

Complex Operating Environment—Stadiums and Arenas


Stadiums and arenas are attractive targets as they can draw large crowds and be easily accessed, and their footprint typically extends well beyond the confines of the venue. Because of the physical layout of these venues, attacks can cause mass casualties and significant damage as a direct result of the attack mechanism (IED, fire, small arms) and its ancillary effects (stampedes). These attacks can generate mass panic and significant fear among the general public. In addition, attackers may view surrounding businesses and transportation infrastructure as potentially attractive targets if they perceive the principal venue to be a hardened target.

- In June 2018, ISIS released a series of four posters calling for lone-offender attacks against the World Cup. One poster depicted the Fisht Olympic Stadium—capable of occupying about 48,000 people—in Sochi, Russia, engulfed in flames.

- In June 2017, authorities foiled a plot by an ISIS-inspired 17-year-old male to conduct a vehicle ramming and knife attack against concertgoers at Principality Stadium in Wales, UK. The teen's planning included online research on vehicle ramming, knife attacks, and security arrangements for the concert.

- In May 2017, a suicide bomber detonated an IED as spectators were exiting a concert at the Manchester Arena in Manchester, UK, killing 22 and hospitalizing more than 160. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack through social media.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: Attacks against stadiums and arenas may pose significant challenges to public safety personnel, first responders, and security stakeholders. The application of antiterrorism technology and physical security improvements can



NOTICE: This product was developed by the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT), which is a collaboration by NCTC, DHS, FBI, and state, local, tribal, and territorial government personnel to improve information sharing and enhance public safety. The product is intended to promote coordination among intergovernmental authorities and the private sector in identifying, preventing, and responding to foreign terrorist activities in the US. The product should be considered within the context of existing laws, authorities, agreements, policies, or procedures. For additional information, contact us at JCAT@NCTC.GOV.

Complex Operating Environment—Stadiums and Arenas (continued)

bolster detection and protection measures. This, combined with continuous and ongoing efforts—such as planning, coordinating, training, and exercising—to improve interagency coordination and strengthen private-sector partnerships, will enhance overall security and response. An awareness by first responders and security stakeholders of terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures can aid in the detection, response, and prevention of terrorist planning and attacks.

- Gatherings at public entertainment venues, such as indoor arenas and outdoor stadiums, may occur before, during, or after an event and encompass surrounding hotels, local businesses, residential areas, parking areas, and streets;
- Some events are particularly high-profile, garnering national attention and crowds in excess of 100,000. While restricted to ticketholders, most events are public, offering little insight into who purchased the ticket. Security and access control measures are designed to restrict unauthorized entry and detect prohibited items from entering the venue. If not implemented properly, the measures may expose crowds at the entryways and exits of a venue to possible attacks.
- Multi-use venues commonly host a variety of public and private events, with participant and spectator numbers ranging from a few hundred to tens of thousands. These events can include graduation ceremonies, corporate meetings, consumer products shows, conferences, scholastic and professional sporting events, and concerts.

PLANNING AND PREVENTION:

- Ensure each potential responding organization understands the response and communications plan, as well as roles and responsibilities specific to the venue and event;

- Consider establishing security zones (for example, inner, middle, and outer) accounting for protections beyond the confines of the venue and ensure that event security and first responders observe zone integrity before, during, and after an attack to maintain security, assist with crowd control responsibilities, and help clear ingress and egress locations for emergency response personnel;
- Account for security of vertical areas including airspace, landscape, and elevated structures, such as buildings, towers, bridges, and overpasses;
- Self-dispatching responders not assigned to the event should report to a pre-identified staging area for a cohesive and organized response;
- Planning considerations should identify resources that would permit a response and/or methods to backfill critical diverted resources;
- Implement a process whereby event security and state and local first responders share information regarding potential threats;
- Institute strategies for detecting preoperational surveillance and other suspicious activities that may provide pre-incident indicators;
- Establish and encourage a process by which security staff, non-security staff, nearby businesses, and members of the general public identify and report suspicious activity or materials;
- Inspect items brought into venues by spectators, vendors, and employees. Communicate improper items to the spectators in advance of the event;
- Maintain a visible presence of security personnel conducting vehicle and foot patrols that vary in size, timing, and routes;
- Be prepared to provide critical information and clear direction to event attendees using

- mass communication tools, such as public address systems;
- Strictly enforce access control procedures to critical areas of the facility. Ensure proper identification and credentials for employees, support staff, and first responders at an event;
- Include pre-event and post-event security into plans; and
- Provide area and key location familiarization training to assigned personnel.

RESPONSE: Response planning for a stadium or arena attack—which could vary based on event type and venue—requires coordination, communication, and cooperation by the stadium owners/operators, event staff, first responders, and other public safety personnel. An emergency response for mass casualty incidents also requires comprehensive planning and must address the stadium location, traffic patterns, and egress points from the venue and surrounding properties:

- Sectional shelter-in-place and evacuation plans;
- Evacuation routes and alternatives for both pedestrian and vehicular traffic;
- Designated emergency response routes;
- Surrounding transportation infrastructure;
- Staging, activation, and mobilization of specified areas, equipment, and response personnel;
- Collection, relocation, mass casualty care, and reunification points;
- Empowerment of willing and able bystanders to assist response efforts; and
- Public address system notification inside and outside the venue.

RESOURCES:

BEST PRACTICES IN ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY FOR SPORTING AND ENTERTAINMENT VENUES RESOURCE GUIDE:

<https://www.safetyact.gov/externalRes/refdoc/CCICADA%20BPATS.pdf>

COMMERCIAL FACILITIES PUBLICATIONS:

<https://www.dhs.gov/commercial-facilities-publications>

COMMERCIAL FACILITIES SECTOR SPORTS LEAGUES SECURITY RESOURCES GUIDE:

<https://www.stadiummanagers.org/images/stories/SportsLeaguesSecurityResourcesGuide.pdf>

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY SPECIAL EVENTS CONTINGENCY PLANNING JOB AIDS MANUAL:

<https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is15aspecialeventsplanning-jamanual.pdf>

MANAGING LARGE-SCALE SECURITY EVENTS: A PLANNING PRIMER FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES:

<https://www.bja.gov/publications/lse-planning-primer.pdf>

NATIONAL CENTER FOR SPECTATOR SPORT AND SECURITY (NCS4):

<https://www.ncs4.com/home>

PLANNING AND MANAGING SECURITY FOR MAJOR SPECIAL EVENTS: GUIDELINES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT:

<https://www.hsd.org/?view&did=482649>

SECURITY AND RESILIENCY GUIDE: COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (C-IED) CONCEPTS, COMMON GOALS, AND AVAILABLE ASSISTANCE:

<https://www.dhs.gov/publication/security-andresiliency-guide-and-annexes>

SECURITY OF SOFT TARGETS AND CROWDED PLACES RESOURCE GUIDE:

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Soft_Targets_Crowded%20Places_Resource_Guide_042018_508.pdf



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PRODUCT FEEDBACK FORM

(U) JCAT MISSION: To improve information sharing and enhance public safety. In coordination with the FBI and DHS, collaborate with other members of the IC to research, produce, and disseminate counterterrorism (CT) intelligence products for federal, state, local, tribal and territorial government agencies and the private sector. Advocate for the CT intelligence requirements and needs of these partners throughout the IC.

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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS, OR QUESTIONS. HOW DOES JCAT MAKE PRODUCTS BETTER?

WHAT TOPICS DO YOU RECOMMEND?