


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
(U) Case Name	(U) PSP Contribution
(b)(1), (b)(3)	
[Redacted]	

b1, b3,  
b6,  
b7C,  
b7E

[Redacted]


(U) PSP Information	(U) Description of SIGINT Reporting
	

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(U) PSP Information	(U) Description of SIGINT Reporting
	

(U) PSP  
Information

(U) Description of SIGINT Reporting





b1,  
b3,  
b6,  
b7C,  
b7E

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
~~TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(U) PSP  
Information



(U) Description of SIGINT Reporting




~~TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN~~




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


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
~~TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN~~





~~TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN~~






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


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


b1,  
b3,  
b7E





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
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


~~TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON//NOFORN~~




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
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(b)(3)



(b)(3)




(b)(3)




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
(b) (5), (b) (3)



(b) (3), (b) (5), (b) (1)



(b)(1), (b)(3)




~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ On 12 March, the President directed DoJ to continue working on the legal issues, and on 15 March OLC issued a three page memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General stating that, while it had only begun to analyze the issues and was not yet prepared to issue a final opinion, it believed that (b)(1), (b)(3) types of collection authorized under the PSP were legally supportable. OLC had not yet developed a supportable argument to justify

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5)







(b)(1), (b)(3)



<sup>23</sup>~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ The Assistant Attorney General for OLC issued a memorandum on 6 May 2004 concluding that operation of the PSP as described in the opinion was lawful. A 16 July memorandum upheld the 6 May opinion. (b)(5)


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
<sup>22</sup>(TS//SI//NF) The minimization probable cause standard states that the Agency may target for collection, communications for which there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of [REDACTED] and the communication is to or from a foreign country.

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~~TOP SECRET//STLW//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN~~

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


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~~TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN~~


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(U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG issued a report for each of the 13 investigations and reviews described above. Ten reports on PSP activity resulted in 11 recommendations to management; 10 have been closed, and one remains open. Three reports on FISC-approved activity previously authorized by the PSP contained nine recommendations to management; three have been closed and six remain open.


~~(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)~~ Beginning in January 2007, violations that had occurred under the Authorization and violations related to PSP activity transitioned to court orders were reported quarterly to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight).

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**(U) Recently Reported Incidents**


~~(TS//STLW//SI//OC/NF)~~ NSA OIG learned in late 2008 that, from approximately [redacted] collection of [redacted]




All related records were purged from NSA databases in 2004; therefore, it was not possible to determine the exact nature and extent of that collection. The NSA OIG will close out this incident in an upcoming report to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ On 15 January 2009, the Department of Justice reported to the FISC that NSA had been using an "alert list" to compare incoming business records FISA metadata against telephone numbers associated with counterterrorism targets tasked by NSA for SIGINT collection. NSA had reported to the Court that the alert list consisted of numbers for which NSA had determined that a reasonable articulable suspicion existed that the numbers were related to a terrorist organization associated [redacted]

[redacted] However, the majority of selectors on the alert list had not been subjected to a reasonable articulable suspicion determination. The NSA OIG has reported this incident to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board and has filed updates as required. The alert list and a detailed NSA 60-day review of processes related to the Business Records FISC order were the subject of several recent submissions to the FISC and of NSA briefings to Congressional oversight committees.



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(U//~~FOUO~~) Other IG Program concerns were documented in the 2003-2008 reports. Presidential Notifications are listed and described in Appendix F. The 2008 report described the adequacy of Program decompartmentation plans.

(U) ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~


Bps	Bits per Second
BR	Business Records
CDR	Call Detail Records
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
CT	Counterterrorism
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
EO	Executive Order
FAA	FISA Amendments Act
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISA	Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISC	Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
GC	General Counsel
Gbps	Gigabits per Second
HPSCI	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
IG	Inspector General
LAN	Local Area Network
NSA	National Security Agency
NSA/CSS	National Security Agency/Central Security Service
O&C	Oversight and Compliance
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OGC	Office of the General Counsel
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OIPR	Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (now the Office of Intelligence, National Security Division)
OLC	Office of Legal Counsel

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PM           Program Manager  
PR/TT       Pen Register/Trap & Trace  
PSP         President's Surveillance Program  
RFI         Request for Information  
SID         Signals Intelligence Directorate  
SIGINT      Signals Intelligence  
SSCI        Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
  
TS/SCI      Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information  
~~(TS//SI//NF)~~

(U) GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- (U) COMINT (U) Communications Intelligence – technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by someone other than the intended recipients
- (U) E.O. 12333 (U) Executive Order 12333 - *United States Intelligence Activities* - provides goals, duties, and responsibilities with respect to the national intelligence effort. It mandates that certain activities of U.S. intelligence components are to be governed by procedures issued by agency heads and approved by the Attorney General.
- (U) FISA (U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, governs the conduct of certain electronic surveillance activities within the United States to collect foreign intelligence information.
- (U)  (S//SI//NF) Analytic tool for contact chaining used by analysts to do target discovery by quickly and easily navigating global communications metadata
- (TS//SI//NF) METADATA (TS//SI//NF) Header, router, and addressing-type information, including telecommunications dialing-type data, but not the contents of the communication
- (U)  
- (U)  (S//NF) NSA's primary storage, search, and retrieval mechanism for SIGINT text
- (U) SANITIZATION (U) The process of disguising COMINT to protect sensitive intelligence sources, methods, capabilities, and analytical procedures in order to disseminate the information outside COMINT channels.

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(U) SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

(U) A category of intelligence comprising individually or in combination all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) and foreign instrumentation intelligence (FISINT), however transmitted.

(U) TEAR LINE REPORTS

(U) Reports used to disseminate SIGINT-derived information and sanitized information in the same record. The sanitized tear line conveys the same facts as the COMINT-controlled information, while hiding COMINT as the source.

(U) TELEPHONY

(U) The technology associated with the electronic transmission of voice, fax, and other information between parties using systems historically associated with the telephone

(U) TIPPERS

