[redacted]-DNI-

From: James R. Clapper-DNI-
Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2016 7:43 PM
To: Rogers Michael S ADM NSA-D USA USN; John O. Brennan; Comey James FBI USA GOV
Cc: Stephanie L. OSullivan-DNI-; [redacted]-DNI-; [redacted]; [redacted]-DNI-
Subject: RE: (U) Russian Response Planning
Signed By: [redacted]

Classification: [redacted]

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived From: [redacted]
Declassify On: [redacted]
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Mike/John/Jim:

Understand your concern. It is essential that we (CIA/NSA/FBI/ODNI) be on the same page, and are all supportive of the report—in the highest tradition of "that's OUR story, and we're stickin' to it." This evening, CIA has provided to the NIC the complete draft generated by the ad hoc fusion cell. We will facilitate as much mutual transparency as possible as we complete the report, but, more time is not negotiable. We may have to compromise on our "normal" modalities, since we must do this on such a compressed schedule.

This is one project that has to be a team sport.

Jim

From: Rogers Michael S ADM NSA-D USA USN [mailto[redacted]]
Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2016 7:00 AM
To: James R. Clapper-DNI- <[redacted]>; John O. Brennan <[redacted]>; Comey James FBI USA GOV <[redacted]>
Cc: Rogers Michael S ADM NSA-D USA USN <[redacted]>
Subject: (U) Russian Response Planning

Classification: [redacted]

Jim, John, Jim –

I've just returned from a TDY overseas and been updated on the current status of our efforts to produce a joint product related to Russian attribution and intent for the DNC/DCCC hacks. I know that this activity is on a fast-track and that folks have been working very hard to put together a product that can be provided to the President. However, I wanted to reach out to you directly to let you know of some concerns I have with what I am hearing from my folks.

Specifically, I asked my team if they'd had sufficient access to the underlying intelligence and sufficient time to review that intelligence. On both points my team raised concerns. They were clear that, at the staff level, folks have been forward-leaning and trying to ensure that we have an opportunity to review and weigh in, but I'm concerned that, given the expedited nature of this activity, my folks aren't fully comfortable saying that they have had enough time to review

all of the intelligence to be absolutely confident in their assessments. To be clear, I am not saying that we disagree substantively, but I do want to make sure that, when we are asked in the future whether we can absolutely stand behind the paper, that we don't have any reason to hesitate because of the process.

I know that you agree that this is something we need to be 100% comfortable with before we present it to the President – we have one chance to get this right, and it is critical that we do so. If the intent is to create an integrated product that is CIA/FBI/NSA jointly-authored that we can all defend, we need a process that allows us all to be comfortable, and I'm concerned we are not there yet. In addition, if NSA is intended to be a co-author of this product, I personally expect to see even the most sensitive evidence related to the conclusion. However, if your intent is to create a CIA-only or CIA/FBI-authored product, then I will stand down on these concerns. I would welcome your thoughts on these points and any adjustments we might make to the process to ensure that we all have the necessary level of confidence in the final assessment.

V/R,

Mike

ADM Michael S. Rogers, USN
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command
Director, NSA / Chief, CSS
FT George G. Meade, MD
NSA NET: [redacted]
SIPR: [redacted]
Comm [redacted]

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