increase in staff.

[3] The statute also requires IC OIG to provide any portion of this report involving a component of a department of the United States Government to the head of that department.

[4] The statute further requires the DNI to transmit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any portion of the report involving a component of such department simultaneously with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence committees.

Data Access

Under 50 U.S.C. § 3033(g)(2)(B)-(D), the IC IG is entitled to unrestricted access to all IC personnel, and direct access to any information and materials within the IC IG's oversight responsibilities. No level of classification or compartmentation may serve as a basis for denying such access. During the reporting period, IC OIG obtained access to information relevant to the performance of its duties. IC OIG had previously reported that in limited, but important instances, data stewards had been unable to provide IC OIG information relevant to certain investigations due to technical and other limitations. While IC OIG has made significant progress toward addressing this challenge, we continue to pursue organic access to critical data sets to reduce investigation timelines and better protect the identities of whistleblowers without disrupting critical IC activities.

Subpoenas

IC OIG did not issue any subpoena under its 50 U.S.C. § 3033(g)(5) authority.

Unauthorized Public Disclosure of Classified Information

IC OIG did not complete any investigation into the unauthorized public disclosure of classified information. IC OIG did not initiate or refer any investigation of unauthorized public disclosure of classified information to the Attorney General for potential criminal investigation.

Oversight Projects

Completed Projects

AUD-2025-002: Biennial Report on the ODNI Compliance with the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (September 2025)

IC OIG conducted an evaluation of ODNI's implementation of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA), 6 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., to assess the actions ODNI took during calendar years 2023 and 2024. Under CISA, the inspectors general of six federal departments (Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury) and ODNI, in consultation with IC OIG and the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, must jointly submit an interagency report to Congress on Executive Branch implementation of the Act for the most recent two-year period.

Our evaluation found that ODNI improved its sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with IC elements over the past two years. ODNI and its information technology (IT) service provider enhanced accessibility to cyber threat information for improved sharing with other Federal entities and continued to implement cybersecurity information-sharing requirements. This report did not include any recommendation. Additional details on this evaluation are available in the classified version of this report.

AUD-2025-003: FY 2025 Independent Evaluation of the ODNI Security Program and Practices Required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (July 2025)

IC OIG contracted with an independent firm to conduct an evaluation pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3558, of ODNI's information security program for FY 2025, including information security policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines.

The firm summarized and reported the evaluation results through the six functions outlined in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework Function Areas, using the FY 2025 Inspector General FISMA Reporting Metrics. This report includes new recommendations to address identified deficiencies. Additional details on this evaluation are available in the classified version of this report.

AUD-2025-003a: FY 2025 Independent Evaluation of the ODNI Security Program and Practices Required by FISMA: Results of Technical Assessments

As part of the above evaluation, the firm also assessed the implementation of key information security controls for eight ODNI information systems. This report did not contain any enterprise-wide recommendation. Additional details on this evaluation are available in the classified version of this report.

AUD-2025-004: Review of ODNI's Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 for Fiscal Year 2024

IC OIG reviewed ODNI's compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3351-3358, for FY 2024. The PIIA directs agency Inspectors General to review payment integrity reporting for agency compliance and issue an annual report. IC OIG determined that ODNI met all PIIA requirements and complied with PIIA for FY 2024. This report did not include any finding or recommendation.

INS-2024-003: Joint IC OIG and DOE OIG Evaluation of DOE Security Processes

IC OIG conducted a joint evaluation with DOE OIG to assess the DOE security processes in FYs 2023 and 2024. We made several findings and observations. The report included two recommendations. Additional details on this evaluation are available in the classified version of this report.

Ongoing Projects

AUD-2024-005: Audit of the ODNI Hiring Process

AUD-2025-001: Interagency Joint Report on Compliance with CISA

AUD-2025-005: FY 2025 Audit of ODNI's Financial Statements

INS-2024-005: Assessment of Overt Human and Open-Source Intelligence Collection Programs Established by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis

INS-2024-006: Classification Review of ODNI for FY 2023

INS-2025-001: Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Confidential Human Source Program

INS-2025-003: Evaluation of IC Information Sharing Practices

Multiple Projects: Audits and Reviews of IC Compliance with Insider Threat Policy

Investigations

Completed Investigations[5]

Employee Misconduct

23-0023-IN: IC OIG completed an investigation into fraud and employee misconduct involving an ODNI employee who used U.S. Government funds for a graduate degree program without proper approval. The investigation substantiated violations of two ODNI Instructions and one ODNI internal process, contributing to a loss of $150,178.13. There was insufficient evidence of fraud. The violations were attributed to errors made by multiple officers, including the subject. IC OIG issued recommendations to ODNI management to recover the funds and address the identified deficiencies.

