(U) Handout on Foreign Threats to U.S. Elections for Congressional Members
10 March 2020

- (U) The Intelligence Community (IC) supports DHS, FBI, and other federal, state and local partners to help protect the 2020 election.

- (U) Election security is led by DHS and FBI. ODNI serves as a coordinating authority for the IC and is a bridge between foreign collection activities and domestic actions to secure the elections. ODNI ensures threat information is consistent and communicated across a broad base of customers.

- (U) A number of foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures in their attempts to influence the public debate.

- (U) To date, we have not identified any activity designed to prevent Americans from voting or to change vote tallies. However, we remain watchful of any malicious activities from cybercriminals or foreign actors.

- (U) The states’ autonomy over elections makes our democratic process more resilient. The diversity of election systems among the states, multiple checks and redundancies in those systems, and post-election auditing all make it extraordinarily difficult for foreign adversaries to disrupt or change vote tallies.

- (U) We expect that the intent of hostile state actors toward the 2020 election will evolve as the election nears.

- (U) This is not a Russia-only problem. China, Iran, other countries like North Korea and Cuba, and non-state actors all have the opportunity, means, and potential motive to interfere in the 2020 elections as a way to achieve their goals. Some are trying to influence the public debate largely on social media in order to stoke discord in the United States, with the hope of swaying U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, and undermine the American people’s confidence in our democratic process.

- (U) Russian social media and state media messaging has taken aim at some of the candidates from both parties, in part to signal Russia’s unhappiness with policy statements or choices.

- (U) The IC has not concluded that the Kremlin is directly aiding any candidate’s reelection or any other candidates’ election. Nor have we concluded that the Russians will definitely choose to try to do so in 2020.

- (U) Beijing continues to promote policies that are in line with China’s interests.

- (U) China may consider more aggressive or expansive activity if bilateral relations significantly worsen.
- (U) We must not underestimate Iran, which maintains a robust cyber program, and is intent on countering the U.S. maximum pressure campaign.

- (U) In addition, non-state actors, such as criminals or terrorist groups, have access to tools like ransomware that in principle could be used to attack election operations.