22-0008-IN: IC OIG completed an investigation into alleged misconduct by two ODNI employees involving government fund waste, improper contractor evaluation, and unauthorized travel. The investigation attributed the issues to miscommunication rather than intentional misconduct. Although the employees' actions led to reduced productivity, the contractors' work met contract standards. Other allegations, including a personnel evaluation error and claims of a toxic work environment, were resolved by other means.

24-0009-IN: An IC OIG investigation did not substantiate allegations that an ODNI employee was engaged in misconduct related to promoting an organization's inclusion in an IC course and soliciting partnerships in exchange for event tickets. IC OIG found no evidence of legal or regulatory violations, as the employee followed appropriate guidance in accepting the tickets. The issue was attributed to an ODNI office's failure to follow proper procedures. Recommendations to address internal control deficiencies have been made, with responses pending.

Time and Attendance Fraud

24-0002-IN: IC OIG concluded an investigation into an ODNI employee accused of time and attendance fraud. The investigation found that the employee's frequent meetings away from the office, coupled with errors in updating timesheets, likely accounted for the discrepant hours. The case was closed, and the remaining discrepancies were referred to ODNI management for appropriate action.

Contract Labor Mischarging

24-0006-IN: An IC OIG investigation revealed that an ODNI contractor had mischarged 270.50 hours between November 2022 and December 2023, in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and (B). The unsubstantiated hours resulted in a $57,661.54 loss to the U.S. Government. The contractor claimed to have worked off-site during these hours but could not substantiate this claim. Recovery of funds and responses to recommendations are pending.

[5] This section only includes summaries of substantiated investigations, or those with recommendations, completed during the reporting period.

24-0007-IN: An IC OIG investigation found that an ODNI contractor had mischarged 280.50 hours from August 2023 to March 2024, violating the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and (B). This resulted in a $24,668.81 loss to the government. The contractor claimed to have worked off-site during these hours but provided no supporting evidence. Recovery of funds and responses to recommendations are pending.

Open Investigations

At the end of the reporting period, IC OIG had 35 open investigations, as shown in Figure 7. The majority of these cases involved alleged whistleblower retaliation, employee misconduct, and time and attendance fraud.



Figure 7: IC OIG Open Investigations as of 30 September 2025

Referrals

IC OIG often receives complaints or allegations best addressed by other entities, including those posing security risks that require further coordination. During the reporting period, IC OIG referred approximately 150 complaints to other entities.

New Recommendations

The following section lists the IC OIG recommendations for corrective actions addressing significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies in intelligence programs and activities.[6]

Investigation (23-0023-IN): Employee Misconduct (Issued April 2025)

23-0023-IN-1: The ODNI Chief Operating Officer (COO), in coordination with the ODNI Chief Financial Executive (CFE), should determine, consistent with applicable law and policy, how it will recover the funds expensed related to the employee's participation in a graduate program and how it will action the existing open vouchers.

23-0023-IN-2: This recommendation is related to one or more sensitive, administrative personnel actions.

23-0023-IN-3: IC OIG recommends that the ODNI COO engage the ODNI Policy and Capability Directorate (P&C) to review and revise the current version of the relevant ODNI Instruction, to clarify that the COO must issue a "written waiver" to waive ODNI Instructions or Internal Process Documents (IPDs).

23-0023-IN-4: IC OIG recommends that the ODNI COO engage the ODNI Corporate Board, Employee Management Solutions Group, and ODNI P&C, to create an ODNI Internal Process Documents setting forth clear guidance governing the management and execution of an internal management review.

23-0023-IN-5: IC OIG recommends the ODNI COO engage with the ODNI CFE and the relevant agency partner to evaluate and make necessary updates to the standard operating procedures and the required trainings. These organizations should make the necessary updates based on the findings in this report as it relates to the approving and certifying of ODNI-associated vouchers. Such changes may include procedures for more effectively freezing all related financial transactions when concerns were appropriately raised and are being evaluated.

23-0023-IN-6: IC OIG recommends the ODNI COO engage with the ODNI CFE to determine whether additional training or certification requirements are needed for officers approving external training requests at the ODNI Directorate, Component, and Office (D/C/O) level.

23-0023-IN-7: IC OIG recommends the ODNI COO engage with the ODNI CFE to determine whether external training requests exceeding a predetermined dollar amount should require documented approval from an officer outside of the requesting D/C/O.

[6] IC OIG does not have any status updates to provide on significant recommendations described in previous semiannual reports.

Investigation (24-006-IN): Contractor Cost Mischarging (Issued May 2025)

24-0006-IN-1: The ODNI COO, in coordination with the ODNI CFE, should initiate procedures to collect the $57,661.54 owed to the U.S. Government.

24-0006-IN-2: The ODNI COO, in coordination with the ODNI Counterintelligence and Security (CIS), should determine whether the information in this report warrants referral to the CIA Office of Security, pursuant to the criteria in Security Executive Agent Directive (SEAD) 4, ODNI Instruction 112.02, and Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 703-02, and provide written notification of any actions taken to IC OIG.

Audit (AUD-2025-003): FY 2025 ODNI FISMA Evaluation (Issued July 2025)

Recommendations from this evaluation are available in the classified version of this report.

Evaluation (INS-2024-003): Joint IC OIG and DOE OIG Evaluation of DOE Security Processes (Issued August 2025)

Recommendations from this evaluation are available in the classified version of this report.

Investigation (24-0007-IN): Contractor Labor Mischarging (Issued September 2025)

24-0007-IN-1: IC OIG recommends the ODNI COO, in coordination with the ODNI CFE, initiate procedures to collect the $24,668.81 owed to the government. Further, within 90 days, report the amount of debt collected, or reasons why the debt was not collected.

24-0007-IN-2: The ODNI COO, in coordination with ODNI CIS, should determine whether this information warrants referral to the CIA Office of Security, pursuant to the criteria in SEAD 4 and ICS 703-02, and provide written notification of any action taken to IC OIG.

Investigation (24-0009-IN): Employee Misconduct (Issued September 2025)

24-0009-IN-1: IC OIG recommends the ODNI COO, in coordination with the ODNI Executive Secretary, initiate a review of ODNI Protocol's internal operating procedures to determine whether the information in this report warrants the development and implementation of an internal standard operating procedure, and update corresponding training. IC OIG further recommends that all Protocol officers receive training on the ODNI gift review process.

24-0009-IN-2: IC OIG recommends the ODNI COO, in coordination with the ODNI P&C, create an IPD describing the responsibilities and coordination necessary to receive an approved gift in accordance with ODNI Instruction 24.05. The ODNI COO should report the action(s) resulting from this recommendation to IC OIG.

24-0009-IN-3: The ODNI COO, in coordination with the ODNI Executive Secretary, should determine the most appropriate method for tracking the complimentary private museum tickets the Intelligence Learning Network and ODNI previously received, in accordance with applicable law and policy.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AUD............................ Audit
CDA............................ Congressionally Directed Action
CFE .... Chief Financial Executive
CIA .... Central Intelligence Agency
CIGIE.......................... Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CIO............................. Chief Information Officer
CIS .... Counterintelligence and Security
CISA .... Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015
COO .... Chief Operating Officer
COUN......................... Counsel to the Inspector General
CPD............................ Center for Protected Disclosures
D/C/O......................... Directorate, Component, and Office
DNI............................. Director of National Intelligence
DOE............................ Department of Energy
The Forum.................... Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum
FTE .... Full-Time Equivalent
FY............................... Fiscal Year
FISMA .... Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
GAGAS........................ Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
I&E .... Inspections and Evaluations
IC .... Intelligence Community
IC IG .... Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
IC OIG......................... Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ICS .... Intelligence Community Standard

ICWPA .... Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act

INV .... Investigations

IPD .... Internal Process Document

IT .... Information Technology

ODNI .... Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OIG............................. Office of Inspector General

P&C .... Policy and Capabilities

PIIA............................. Payment Integrity Information Act

PPD .... Presidential Policy Directive

SEAD .... Security Executive Agent Directive

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REPORT SUSPECTED FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE

WE THE PEOPLE OF ... ISH JUSTICE, INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUIL... RE, AND SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBER... NSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF A... ORE PERFECT UNION, ESTABLISH JUSTICE, INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE, AND SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY TO OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY, DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH THIS CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION, ESTABLISH JUSTICE, INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE, AND SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY TO OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY, DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH THIS CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION, ESTABLISH JUSTICE, INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE, AND SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY TO OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY, DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH THIS CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION, ESTABLISH JUSTICE, INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE, AND SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY TO OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY, DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH THIS CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION, ESTABLISH JUSTICE, INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE, AND SECURE THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY TO OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY, DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH THIS CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER