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2. Attended a discussion where there were two delegates to the Cuban mission to the United Nations present. I discreetly overheard one conversation where one delegate expressed his concern that jurisdictional problems

preventing terrorist actions by Cuban exiles.

3. Lunched with Sergio Motta Mello, a journalist with O Estado da Sao Paulo, Brazil's leading newspaper, and discussed the current state of U.S.-Brazilian relations. He said that Brazilian politics were in turmoil at the present time, and it was not clear to him whether the forces of moderation or the forces of repression would win. He said that in the short term, U.S. policies on human rights may cause some problems, but he thought that in the long term it would be beneficial both to Brazil as well as to the United States. Like me, he expressed uncertainty about how the nuclear problem would work itself out, but he suggested a cooling off period might be in order.

4. Met with Eugenio Velasco, one of the two Chilean lawyers who was exiled recently because they were defending political prisoners in Chile, and discussed the current political situation in Chile.

5. Worked on Pan American Day speech, letter to Echeverria, background memo for credentials ceremony (Chilean Ambassador), and various memoranda.

#### Significant Information/Intelligence

(Thornton)

My batting average slipped to 500 as Mrs. Gandhi went down to crashing defeat at the polls. There are other unfortunate implications of this, also, but they will require detailed analysis. It is not completely certain yet that the Congress could not form a government, but given the trend, it seems highly unlikely. The opposition has yet to organize itself and is much of an unknown quantity although we know the individual leaders very well.

In Pakistan, the violence over the weekend has abated somewhat, but the Embassy now believes Bhutto's days to be numbered.

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-3-

The situation on the ground in Zaire shows no marked change. Nigeria has apparently taken on responsibility to mediate. This is obviously the most desirable outcome. Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba was here today and has left for the UN. Bill Schaufele tells me that the meeting was productive, and a report is on its way over. I am aware of nothing further in the military supply front since the SCC Working Group met on Saturday.

The Turnhalle Conference being held in Southwest Africa has ended. It has produced the basis of a constitution which leaves all real power in the hands of the South African Government and provides for an interim government that may be in place by summer but will be subject to consensus procedures and hence very limited in what it can do.

SWAPO remains unreconciled, and the results of Turnhalle do not look like a basis for building a Namibia settlement.

(Pastor)

Panama. In a discussion with Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander, General Torrijos of Panama said that he was prepared to accept some form of bilateral security assurance in a post-Treaty period if the United States would be more forthcoming on disposition of lands and facilities to Panama during the Treaty's life.

Chile. The Catholic Church in Chile reacted violently to the Government's decision to dissolve the remaining political parties, and it feels that a return to democracy almost impossible. The Chilean Government has apparently given up on its interest in trying to influence the U.S. Government, and one indication of that is its support for the Panamanian Government in international fora. Previously, Chile has supported the United States on Canal-related issues, but because of our tough position on human rights at the UN Commission and because Panama also voted against Chile, Pinochet apparently thought it would be easier to gain the support of Panama.

#### Foreign Reaction to U.S. Human Rights Policy:

-- In Brazil, the recent silence by the government has given pro-human rights elements an opportunity to voice their support for U.S. policy on human rights. This is best seen in editorial pages of several newspapers and among the congressional leadership of the opposition party. MDB Deputy Carreira delivered a speech congratulating Jimmy Carter and declared that the West owed Carter thanks for his desire to give force to the idea of liberal democracy.

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-4-

- In Nicaragua, the Somoza family newspaper, Novedades, included a vituperative editorial page attacking Carter's hypocritical policy on human rights.
- In Costa Rica, Foreign Minister Facio, said that the Carter Administration's policy on human rights "was logical for the country that proclaims to be a leader of the free world."

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CONFIDENTIAL - GDSDaily Activities (Pastor)

July 11, 1978

Met with our Ambassador to Argentina Castro today to discuss the gamut of U.S.-Argentine relations. On Tlatelolco, he explained the complex ratification process, but said that it is virtually completed, and he expects the foreign ministry to send the ratified treaty to Mexico. On the Beagle channel dispute, he expressed concern over the possibility of war, said that we should make our interest in a peace settlement known, but should stay away from the problem, and perhaps recommend that the Canadians mediate. On human rights, he said that Argentina had made a good deal of progress, and he expected it to complete agreement with the Inter-American Commission for a visit soon. After that, we could go ahead with military training and credits, etc. He also plans to press them on releasing prisoners (c)

With Mathews, I met with Governor Peabody and aide who were lobbying on behalf of the Haitian government for a couple of small military assistance items.

Attended a session on Puerto Rico between Stu Eizenstat, Jose Cabranes, and State people. Henry and I will send you a short memo on it.

Met with Jan Kalicki of Kennedy's staff and discussed a variety of human rights issues. He said that he will try to get Kennedy to work on the human rights conventions more. Also worked on a possible compromise on the Quito Sueno treaty with Pete Vaky and Senate staff. Sparkman has answered the President's letter on the subject and I will send you a memo on it.

Worked on letter to Dominican President-elect Guzman, the non-aligned cables, a memo on energy discussions with Venezuela. At North-South meeting this morning we discussed the Jamaican Cooper trip and a possible address by the President on North-South issues. (c)

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Daily Activities (Pastor)

May 30, 1978

At the North-South meeting, we discussed the future of Zaire and agreed there wasn't much. Then attended, with Tom Thornton, the interagency meeting at State on the new PRM on Cuban/Soviet Involvement in Africa. Newsom chaired it, and Moose suggested that we proceed by keeping our Africa policy, that we not keep our head in the sand, but that we also don't run off half-cocked. (S)

Lunched with Paul Kreisberg, Tony Lake's Deputy, and talked about ways to put the Cuban cat back in the bag. He raised some interesting questions about my ideas on cutting European credits and working through the NAM, and I will refine a memo on the subject to you. Also talked about US-Brazilian military relations, and I suggested that now was not the best time to formulate a grand initiative on the subject. (In a later conversation with Mort Abramowitz, he told me he would send DOD's idea for a new "minimal military relationship" to the President through NSC when it was ready.)

Met with Gregory Wolfe of American University who was Don Fraser's representative observing the Dominican elections, and he felt assured that outside pressure facilitated Balaguer's decision to respect the elections. He suggested that Guzman might come to the U.S. to meet with U.S. business and Congressional leaders to talk about the Dominican Republic's future. I said that provided it was clearly understood by all that a meeting with the President would not occur, I thought the idea seemed fine. Kirby Jones called and tried out the same idea on me so something must be cooking. (C)

With Guy Erb, I met with Steve Lande and Jon Rosenbaum of STR to discuss their latest round of consultations on the MTN with selected Latin American countries. They met with mixed success, but I think the fact that they discussed these issues with the Central American Secretariat, the Andean Pact, and several Latin American countries is, in many ways, more important than reaching agreement at this stage.

The President received a letter, dated May 10, from Luis Piñerúa Ordaz, the Presidential candidate from Perez's party in Venezuela, thanking him for the President's letter of March 30 and for his wonderful visit to Venezuela. The State Department recommends that the President does not need to respond to the letter, and I concur.

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Significant Intelligence: (Pastor)

Argentina: In follow-up to Newsom mission, Ambassador Castro told President Videla that US would consult with Congress and grant military training application if the Argentines invite IAHRIC visit in near future under mutually acceptable ground rules. Videla was apparently pleased and, hopefully, will take firm action to rally support for an IAHRIC visit.(C)

Brazil: President Geisel's handpicked candidate Figueiredo faces an uncertain future. The broad spectrum of opposition is still divided: most likely opposition candidate at the moment is Euler Bentes Monteiro--left of center but possibly attractive to Brazilian military. Figueiredo meanwhile gave a series of interviews which emphasized his inflexible support of current Brazilian foreign policy and sought to justify his selection by Geisel--on several issues Figueiredo came out so badly that his staff decided he won't give any more interviews for a while and then only in written form.(S)

Dominican Republic: In delivering the messages from President Carter, Ambassador Yost met with President-elect Guzman, who was very pleased with supportive role of US during the electoral crisis, and with Balaguer. Both meetings provide a reasonable basis for the still potentially difficult transition period. Perez of Venezuela also sent congratulations to Guzman.

Chile: Reports from Chile emphasize that Pinochet's future rides on the outcome of the Letelier investigation. Belief is that Pinochet will be forced from office if the investigation reveals DINA involvement.(S)

Peru: Although the details are not yet clear, the Peruvian Government, in apparent response to the general strike, exiled a number of individuals. This is a deplorable, but understandable, regression in Peru's hitherto admirable progress on human rights.(C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 5172

P.C. 12065 XDS-1 6126109 (CASTRO, RAUL R) CR-M  
TAGS AR, SHUM  
SUBJECT (C) AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS WITH GENERAL VIOLA  
REF: A BUENOS AIRES 4721; B STATE 163602

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: GENERAL DENIAL ENTERED BY GENERAL VIOLA ON JACOBO TIMERMAN'S REPORTED IMMINENT RELEASE. HE LABELED RECENT NEWSPAPER STORIES AS TOTALLY INACCURATE. VIOLA AGAIN PROMISED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WOULD BE REDUCED SUBSTANTIALLY. HE ALSO PREDICTED GREAT MOVEMENT IN RIGHT OF OPTION CASES. VIOLA EXPRESSED GREAT CONFIDENCE IAIRC WOULD FIND IMPRESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD, BUT OFFERED NO HOPE FOR "DESAPARECIDOS." HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NICARAGUA STRESSING COA'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH USG IN ITS OBJECTIVES. VIOLA FELT AN OAS MILITARY PEACE FORCE PROBABLY NEEDED BUT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY

3. APPRECIATION FOR MFM SUPPORT: GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA, JUNTA PRESIDENT AND ARMY COMMANDER, REQUESTED I MEET WITH HIM ON MONDAY, JUNE 25 AT 1715 HOURS AT HIS OFFICE. DUE TO MY BEING OUT OF COUNTRY, I HAD NOT SEEN GENERAL VIOLA SINCE ABOUT MIDDLE OF APRIL. HE MET ME WITH THE TRADITIONAL "ABRAZO" AND INQUIRED ABOUT HOW THINGS STOOD IN WASHINGTON, DC. HE EXUDED FRIENDLINESS BUT YET SHOWED CONCERN ABOUT RECENT WAVE OF NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ON ARGENTINA APPEARING IN CONUS.

4. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES: VIOLA WAS SPECIFIC IN HIS DISDAIN FOR NEW YORK TIMES SERIES WRITTEN BY MR OAKS AND ENSUING EDITORIAL. HE TERMED WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL CONTEMPTIBLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE. HE HOPED

\*\*\*\*\*WHSE COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

FOR: PASTOR, BLOOM

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DEPARTMENT WOULDN'T ACCEPT VERACITY OF ARTICLES "IN TOTO", RECOGNIZING SOME MERIT TO PORTIONS OF REPORTING. I MADE IT CLEAR TO VIOLA AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ARE INDEPENDENT AND ATTRIBUTION SHOULD NOT BE TO EMBASSY OR DEPARTMENT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF NEWS MEDIA AND STATED NO LINKAGE OR ATTRIBUTION SHOULD BE MADE TO USG. VIOLA'S CONCERN WAS THAT DUE TO IMPORTANCE OF NEW YORK TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, DEPARTMENT MIGHT CAVE IN AND ASSUME AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS POSTURE TOWARDS GOA. I ALLAYED VIOLA'S FEARS BY TELLING HIM DEPARTMENT AND USG TOOK AN OBJECTIVE AND JUDICIOUS VIEW ON ARGENTINA. I REMINDED VIOLA THE STRAIN IN RELATIONS IS DUE TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BUT USG WELCOMED IMPROVEMENTS. I EMPHASIZED "BALL NOW IN THEIR COURT" AND IMPROVED RELATIONS WERE CONTINGENT ON MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS. HE ACCEPTED THIS AS A FACT.

5. IAHRV VISIT: VIOLA REMINDED ME IAHRV WOULD BE VISITING ARGENTINA ~~STARTING SEPTEMBER 6~~. HE STATED THIS DATE WAS CHOSEN BY IAHRV AND NOT BY GOA, WHO HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATING ITS VISIT SINCE LATE MAY. VIOLA STATED PRISON CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED TREMENDOUSLY AND RELEASES WILL OCCUR IN LARGE NUMBERS. HE SAID ALL OF GOA IS BEING GEARED FOR IAHRV VISIT RESULTING IN VIRTUALLY NO DISAPPEARANCES, NO TORTURE AND NO IRREGULAR ARRESTS. I REMINDED HIM OF SIX DISAPPEARED STUDENTS AS OF A FEW WEEKS AGO. HE AGREED THIS WAS A BLACK MARK IN THEIR RECORD, BUT DESPITE ALL INVESTIGATORY EFFORTS NO INFORMATION EXISTED ON THIS BIZARRE OPERATION.

6. DESAPARECIDOS: VIOLA STATED IN 1978 THERE WAS AN AVERAGE OF ABOUT FIFTY "DESAPARECIDOS". AT THIS POINT HE LOOKED AT ME WITH DIABOLICAL GRIN -- FROM EAR TO EAR -- JOINING HIS GREY MUSTACHE WITH HIS SIDEBURNS, AS IF THOUGH HE HAD ONE ON ME AND SAID: "I TAKE YOUR FIGURES OF FIFTY PER MONTH LAST YEAR. LOOK AT THE RECORD THIS YEAR. IT'S ONLY SEVENTEEN DISAPPEARED IN SIX MONTHS." I INTERRUPTED HIM STATING OUR FIGURES INDICATED TWENTY-TWO DISAPPEARANCES. HE SAID "EVEN SO, YOU MUST ADMIT THERE IS A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT." I ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPROVEMENT BUT TOLD HIM HE WOULD NOT GET MUCH SOLACE FROM USG UNTIL THE FIGURE WAS ZERO. HIS REPLY WAS THAT THEY WERE GETTING THERE AND WAS CONFIDENT BY TIME IAHRV ARRIVED GOA WOULD REACH THE ZERO STATUS. VIOLA MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THE "DESAPARECIDOS" WOULD NOT RETURN. I INQUIRED ABOUT HIS STATEMENT. HE REPEATED IN HIS OPINION THE DISAPPEARED WOULD NOT BE SURFACING. AGAIN, I ASKED ON WHAT HE BASED HIS OPINION. VIOLA'S REPLY WAS THAT GOA LACKED INFORMATION ON THE DISAPPEARED

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AND IN VIEW OF THE EXTENDED PERIODS OF DISAPPEARANCE  
WE DOUBTED ANY OF THESE PEOPLE WERE ALIVE. HE SAID THERE  
MIGHT BE A FEW CASES SURFACING - THOSE UNACCOUNTED  
FOR IN PRISON DUE TO ERROR -- BUT THESE WERE RARE EXCEPTIONS.  
VICLA STATED GOA WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME STATEMENT ON  
DISAPPEARED WHEN IAHRC ARRIVED. HE SAID IT WOULD BE A  
STATEMENT WITHOUT SPECIFICS, BUT HOPEFULLY WOULD BE  
PALATABLE TO SOCIETY.

7. RIGHT OF OPTION: I TOLD VIOLA THE RIGHT OF OPTION  
PROGRAM HAD BEEN A FIASCO UP TO NOW. HE WAS REMINDED  
GOA -- THROUGH ITS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES -- HAD NOT GIVEN  
EMBASSY REASONABLE COOPERATION, BUT TO CONTRARY HAD  
RAISED ALL KINDS OF BARRIERS. AMAZINGLY ENOUGH, HE AGREED  
WITH MY STATEMENT, BUT RETORTED RIGHT OF OPTION CASES  
WOULD BE MOVING FAST FROM NOW ON. HE SAID THESE CASES  
WERE HIGH ON THE AGENDA.  
BT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1253

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 5172

8. TIMERMAN CASE: RECENTLY "CONVICCION", NAVY ORIENTED NEWSPAPER, AND THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, ENGLISH-AMERICAN NEWSPAPER, FRONT-PAGED TIMERMAN'S IMMINENT RELEASE. I TOLD VIOLA USG HOPED THESE PREDICTIONS WERE ACCURATE. HE DENIED ANY TRUTH TO THE REPORTS. HE SAID TIMERMAN WAS NO CLOSER NOW THAN HE WAS SIX MONTHS AGO TO BEING RELEASED. VIOLA AGAIN EXCULPATED HIMSELF BY STATING IF IT WERE LEFT UP TO HIM TIMERMAN WOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED A LONG TIME AGO. IN A JESTING FASHION, I SUGGESTED TO VIOLA THAT AS ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA HE WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF AUTHORITY TO LEAD THE WAY. HE SMILED AND REPLIED HIS OBSTACLES WERE WELL KNOWN TO ME. IT WAS THEN I INQUIRED IF IT WOULD BE PROPER TO DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE WITH GENERAL SUAREZ MASON, CHIEF OF STAFF AND TIMERMAN'S NEMESIS. I EXPECTED A MINOR EXPLOSION ON THIS SUGGESTION FOR AS LONG AS I HAVE DEALT WITH VIOLA HE HAS NEVER ADMITTED SUAREZ MASON TO BE ONE OF HIS PROBLEMS. MUCH TO THE CONTRARY, VIOLA LOWERED HIS VOICE AND TOLD ME HE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE WITH SUAREZ MASON. I TOLD VIOLA THAT RECENTLY SUAREZ MASON HAD INVITED HIMSELF TO MY RESIDENCE FOR AN "ASADO" - "GAUCHO BARBECUE". IT WAS SUGGESTED BY VIOLA THAT DURING THIS BARBECUE I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE. VIOLA INDICATED EVEN THOUGH TIMERMAN'S RELEASE IS NOT IMMINENT, THERE IS STILL SOME HOPE.

9. SARAGOVI CASE: I REMINDED VIOLA OF RENEWED AND CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST ON THE PORACIO SARAGOVI CASE. HE APPEARED NOT TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE. I TOLD HIM THE CASE WAS DIRECTLY IN HIS LAP AS IT WAS A MILITARY TRIBUNAL CASE. THE CASE WAS UP FOR REVIEW BY HIM. HE TOOK NOTES AND PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

10. SOCCER GAME: LAST NIGHT ARGENTINA, WORLD CHAMPIONS,

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PLAYED AGAINST A TEAM, COMPRISED OF OUTSTANDING PLAYERS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARGENTINA LOST 2 TO 1 WITH A FULL STADIUM OF OVER 75,000 PEOPLE. I ATTENDED THE GAME. I WAS PREPARED TO SIT WITH THE REST OF THE "COMMON HERD" BUT AS I WALKED INTO THE STADIUM AN UNKNOWN GENTLEMAN SPOTTED ME AND TOLD ME I WAS TO SIT IN THE "PALCO DE HONOR" (VIP BOX). I TOLD THIS PERSON MY TICKETS WERE NOT THE VIP AND I WAS PERFECTLY CONTENT TO SIT AT MY DESIGNATED PLACE. THIS GENTELMAN WAS QUITE STERN IN TELLING ME I BELONGED IN THE PRESIDENT'S BOX. I WAS THE ONLY AMBASSADOR IN THAT SPECIFIC AREA. THERE WERE SEVERAL AMBASSADORS IN ATTENDANCE, BUT I WAS THE ONLY ONE PERMITTED TO SIT NEAR THE PRESIDENT AND THE JUNTA. I THOUGHT THIS WAS AN UNUSUAL TWIST CONSIDERING SOMEWHAT STRAINED RELATIONS DUE TO NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER STORIES FROM USA.

11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE MEETING VIOLA KEPT TELLING ME HIS PURPOSE IN WANTING TO SEE ME WAS TO DISCUSS NICARAGUA. WE DID DISCUSS NICARAGUA, BUT I FELT IT WAS ONLY AN EXCUSE TO DISCUSS MULTIPLE OTHER MATTERS. HE SAID GOA WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH USG ON NICARAGUAN POLICY, BUT FEARED SENDING A MILITARY PEACE FORCE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. HIS REASONING WAS MOST OF LA COUNTRIES HAVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND EACH COUNTRY FEARED A PRECEDENT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN SENDING MILITARY UNITS TO SETTLE BASIC DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. VIOLA SAID THE NICARAGUAN PROBLEM WAS NOW BEYOND DIALOGUE AND NECESSITATED CURTAILING THE INFILTRATION OF MATERIAL AND TROOPS THROUGH PANAMA AND COSTA RICA. VIOLA RATIONALIZED THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE WITH A MILITARY PEACE FORCE, BUT THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC WOULD NEVER BUY IT. IT APPEARED TO ME HE WAS GRIPPING OR GOING FOR ME TO GIVE HIM SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING A PEACE FORCE TO NICARAGUA, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ARGENTINA.

12. ADMIRAL MASSERA: STRANGELY ENOUGH AS I WAS LEAVING VIOLA'S OFFICE I RAN INTO ADMIRAL MASSERA, WHO WAS COMING TO REPORT TO VIOLA ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO MEXICO. MASSERA WAS COMPLETELY SURPRISED TO SEE ME AS I WAS TO SEE HIM. THE ONLY ONE NOT SURPRISED WAS VIOLA AND I FELT HE HAD PLANNED IT THAT MASSERA AND I WOULD MEET. IT APPEARED VIOLA WANTED MASSERA TO KNOW I HAD BEEN WITH HIM. IT'S JUST THE CASE OF THE OLD "ARGENTINE INTRIGUE" JUST AS SUAREZ MASON WANTED VIOLA TO KNOW THAT I WAS HAVING AN "ASADO" WITH HIM.  
CASTRIC  
ET

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 18, 1977

DOS REVIEWED 25-Aug 2009: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL.

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *RP*

SUBJECT: Trip of Secretary Vance

*File*  
*Brazil*

*See*  
*23*

Secretary Vance was trapped into this trip by the request of Argentine President Videla and the comedy of circumstances that followed-- announcement of President's trip, then postponement. Still, it could be an important trip for several reasons:

In Argentina:

- A breakthrough on Tlatelolco is possible.
- The Secretary could strengthen the cause of human rights, and the hands of the moderates.

in Brazil:

- He can help create an atmosphere where more solid achievements would be possible, say during the President's trip in March.
- If he obtains agreement on Argentine ratification of Tlatelolco, then the chances of gaining some agreement from Brazil increase as well. But I rather doubt this will occur.

In Venezuela:

- He can make a strong demarche on oil prices.

These are the principal points which could be accomplished on the trip. I am not sure I know the best way to plug into this trip, but for your benefit, while I am travelling, let me sketch some impressions.

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Authority NLC-24-3-4-11-5  
NARA EF Date 7/9/10

Argentina

Clearly, Argentina's leaders are hungriest for U.S. recognition. That is why Videla dared to make his request in the middle of the bilateral.

The political climate is confused in Buenos Aires. The Army and the Navy seem caught in an explosive and dangerous struggle for power. Navy Chief Massera has shown himself capable of extraordinary excesses to try to embarrass Videla and enhance his own chance for leadership. He ordered the bombardment and boarding of Chilean, Soviet, and Bulgarian ships; he is said to have ordered the kidnapping of the Argentine Ambassador to Venezuela when he was on home leave and several important labor leaders when Videla was in Washington. Still, no one seriously believes that Massera or any other Admiral can ascend to be head of the Junta.

The Argentines are still a very proud people, but they are not as sensitive to U.S. intrusions as they were in the 1940's, or the Brazilians are now. The power to confer legitimacy on Videla is our most powerful bargaining chip, and we should be careful how it is done. The potential for improving the human rights picture in Argentina is great, and we can press hard there, as well as on non-proliferation.

Brazil

In Brazil we have three objectives, with the third being the most important:

-- to state our policies on human rights and non-proliferation clearly and forcefully;

-- to restate our interest in good bilateral relations; and

-- to try to clear up the atmosphere so that we can, in time, move forward on the two previous goals.

One way to clear the atmosphere would be to approach the nuclear issue differently. Instead of focusing on non-proliferation, we should concentrate on developing arrangements for cooperative research on alternative energy technologies. State and Energy Departments have set up pilot programs with Egypt and Indonesia, but the concept seems perfectly suited to Brazil.

Jose Goldenberg, one of Brazil's most noted nuclear physicists, told Jessica and I that much of the disillusionment which Brazil's scientists feel towards the Brazil-German nuclear agreement is that it would transfer

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technology but not science. Goldenberg said that the U.S. would be much more effective if we concentrated on positive areas of future cooperation. The two of us believe that it would make sense to negotiate an agreement on the precise allocation of scientific work in the following areas: coal mining technology, coal conversion and fluidized technology, bioconversion (Brazil has done some work in this area), and solar energy.

There is currently a Joint US-Brazil Group in Energy Technology, which was established under the Memorandum of Understanding, which has met several times, but has never really obtained the kind of attention it deserves. Secretary Vance's trip provides an opportunity to probe about Brazilian interest in this area. If you approve, I could relay this strategy to him during the trip.

Approve       Disapprove

or alternatively, you could bring it up with the Secretary directly.

Approve       Disapprove

I plan to prepare a detailed report, suggesting a step-by-step strategy for US-Brazilian relations when I return. If there are any other questions you would like me to address on this trip, please contact me.

#### Venezuela

In Venezuela, our objective is quite simple: to state with considerable vigor our concern that the price of petroleum should stay frozen through 1978. There is little else which is necessary, but a full agenda to cover nonetheless because Perez is such an important ally.

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

file: Argentina

October 5, 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Appointment with Vice President Mondale by Emilio Massera, Military Junta Argentina.

On September 26, a private individual recommended to Vice President Mondale that he meet with Admiral Emilio Massera of the Argentine Military Junta who is visiting the United States October 9-11.

Earlier on September 15, his last day as the Navy member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Massera had written President Carter concerning relations between Argentina and the U.S., and requested a meeting with the President. Our recommendation on the latter is attached.

Our recommendation on a presidential appointment, and the reason for it, are fully applicable to the Vice President as well. Our Ambassador specifically recommended that Admiral Massera not be received by the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State.

As indicated in our earlier memorandum, we believe that it would be appropriate for Admiral Massera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and Assistant Secretary Vaky.

*Jack Perry for*  
Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

## Attachment:

Tarnoff/Brzezinski Memorandum of October 2, 1978.

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Washington, D C 20521

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*A.R.H.*

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October 2, 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Carter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Military Junta, Argentina

On September 15, his last day as the Navy member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Emilio Massera wrote President Carter concerning relations between Argentina and the U.S., and requested a meeting with the President.

The Admiral has now retired from military service and is trying to build a political base in Argentina. A talented opportunist, Massera will soon travel to Europe and the United States in an attempt to gain international recognition to further his domestic ends. Massera is viewed with suspicion and some hostility by the Argentine Army, which is the dominant partner in the Junta. Our Ambassador in Buenos Aires has been told that Argentine President Videla and the Army would not favor a meeting between Admiral Massera and President Carter. The Ambassador has personally recommended against such a meeting, suggesting instead that Massera speak with a lower ranking U.S. official. The Department agrees with this view; we do not want to antagonize the Army by arranging a meeting between Massera and President Carter, but we do believe that Massera should meet with appropriately high-level U.S. officials.

We believe that it would be appropriate for Admiral Massera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and Assistant Secretary Vaky.

*Jack Perry for*  
Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Suggested Draft Reply

Drafted: 121/PCA/JP/...  
9/28/1978 \* 2016 87818470

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GDS

Clearance: 121/PCA/...

*ARA:FM/...*  
*ARA:VP Vaky*

Admiral Emilio Massera,  
Military Junta,  
Argentina, Buenos Aires

Dear Admiral Massera:

I have been asked to respond to your September 15 letter to President Carter concerning relations between our two countries.

As you suggest, there is a need for continuing dialogue between Argentina and the United States so that the problems which exist can be discussed and resolved.

We are hopeful that the conversations held between President Videla and Vice President Mondale will lead to actions which will make it possible to bring about closer cooperation and better understanding between our two countries.

Like you, we believe that it is essential for all countries to work toward a world in which the dignity of all is acknowledged and observed.

President Carter's schedule is very filled in the next few months but I would be pleased to have an opportunity to talk with you when you visit Washington. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Viron Vaky has also expressed a desire to meet with you during your stay here.

With my best regards.

Sincerely,

Robert Pastor

*Junta Militar*

*Comandante en Jefe de la Armada*

BUENOS AIRES, 15 de setiembre de 1978.

Excelentísimo señor Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América  
Dn. JAMES EARL CARTER  
WASHINGTON - ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA

Señor Presidente:

Al cesar en mis funciones como miembro de la Junta Militar de la República Argentina, he creído conveniente dirigirme a usted para hacerle partícipe de algunas reflexiones sobre la situación de mi país.

Así como los argentinos tenemos dificultades para comprender en plenitud las acciones de la política norteamericana, de la misma manera debemos admitir que por parte de su gobierno deben existir similares inconvenientes para visualizar los reales problemas que nos aquejan a los argentinos.

Ello, como es lógico, produce diferentes enfoques de un país con respecto a otro. Pero es deber de los gobernantes visualizar cual es la verdadera intención con que se llevan a la práctica esas interpretaciones diferentes, con el objeto de adecuar el accionar propio a los mejores intereses nacionales.

En tal sentido, me siento obligado a manifestar que, aún cuando personalmente he llegado a disentir con algunos aspectos de la política exterior de su gobierno con respecto al mfo, jamás abrigué la menor duda de que sus pasos estaban inspirados por un noble y genuino interés por el bienestar de la República Argentina, en el contexto global de las naciones que tradicionalmente han sentido y actuado como integrantes del mundo occidental.

En mis frecuentes visitas a todos los países sudamericanos, he hecho especial hincapié en la necesidad de emprender la reconquista del espíritu de Occidente por parte de todos los países americanos, como único camino para salvaguardar nuestra identidad continental. Es así que he enfatizado hasta el cansancio que a Occidente no hay que buscarlo en el mapa, porque es hoy una actitud del alma que no está atada a ninguna geografía. Occidente es el hombre protagonizando la dignidad esencial de la vida. Occidente es la libertad de pensar y de hacer. Occidente es el respeto al honor, al trabajo, al talento. Pero Occidente es también el amor, es la esperanza, y es la misericordia.

Esta insistencia en sacar a la luz ese espíritu dormido de nuestros pueblos, ha sido acogido siempre con beneplácito. Resulta extraño entonces comprobar que, paradójicamente, el tema central de las presentes divergencias argentino-norteamericanas sea el mismo que nos ofrece la mayor posibilidad de una comprensión total entre nosotros.

Comprendo que existen dificultades para promover una generosa campaña de promoción de los derechos humanos en el mundo, que no roce en algunos aspectos la sensibilidad de los propios amigos. Pretender que esto no ocurra sería casi utópico y falto de realismo político. Yo mismo he sentido la incompreensión de los esfuerzos por promover dentro de mi propio país un cambio de outlook.

///...

*Junta Militar*

*Comandante en Jefe de la Armada*

.../1/2.

Es por tal razón que interpreto debidamente -y en tal convencimiento se la agradezco- la generosa mención que usted hizo el 27 de enero, ante un grupo de periodistas de la Nueva Inglaterra reunidos en la Casa Blanca, sobre nuestro rol en la cuestión de los derechos humanos.

Esa actitud nuestra que mereciera tal mención suya, es firme y decidida. Puede usted tener la certeza de que no habrá desviación de ese propósito bajo la Comandancia de mi sucesor, el Almirante Armando Lambruschini.

Señor Presidente: al despedirme de usted como miembro del máximo órgano de poder de la República Argentina, lo hago persuadido de que debo seguir bregando -desde el llano- por la consecución de los objetivos que se propusieron las Fuerzas Armadas al hacerse cargo del poder. Como he manifestado recientemente ante la IX Conferencia Naval Interamericana, las ideas no pasan a retiro. Yo puedo asegurarle que las mías no lo harán y que por tal razón seguiré bregando para restablecer a breve plazo la estructura institucional de mi país.

Mis recientes conversaciones en Caracas con el Presidente Carlos Andrés Pérez y con los ex-Presidentes Betancourt, Caldera, Sanabria y Larrazábal, han robustecido mi convencimiento sobre las posibilidades del afianzamiento democrático en la América Latina.

Espero que en los próximos meses, oportunidad en que tengo planeado "a brief sentimental return to Washington" en donde viví por dos años en la década del 60, pueda tener la ocasión de conversar personalmente con usted sobre la evolución de la situación argentina.

Sinceramente,



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 69089  
WD/BP  
Spanish

Military Junta  
Chief of Naval Operations

Buenos Aires, September 15, 1978

His Excellency  
James Earl Carter,  
President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D.C.

Mr. President:

Now that I have ceased to be a member of the Military Junta of the Argentine Republic, I should like to share with you some thoughts about the situation in my country.

Just as we Argentines have difficulty in fully understanding United States policy actions, your Government must, of course, have similar trouble in visualizing the real problems that confront Argentina. The natural result is that differences in points of view develop between the two countries. But it is the duty of those in power to seek to understand the true intentions with which those differing interpretations are put into practice, in order that they may make their own actions consistent with their countries' best interests.

In that connection I feel impelled to state that, even though I have personally disagreed with some aspects of your Government's foreign policy with respect to mine, I never harbored the slightest

doubt that your course was inspired by a noble and genuine interest in the well-being of the Argentine Republic as one of the nations that have traditionally felt and acted as members of the Western world.

On my frequent visits to all the South American countries, I have laid special emphasis on the need for all the American countries to recapture the Western spirit as the only way to safeguard our continental identity. I have thus repeatedly stressed that the West is not to be sought on the map, because today it is a spiritual attitude independent of geography. The West is mankind acting out the essential dignity of life. The West is freedom of thought and action. The West is respect for honor, work, talent. But the West is also love, hope, and compassion.

This insistence on bringing to light that sleeping spirit of our peoples has always been favorably received. It is therefore strange to note that, paradoxically, the central theme of current U.S.-Argentine differences is the very one that offers us the greatest potential for complete mutual understanding.

I realize that it is difficult to conduct a generous human rights campaign in the world without occasionally bruising the sensibilities of one's own friends. To pretend otherwise would be almost Utopian and politically unrealistic. I myself have felt the lack of understanding for efforts to promote a change in outlook within my own country.

It is in that light that I interpret--and appreciate-- your generous reference, on January 27 to a group of New England journalists gathered at the White House, to our role in the matter of human rights.

We remain firm and determined in the attitude that inspired your comment. You may rest assured that there will be no departure from it under my successor, Admiral Armando Lambruschini.

I take my leave of you, Mr. President, as a member of the supreme governing body of the Argentine Republic, convinced that I must continue to strive--from afar--for the attainment of the objectives undertaken by the Armed Forces when they took power. As I recently stated before the Ninth Inter-American Naval Conference, ideas do not retire. I can assure you that mine shall not and that I will therefore continue to strive for the early reestablishment of my country's institutional structure.

My recent conversations in Caracas with President Carlos Andres Perez and with former Presidents Betancourt, Caldera, Sanabria, and Larrazabal strengthened my conviction regarding the possibility of assuring democracy in Latin America.

I hope that in a few months' time, when I am planning "a brief sentimental return to Washington," where I lived for two years in the 1960's, I may have the opportunity for a personal

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4

conversation with you on the development of the Argentine situation.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

7818470



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 21, 1978

COPIES TO:  
RF:WEB

MEMORANDUM FOR: MS. CHRISTINE DODSON  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Alerting NSC on Presidential  
Correspondence

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to President Carter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Military Junta, Argentina which is transmitted for your information.

This document was received in the Executive Secretariat Information Management Section on September 21, 1978.

*William E. Brown*  
Director, S/S-I  
Information Management Section  
Executive Secretariat  
ext. 23836

SUMMARY TRANSLATION

7818470

Letter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Member of the Military Junta of Argentina to President Carter.

Admiral Massera notes that he is writing this letter on the date of his retirement from the Junta. He states that he believes there may have been misunderstandings between our two countries because of a mutual misinterpretation of the policies that have been implemented. He does not, however, doubt the sincerity of the U.S. in adopting these policies. He believes there is a community of interest between Argentina and the U.S., both of which are dedicated to the dignity of human life. He states that his successor as Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy also believes in these values. He hopes to speak with you personally in the next few months when he visits Washington.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 >

U.S. HOUSE DOCUMENT

Department of State  
Executive Secretariat

*Urgent*  
*ECA - see ARA 10/2.*

ACTION: *ARA*

**URGENT**

*9/27* S/S 78/8803  
Date 9/27/78

INFO TO:

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> S	<input type="checkbox"/> D/LOS	<input type="checkbox"/> A	<input type="checkbox"/> ACDA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D	<input type="checkbox"/> M/DG	<input type="checkbox"/> CA	<input type="checkbox"/> AID
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> S/P	<input type="checkbox"/> EA	<input type="checkbox"/> PA	<input type="checkbox"/> Team C
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<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> NEA	<input type="checkbox"/> PM	<input type="checkbox"/>

Action Requested:

Memorandum for the President

Memorandum for the White House:

Bureau Handling

Other

Due Date in S/S: noon, Oct 3

† Remarks: *Please prepare recommendation for the VP under a Tarnoff/Brzezinski memo.*

Authorized by:

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Shua Kopf*  
S/S

7818803

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo No. 916-78

~~September 26, 1978~~

ACTION (ARA)

COPIES TO:

S  
D  
P  
S/P  
INR  
RF (rs)

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTINE DODSON

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with Member of  
Argentine Junta, Admiral Massera.

It has been recommended to the Vice President by a private individual that the Vice President agree to meet with Admiral Massera when the latter is in the U.S. October 9-11. Given the current state of play of US-Argentine relations, I have questions about this recommendation. I would greatly appreciate a State-NSC recommendation on this proposal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE  
CONFIRM

78 SEP 27 PM 12:36  
*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Large handwritten letter 'C']*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SEP 27 1978

MESSAGE NO. 151 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 2  
FROM M. West 3723       
(Name) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION \_\_\_\_\_

<u>TO(Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>State</u>	<u>Peter Tarnoff</u>		

REMARKS: Recommendation Due Date  
Oct 3, 1978


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

REFERRAL

Date: 9/27/78  
NSC log # 5718

MEMORANDUM FOR:

STATE SECRETARIAT



DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

To: Christina Dodson

From: Dennis Clift

Date: September 26, 1978

Subject: Proposed Mtg w/ Member of Argentine Junta, Admiral Massera

ACTION REQUESTED:

Draft reply for:  President's Signature  
 White House Staff  
 Other \_\_\_\_\_

Direct reply  Furnish info copy

Dispatch  Translation

~~XXXXX~~ Recommendations / ~~Comments~~  Appropriate Handling

Other  Information

DUE DATE: \*\*\*\* October 3, 1978

COMMENTS:

*Handwritten signature: Nancy J. Stark*  
For CHRISTINE DODSON  
STAFF SECRETARY

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo No. 916-78

September 26, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTINE DODSON

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting With Member of  
Argentine Junta, Admiral Massera.

It has been recommended to the Vice President by a private individual that the Vice President agree to meet with Admiral Massera when the latter is in the U.S. October 9-11. Given the current state of play of US-Argentine relations, I have questions about this recommendation. I would greatly appreciate a State-NSC recommendation on this proposal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5738

~~CONFIDENTIAL/GDS~~

October 6, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR DENIS CLIFT

FROM: Christine Dodson

*Christine*

SUBJECT: Admiral Massera

The NSC staff concurs with the attached State Department recommendation against a Vice Presidential meeting with Admiral Massera.

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-133-57-6-6-9  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 5, 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Appointment with Vice President Mondale by Emilio Massera, Military Junta Argentina.

On September 26, a private individual recommended to Vice President Mondale that he meet with Admiral Emilio Massera of the Argentine Military Junta who is visiting the United States October 9-11.

Earlier on September 15, his last day as the Navy member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Massera had written President Carter concerning relations between Argentina and the U.S., and requested a meeting with the President. Our recommendation on the latter is attached.

Our recommendation on a presidential appointment, and the reason for it, are fully applicable to the Vice President as well. Our Ambassador specifically recommended that Admiral Massera not be received by the President, Vice President, or Secretary of State.

As indicated in our earlier memorandum, we believe that it would be appropriate for Admiral Massera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and Assistant Secretary Vaky.

*Jack Perry for*  
Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tarnoff/Brzezinski Memorandum of October 2, 1978.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GDS



*APF*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 2, 1978

COPIES TO:

P  
ARA  
TMC  
RF (jhw)

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Carter from Admiral Emilio  
Massera, Military Junta, Argentina

On September 15, his last day as the Navy member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Emilio Massera wrote President Carter concerning relations between Argentina and the U.S., and requested a meeting with the President.

The Admiral has now retired from military service and is trying to build a political base in Argentina. A talented opportunist, Massera will soon travel to Europe and the United States in an attempt to gain international recognition to further his domestic ends. Massera is viewed with suspicion and some hostility by the Argentine Army, which is the dominant partner in the Junta. Our Ambassador in Buenos Aires has been told that Argentine President Videla and the Army would not favor a meeting between Admiral Massera and President Carter. The Ambassador has personally recommended against such a meeting, suggesting instead that Massera speak with a lower ranking U.S. official. The Department agrees with this view; we do not want to antagonize the Army by arranging a meeting between Massera and President Carter, but we do believe that Massera should meet with appropriately high-level U.S. officials.

We believe that it would be appropriate for Admiral Massera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and Assistant Secretary Vaky.

*Jack Perry for*  
Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Suggested Draft Reply

Drafted: ARA/KCAJF/...  
9/28/1978 n 29168 887818470

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GDS

Classified by: [unclear]

ARA:FM/MEI  
ARA:VP/Vaky

DOS REVIEWED 10-Jan-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

THE DYNAMICS OF ARGENTINE DECISION-MAKING

Conclusions

Our analysis of the Argentine decision-making mechanism indicates that:

- emphasis is always upon the tri-service nature of the government with the Navy and the Air Force over-represented in an effort to maintain the degree of military cohesion necessary for effective rule;
- nonetheless, the Army is the predominant service, capable of forcing implementation of its preferred policies if compromise is impossible;
- each service formulates its own policy positions based on service consensus, and differences are ironed out at the top;
- compromise in the interest of unity is always sought and usually achieved;
- while often slow and cumbersome, the process has worked, and Videla is comfortable with it;
- the Army's potential power and the tri-service arrangement will continue to be the significant factors under the new junta-president formula; and
- outsiders seeking to influence the decision-making process must seek access at the top through, in the US case, the Videla-Viola channel.

\* \* \*

Army predominance is the crucial element in the present as in past Argentine military governments. The post-March 1976 government has been a tri-service affair in structure and operation. The Army, Navy and Air Force have shared office-

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-133-22-30-1-5  
Date 7/9/16  
EF

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

holding responsibilities as equitably as the manpower of the two junior services permits, and all three services have participated fully in the decision-making process. All participants, however, conduct themselves with the knowledge that a unified Army is the "most equal" of the services, capable of forcing implementation of its preferred policies if compromise with Air Force and Navy views cannot be reached.

Army willingness to accept a tri-service governing format in which the other two services are, in fact, over-represented rests on the belief that armed forces unity is critical to the viability of military government. Past experience (especially the 1966-73 Ongania, Levingston, and Lanusse governments) has demonstrated that military governments dominated by one man or one service run a high risk of alienating significant elements within the armed forces and thereby, forfeiting the chance for prolonging effective rule. Establishing the Air Force and Navy as equal parties in the governing process ensures that they will have a stake in its success and presumably act accordingly.

Within the tri-service format, the decision-making process basically involves each service developing its own policy positions, with differences of opinion being compromised through discussion in one of several formal and ad hoc forums. When a tri-service consensus cannot be reached, the matter is decided by majority vote in the junta (a president's selection or removal requires an unanimous vote.) At each step in the decision-making process, votes are cast in representation of the officer's particular armed force.

Within each service, the task of canvassing opinion and drafting policies usually falls to the office of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary General, insofar as that process is formalized. On political matters, the service secretaries general (Army-Brigadier General Reynaldo Bignone; Navy-Rear Admiral Eduardo Fracassi; Air Force-Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo) have shouldered much of the burden not only for formulating policy but also for conducting inter-service bargaining to compromise differences. For example, recent negotiations to delineate the power relationship between the junta and the president after Videla retirement as army commander were handled by the secretaries general. In essence, the general secretariat in each service has become a cabinet for the service commander. The secretary general is a trusted subordinate of the commander, and the secretariat is staffed by carefully selected officers, often at the colonel level.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

When disagreements are not resolved prior to junta consideration of the issue at hand, it is extremely important for all three junta members to enter discussions with the solid backing of their subordinates. Thus, important junta meetings are often preceded by intra-service gathering chaired by the relevant commander and attended by all senior officers of the service. These are closed meetings involving frank, extended, and often heated discussions. Nothing beyond possibly the topics discussed is disclosed to the public. Service discipline is usually strong enough to ensure almost unanimous support for whatever service position emerges from senior officer conclaves.

With the emphasis always upon compromising differences, ad hoc decision-making instrumentalities are employed without hesitation when the circumstances demand. In late April, for instance, during the deliberations over the choice of a president, the key meeting may well have been that of the "big junta" on March 28-30. Senior officers, from the services (9 Army Major Generals; 3 Vice Admirals; 6 Air Force Brigadiers) met in ad hoc fashion, settled on Videla, and left the details on the president-junta relationship to be ironed out by the secretaries general. At that meeting, Army Major General and Interior Minister Ablano Harguindeguy bluntly informed his Air Force and Navy colleagues that the Army represented 70% of the armed forces' power and therefore, like it or not, Videla would be president. It was one of the few occasions of which we are aware, that the Army has so bluntly wielded its recognized power advantage.

Decision-making centers outside the junta are also characterized by the tri-service arrangement. The Legislative Advisory Commission (CAL) advises the presidency concerning armed forces' opinion on proposed legislation. The nine CAL members (3 senior officers from each service) seek and reflect the views of their own services, and votes are cast by service with the majority deciding. Should the presidency disagree with the CAL, the matter is decided by majority vote in the junta.

The cabinet ministries are divided among the services (3 Army, 2 Navy, 2 Air Force, 2 civilian) and tend to become the preserve of the presiding service. Navy control of the Foreign Ministry, for instance, has led Videla at times to conduct foreign policy outside Foreign Ministry channels. Even here, however, the tri-service rule is evident in form if not in substance. Each service is entitled to place what are called Junta Delegates in each of the ministries and presidential secretariats, and in the government of the City of Buenos Aires.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

The apparent anomaly in this governing system lies in the ability of the junior services to outvote the more powerful Army two-to-one at almost every turn. That this has not happened often, and never on a major issue on which the Army is unified, can be attributed to:

- the wide area of inter-service and intra-service agreement on the general parameters of the National Reorganization Process, a crucial factor which lends cohesion to the entire process;
- tacit recognition of the Army's strength in any forced showdown; and
- the knowledge that schisms would be the harbinger of a near-term end to military rule.

Generally, the Navy has been more prone to challenge the Army on a variety of issues, often because of the personal interests and ambitions of Commander Massera. Air Force Commander Agosti has supported the Navy insofar as challenge has been useful to maintain the independence and influence of the junior services. But the Air Force has generally been inclined to side with the Army when a confrontation looms. Agosti has no desire to test the Army's power, nor does he want to appear to be endangering the military's reconstruction process by backing a navy boss whose motivation is suspect in most military quarters outside the Navy.

It is a cumbersome decision-making process, often slow to function, and almost bound to give the appearance of indecisiveness and, at times, of officials working at cross purposes. The problem is complicated by the difficulty that the Army often experiences in developing positions acceptable to senior officers with varying political and policy preferences. Moderates like Videla and new Army Commander Viola must work carefully to ensure the continued support of hardline generals like Suarez Mason (Corps I, Buenos Aires); Menendez (Corps III); and Laidlaw (Planning Ministry.) Without a coherent Army position on key issues, the whole tri-service pattern begins to disintegrate.

However slow and seemingly inefficient the process may be, it has worked. Tri-service support for the government remains solid, and there is little indication of grumbling in the ranks because officers or groups of officers feel their opinions are not being at least heard. The system has the added virtue of fitting neatly with Videla's personal style and temperament. Cautious and reticent about acting without careful preparation, Videla has not been uncomfortable with the tri-service arrange-

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

ment. Argentines as well as Argentine-watchers have questioned the viability of his low-key style in a country that has always demanded and usually received strong presidential leadership. Nonetheless, his success to date in preserving armed forces cohesion argues the wisdom of his tactics.

Massera's machinations have often added a discordant note to the governing process since the March 1976 coup. Politically astute and ambitious, the admiral has been building a political base that he hopes to parlay into the presidency, perhaps within two or three years. Seen in this light, Massera's criticisms of Videla's and the Army's handling of affairs emerge as an attempt to compile the basis for a subsequent Massera challenge to military government. He apparently plans to present himself as a former junta member who dissented from unpopular policies (e.g., human rights violations and labor repression.)

There is little doubt that Massera has complicated the junta's governing task, but his experience reflects the two key characteristics of this military government, army predominance and tri-service participation.

--Massera has never pushed Videla to the point of an open confrontation that would force one or the other from power. Massera knows he would lose. He cannot obtain sufficient Army support to oust Videla in his favor.

--Massera has been effective because he has maintained the support of his own service.

#### Impact of the Fourth Man Scheme

Videla's August 1 assumption of the presidency as a retired officer has necessitated changes in the decision-making process. Some new guidelines have been established to regulate the president-junta relationship, but little is clear beyond the fact that:

--the junta will remain the supreme governing body, setting policy guidelines and reviewing presidential actions to ensure that they remain within those guidelines; and

--the president will be responsible for daily government operations, enjoying considerable powers of appointment (often with junta consent.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

- 6 -

Videla's latitude to set as well as execute policy will probably be decided in an ad hoc manner over the coming months. Critical to Videla's success will be the degree to which he retains Army support through Army Commander Viola. The two share moderate policy outlooks and have a close working relationship. Viola, however, will have to work assiduously to placate hardline Army elements and maintain their support. If he can do so, the Videla-Viola alliance can be expected to reflect, and wield when necessary, the Army's power edge. The Air Force and Navy, on the other hand, will be seeking to guarantee continuation of the tri-service governing arrangement by ensuring that the Videla-Viola connection is not translated into a de facto government by the Army.

Pressure Points. The only feasible tactic for outsiders interested in influencing the Argentine decision-making process is to attempt to gain access at the top. Since the US cannot directly influence the number of officers in any service necessary to create a consensus behind our preferred policies, the alternative is to work through moderate leaders in the hope that they will be able to sustain the support of their subordinates.

At present, the selection process is complicated by:

- the blurring of lines of authority that has accompanied installation of the junta-president formula; and
- the imminence of the annual military promotion/retirement cycle; it could alter the political complexion of the armed forces, especially the Army.

Nonetheless, the most promising alternatives remain Videla, Viola, and moderate army officers close to those two, particularly Army Secretary General Bignone and Brigadier General Jose Villarreal, Secretary General of the Presidency.

A possible pressure point may emerge in the figure of Vice Admiral Armando Lambruschini who is expected to replace Massera as Navy commander on September 15. A Navy chief disposed to cooperate with Videla would simplify and expedite the governing process. Most importantly from the US perspective, it might obviate the Army's felt need to circumvent the navy-controlled Foreign Ministry and thereby prevent the lack of communication within the Argentine government that has complicated, among other things, the Argentine-IAHRC negotiations.

Lambruschini will not indulge in the kind of political machinations characteristic of Massera. However, his political views are not well-known, nor is the extent to which he will be

susceptible to manipulation by a retired Massera. Likewise, we cannot judge the degree to which the brutal murder of Lambruschini's daughter will be reflected in the new commander's attitudes and actions.

IAHRC Visit. We have no information on the Argentine-IAHRC negotiations not contained in Embassy reporting (see appended copy of Buenos Aires 6425 of August 18 for the most recent account of Argentine attitudes.)

Timing is a crucial element. The nationalistic response to recent US actions (or at least how US actions were perceived) provides a pretext for rejecting an IAHRC visit that can be convincingly used by hardline officials who would not accept a visit under any terms. The current Argentine atmosphere makes it extremely difficult for Videla to issue an invitation without provoking charges of "vende patria" from disgruntled military and aroused citizens.

The chances of a visit will increase if the IAHRC can justify something less than a totally unconditioned presence in Argentina. We understand that a precedent for a visit under previously agreed guidelines may exist in the form of the Commission's 1974 visit to Chile. The Commission may also be inclined to compromise because of the area-wide implications of an on-site visit to any Southern Cone country. By accepting half-a-loaf, the IAHRC might fatally undermine the reported mid-1977 agreement among Southern Cone governments to ban IAHRC visits to the area.

Drafted: INR/RAR:JEBuchanan:plap  
8/25/78

Approved: INR/RAR/OD:Hunter L. Estep

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

6275

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

ACTION

November 2, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *Zb*

SUBJECT:

Jacobo Timerman (U)

Jacobo Timerman, the Argentine newspaper editor and publisher, who was recently released from house arrest and expelled from Argentina, has asked to see you. He has been in New York since October 29 to receive the Hubert Humphrey Freedom Award from B'nai B'rith. In light of your personal intervention with President Videla on behalf of Mr. Timerman, the Department of State believes you should meet with him. (C)

Timerman last week told our Press Attache in Tel Aviv that he is now reluctant to write about his experiences in Argentina because he fears reprisals by the military against friends still in Argentina. For a similar reason, I believe a meeting could be counterproductive to our efforts to encourage human rights improvements in Argentina. Timerman's release was the culmination of such a vicious struggle between moderates and hardliners in the Argentine military that it provoked a coup (which was unsuccessful) by the hardliners. I believe that the moderates would consider your meeting with him as an unfriendly (rather than an appreciative) gesture, and they would be less likely to be accommodating to future cases. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That in lieu of a meeting, you sign the attached letter to Timerman conveying your congratulations.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

The letter has been cleared by the speechwriters.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review 10/30/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526 Nsc waiver

Authority NLC-6-4-7-22-0 6/1/83

WASA EF Date 7/9/16

MEMORANDUM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 25, 1979

23 HAS BEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD *LB*

SUBJECT: Department of State Request for Meeting  
between Mrs. Carter and Mrs. Timerman

State has sent a rather half-hearted recommendation (which was, however approved in principal by both Christopher and Vance) that Mrs. Carter see the wife of the detained Argentine newspaper publisher Jacobo Timerman. ARA is opposed, but Patt Derian (who is after me in full cry) strongly recommends it. Bob Pastor thinks we should give the Argentines two more weeks to release Timerman, prospects being a little brighter now. Patt insists that Mrs. Carter be asked to make the decision. I feel the urgent need to pass the buck. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

Option 1. Mrs. Carter sees Mrs. Timerman tomorrow (evidently the only possible day).

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Option 2. A visit be postponed to see if Timerman is released. (We recommend Option 2.)

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ *✓* *9/25/79*

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

*Bob Pastor  
9/25/79  
9/26/79*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 9/15/85

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526

Authority NSC 6221/2 6713  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 10, 1979

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *Bob*  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Admiral Massera (U)

At your suggestion, I called Boleslaw Wierzbianski about his recommendation on Massera. Wierzbianski met Massera briefly, but does not really know him. The suggestion of meeting with you probably was made by Massera and conveyed to Boleslaw Wierzbianski through a mutual friend. (C)

I would recommend that you not meet with Massera for the following reasons:

- When Massera was the Argentine Navy's representative on the junta, some of the worst human rights violations occurred, and many then attributed that to the rivalry he pressed against the Army in the junta. (C)
- I have not met Massera, but Vaky, Kissinger and many others have, and their nearly unanimous impression is that he should not be trusted, and that his principles do not extend any further than his own ambitions. (C)
- The Argentine government would probably be more disturbed at a meeting between you and Massera than by anything Pat Derian could do. Videla and the Army Chief, Viola, view Massera as their most dangerous rival, and would fear that a meeting with you would endow him with more legitimacy than he deserves. They would also probably fear the possibility of Massera's conspiring with you. There is little question that he would exploit such a meeting for his own purposes. (C)

In short, I think that a meeting between you and Massera would have the paradoxical effect of angering both the Argentine government and the human rights lobby in the US, and I don't believe that anything you could learn from the meeting could override that. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 9/10/85

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority NSC Waiver 6/7/83  
NARA EF Date 7/9/86

CONFIDENTIAL

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RECOMMENDATION

Therefore, I recommend that I respond to Boleslaw Wierzbianski's letter on your behalf and express regrets that you will be unable to meet with Admiral Massera on the grounds that a meeting could be misinterpreted in Argentina as you trying to get involved in domestic politics in that country at a delicate moment in our relationship. (I will also repeat our strong and positive interests in promoting human rights in that country and elsewhere.) (C)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 5, 1979

DOO REVIEWED 22-Jun-2010: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

*shown*  
↑ BA

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *BP*  
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

Attached at Tab A is the report on Argentina, which I mentioned in a recent evening report item. After reading it, both Vance and Christopher were convinced that we should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loans to Argentina in the IFI's. We changed our position to abstention in February 1978 and have kept it since then, hoping that would induce some improvement in the human rights situation. Such improvement has not occurred, and Vance and Christopher now believe that we should vote "no" on loans in the IFI's; lobby OECD countries to follow our example; and assess whether further action in X-M and OPIC should be taken. (S)

Assessment

The report was prepared by INR--not HA-- and it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere, and despite repeated promises in 1978 by the Argentine government, it has not improved. Let me summarize the report:

-- There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners; probably another 500 who are believed to be terrorists are held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabilitated." There is no effort underway to substantially reduce this number. (S)

-- "Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment." [redacted] estimated that 90% of the political prisoners are tortured, and some are executed. (S)

-- Disappearances -- probably by security units -- continued at a rate of about 55 per month during 1978. (Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 40 per month; while

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ORIGINAL CL BY R. Pastor  
DECL  REVW ON March 5, 1985  
EXT BYND 6 YEARS BY \_\_\_\_\_  
EASON \_\_\_\_\_

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E.O. 13526  
Authority NLC-24-81-1-6-8  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

the Foreign Ministry admitted to 80 per month; Embassy estimates, 55.) Increasingly, the people who disappear have vague associations with the "political left" rather than with terrorists. Both international NGO's and Argentine human rights groups estimate that there have been about 15,000 disappearances in the past 3-4 years. (S)

-- Illegal invasion of the home -- including theft by security units -- remains as commonplace as fair public trials are infrequent. (S)

The justification for official terrorism is tenuous, even using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina's Federal Security Service estimated that there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina in 1978, and even Videla has admitted that the war is over. INR concludes that the explanation for continued official terrorism is army politics. (S)

### Policy

While I think the assessment is quite accurate, I draw different conclusions than State as to what policy we should adopt. I understand that Vance and Christopher approach the issue as a legal one: Argentina is unquestionably engaged in a systematic pattern of human rights violations, and the law requires that we vote "no" on non-basic human needs loans. (Laws on X-M and OPIC provide more flexibility.) The law only requires that we "oppose" such loans, and "opposition" has been interpreted to include abstention as well as negative votes so I believe we have some flexibility. (S)

In deciding what approach to take, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to improve the human rights situation? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take punitive steps toward Argentina, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that it's required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-range audience before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

### An Effective Policy

What is the most effective approach? Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government

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decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case of our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us for three reasons: (1) our historical, reasonably close relationship; (2) the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.; (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights policy, and (2) they have taken "baby steps" in the human rights area at home. I think our cool and correct posture has been as effective as any policy could be. I think negative steps as State envisages would not be any more effective with Argentina, and it would cause us serious problems in the U.S. (S)

In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct posture to Argentina, though we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to clean up their act. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors, and we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

But even if you believe as Vance and Christopher do, that we should take the negative steps outlined above, I would encourage delay. (S)

One could argue that we have been waiting for 18 months; what will several more months do? Four new factors argue for waiting a bit longer: (1) The Argentine government has been paralyzed by the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months; now that it's quiet, they have the opportunity to move. (2) Several of Argentina's most hard-line Generals have been transferred, and Videla and Viola are more secure than at any time before. (3) Argentina's Ambassador has just told Vaky that he thinks there is a good possibility of some progress on the human rights front over the next few months. And (4) the Inter-American Human Rights Commission is going there in May. We should wait and gear any new policy shifts to their report. That may mean a delay of six months or more.

RECOMMENDATION:

Vance has apparently decided to change our policy. I therefore recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider. If he remains convinced, you may want to ask him to delay a decision pending the IAHRRC report.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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cc: Jessica Mathews Views:

Bob is right that our primary concern should be what will work with Argentina. Our policy of the past year (abstention) certainly hasn't worked, and I have little expectation that prolonging it will change anything, despite the fact that the Beagle Channel dispute is over. On the other hand, a tougher posture probably won't work either. I suspect that in the near term nothing will work until and unless Videla gets much more secure or there is a strong change in Argentine public opinion.

However, there is one important consideration missing here, namely the relationship of Argentina to the rest of our human rights policy. As Bob points out, the situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere and has even deteriorated in the past year (at least in relation to the terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is impossible to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, we do have to struggle to make the policy consistent insofar as we can, and by these standards there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer stand toward the GOA.

If neither posture is likely to be much more successful vis-a-vis the GOA, we should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights policy -- returning to the tougher "no" vote position.

*JHM*

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ARGENTINA: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

(C) Parameters and problems. The following assessment covers the Argentine government's 1978 performance and the current situation with respect to category-one human rights. Inevitably, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US Government's limited capacity for monitoring human rights events in Argentina and verifying reports of either positive or negative developments.

(C) Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We are forced, in many cases, to reply upon estimates whose credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance among groups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights developments.

(C) We do not believe, however, that timely, precise and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the assessment offered below. The record of Argentine human rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing cumulative picture of the government's performance. And while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would remain unchanged.

(C) Current situation. With respect to category-one rights, conditions can be summarized as follows:

(C) -- Political prisoners: Approximately 2,900 persons purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained at the disposition of the national executive branch under state-of-siege powers provided for in the Argentine constitution (PLN prisoners).\*

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(C) \* The current state of siege was instituted on November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punish detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention

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There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAM prisoners) and probably includes about 500 persons. According to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are either former terrorists now cooperating with security units or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore, listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most a few hundred persons.

(C) No sustained official effort is being made to substantially reduce the number of political prisoners by (1) releasing those against whom there exists no evidence of terrorist or criminal involvement nor pending charges; (2) trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights to choose exile over imprisonment (right-of-option). The right-of-option program initiated in late 1977 has resulted in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile.

(C) There is little evidence to substantiate persistent rumors that thousands of political prisoners are being held in clandestine camps located throughout the country.

(C) -- Torture and prisoner mistreatment: Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have information about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security

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in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners. However, the Executive does not always respond to court order. While we have little information that would permit categorizing detainees according to types of offenses, the PEN list probably includes few if any terrorists suspected of having committed violent acts against persons or property. Such individuals, when captured by security units, are routinely killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include such things as (a) non-violent actions undertaken in support of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings contrary to the military's conception of social order) groups, e.g., poster and pamphlet distribution and a variety

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officials. Torture generally occurs during interrogation, prior to official listing of a detainee as a PEN prisoner, or his or her summary execution. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reported in August that as many as 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured during interrogation. \*\*

(C) Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending upon such factors as the prisoner's alleged offense, the proclivities of the regional military commander, and the character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment (beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise, etc.) are most often associated with specific military jurisdictions and prisons, or with the transfer or release of prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances in early 1978, for example, prisoners released from a La Plata jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978 an ICRC official reported to the Embassy his belief that prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during the year.

(C) -- Disappearances: Reports of disappearances continue to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases, responsibility almost certainly lies with one of the many security units. In the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing thousands of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed dead.

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of other support activities; (b) economic actions perceived by the authorities as directly having supported subversion (the Graiver case) or otherwise endangered national interests; (c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as "leftist"; or (d) actions that contributed to an intellectual-cultural environment conducive to the growth of "subversion" (herein lies the danger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing artists, etc.). Thus, the term "security violation" has no specific meaning. Its operative definition is largely left to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest powers.

(C) \*\* Reports received from released prisoners tend to substantiate the [REDACTED] on the frequency of torture.

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(U) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend to use the figure of 15, 000 for disappearances over the past 3-4 years. Argentine groups share that estimate and have presented the government with documentation on almost 5,000 cases. In truth, however, no one knows precisely how many people have disappeared or, in many cases, why specific individuals were victimized.

(C) Few who have disappeared since about mid-1977, and on whom we have any information, could be considered terrorists or security threats. With most terrorists either eliminated or living in exile, the security forces have made a significant shift in their targetting practices to draw into the security net a range of non-terrorists associated with the vague and expansively defined political left. The decision as to which specific individuals will be picked up is left to regional and local authorities and, therefore, depends upon the latter's perception of what kinds of activities constitute security threats. The victim's culpability may only have involved past membership in a group that was entirely legal at the time. Insofar as there is a discernible pattern, there has been a tendency toward the disappearance of persons with a common association past or present; e.g., graduates of the same high school or university faculty, members of a political party or youth group, etc. However, there are many cases that make no apparent sense and for which the explanation may lie more in internal politics than in any specific act of the victim.

(C) Public criticism of government policies has, with few known exceptions, generally not been considered by authorities as grounds for detaining the critics and abusing or killing them. Many politicians, labor leaders, businessmen, and other professionals have criticized the government's economic, political and human rights policies without suffering retribution at the hands of the security forces.

(C) There has been no significant official effort to collect and publish information on persons who allegedly have disappeared. When queried about disappearances by non-governmental organizations or foreign governments, the Argentines' standard response is "no information". The Argentine courts

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regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged disappeared persons, but they have refused to accept jurisdiction in such cases.

(C) The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (relatives of disappeared persons) one of the most persistent and cohesive groups seeking information on disappeared persons, has recently been prohibited from conducting what had been a weekly Thursday vigil in front of Government House in downtown Buenos Aires. The demonstrations apparently had become too large and potentially disruptive in the judgment of government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands for information. The Mothers are now holding their gatherings at smaller and less conspicuous sites.

(C) Given the diffusion of authority that has characterized the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that any government agency either has collected or will be able to collect definitive files on alleged disappearance cases. The various security units have an obvious interest in withholding or destroying information on cases for which their operatives have been responsible.

(C) "Reappearances" emerged as a new and possibly under-reported facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probably quite small in relation to the reported number of disappearances. As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15 cases and by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placed the figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting it might be as high as 300. During 1978, the government published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who had allegedly reappeared. In most cases, however, the individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular "missing persons" cases. Their names did not appear on the lists of disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine human rights organizations.

(C) -- Fair public trial. All who have been detained by official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges against them.

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(C) Insofar as alleged security violators are charged and tried in civilian or military courts, \*\*\* there are two notable problems: the often extended period between detention and judicial processing and the reported predominance of convictions based on confessional evidence extracted through torture. Professional legal groups such as the ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional evidence.

(C) -- Invasion of the home. The detention practices of operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal invasion of the home. In addition, there are numerous reports of arresting officers ransacking private residences and stealing the personal property of the detainee.

(C) Trends. 1978 produced no substantial quantitative improvement or deterioration in category-one terms. The year featured a variety of positive and negative factors, but the net result was to leave the situation little changed. 2 Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official security personnel were frequent throughout the year, and there was no evidence of a concerted, effective government effort to halt the abuses.

(C) It is difficult to refine the trends analysis to reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds or abuses because the available statistical material is not always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a good example. In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequency (about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977. By later in

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(C) \*\*\* The status of PEN prisoners with respect to judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner held under a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted, serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half or more of the current PEN detainees are either being tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities. This is significant because, among other reasons, PEN detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition for exile under the right-of-option program.

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the year, however, additional information forced upward adjustments in the figures. Interior Ministry records showed a rate of 40 per month for January to October (as compared to 150 per month in 1977 and 250 per month in 1978) and a Foreign Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at about 80 per month. By November, the Embassy had reports of disappearances averaging about 34 per month for the January-April period. The Embassy has since concluded that a figure of 55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978.

(C) On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative frequency throughout the year with month-to-month variations reflecting tactical considerations rather than policy decisions. In essence, the situation changed little during 1978.<sup>3</sup>

(S/NF/NC) Counterterrorism uncontrolled. The conclusion that conditions did not improve in 1978 is based, in part, on evidence that the security forces continued to operate without effective central control. Numerous reports during the year from a variety of intelligence sources stated that:

- President Videla and his moderate supporters were attempting to establish rigid command and control over security operations;
- new orders had been issued with respect to conducting police and military operations within the bounds of the law; or
- police and military operatives had been dismissed or disciplined for abuses.

(C) Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken. Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward reform. Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted in accord with orders issued by regional and local military authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrained by the law or the directives of national authorities. In late October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsibilities in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that there was almost no central control over operational counterterrorist units.

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(C) The political context. The "dirty war" argument so frequently employed by Argentines to rationalize human rights abuses is no longer relevant. According to estimates drafted by the Argentine Federal Security Service in late 1978, there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina; no single group was estimated to have more than 245 resident activists, and no group was judged a serious and immediate security threat. High government officials, including President Videla, have repeatedly stated both publicly and privately that the "war" is over, i.e, that there is no continuing high-level internal security threat.

(C) The explanation for the continuing human rights abuses lies in armed forces, and especially army, politics rather than in internal security problems. The army is the predominant service, and its political heterogeneity is reflected in the conduct of government affairs. President Videla leads a group of military and civilian moderates who would prefer to see human rights abuses halted. Videla's priority concern, however, is to maintain the maximum degree of army and military unity, because the development of irreparable internal splits probably would spell his own quick demise and the end of the military's National Reorganization Process. Videla is not power hungry, but he is committed to the military government's reform program and believes his own role important. Thus, Videla's preferences give way to his long-term political goals when his preferences threaten military cohesion.

(C) In the case of human rights abuses, neither Videla nor any other significant military figure, has questioned the pre-March 1976 decision to physically eliminate hard core terrorists. Videla's differences with the so-called hardliners center on violations of the rights of non-terrorists. The hardliners are philosophically authoritarian and inclined to label a wide range of political activity and sentiment as subversive. They do not entirely share the moderates perception that the "war" against subversion is over.<sup>4</sup> Powerful corps commanders like Major General Carlos Guillermo Suarez Mason (formerly Commander, Corps I, Buenos Aires) and Major General Luciano Benjamin Menendez (Corps III, Cordoba) continued throughout 1978 to condone counterterrorist tactics that ensured human rights abuses.

(C) Other factors that diminished Videla's chances of achieving human rights reforms in 1978 included his August retirement as an active-duty officer and Army Commander and

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a gradual increase in military and civilian disenchantment with the general economic and political performance of his government. Those conditions, plus the degree to which the Beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official attention during the last quarter of the year, created highly improbable circumstances for bold human rights initiatives on Videla's part.

(C) The results of the recent army promotion/reassignment cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms. Moderates politically in sympathy with Videla and Army Commander Viola now may be in a position to exert more effective control over the service. Particularly notable changes involved the following officers:

- Suarez Mason has been shifted from his Corps I commander slot to Army Chief of Staff. His new post is a prestigious one from which he might be able to advance to the Commander in Chief's slot. Nonetheless, since he no longer has a troop command nor, more importantly, direct control over counterterrorist units, his promotion is probably a net short-term human rights gain.
- Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri has replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander. Galtieri most recently commanded Corps II (Rosario) where he established a reputation for reasonableness and restraint in human rights matters. It has been in his geographic jurisdiction, for example, that the most progress has been registered with respect to the judicial processing of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a needed improvement over Suarez Mason.
- Major General Santiago Omar Riveros, another officer notorious for his permissive attitude toward human rights abuses, has been snifted from his sensitive Buenos Aires command (Military Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board.
- Major General Jose Montes will replace Riveros. A Videla-Viola loyalist, Montes could combine with Galtieri to give the moderates the potential for curbing the abuses heretofore characteristic of

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counterterrorist operations in the Buenos Aires area.

- Brig. General Juan Bautista Sassiain's appointment as Chief of the National Police is an ominous move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist expert, Sassiain is reputedly rough and cruel.
- Major General Luciano B. Menendez, a fanatic on subversion who has condoned human rights violations by those under his command, remains the Corps III commander (Cordoba). Militarily, Menendez's retention may be attributable to the need for his services in the event of hostilities with Chile over the Beagle Channel. In human rights terms, however, it means that the situation in Cordoba is not liable to improve in the near future.

In all likelihood, the army command shifts will not result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements, but the political context appears to be more favorable than it has been since the March 1976 coup.<sup>5</sup> Much will depend upon whether the Videla-Viola tandem chooses to exercise the necessary leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether the Argentine public becomes sufficiently exercised over continuing abuses to demand change.

(C) IAHRC visit. From the Argentine government's perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29 when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will begin a week-long on site investigation.

It is questionable, however, whether the prospect of the IAHRC visit will lead to fundamental changes in the tactics employed by the security forces and, thereby, open the way to long-term human rights advances. In this critical area, the army command changes probably offer more hope for reform than the IAHRC visit.<sup>6</sup>

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FOOTNOTES

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1. HA Note: HA prefers the following wording for the text from sentence two of paragraph 1 through first sentence of paragraph 3.

"Although it is difficult to quantify precisely certain aspects of the situation - such as the exact number of people killed and tortured and the number being held in clandestine military camps - we receive a steady flow of detailed information from a wide variety of credible sources in Argentina about human rights events and conditions. These sources include our Embassy, international non-governmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International, Argentine Government officials, Argentine human rights organizations, victims of arrest and torture, eyewitnesses to incidents of abduction and torture, and relatives of victims."

2. HA Note: No overall trend of improvement in category - one terms can be shown. There was substantial qualitative deterioration in at least two areas - the widening scope of the victims of disappearance, and the worsening of treatment of political detainees. The simple passage of time can also be reviewed as a negative factor - another year of widespread violations long after any terrorist threats has passed.
3. HA Note: HA would again emphasize that despite uncertainties with quantitative material, the shift in targeting noted above is a significant negative development.
4. HA Note: However, Videla himself said last year that "A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or bomb but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization" (Reported in the London Times, January 4, 1978). INR and ARA view the inclusion of this statement attributed by the press to Videla as potentially misleading when used in the above context. The

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quote invites the inference that Videla supports the application of extreme security measures against those who have not committed violent terrorist acts. There is no evidence to support that contention.

5. HA Note: The army command changes present a mixed picture from which it is not possible to conclude that the overall political context for human rights improvement is more favorable than in the past.
6. S/P and HA Note: S/P and HA would delete this last sentence because it contradicts the assessment that the command changes are "mixed".

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 9, 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: THOMAS THORNTON  
SUBJECT: Visit to Argentina (U)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
Authority NSC waiver 6/7/13  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

I enquired further about the possibility of your wife going to Buenos Aires (see attached). I did this in a low key through State, so there are still gaps. I don't, however, want to be higher-profile unless you are more firmly committed. (U)

Mrs. Mondale will definitely not go. (U)

There would be no need to go to the other cities. (U)

The host, as I wrote, would be the Mozarteum Argentino, the head of which, incidentally, is Martinez de Hoz. The normal way this sort of thing is handled (Nancy Kissinger is the model!) is lots of parties, concerts, museums and receptions in B.A. followed by a couple of days on a ranch. There would be no expenses involved in all of this; even if the Mozarteum didn't pick up the hotel bill, that would be irrelevant since your wife would probably stay with the Ambassador anyway. (U)

It is not specified who pays the air fare but that would be paid up by the Argentine Government. (U)

I did not directly raise the question of taking one of your children along. That is beyond the scope of the invitation. I have no doubt that the Argentine Government would fall all over itself to broaden the invitation, but I recommend that you not pursue this. That would make you too beholden to the GOA and open you up to criticism from the human rights lobby here. (Indeed, even without a child along, there will be some flak.) (C)

If you want to pursue this seriously, I will contact the Argentine Ambassador and pin down the details. I think you should give this some further thought, however, as to the political implications. (C)

GUIDANCE REQUESTED:

- Shall I contact the Argentine Ambassador?    \_\_\_
- Or, wait for them to make another move?    \_\_\_\_\_
- Or, drop the idea?                            \_\_\_\_\_


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review on June 9, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 26, 1980

Dr. Brzezinski Only (Thornton)

At lunch with the Argentine Ambassador, he pressed the point that Mrs. Mondale should visit Argentina during the visit there of the National Symphony Orchestra. This would be at the invitation of the Mozarteum Argentina and would commemorate the 400th Anniversary of the founding of Buenos Aires. I said that this would probably result in US-Argentine relations becoming an unwelcome campaign issue and that I thought it a poor idea. (I will check this out later with Dennis Clift.) He then wondered if your wife might like to come instead. I made no comment. The dates are July 24-26; the NSO then goes on to Uruguay and Brazil for three more days. Would she be interested? It is all expenses paid and might be fun. She would be less of a target for the human rights lobby than Mrs. Mondale, but it would still come up. How should I reply if he asks again? (C)



would she  
have to  
go there, too?

I will check with  
her & let you  
know

- If she could
- 1) spend a few days in the Pampas
  - 2) bring 1 kid along for company.

she would be interested.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on May 28, 1986

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

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DOS REVIEWED 07-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: ARA - Terence A. Todman

Your Visit to Argentina November 20-22, 1977

I. Objectives

U.S.-Argentine relations are increasingly strained. Basic differences on human rights have led to a de facto US refusal to sell arms and to a "no" vote on an Argentine loan application in the Inter-American Development Bank. Meanwhile, Argentina's rush toward nuclear reprocessing raises the spectre of its becoming a member of the nuclear club.

President Videla offers the best hope on the nuclear issue, and the possibility, though by no means the certainty, of the progress on human rights improvements basic to other issues. But Videla's position is not secure, and there are indications that the Argentines expect to make some basic decisions on their relations with us after evaluating their talks with you.

In this context, our objectives are to:

- strengthen Videla's position vis-a-vis military elements who oppose him on human rights and nuclear issues (the "hardline" nationalist constituencies on these issues overlap);
- obtain Videla's agreement to ratify Tlatelolco, preferably at a date certain in the near future, and to set the stage for possible movement on the reprocessing issue;
- encourage Videla to follow through on his promise of significant improvements in the Argentine human rights situation through (a) release of detainees or affording them due process, and (b) ending "disappearances" and torture.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526

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GDS

*permitted  
of interest*

Authority NLC-24-67-4-9-8  
NARA EF Date 7/9/10

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Argentina's objectives are twofold:

-- the government wants a clarification of what Argentina may expect from us on issues on which they would like our cooperation, including military sales; and

-- President Videla will try to make the talks appear cordial and substantive and hence to demonstrate to Argentine public opinion that his government has our ear and respect.

## II. Setting

Although Argentina is Latin America's most European country, chronic political instability and exaggerated economic nationalism have long impaired its otherwise significant achievements. At the time of the military takeover in March 1976 the civilian government had disintegrated: fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terrorists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly bankrupt, and inflation exceeded 600% per year.

The three-man Junta, of which President Videla is the Army member, came to power with two primary goals: elimination of terrorism and restoration of the economy.

Organized terrorist movements are now largely under control. The once powerful Peronist-inclined Montoneros have been reduced to some 700 combatants, and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) to only 120. Both groups have been forced to confine themselves to low risk, high visibility operations such as assassinations of military officers and businessmen, and bombings of public buildings.

The defeat of large-scale armed groups has not brought peace, however. Acts of violence are still relatively common, and respond to various motives, including personal vendettas, political radicalisms of all kinds, and even cynical maneuverings to weaken contending government factions, and may on occasion be designed to embarrass Videla himself.

Under these conditions, official and unofficial abuses are common. Armed Forces units hunt down suspected terrorists. Nonviolent citizens are sometimes imprisoned or killed under circumstances difficult to ascertain. Homes of detainees are often looted, and torture is fairly common during the first days of detention. We have been told repeatedly that excesses of the security personnel have been punished, but there is no public record of it.

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Economic performance has improved under the Junta. Foreign currency reserves now exceed \$3 billion, inflation has been reduced, a balanced budget may be possible in 1978, serious distortions in relative prices have been corrected and record level crops and exports were reached in 1976-77.

On the negative side, the government has not been able to force inflation below 150%, and wage restraints have reduced real income by 40%. As a result, consumption has decreased, and worker dissatisfaction is increasing. Strikes for higher salaries have rocked the country in recent weeks and more unrest is likely.

Problems or not, Argentina's international economic position is improving steadily. Exports should reach \$4.5 billion this year, compared to imports of about \$4 billion, including more than \$700 million from the US. Interestingly, while the Argentine-US trade balance will be some \$400 million in our favor this year, Argentina's balance with the Communist countries in 1976 was almost as much in its favor, and may lead to some pressure to increase Argentine purchases from the Soviet Union.

Recent improvements in Argentina's economic situation have led to considerable new interest and some new activity by foreign investors. US investment now stands at \$1.4 billion and loans by US banks to Argentina exceed \$3 billion.

The military dominate the Argentine political scene: Armed Forces officers act as governors, mayors and managers of nationalized companies. With the exception of Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, civilians are excluded from major decision-making positions.

Internal military rivalries are endemic. President Videla mediates pragmatically among military factions, but cannot impose his will. Several "hard-line" Army generals remain in key command positions even though their retirement would relieve right wing pressures on the President. The politically adroit but unscrupulous Navy Junta member, Admiral Massera, who is associated with the Navy's hard-line human rights practices, takes advantage of every opportunity to embarrass Videla and boost his own chances for the Presidency.

The Junta has not committed itself to restoring civilian rule, but consultations between prominent citizens and military leaders are taking place. Meanwhile, political party activities are suspended, and the

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powerful labor unions are largely under the control of military interventors.

Argentina's international activity has been limited by concentration on its own chaotic internal politics and by a general disinclination to identify closely with the problems of the Third World. However, Argentina does have an exceptionally able diplomatic service which could help build better understanding between the DCs and LDCs in international fora.

As noted above, the U.S. is the country which presents the most significant challenges for the Argentines. They are deeply disturbed by our conditioning of weapons sales and IFI loans on their human rights performance, and may be on the verge of making basic decisions to reduce their ties to us.

Argentina has Latin America's most advanced nuclear technology, and probably has the capacity to produce a nuclear explosion within the next two years. The Argentines are fully aware of our nuclear preoccupations and may hope that cooperation on that front might strengthen our relations and diminish tensions on other fronts, including human rights.

The historic rivalry with Brazil continues (e.g. the dispute over rights to Parana River water.) There is, however, no great tension now. An April U.K. international arbitration decision awarding ownership of Tierra del Fuego to Chile raised nationalist sentiments in Argentina, already resentful of the British presence in the Falkland Islands. The Argentine Navy has increased its patrols in the area, but the other elements in the GOA seem more inclined toward negotiation. The Navy apprehended nine Russian and Bulgarian fishing boats in October, but the seizures do not seem to have had a lasting impact on Argentine-Soviet relations.

### III. Key Issues

#### 1. Human Rights

U. S. Objective: To convince the Argentines that better relations are dependent upon their making human rights improvements, i.e., (a) releasing or affording due process to detainees, and (b) ending torture and "disappearances."

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Argentine Objective: To convince the US that the human rights violations which have taken place were a result of a bloody civil war, that official violations were an unfortunate but necessary part of the fight against terrorism, that such violations are being gradually brought under control, and that a full return to the rule of law will take time.

Essential Factors: U. S. reactions to Argentine human rights violations have severely strained our relations. The Argentines claim not to understand why we have limited arms sales and voted against Argentine IFI loans. They believe that we overemphasize official violations and underestimate the terrorist actions which triggered them.

Hundreds of members of the Armed Forces and innocent civilians have been killed by leftist terrorists. The military, aided by fanatical rightist civilians, have reacted brutally. Many terrorist activists and suspects have been summarily executed. Torture to produce confessions and obtain information is commonplace. Military authorities have frequently allowed off-duty security personnel to terrorize leftist sympathizers and human rights advocates not involved in the bloodletting.

Supreme Court writs of habeas corpus concerning the disappeared are often ignored by the government. A group of "Mothers of the Plaza" assemble weekly in downtown Buenos Aires to petition for information about disappeared family members. We have received a letter signed by 178 of them asking for your intercession with the Argentine government.

The State of Siege provisions of the Constitution enable the government to detain prisoners without charges or set trial dates. President Videla pledged to President Carter to try to resolve the cases of the 4,000 prisoners held under these provisions by Christmas, but there has been little progress. A recently reinstated "right of option", which would allow political prisoners to choose exile instead of jail, has resulted in the release of only a few prisoners.

There is considerable U. S. public and Congressional interest in the fate of Argentine political prisoners and the disappeared: five members of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs wrote you asking your inter-

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vention on behalf of jailed newspaper editor, Jacobo Timerman, and some 25 Congressmen have expressed interest in the Deutsch family. (These cases are covered in the Background Paper on Human Rights.) Congressman Harkin has asked that you inquire about the application of the right of option. A U.S. human rights group has just given us an unverified list containing the names of 7,500 people they claim have disappeared or have been detained in Argentina.

Points to be Made

-- Incidences of prolonged detention, disappearances and torture strain our relations with Argentina. We do not wish to tell Argentines how to run their country, but we feel compelled to express our concern.

-- President Carter was heartened by President Videla's desire to resolve the status of political detainees by Christmas; we know that it is difficult to process 4,000 individual cases, but we hope that they will soon be decided.

-- We were encouraged by the decision to restore the "right of option." We hope that its provisions will allow many detainees to be freed from prison.

-- We are especially concerned about the fate of Jacobo Timerman and the Deutsch family. Both cases have aroused great interest in the U.S., as did the detention of the AP reporter Serrat.

-- The government should clarify what has happened to individuals who have disappeared without explanation. We know some may be victims of terrorists, but the security forces appear to have been involved in many instances.

-- A public accounting of all prisoners held by the government would help resolve questions about disappearances and would considerably improve Argentina's world image.

-- We still frequently hear reports of torture, especially during the first days of detention. We understand that the fight against terrorism has been brutal, but torture of prisoners is not acceptable under any circumstances. Torture should be forbidden and future cases tried in the courts.

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## 2. Terrorism

U. S. Objective: To remind the Argentines that we, too, abhor terrorism but that we cannot condone counterterrorist measures that violate human rights.

Argentine Objective: To focus U.S. thinking on terrorism as a prime violator of human rights, and as the origin of what most Argentines privately consider "shameful" conditions of internal disorder.

Essential Factors: The Argentines contend that U.S. concentration on human rights violations by government authorities has forced attention away from terrorism, which they say also violates human rights and is the real threat to Western civilization. They have forcefully pressed a campaign in international organizations to combat terrorism. This was the principal theme in Foreign Minister Montes' speech to the UNGA in October and a major concern of Deputy Foreign Minister Allara during his calls at the Department in early November. The Foreign Minister will have especially strong feelings about terrorism; his predecessor, Admiral Guzzetti, was almost killed by an assassin in May.

A recent upsurge in terrorism in Argentina heightens their concern; two Armed Forces officers were assassinated, three businessmen were killed, and the office of the Labor Minister and the home of a Chrysler executive have been bombed in the last month.

### Points to be Made

-- Terrorist attacks against government officials and innocent civilians are deplorable. We wish to express our sympathy to these men and their families.

-- We are as deeply troubled as the Argentines by the actions of the international terrorists. We cannot, however, condone counterterrorist actions that violate human rights and due legal process.

## 3. Ratification of Treaty of Tlatelolco

U. S. Objectives: To have Argentina ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, bring its nuclear program under fullscope safeguards, defer reprocessing and forego nuclear explosions.

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Argentine Objectives: To complete its nuclear fuel cycle in order to have greater energy independence, to become a nuclear technology exporter and to maintain cooperative ties with the U.S.

Essential Factors: Argentina is now proceeding apace to construct a reprocessing plant which in two years could produce plutonium in sufficient quantities to support a nuclear explosive capability. Argentina, which is by far Latin America's leading nuclear state, views nuclear technology as a source of both energy and international status. It was the first to have a research reactor (1958), the first and so far only state to operate a power plant (1974), and is a major exporter of technicians under IAEA programs.

If Argentina were to defer its reprocessing plans, accept fullscope safeguards and forego nuclear explosions, we would consider the transfer of sensitive heavy water technologies. Failure to defer reprocessing could scuttle the chances of establishing a Latin American nuclear-free zone and lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our own hemisphere. The President has approved a long-range nuclear strategy involving both Argentina and Brazil which is outlined in the background papers, but a key immediate objective of our foreign policy and your trip is to get Argentina to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco now.

Points to be Made

-- The United States is determined to do all it can to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

-- Ambassador Smith is available to brief your officials on our efforts to achieve a new SALT agreement and a Comprehensive Test Ban.

-- It is not our policy to dissuade Argentina or any nation from acquiring nuclear technology. On the contrary, if steps can be taken to ensure the safe uses of such technology, we have indicated to your government a readiness to assist you in the sensitive field of heavy water.

-- Any cooperation on heavy water would, of course, involve your deferral of reprocessing plans while an urgent world study is conducted on how to reprocess in a safer manner.

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-- We accept and support Argentina's expectation that its Latin American neighbors should also make sacrifices on behalf of safe nuclear technologies.

-- What we ask now, therefore, is that Argentina take a bold step on behalf of continental security and move now to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

-- We were heartened by President Videla's conversation with President Carter, and President Videla's commitment to consider Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

-- Ratification and entry into force of the Treaty would give dramatic impetus to Latin America's efforts to create a nuclear free zone, and would demonstrate Argentina's dedication to peace.

#### 4. U. S.-Argentine Military Relations

U. S. Objectives: To assure the Argentines that we want a good military relationship, but to get them to understand that this depends on their human rights performance.

Argentine Objective: To inform us that it values its military ties to the U. S., but that without a clarification of U.S. arms policies, particularly on spare parts, Argentina will be forced to reorient its military procurements and relationships.

Essential Factors: U. S.-Argentine military relations have deteriorated sharply as a result of U. S. actions taken to disassociate the U. S. from the GOA's human rights violations. As a result of our strictures, Argentina has refused all military sales financing for fiscal year 1978. We will not request funds from the Congress for fiscal year 1979. In addition, Congress has prospectively banned military training and arms sales as of October 1, 1978 unless human rights conditions improve. Already, the Department has been refusing almost all Argentine military requests.

While our policy has little real military significance for Argentina, our actions have damaged relations with the armed forces who run the country. Argentina dropped out of UNITAS fleet exercises this year. Until substantial progress is made on human rights considerations-- release or the affording of due process to detainees, and the ending of torture and disappearances -- Argentina can expect our military relations to remain paralyzed.

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Points to be Made

-- The United States values its military relations with Argentina and regrets the circumstances which have led to the current situation regarding military sales and training.

-- Our willingness to provide equipment is directly related to internal security policies. Given the present situation in Argentina, it is virtually impossible for the Administration to justify military sales to Argentina.

-- We hope earnestly that the restoration of due process in Argentina will permit us to develop more normal military relationships.

-- This would permit us to advise the Congress of a changed situation and to recommend abrogation of the law which will prohibit military transfers to Argentina after October 1, 1978.

5. Argentina and the International Financial Institutions

U.S. Objectives: To explain to the Argentines that we cannot support their loan requests, except those which meet basic human needs, until they demonstrate substantial human rights improvements.

Argentine Objective: To persuade the U.S. to vote "yes" or abstain on Argentine loan requests in the IFIs.

Essential Factors: In June we abstained instead of voting "no" on one loan and told the Argentines that this was due to improvements in their human rights situation. We added, however, that it would be difficult for us to support their loan requests in the IFIs. They held back loans until October when they submitted a \$36 million gas pipeline project to the IDB. We voted "no", and informed the Argentines that without human rights improvements we would vote "no" on future loans not clearly meeting basic human needs. (We have since voted "yes" on a potable water loan in the IDB that met our basic human needs criteria, but decisions on two more Argentine loan requests in the IDB, \$60 million for science and technology development and \$50 million for electrical transmission lines, have been delayed until after your visit.)

The Argentines claim, somewhat disingenuously, to be confused by our voting record in the IFIs. They ask how we could abstain on a loan in June and now,

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after significant improvements in human rights have taken place, vote "no".

Points to be Made

-- We do not seek to intervene in the internal affairs of other societies; but we believe that no member of the United Nations can claim that violations of internationally sanctioned human rights are solely its own affair.

-- We will continue to use our vote in the IFIs to promote human rights and hope that conditions in Argentina will permit us to take a more positive stance in the World Bank and IDB when future loans come up.

-- (If raised) Eximbank is encouraged by Argentine progress on economic questions and this is revelent to the Bank's decisions. However, Exim is required by law to consider human rights factors in passing on all loans.

6. North-South Issuss

U.S. Objectives: To encourage Argentina to use its influence within the G-77 on issues where our interests overlap.

Argentine Objective: To encourage the U. S. to cooperate with Argentina on economic issues affecting middle-income developing countries.

Essential Factors: Although outwardly supportive of Third World positions on North-South issues, Argentina has been quietly but energetically arguing against many G-77 proposals. Along with other large Latin American countries, Argentina is concerned about important aspects of the New International Economic Order, and increasingly sees itself as a potential "swing" country between DC's and LDC's.

Argentina believes that the UNCTAD Integrated Program for Commodities favors Africa and Asia. It is not a major exporter of any of the 18 core commodities. Last September, it opposed the African countries' demand for an immediate LDC pledge of financial support for the rapid creation of the Common Fund to finance the Program. Argentina feels that any generalized debt moratorium for all LDC's would jeopardize the Latin American region's vitally important credit standing with private lenders.

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As a middle-income country, however, Argentina has strongly criticized our "basic human needs strategy" as a no growth ploy designed to divide the LDCs.

Points to be Made:

-- The United States appreciates the constructive, moderate position Argentina has taken on many economic questions in the international fora. We hope they will continue to use these fora to speak out constructively on issues of importance to the world community as a whole.

-- Argentina is a country with strong ties to both the G-77 and the developed countries; we look forward to working with the Argentines in seeking practical solutions to North/South issues.

-- We look forward to cooperating closely with the Argentines in the MTN negotiations, and would be interested in exchanging views on ways in which developing countries can become more involved in international economic decisions generally.

-- Our support for the basic human needs approach is not designed to supplant programs to develop infrastructure and productivity, which are obviously essential to meet basic human needs in all developing countries

7. U. S. - Argentine Mixed Commission

U. S. Objective: To be receptive to Argentine requests for closer economic consultations.

Argentine Objective. To reactivate the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Commission on Economic Relations.

Essential Factors: A U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission was established in 1966, but is moribund. The Argentines proposed its reactivation when Assistant Secretary Todman visited Buenos Aires in August and we have since agreed to meet with the Argentines in Washington at an unspecified date, possibly in January.

We consider a consultative group useful, but would prefer to organize it at a relatively low level, e.g., Deputy Assistant Secretary, to avoid the appearance of too close a relationship to Argentina at this time.

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The Argentines may wish to use a reactivated Commission to consider ways to improve their negative trade balance with the U.S. -- some \$400 million in 1977. Our restrictions on beef imports and countervailing duty cases against Argentine leather and clothing exporters may also be raised by the Argentines in the Commission. (Although the incidence of hoof and mouth disease in Argentina limits raw beef trade, we did import some \$100 million worth of cooked-frozen and canned beef in 1976). On our side, the Commission could be used to raise investment disputes: Deltec International (a major meat producer) has a claim pending in the Argentine courts.

Points to be Made:

-- The U. S. views the Economic Commission as a useful instrument to achieve shared economic interests.

-- Our health restrictions against Argentine beef are not a device to deny access to U. S. markets. We welcome discussions with Argentina regarding health and sanitation matters.

-- The Treasury Department appreciates the cooperation of the GOA in providing information relevant to pending countervailing duty cases and is taking that information into consideration in making its decision.

8. Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition (If raised)

U. S. Objective: To consider Argentine proposals for cooperation.

Argentine Objective: To discuss the establishment of a U.S.-Argentine Commission on Malnutrition.

Essential Factors: The Argentines first suggested this Commission during the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister's visit earlier this month. They seemed undecided about what they want the group to do and gave the impression that they may have included it on the agenda to divert attention from the harder issues of human rights and nuclear non-proliferation.

Points to be Made:

-- The U. S. will listen with interest to Argentine proposals on a Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition.

-- We would like to cooperate with Argentina to alleviate malnutrition in the hemisphere.

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## 9. Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries

U. S. Objectives: To encourage greater technology development in LDCs, but to restrain discrimination against U. S. suppliers of technology. To insure that IFI and USAID money is used to finance the best technology available, regardless of origin.

Argentine Objective: To foster greater utilization of Argentine technology by other LDCs through multilateral agreements.

Essential Factors: A United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries will be held at Buenos Aires from August 30 to September 12, 1978. The GOA has long been the prime proponent of such a conference, which it hopes will help promote greater use of technology developed in advanced LDCs like Argentina.

### Points to be Made:

-- We will attend the Buenos Aires Conference with the goal of cooperating with LDC's to enhance use of technology available in their countries.

-- We hope to work with Argentina to direct the Conference toward that goal.

-- We would not favor a Conference attempt to justify use of LDC technology for its own sake at the expense of superior technology available elsewhere.

## 10. Malvinas/Falkland Islands

U. S. Objective: To urge negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement and avoidance of incidents, while staying out of the middle of this Argentine-U. K. question.

Argentine Objective: To solicit U. S. support for the return of the U. K. held Malvinas Islands to Argentina. (The Argentines would prefer you use the name Malvinas.)

Essential Factors: The Malvinas have been governed by the U. K. since 1833. Argentine-UK conversations will take place in New York in December, but there is basic disagreement on a date. The Argentines want them now but the U. K. is thinking of an end-of-century turnover. The negotiations are complicated by the 2,000 inhabitants'

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unwillingness to be ruled by Argentina and the possibility that large oil deposits may exist in the area.

We have consistently urged both parties to seek a solution through negotiation. The Argentines, however, may be thinking of other tactics: Deputy Foreign Minister Allara told Assistant Secretary Todman in early November that an "incident" was possible so long as the matter remained unsettled. The Argentines urged that we pressure the British to return the Malvinas to Argentina. The British have asked that we urge restraint on the Argentines to permit an evolutionary approach.

Points to be Made:

(In view of Argentine interest and the UK request, we believe you could profitably take the lead in raising this issue.)

-- The U. S. hopes that the U. K. and Argentina can work out a suitable agreement on the Malvinas.

-- Argentina should show restraint; any "incident" would only make the future of the islands more difficult to resolve.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECEPTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4937

8. EARLY THURSDAY MORNING DR. KISSINGER MET WITH DR. JORGE LUIS BORGES, NOTED ARGENTINE POET AND WRITER. THIS PROMPTED MUCH NEWS COVERAGE. LATER IN DAY KISSINGER AND FAMILY DEPARTED WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ TO OVERNIGHT AT AN ESTANCIA (FARM). THIS WAS MOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT.

9. ON HIS RETURN FROM THE FARM, KISSINGER SPOKE TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL. HE GAVE A PEP TALKS TO AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL AS WELL AS LOCALS. HE NARRATED SOME OF HIS EXPERIENCES WHILE IN USG SERVICE. HIS HUMOROUS APPROACH WAS WELL RECEIVED BY ALL.

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10. ON FRIDAY EVENING A RECEPTION WAS GIVEN AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE HONORING KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WERE WELL REPRESENTED.

11. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTENDED A DINNER GIVEN BY MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ. THIS GROUP WAS COMPOSED OF BANKERS, ECONOMISTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS. THE MAIN DISCUSSION CONCERNED MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER INVESTMENT TO ARGENTINA. THE LONG TERM LACK OF POLITICAL STABILITY AND INFLATION SEEMED TO BE THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE GROUP. LITTLE ELSE DEVELOPED FROM THE DINNER.

12. ON JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTICIPATED IN AN OFF THE RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE AND WAS MADE AN HONORARY MEMBER OF ARGENTINE COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS GROUP IS COMPRISED OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO HOLD THEMSELVES UP TO THE PUBLIC AS THE "ELITE GROUP" ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. DR. KISSINGER GAVE AN OFF THE GUFF TALK. HE STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION BUT THAT AMERICANS LACKED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ARGENTINA'S HISTORY. ESPECIALLY, AMERICANS LACKED FAMILIARITY WITH ARGENTINA'S EXPERIENCE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM. HE EXPLAINED HIS OPINION GOA HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN WIPING OUT TERRORIST FORCES, BUT ALSO CAUTIONED THAT METHODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISM MUST NOT BE PERPETUATED. HE EXPLAINED A MOVEMENT TOWARDS NORMALCY MUST TAKE PLACE IF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS ARE TO PREVAIL.

13. DR. KISSINGER ALSO APPEARED IN A QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD WITH ONE OF ARGENTINA'S POPULAR NEWS COMMENTERS. DURING THE INTERVIEW KISSINGER STATED TERRORISTS WERE ONE OF THE GREATEST VIOLATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT IN SOME INSTANCES HUMAN RIGHTS WAS BEING USED AS A WEAPON AGAINST ITS FRIENDS.

COMMENT: THE KISSINGER FAMILY ATTENDED A FOOTBALL GAME IN ROSARIO, WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PUBLIC. INDICATIONS ARE HE WAS WELL RECEIVED BY THE AUDIENCE. HE ALSO ATTENDED TWO OTHER GAMES IN BUENOS AIRES AS A GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA. THE ARGENTINE MEDIA GAVE FAVORABLE AND HEAVY COVERAGE TO THE KISSINGER VISIT.

COMMENT: DR. KISSINGER TOLD THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SO LONG AS HE WAS OVERSEAS. HE SPoke HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY TO THE AMBASSADOR, BUT FELT HE WOULD SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE

CONCEPT OF ATTEMPTING TO IMPLEMENT HUMAN RIGHTS IN LA. HE SAID HE WOULD WAIT ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS RETURN TO US BEFORE SPEAKING OUT. KISSINGER WORKED CLOSELY WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL. THEY WERE GOOD GUESTS AND MADE EVERY EFFORT TO GIVE APPEARANCE THEY WERE NOT EMISSARIES OF OPPOSITION TO CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION.

MY ONLY CONCERN IS THAT KISSINGER'S REPEATED HIGH PRAISE FOR ARGENTINA'S ACTION IN WIPING OUT TERRORISM AND HIS STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA MAY HAVE GONE TO SOME CONSIDERABLE EXTENT TO HIS HOSTS' HEADS. DESPITE HIS DISCLAIMERS THAT THE METHODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISM MUST NOT BE PERPETUATED, THERE IS SOME DANGER THAT ARGENTINES MAY USE KISSINGER'S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR HARDENING THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE. CASTRO

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14A

Afghanistan

May 19, 1977 IDA Agricultural Bank - \$12 million

The Committee recommended that a demarche be made to the GOA linking our support for their loans in the international financial institutions to human rights considerations.

Argentina

May 19, 1977 IBRD - \$100 million  
 IFC - \$ 7 million  
 IDB Gas Pipeline - \$35 million  
 IDB Petro-chemical Program - \$83  
 IDB Urban and Rural Potable Water - \$40 million

The Committee agreed that Secretary Blumenthal should ask Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, when he sees him on June 1 at the Annual IDB meeting in Guatemala to postpone an upcoming \$100 million industrial credit loan in the IBRD. He will also inform the Minister that, because of human rights considerations, we may have problems with other loans in both the IDB and the IBRD and that we would like to avoid a confrontation on them by having them delayed until a more propitious time. It was also agreed that the U.S. Executive Directors in the IDB and IBRD would indicate to their colleagues that the U.S. was seeking a delay on consideration of these loans.

June 9, 1977

The Committee was appraised that despite U.S. urging, the Argentines had refused to withdraw the \$100 million loan in the World Bank. Another small \$7 million loan was scheduled to come up for consideration at the same time. The Committee agreed that the U.S. should abstain on these two World Bank loans and make a statement at the Bank Board meeting explaining our action. The rationale for not deciding to vote no was that a graduated approach was considered to be more likely to obtain positive results from the Argentines. It was agreed that the U.S. Bank Director could let other Bank Directors know a few days in advance that we would not be supporting this loan.

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-07 DHA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04  
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01  
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00  
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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1040

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4638

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, SHUM, AR, US, EFIN

SUBJECT: GOA NOTES HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS

REF: (A) STATE 138380, (B) BUENOS AIRES 4444, (C) BUENOS AIRES 4483

SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN DEMARCHES BY MARTINEZ DE HOZ IN BUENOS AIRES (REPTTEL B) AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL IN WASHINGTON (REPTTEL A), ARGENTINE OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED A NUMBER OF ACTIONS JUNE 14 THAT BEAR ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN RIGHTS IMAGE OVERSEAS. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS INCLUDE THE RELEASE OF 342 PERSONS FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY, PROCESSING OF ALMOST 1,000 SUBVERSIVE CASES IN FEDERAL AND MINITARLY COURTS, POSSIBLE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, AND BANNING OF TWO ISSUES OF A FAR RIGHT, RACIST MAGAZINE. WHILE THE ANNOUCEMENTS IN THEMSELVES SHOW LITTLE BY WAY OF CERTIFIABLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO COMPILE EXAMPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES ITS RISING SENSITIVITY TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION AND OUR ADVERSE VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

END SUMMARY

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1. AS NOTED IN REPTTEL B, GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA'S (GOA'S) PRESENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES BASICALLY FRIENDLY GESTURES AND INCREASED CONCERN ON THE PART OF GOA OFFICIALS TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN RESPONSE TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. THE LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN, HOWEVER, SHOWS LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE. AS ANTICIPATED, THE GOA ACTIONS AND COMMUNIQUE WERE RELEASED JUNE 14 AND PUBLISHED IN JUNE 15 PRESS.

2. AS A 15-DAY COMPENDIUM THE LISTING OF 342 PERSONS CITED AS NO LONGER BEING HELD AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE IS CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THE TYPICAL WEEKLY LISTS PUT OUT BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. FURTHER, THERE IS NO WAY IMMEDIATELY TO VERIFY THAT PERSONS LISTED HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN RELEASED. (MARTINEZ DE HOZ DID, HOWEVER, TELL CHARGE THAT THE PERSONS LISTED WERE DEFINITELY BEING PHYSICALLY RELEASED FROM DETENTION AND NOT JUST PASSED TO OTHER AUTHORITIES.)

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-07 DHA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04  
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1041

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4638

4. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT 667 SUBVERSIVE CASES HAVE BEEN REMANDED TO THE FEDERAL COURTS (WITH 327 SENTENCES PASSED) AND 305 CASES SENT TO SPECIAL MILITARY COURTS MARTIAL. (WITH 158 SENTENCES HANDED DOWN) APPEARED IN PRESS WITHOUT NAMES OR COMMENTARY. AS VERY FEW OF THESE TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS OR INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED BY EMBOFFS, WE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

5. PRESIDENT VIDELA'S REPORTED INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORITIES TO ANALYZE THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE SUSPENDED CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION FOR PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY RECALLS HIS EARLIER APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION CHAIRED BY INTERIOR MINISTER HARGUINDEGUY TO REVIEW THE SUSPENSION LAST APRIL. AS A RESULT OF THE COMMISSION'S DELIBERATIONS AT THAT TIME, LEGISLATION WAS PASSED TO EXTEND THE SUSPENSION FOR ANOTHER 150 DAYS BEGINNING MAY 1, 1977. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS MEAN THE OPTION WILL BE CONSIDERED MORE FAVORABLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE OR WILL ACTUALLY BE REINSTATED BEFORE THE PRESENT 150 DAYS SUSPENSION IS UP IN SEPTEMBER.

6. GOA SUSPENSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION, SALE, AND CIRCULATION OF THE MAY-JUNE CABILDO ISSUE NO. 8 WAS OF INTEREST. THE MAGAZINE  
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WAS ACCUSED OF "PROPAGATING IDEOLOGICAL--RACIAL CONFLICT IN OPPOSITION TO THE NATION'S OBJECTIVES." THE DECREE FURTHER PROHIBITED THE PRINTING AND CIRCULATION OF THE JULY ISSUE AND "ANY OTHER THAT ATTEMPTS TO REPLACE IT." THE BAN DOES NOT, HOWEVER, AFFECT THE MAGAZINE'S ADMINISTRATIVE OR PUBLISHING CAPACITY BEYOND THE TWO ISSUES, AND THIS SHORT TERM SUSPENSION DOES LITTLE TO UNDO THE STRIDENT ANTI-SEMITIC RHETORIC OF THE APRIL CABILDO, ISSUE NO. 7. IT WAS THIS WHICH PROMPTED PROTESTS BY JEWISH GROUPS IN ARGENTINA AND OCCASIONED LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS COMMENTARY (SEE BA 3370 AND 3631).

7. COMMENT: THIS FLURRY OF STATEMENTS TO THE PUBLIC ON HUMAN RIGHTS WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING THE U.S. VOTE ON TWO LARGE BANK LOANS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THIS COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT-INTERVENED LA OPINION ON JUNE 16 FLATLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT ACTIONS WERE

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TELEGRAM <sup>IF</sup>

# Department of State

DOS REVIEWED 18-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

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GUATEM 03446 01 OF 02 011913Z

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 IS0-00 SP-02 OHA-02 H-01 IHR-05  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0232  
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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 GUATEMALA 3446

1 INFO IS

TREASURY FOR PETER BRIDGES

E.O. 11652 GDS  
TAGS: ECON, FIN, SHUM, GT  
SUBJ: SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINA

REF: GUATEMALA 3418, BRIDGES-BITTNER TELECON

AS PER REQUEST BY MR. PETER BRIDGES THERE FOLLOWS MEMO OF  
SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINE MINISTER  
OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

ARGENTINA: JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY  
ALDOLFO CEXAR DIZ, PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK  
DANTE SIMONE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IMF  
U.S.

MICHAEL BLUMENTHAL, SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
C. FRED BERGSTEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
ARNOLD NACHMANOFF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
RICHARD ARELLANO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
EDWARD BITTNER, OFFICE OF DEVELOPING NATIONS FINANCE, TREASURY  
TIME AND PLACE: MAY 31, 1977 - U.S. CHANCERY, GUATEMALA

SUBJ: BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINA

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN  
PERSONALLY TO SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS THAT  
ARGENTINA HAS MADE SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION OF VIDELA. HE BEGAN  
BY GIVING A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL MACHINATIONS  
LEADING UP TO THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN MAR 1976, EMPHASIZING  
THAT THE MILITARY RELUCTANTLY ASSUMED POWER WHEN PERON'S WIFE HAD  
LOST CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE ECONOMY HAD REACHED  
"ROCK BOTTOM". HE SAID HE AGREED TO BE MINISTER OF ECONOMY ONLY  
IF HE HAD THE COMPLETE POLITICAL BACKING OF THE MILITARY AND IF  
HE WOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER ALL MINISTRIES INVOLVING THE ECONOMY.  
THE MILITARY INHERITED A LEGACY OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WHICH  
PERON HAD BACKED IN ORDER TO OPPOSE THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS,  
BUT WHICH ULTIMATELY GOT OUT OF CONTROL.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ REITERATED THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS WHICH HAS  
BEEN MADE UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, DIRECTING GUF ATTENTION TO BOOK  
WITH CHARTS SHOWING INTER ALIA DECREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT,  
DECREASE IN MONETARY EXPANSION, INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRO-  
DUCTION, EMERG. PRODUCTION AND EXPORT SHIFMENTS, REDUCTION IN  
GOVERNMENT DEFICIT, DECLINE IN RATE OF INFLATION, AND IMPROVE-  
MENT IN EXTERNAL SECTOR. HE SAID HE WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE  
POPULATION ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF A DECREASED GROWTH IN REAL WAGES  
AS THE PRICE FOR ACHIEVING STABILITY.

BLUMENTHAL SAID HE ADMIRER THE PROGRESS IN THE ECONOMY WHICH  
HAD BEEN MADE AND UNDERSTANDS THE POLITICAL SITUATION STEMMING  
FROM THE TERRORISM INHERITED FROM PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS. HE CITED  
THE FACT THAT THE BEVIZ CORPORATION WITH WHICH HE PREVIOUSLY HAD  
BEEN ASSOCIATED, LOST THREE EMPLOYEES TO THE TERRORISTS. NEVER-  
THELESS, THE U.S. IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROCESS OF LAW  
AND THE GENERAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE ASKED MARTINEZ

DE HOZ IF HE SAW A WAY TO MOVE FROM EXTRA LEGAL METHODS OF CON-  
TROL TO THE NORMAL LEGAL PROCESS IN HANDLING TERRORISTS.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID THAT WHILE ARGENTINA ADMIRER U.S. TRADITIONS  
AND LAWS AND CITED THE COMMON HISTORY, THE PRESENT SITUATION  
IS HIGHLY ABNORMAL, STEMMING IN PART BY INHIBITION OF THE JUDICIARY  
TO SENTENCE TERRORISTS BECAUSE OF FEAR OF RETRICTION AGAINST  
THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES. THE POLICE BECAME DISCOURAGED WHEN  
TERRORISTS BROUGHT TO TRIAL WERE ALWAYS SET FREE. THUS, A POLICY  
OF TAKING NO PRISONERS WAS ADOPTED. LIKEWISE, YOUNG MILITARY  
OFFICERS TOOK MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. MARTINEZ DE HOZ  
SAID PRESIDENT VIDELA IS COMMITTED TO RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS.  
CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN WIPING OUT THE TWO MAIN  
TERRORIST GROUPS AND HE ANTICIPATES GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT IN  
RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.  
ROSTER

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NARA EF Date 7/9/11

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TELEGRAM

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INFO OCT-#1 SS-14 ISO-#0 SP-#2 DMA-#2 W-#1 INR-#5  
NSC-#5 NSCE-#0 CIAE-#0 SSC-#0 IARE-#0 /#36 W  
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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 GUATEMALA 3446

LIMDIS

TREASURY FOR PETER BRIDGES

BLUMENTHAL SAID THAT WHILE HE IS UNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S PROBLEM AND HE DOESN'T WISH TO INTERFERE INTERNALLY, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION MUST BE CONSISTENT IN THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE HARKIN AMENDMENT REQUIRES US TO VOTE AGAINST LOANS BY THE IDB FOR COUNTRIES WITH GROSS VIOLATIONS EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE MEFOY. THE BADILLO AMENDMENT, WHICH ALREADY HAS PASSED THE HOUSE WOULD EXTEND THIS LAW TO OTHER IFI'S. WHILE HUMPHREY AMENDMENT WOULD PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY, THE ADMINISTRATION IS AS A MATTER OF ITS OWN POLICY AND CONVICTION, COMMITTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO POSTPONE APPLICATIONS FOR LOANS UNTIL IT COULD SHOW SOME DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA IS COMMITTED TO RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ARGENTINA HAS TWO LOANS IN THE PIPELINE FOR IDB CONSIDERATION WHICH COULD BE HELD UP, BUT HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT A \$122 MILLION LOAN FOR THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK WHICH IS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE IDB. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO UTILIZE ITS \$300 MILLION QUOTA WITH THE IDB IF THE LOAN WERE DELAYED TO THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THIS LOAN MIGHT GET THROUGH THE "NEEDY" LOOPHOLE ON THE GROUNDS OF EMPLOYMENT GENERATION.

BLUMENTHAL RESPONDED BY INDICATING THAT THE IDB LOAN IS VERY LIKELY TO PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR US.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ BECAME SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AND ASKED WHO WORRIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE TERRORISTS.

ARELLANO SAID THERE IS NO WAY OF RATIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

IN RESPONSE TO BLUMENTHAL'S QUESTION ABOUT ASSERTIONS OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN ARGENTINA, MARTINEZ CLAIMED THERE WAS NO SUBSTANCE TO THE CHARGES.

BLUMENTHAL SAID HE BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. POSITION IS CLEAR. HE HOPE TO SEE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS MADE QUICKLY AND WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED CONCERNING PROGRESS MADE.

BLUMENTHAL REITERATED U.S. OPPOSITION TO ANY INCREASE IN SALARY FOR IDB EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND ASKED FOR ARGENTINA'S SUPPORT.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ AGREED TO DISCUSS SALARY ISSUE WITH ORTIZ MENA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF HAVING IT PUT ASIDE. HE THEN BROUGHT UP THE POSSIBILITY OF INTAL BEING ELIMINATED, OR TRANSFORMED. SINCE INTAL IS THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION LOCATED IN ARGENTINA MARTINEZ DE HOZ IS ANXIOUS THAT IT REMAIN THERE IN SOME FORM.

BERGSTEN SAID THAT AS THE SECRETARY INDICATED IN HIS IDB MEETING SPEECH, THE U.S. WISHES TO STUDY THE FUTURE OF INTAL.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR BEING ABLE TO SPEAK FRANKLY ABOUT THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA.

AS REPORTED PEFTEL CONGRESSMAN BADILLO EXPAINED

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DOS REVIEWED 21-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

United States - Argentine Relations

The human rights situation in Argentina bedevils our relations. This memorandum reviews our interests in Argentina, discusses the question of terrorism and human rights violations, and reports on steps we have taken to promote human rights. This latter category includes the use of our voice and vote in the international financial institutions, a subject which the Argentine Minister of Economy surely will raise with you.

United States Interests

- Human Rights: Wanton violations of human rights are taking place in the name of counterterrorism. We seek an end to such abuses and restoration of legal processes.

- Non-proliferation: Argentina has the most advanced nuclear weapons prospects in Latin America and is moving rapidly to acquire an indigenous, and presumably unsafeguarded, reprocessing capacity. (The Department is currently considering possible strategies to inhibit this trend.)

- Petroleum: The U.S. Geological Service has estimated that Argentina's vast continental shelf may contain more than double existing proved reserves in the Western Hemisphere.

- Food: Argentina has immense capacity for the production of grains and meat.

- Economic: U.S. private investment stands at \$1.4 billion; our banks are owed \$3 billion; and we have a \$250 million trade surplus. (Prospects for greater trade and investment are enormous in the petroleum, minerals and agricultural fields.)

- Scientific: Argentina is important to our Antarctic research program and an eventual claim to polar resources.

- International Influence: Argentina is an almost wholly literate, generally self-sufficient industrial and cultural leader in Hispanic America.

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Authority NLC-6-4-6-1-3  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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Political Violence and Human Rights

The Argentine military inherited an almost impossible situation when they took over the government of Isabel Peron in March 1976. Terror and inflation were rampant. Even the Peronist Parliament and unions stood aside to permit the military to do their job. Now, well over a year later, the military have largely accomplished their initial security goals but are not moving to restore legal forms and political peace. On the contrary, they are polarizing society. The government refuses to acknowledge the names of thousands of political prisoners; torture, disappearances, prolonged periods of incommunication, summary executions, intimidation of lawyers, journalists and foreign refugees are undeniable. While not directly attributable to the government, anti-Semitism is also a problem. However battered, the terrorists, who are a mixture of anarchists and Marxists, continue to murder military personnel, policemen and businessmen but at a reduced rate. Notwithstanding, President Videla's aircraft was almost blown up upon takeoff earlier this year, and Foreign Minister Guzzetti very narrowly survived an assassination attempt last month.

Promoting Human Rights

The United States raised the question of human rights with the Argentine military even before their well-advertised coup in March 1976. Since then we have pressured Argentina progressively, unfortunately with little to show in return. (Historically, Argentina has been the Latin American state least susceptible to our influence.)

- In February 1977 the Secretary announced that 1978 military sales credits were being halved as a result of the human rights picture. Argentina reacted by turning down the balance. Before then, we had advised the Argentines that \$36 million in 1977 credits could not be signed as a result of the human rights situation.

- Commercial arms purchases with direct applicability to internal security are now denied routinely. Other munitions licenses are also being held up although we have not yet decided how extensively to restrict commercial arms purchases.

- A \$700,000 grant military training program has survived Congressional efforts to eliminate it although this program's demise seems likely in 1979.

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- In the international financial institutions, since September, Argentina has tried to keep loans out of the Inter-American Development Bank which might trigger a negative vote under the Harkin Amendment. In March we raised our human rights concerns orally in the World Bank before voting for a \$105 million highway project.

Most recently we have been faced with the problem of how to vote on \$265 million in five loans soon to come up for Argentina in the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. This issue was raised by Secretary Blumenthal with Minister Martinez de Hoz on May 31. The Secretary said the Administration is as a matter of its own policy and conviction committed to the advancement of human rights. He suggested that it might be advisable for Argentina to postpone applications for loans until it could show a definite improvement in human rights. Martinez stated that this might be possible in the case of two Inter-American Bank loans, but he was anxious to move ahead on a \$100 million World Bank project. The Secretary noted that the World Bank loan was particularly difficult for us (because it may be hard to argue that it benefits the needy).

Suggested Talking Points

Martinez de Hoz may well make a plea for greater understanding of Argentina's difficult problems and raise the question of our votes in the international financial institutions. You might wish to:

-- Compliment the Minister for his achievements to date in restoring Argentine economic stability (notably through the raising of foreign capital and promotion of Argentine agriculture).

-- Inquire about the health of the former Foreign Minister who is now recovering from an assassination attempt.

-- Ask why it has not been possible for the government to begin to restore legal processes after it has acknowledged publicly that it has all but finished the guerrillas.

-- Note the Administration's overall commitment to human rights and the great difficulty we are encountering with respect to Argentine projects in the international financial institutions.

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-- Refer to Secretary Blumenthal's suggestion that it would be helpful if Argentina deferred loan projects in the financial institutions that do not clearly benefit the neediest sectors of society.

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~~SECRET~~ #14CDEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting *W.C.*

Panama Canal. I met with Jack Murphy today to discuss plans for gaining House approval of the implementing legislation. Murphy said the crucial vote would probably occur on a motion by George Hansen to recommit the Murphy bill to committee, or on a substitute Hansen bill which would contravene the treaties.

We had a good talk, and (I hope) established a basis for working more closely together in subsequent stages. Murphy urged us to undertake a major educational campaign to convince House members, particularly Republicans, that the treaties cannot be overturned and that the Hansen approach would jeopardize efficient operation of the Canal. Ed Derwinski's excellent piece on the Op Ed page of the POST today, entitled "Panama: from No to Yes," should be helpful with Republicans.

Bill Rogers has been asked by Panama President Royo to come to Panama to provide counsel on the implementing legislation. I gave Bill our appraisal of the legislative situation this afternoon. It will be good to have his wise and calming counsel available to the Panamanians.

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RDS 2/3 4/18/99 (Christopher, Warren)

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E.O. 13526

State Dept review completed

Authority NLC-7-21-5-22-2  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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- 2 -

Southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army force was deployed to southern Lebanon today. Haddad's artillery continued to shell UN positions in protest until about 7:00 p.m. our time. A Norwegian UN soldier was killed and another wounded in today's shelling. An American officer serving as a UN observer was briefly held by Haddad's forces and released only after Israeli intervention.

At the UN, work is continuing on Waldheim's report to the Security Council on the implementation of UN resolutions on Lebanon. We understand Begin's decision to cooperate with UNIFIL is likely to soften criticism of Israel in the report. The possibility of Security Council action will depend on whether the shelling resumes tomorrow.

The Shah. A campaign remains in progress to change our position with respect to the Shah's admission to the U.S. John McCloy, following up conversations with Cy and Zbig and a long letter to me, is continuing to call influential people throughout the country. We understand that McCloy's effort continues to be stimulated by Henry Kissinger and by the efforts of Ardeshir Zahedi.

The Shah has turned down Panama. We are awaiting a response to an inquiry to President Lopez Portillo on behalf of the Shah.

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Our belief that we must encourage the Shah to go elsewhere, at least for the time being, is further strengthened by Khomeini's verbal attacks on American influence and the withdrawal of two-thirds of the Iranian guard force from our Embassy compound. A new evaluation has just come in from Tehran confirming our assessment that the safety of official and unofficial Americans would be jeopardized if the Shah comes here.

Argentina. I saw Ambassador Castro today to discuss the recent significant improvements in the human rights situation in Argentina. In the first months of 1979, the Argentines have almost eliminated the abductions by official security units which had occurred at a rate of almost 50 per month in 1978.

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- 3 -

They appear to be investigating the few reports of recent abductions that have been received. The Argentine Supreme Court is also beginning to play a more active role in pressing the regime for information on missing persons. We believe these and other encouraging developments are partly attributable to our policy of pressing firmly for improvements and to the anticipated visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (now scheduled for late next month).

U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism. U.S. participants in six of the eight working groups have now had organizational meetings and are preparing for meetings with their Mexican counterparts in April and May.

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DOS REVIEWED 09-Apr-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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/

November 22, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting W.C.

Guyana. The Guyanese Ambassador called on me today to express the condolences of his government and people, and to pledge full cooperation. In thanking him, I asked that his government reconsider its decision not to permit an FBI team to assist in the investigation in Guyana. I noted the FBI's statutory responsibility in cases of assassination of public officials, as well as the possibility of other crimes under U.S. law, and I assured him the FBI team would work in a cooperative and sensitive manner in Guyana. He promised to contact his government.

Rhodesia. Nyerere and Khama have reacted favorably to Callaghan's proposal for a Cledwyn Hughes mission to see whether conditions favor a call by Callaghan for an all-parties meeting in London early next year. Nyerere said the mission is the proper way to proceed and that it would fit well with other similar exploratory efforts. Both the Rhodesians and the South Africans have also indicated their readiness to receive the Hughes mission. In response to a UK request, Andy Young has agreed to delay his travel to Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia by a week in order not to conflict with Hughes. This will enable him to reinforce Hughes' presentation and to take an independent sounding of Front Line reactions.

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E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-7-21-1-15-3

NARA EF Date 7/16/16

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- 2 -

Nicaragua. There has not yet been any definitive response to the plebiscite proposal presented to both sides by the mediation team. While Somoza's initial reaction was not positive, he did not reject the proposal and told his Cabinet that "we are beginning a new process of negotiation."

The opposition coalition (FAO) issued a communique saying that the mediation has not achieved its fundamental objectives for democratization of the country, but adding that they would respond later to the plebiscite proposal.

OAS. The Permanent Council met today to begin consideration of the Costa Rican charge that Nicaragua violated its frontier yesterday, Costa Rica is pushing for an OAS fact-finding team, a commission of observers on its side of the frontier, and the return of a Costa Rican prisoner and the bodies of two killed. Nicaragua maintains the violation was into its own territory and is welcoming a fact-finding group and the concept of a border force. In preliminary consultations, agreement was reached to name the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Uruguay to the fact-finding team.

Angola. In further discussions with Dick Moose and Don McHenry in Luanda today, the Angolans related Cuban withdrawal from Angola to a Namibia settlement and left no doubt that removal of South African forces from their southern border is their basic security objective. The Angolans said they feel Cuban forces in Angola should not intervene in Zambia, Rhodesia or Namibia and told Moose there is no flow of Cubans from Angola to Zambia.

Argentina. We have no confirmation of last night's report that Argentina is about to occupy three islands in the Beagle Channel area. Ambassador Castro reports that positions have probably hardened in recent days among the Argentine military but that there are no indications of imminent military action. Ambassador Landau in Santiago tells us the Chileans do not appear unduly concerned and have not taken additional military readiness moves. We are considering at what stage we might wish to take the situation to the OAS, preferably in conjunction with other governments.

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#19A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting W.C.

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PAGE #1 BUENOS 84937 #1 OF #2 272116Z  
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BUENOS 84937 #1 OF #2 272116Z

INFO OCT-21 ISO-08 CIAE-08 DODE-08 PH-05 K-01 INR-10  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4937

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP  
SUBJECT: HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO ARGENTINA

SUMMARY: FROM ARRIVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS FAMILY WERE WELL RECEIVED BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA L.A.O OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. DR. KISSINGER SPOKE TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS--FROM BANKERS TO GAUCHOS. IN MOST INSTANCES, HE COMPLIMENTED GOA FOR DEFEATING TERRORISTS BUT HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEM THEN ARE NOT JUSTIFIABLE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS.

**DOS REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL**

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN BA EARLY WEDNESDAY MORNING (JUNE 21). HE WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY A FANOFF REP WHO DOGGED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT A SPOKESMAN FOR USG.

2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY WAS TO LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, COL. MALLEA GIL (INTERPRETER) AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDELA PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL. IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL AT 1300 LUNCH WAS SERVED.

3. KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT DURING PRIVATE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. ALLEGEDLY VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTIONS FROM DR. KISSINGER AS TO HOW TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USG. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED WHETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS.

4. AT LUNCH, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VIEWS ON LATIN AMERICA. FORMER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT NOW MORE THAN EVER WAS TIME TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE. HE ADDED UNITY OF ACTION AMONG THE LA COUNTRIES IS REQUIRED IF ALL AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE TO SURVIVE. HE STRESSED THAT DURING HIS TENURE AS SECRETARY OF STATE, LATIN AMERICA WAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE NOW. KISSINGER POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A REFLECTION ON ANY ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK OF ATTENTION TOWARDS LA WAS NOT A DELIBERATE ACT ON ANYBODY'S PART. IT WAS JUST A FACT THAT WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD EXPLODING, NEGLECT ENSUED.

5. KISSINGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AMERICAN MAY BE NEXT ON RUSSIA AND CUBA'S SCHEDULE. HE ADDED IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN AFRICA IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA HE APPLAUDED PRESIDENT CARTER FOR HIS ANNAPOLIS SPEECH. KISSINGER STRESSED HIS SUPPORT OF MOST OF CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND SALES OF AIRCRAFT TO MID-EASTERN COUNTRIES. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS UNBORNABLE THAT A MYTH PREVAILED THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE INVINCIBLE SINCE WHEN, HE ASKED, CAN CUBAN SOLDIERS MARCH FROM SOUTH TO NORTH IN AFRICA AND EXPECT THE WORLD TO APPLAUD

THEN. THE FORMER SECRETARY TOLD VIDELA HE GAVE HIS FULL SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON HIS AFRICAN POLICY.

6. HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE MANY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA WAS A SOFT DRINK. HE SAID THIS INDICATED THAT AMERICANS ARE NOT AWARE OF ARGENTINE HISTORY NOR OF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TERRORISM WAS NOT SOLELY OF ARGENTINE ORIGIN BUT INSTEAD IT HAD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT. KISSINGER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN COMBATTING TERRORISM BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED IN DEFEATING TERRORISTS HAD NO PLACE IN ARGENTINA TODAY.

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEEMED RELAXED AND FRIENDLY. HE TENSED UP ONLY WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT USG.

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Authority NLC-6-4-6-11-2  
NARA EF Date 7/9/14

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## Department of State TELEGRAM

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BUENOS 04037 02 OF 02 272123Z

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4837

8. EARLY THURSDAY MORNING DR. KISSINGER MET WITH DR. JORGE LUIS BORGES, NOTED ARGENTINE POET AND WRITER. THIS PROMPTED MUCH NEWS COVERAGE. LATER IN DAY KISSINGER AND FAMILY DEPARTED WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ TO OVERNIGHT AT AN ESTANCIA (FARM). THIS WAS MOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT.

9. ON HIS RETURN FROM THE FARM, KISSINGER SPOKE TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL. HE GAVE A PEP TALKS TO AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL AS WELL AS LOCALS. HE NARRATED SOME OF HIS EXPERIENCES WHILE IN USG SERVICE. HIS HUMOROUS APPROACH WAS WELL RECEIVED BY ALL.

10. ON FRIDAY EVENING A RECEPTION WAS GIVEN AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE HONORING KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WERE WELL REPRESENTED.

11. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTENDED A DINNER GIVEN BY MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ. THIS GROUP WAS COMPOSED OF BANKERS, ECONOMISTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS. THE MAIN DISCUSSION CONCERNED MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER INVESTMENT TO ARGENTINA. THE LONG TERM LACK OF POLITICAL STABILITY AND INFLATION SEEMED TO BE THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE GROUP. LITTLE ELSE DEVELOPED FROM THE DINNER.

12. ON JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTICIPATED IN AN OFF THE RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE AND WAS MADE AN HONORARY MEMBER OF ARGENTINE COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS GROUP IS COMPRISED OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO HOLD THEMSELVES UP TO THE PUBLIC AS THE "ELITE GROUP" ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. DR. KISSINGER GAVE AN OFF THE CUFF TALK. HE STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION BUT THAT AMERICANS LACKED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ARGENTINA'S HISTORY. ESPECIALLY, AMERICANS LACKED FAMILIARITY WITH ARGENTINA'S EXPERIENCE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM. HE EXPLAINED HIS HIS OPINION GOA HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN WIPING OUT TERRORIST FORCES, BUT ALSO CAUTIONED THAT METHODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISM MUST NOT BE PERPETUATED. HE EXPLAINED A MOVEMENT TOWARDS NORMALCY MUST TAKE PLACE IF DEMOCRATIC DEALS ARE TO PREVAIL.

13. DR. KISSINGER ALSO APPEARED IN A QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD WITH ONE OF ARGENTINA'S POPULAR NEWS COMMENTERS. DURING THE INTERVIEW KISSINGER STATED TERRORISTS WERE ONE OF THE GREATEST VIOLATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT IN SOME INSTANCES HUMAN RIGHTS WAS BEING USED AS A WEAPON AGAINST ITS FRIENDS.

COMMENT: THE KISSINGER FAMILY ATTENDED A FOOTBALL GAME IN ROSARIO, WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PUBLIC. INDICATIONS ARE HE WAS WELL RECEIVED BY THE AUDIENCE. HE ALSO ATTENDED TWO OTHER GAMES IN BUENOS AIRES AS A GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA. THE ARGENTINE MEDIA GAVE FAVORABLE AND HEAVY COVERAGE TO THE KISSINGER VISIT.

COMMENT: DR. KISSINGER TOLD THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SO LONG AS HE WAS OVERSEAS. HE SPOKE HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY TO THE AMBASSADOR, BUT FELT HE WOULD SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE

CONCEPT OF ATTEMPTING TO IMPLEMENT HUMAN RIGHTS IN L.A. HE SAID HE WOULD WAIT ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS RETURN TO US BEFORE SPEAKING OUT. KISSINGER WORKED CLOSELY WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL. THEY WERE GOOD GUESTS AND MADE EVERY EFFORT TO GIVE APPEARANCE THEY WERE NOT ENVISSARIES OF OPPOSITION TO CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION.

MY ONLY CONCERN IS THAT KISSINGER'S REPEATED HIGH PRAISE FOR ARGENTINA'S ACTION IN WIPING OUT TERRORISM AND HIS STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA MAY HAVE GONE TO SOME CONSIDERABLE EXTENT TO HIS HOSTS' HEADS. DESPITE HIS DISCLAIMERS THAT THE METHODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISM MUST NOT BE PERPETUATED, THERE IS SOME DANGER THAT ARGENTINES MAY USE KISSINGER'S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR HARDENING THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE.  
CASTRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE  
WASHINGTON

DOS REVIEWED 05-Apr-2012, DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 28, 1979

TO: OES - Assistant Secretary of State Pickering

Tom:

I would like to add a further thought to my earlier memo of today on heavy water production technology sales to Argentina. Ambassador Castro's recent reports that Argentina omitted mention of reprocessing in its twenty year nuclear energy master program may also be a significant element worthy of analysis in a review of our position.

~~Gerard~~ Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GDS

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E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-6-24-6-2-0  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

D R A F T

~~SECRET~~ (Entire Text)

DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: REFER TO OSD

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

OSD REVIEWED 18-Jan-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

From: Warren D. Christopher

Subject: Steps to Improve U.S.-Argentine Relations

Pursuant to your instructions, the Inter-Agency Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan of action for 1980, which I am submitting for your approval.

I. OBJECTIVES

Our principal objective will be improve our relationships so as to foster Argentina's identification with the West; to seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues (e.g. grains); to foster increased sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation concerns; to encourage further specific

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E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-24-91-3-11-9

NARA EF Date 7/9/14

improvement in current human rights practices (e.g. due process for all persons suspected of subversion or terrorism); and thus to contain Soviet political and economic influence. We also wish to encourage continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal Mediation of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive role with respect to developments in Central America and in other Hemispheric issues.

## II. ACTIONS FOR 1980

### I. The Consultative Process

We will continue the process of political and economic consultations begun with General Goodpaster's visit to Buenos Aires in January. We contemplate:

--A visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to Buenos Aires, possibly about August 1.

-3-

--A meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission in October, the U.S. delegation to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

--Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues, with the first round of such talks to be held during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

## 2. Nuclear Relations

We want to keep open the door for such cooperation as Argentina may desire for its nuclear program, as a way to maintain influence for the longer-term. In particular, we should try to meet our commitment to provide highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's research program. We should:

--Try to resolve promptly, in accordance with U.S. law, the remaining safeguards issues to permit

delivery of the research fuel and the licensing of U.S. components;

--once this is done, undertake a review of the advisability of modifying U.S. policy to facilitate greater participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program. (The principal case currently at issue is an export license permitting the sale of a high-pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor.)

### 3. Human Rights

We would continue the dialogue on human rights with Argentine leaders, through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. In these consultations we will attempt to obtain assurances that:

--the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina and which maintains the integrity of the OAS Commission on Human rights;

--there be no new disappearances, (i.e., extra-legal abductions of persons suspected of association with terrorism or subversion, including persons believed to be active terrorists);

--all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive activities be processed through normal judicial channels, thus ensuring due process to such detainees; and

--there be substantial progress in advance of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political prisoners held without charges through release, trial, or exile (during his recent visit, Ambassador Smith was assured that half of these prisoners--1,300 at the time--would be released or sentenced by the end of the year).

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed in UN fora, and concluded that this should not be a central requirement for improving our bilateral relationship.

#### 4. Military Relations

We will begin to rebuild relations through increased contact and consultations, while stressing that further progress on human rights will be essential to the more fundamental improvement in relations (including a modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy amendment, as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting). We plan to:

--begin periodic security consultations with Argentina; the first round, to be held this year in Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in the South Atlantic;

--invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make a return visit to Washington later in the year to discuss global defense issues;

--invite Argentina to send a guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas. (The Executive Branch will consult with members of Congress on this initiative.)

-7-

Other issues are:

--High-Level Military Visit.

We will keep under review the desirability to proceed with an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to visit Washington this year. A final decision on this (including the question of timing) should take into account the implications of such a move on the selection of the next Argentine president now under way within the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as developments in human rights and U.S.-Argentine relations.

--Sale of P-3 Aircraft.

In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA. We see no possibility, however, to seek special legislation to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina this year.

5. Other Cooperative Steps

In addition, we would:

--Sign the pending U.S.-Argentine Agricultural Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs;

--Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral income tax treaty;

--Seek to negotiate a consular convention.

6. Consultations with Other Allies

The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether and in what form the Administration should consult our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern such as human rights and recent Soviet initiatives toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere. We believe recent Soviet activities are a subject for the NATO experts group on Latin

America and should be addressed in that forum. Human rights are discussed by the WEO group in the appropriate UN fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission. A majority of the Inter-Agency Group recommended against any new bilateral approaches to our Allies on these issues.

#### 7. Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and Chile

The Group also considered the implications for neighboring countries, especially as regards security consultations.

As a general point, the Group noted that many of these steps will merely restore a better balance in U.S. relations with the two countries since the U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations). There was agreement that Brazil would not respond favorably to a proposal for trilateral security talks at this time.

Not addressed by the Group, but a problem of some consequence, nonetheless, is the Chilean perception that we have "tilted" toward Argentina. Chile sees our warming relationship with Argentina as being directly threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoid war. However, the Chileans seem to fear that the Argentines, enjoying improved relations with the U.S., and seeing Chile increasingly isolated, will be encouraged toward adventurism. This problem of an imbalance in our relationships in the Southern Cone, and of the dangers that this could pose to peace in the region, will need to be looked to in the not-too-distant future.

ARA/SC:CWRuser:ls

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## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 21, 1978

DOS REVIEWED 09-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL;

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor *WJ*)

SUBJECT: Weekly Report

Beagle Channel

Within a few hours time, an important switch by the Argentines seems to have averted hostilities, once again, over the Beagle Channel dispute. This morning Ambassador Castro in Buenos Aires was informed by General Viola that it was the view of the GOA that "no option other than war remained." The decision had apparently been taken following the receipt of a Chilean note which agreed to accept the Pope as mediator, but which did not bend on the terms of the mediation. (C)

We sent a flash cable instructing Castro to express our deepest concern over the Argentine position and to remind them that should they take hostile military action, we would view it as "aggression." We took concurrent action with the Pope in Rome, who responded by offering to send a papal emissary to Argentina immediately to explore the possibilities of mediation. The Argentines accepted the Pope's offer, and barring a last minute change of mind by the Chileans, the emissary's presence should serve to defuse the situation sufficiently to enable both sides to stand down and start talking again. (C)

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E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-24-67-9-27-3  
 NARA EF Date 7/9/16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on December 21, 1984

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-27-3

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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CONFIDENTIAL

December 21, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
DAVID AARON

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR *RP*

SUBJECT: Nicaragua Update (U)

With the direct negotiations between the two sides at a standstill, the NG took matters into its hands today and presented a "compromise proposal" to both sides for their approval (or rejection) by next week. The NG proposal contains provisions which had been discussed in earlier negotiating sessions, and which, it is hoped, will be acceptable to both sides. The principal compromise modifications advanced in this latest document are: (C)

(1) Somoza's brother and son, who occupy key command positions in the National Guard, will be relieved and named to posts abroad before the plebiscite is conducted on February 25, 1979. (C)

(2) Should Somoza win, he would be obligated to form a "national government of reconciliation" and the FAO would be obliged to maintain a peaceful, democratic, and constructive opposition. (This is changed from the earlier drafts which required the FAO's participation in the government.) (C)

(3) Should Somoza lose, he would resign immediately and voluntarily absent himself from the country three days later, and remain abroad until at least May 1, 1981. (C)

(4) Following the election by Congress of an interim President, Congress would adopt certain constitutional changes by April 15, 1979, which would permit the election by Congress (FAO nominates and PLN approves) of a new President on May 1, 1979, who would serve with legislative and executive powers until May 1, 1981, with the help of a fifty-person "Committee of Notables," who in turn will be charged with drawing up a draft of a new constitution. A Cabinet will be named by the new President composed of one-third FAO, one-third PLN, and one-third independents chosen by mutual agreement between the FAO and PLN. (C)

(5) A constituent assembly will be elected on November 1, 1980, (Note: Although it is not mentioned, presumably a new President will be popularly elected under the terms of the current constitution, to assume power on May 1, 1981, to replace the interim President.) (C)

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Review on December 21, 1984

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-27-3

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-2-

The other major ideas of the NG proposal, i.e., the reorganization of the Supreme Court and the National Guard, the particulars and timetable of the carrying-out of a fair plebiscite under the control of an international authority -- have not changed from earlier positions tabled by the NG. (C)

Initial reaction to the compromise plan has been negative on the government side. General McAuliffe and Ambassador Bowdler met with Somoza today and informed him that we have been disappointed in the government's unyielding position during the discussions of the past several days. It appears as if Somoza believes that by stalling long enough, he will be able to create sufficient divisions among the FAO to cause it to break off negotiations, and thus bear the onus for having failed to reach an agreement. (C)

I just learned that the meeting between Bowdler and McAuliffe and Somoza went very poorly. Somoza apparently stonewalled, and tried unsuccessfully to persuade McAuliffe that 30 years of a military alliance should not be repaid in this manner. McAuliffe and Bowdler are cabling their recommendations for tough action on our part. McAuliffe believes that half measures will not persuade Somoza anymore. They may be recommending withdrawal of the entire MILGROUP, the entire AID Mission, the Ambassador, and I would not be surprised if they included the furniture. We will have to have an SCC meeting to discuss this tomorrow. Christopher will probably raise it with you at your 6:45 a.m. meeting. (C)

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 04937 01 OF 02 272115Z  
ACTION ARA-14

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BUENOS 04937 01 OF 02 272116Z

INFO OCT-01 15C-00 C AE-00 CODE-03 PH-05 H-01 IHR-10  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6283

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4937

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: 021P  
SUBJECT: HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO ARGENTINA

SUMMARY: FROM ARRIVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS FAMILY WERE WELL RECEIVED BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA LAID OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. DR. KISSINGER SPOKE TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS--FROM BANKERS TO GAUCHOS. IN MOST INSTANCES, HE COMPLIMENTED GOA FOR DEFEATING TERRORISTS BUT HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEM THEN ARE NOT JUSTIFIABLE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS.

DOS REVIEWED 03-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN BA EARLY WEDNESDAY MORNING (JUNE 21). HE WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY A FOMOFF REP WHO DOGGED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT A SPOKESMAN FOR USG.

2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY WAS TO LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, COL. MALLA GIL (INTERPRETER) AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDELA PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL. IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL AT 1300 LUNCH WAS SERVED.

3. KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT DURING PRIVATE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. ALLEGEDLY VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTIONS FROM DR. KISSINGER AS TO HOW TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USG. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED WHETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS.

4. AT LUNCH, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VIEWS ON LATIN AMERICA. FORMER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT NOW MORE THAN EVER WAS TIME TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE. HE ADDED UNITY OF ACTION AMONG THE LA COUNTRIES IS REQUIRED IF ALL AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE TO SURVIVE. HE STRESSED THAT DURING HIS TENURE AS SECRETARY OF STATE, LATIN AMERICA WAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE NOW. KISSINGER POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A REFLECTION ON ANY ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK OF ATTENTION TOWARDS LA WAS NOT A DELIBERATE ACT ON ANYBODY'S PART. IT WAS JUST A FACT THAT WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD EXPLODING, NEGLECT ENSUED.

5. KISSINGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AMERICAN MAY BE NEXT ON RUSSIA AND CUBA'S SCHEDULE. HE ADDED IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN AFRICA IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA HE APPLAUDED PRESIDENT CARTER FOR HIS ANNAPOLIS SPEECH. KISSINGER STRESSED HIS SUPPORT OF MOST OF CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND SALES OF AIRCRAFT TO MID-EASTERN COUNTRIES. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS RECOMMENDABLE THAT WITH PREVAILED THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE LEAVING BLE SINCE WHEN, HE ASKED, CAN CUBAN SOLDIERS MARCH FROM SOUTH TO NORTH IN AFRICA AND EXPECT THE WORLD TO APPLAUD

THEM. THE FORMER SECRETARY TOLD VIDELA HE GAVE HIS FULL SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON HIS AFRICAN POLICY.

6. HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE MANY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA WAS A SOFT DRINK. HE SAID THIS INDICATED THAT AMERICANS ARE NOT AWARE OF ARGENTINE HISTORY NOR OF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TERRORISM WAS NOT SOLELY OF ARGENTINE ORIGIN BUT INSTEAD IT HAD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT. KISSINGER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN COMBATTING TERRORISM BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED IN DEFEATING TERRORISTS HAD NO PLACE IN ARGENTINA TODAY.

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEEMED RELAXED AND FRIENDLY. HE TENSED UP ONLY WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT USG.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-24-56-1-5-7  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

Significant Intelligence: (Pastor)

Bolivia: In the wake of the coup that put Pereda in power a variety of reports pose decisions. Ambassador Boeker has recommended that we hold up all assistance for FY 78 pending clarification of the Pereda government's intentions. Perez of Venezuela has written to Carter proposing that the OAS be asked to urge that new elections be held. The Embassy summarized events: "No one could plan a debacle so complete. Bolivia backed into it by a day-to-day succession of disjointed decisions." (C)

Chile: Army generals backed Pinochet's move to oust AIR FORCE Junta member Gustavo Leigh. Embassy reports that Leigh had hoped to hang on until Letelier indictments were issued, trusting that they would shift balance of opinion in his favor and that Pinochet knowing this appears to now be making his move. (C)

25X1

Ecuador: Embassy and DIA reporting indicate that military is determined to allow Roldes to participate in run-off election. Embassy reports that Poveda and the Navy are determined to have a clean election. A DIA summary sees some possibility of tinkering the outcome for the second slot in the run-off since Huerta would have a better chance of defeating Roldes than the current apparent second place candidate Duran. (S)

Argentina: Ambassador Castro indicates that Videla and Viola are moving to respond to the IAERC letter concerning the potential visit. General Bignone, Army Secretary General, indicated such a visit would be positive and that Videla and others would do battle with the recalcitrant Foreign Office as necessary. (C)

Argentina: On other subjects the Embassy reports that the Supreme Court ruled that Timerman, former editor of La Opinion, could not be detained under one of the charges against him. The other is still pending. Also, the fallout from Ex-Im rejection of a credit for Argentina continues. The latest repercussion was the refusal of a leading Argentine economist who is a prime candidate to replace Martinez de Hoz to accept an IV grant from the US. (C)

Dominican Republic: Antonio Guzman called a US Embassy official to report his (Guzman's) intention to challenge the Dominican military immediately after his election. Balaguer has been assigning particularly supportive military men to high positions, two of whom are obnoxious to Guzman. He intends to fire them and wants to be assured of our support should this provoke the military. (S-Exdis)

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Y CONTAIN CONGRESSIONAL  
TERIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1980

*Ed -  
Good ideas  
Same process  
Should be  
followed w/it.  
other  
difficult  
countries  
J*

C review(s)  
Completed

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: Warren Christopher, Acting W.C.  
Subject: Steps To Improve U.S.-Argentine  
Relations

D REVIEW  
COMPLETED

Pursuant to your instructions, the Inter-Agency Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan of action for 1980, which I am submitting for your approval.

ate Department review  
Completed

I. OBJECTIVES

Our principal objectives in moving to improve our relationship with Argentina are to:

- foster Argentina's identification with the West and thus to contain Soviet political and economic influence;
- encourage further specific improvements in human rights practices;
- seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues (e.g. grains); and
- obtain progress on nonproliferation objectives, particularly full-scope safeguards and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and foster increased sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation concerns.

MORI/CDF per  
C03337518

We also wish to encourage continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal mediation of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive role with respect to developments in Central America and other Hemispheric issues.

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- NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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II. ACTIONS FOR 19801. The Consultative Process

We will continue the process of political and economic consultations begun with General Goodpaster's visit to Buenos Aires in January. We contemplate:

-- a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to Buenos Aires, possibly about August 1, during which he will review our policy concerns and the state of our relations and will be prepared to discuss steps we would plan to take to strengthen cooperation in selected areas, depending on the nature of the Argentine response.

-- a meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission in October, the U.S. delegation possibly to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The meeting would include discussion of ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and to expand commercial relations.

-- periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues, with the first round to be held during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

2. Military Relations

We will begin to rebuild relations through increased contact and consultations, while stressing that further progress on human rights will be essential to the more fundamental improvement in these relations (including consideration of modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy Amendment, as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting). We plan to:

--begin periodic security consultations with Argentina; the first round, to be held this year in Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in the South Atlantic;

--invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make a return visit to Washington later in the year to discuss global defense issues;

--invite Argentina to send a guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas after consulting

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with members of Congress to ensure that this initiative would not be regarded as conflicting with the spirit of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.

Other issues are:

--High-Level Military Visit.

We will keep under review the desirability of proceeding with an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to visit Washington this year. A final decision on this (including the question of timing) should take into account the implications of such a move on the selection of the next Argentine president now under way within the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as continued improvements in the observance of human rights and developments in U.S.-Argentine relations.

--Sale of P-3 Aircraft.

In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA. We see no possibility, however, of seeking special legislation which would modify the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina this year.

3. Human Rights

We will continue the dialogue on human rights with Argentine leaders, principally but not exclusively through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Ambassador Bowdler. In these consultations we will attempt to obtain assurances that:

-- the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which recognizes the role of the OAS Commission on Human Rights and which encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina;

-- there will be no new disappearances, including no disappearances of persons alleged to be terrorists;

-- all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive activities, including unacknowledged detainees, will

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be processed through normal judicial channels and ensured due process;

-- guarantees will be instituted to prevent the torture of detainees; and

-- there be substantial progress, in advance of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political prisoners held without charges through release, trial, or exile (during his recent visit, Ambassador Smith was assured that half of these prisoners--1,300 at the time--would be released or sentenced by the end of the year).

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed in UN fora and concluded that, while this should not be a central requirement for the improvement of our bilateral relations, it should remain an important U.S. objective. We should urge Argentina, in bilateral discussions, to cooperate with these multilateral efforts, particularly with the UN Human Rights Commission's new expert working group on disappeared persons and with other groups such as the Catholic Church.

In addition to human rights discussions initiated by the Ambassador and by Assistant Secretary Bowdler, the U.S. side of the Mixed Economic Commission will be prepared to raise or respond to human rights concerns in discussions with their Argentine counterparts, and will be fully briefed for this purpose.

#### 4. Nuclear Relations

We want to move Argentina' over time to accept IAEA safeguards on future as well as current facilities (including the reprocessing facility) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To do this, we need to keep open the door for continued cooperation with Argentina's nuclear program to the extent commensurate with your policy. We should:

-- try to resolve promptly, in accordance with U.S. law and our nonproliferation objectives, the remaining safeguards issues to permit delivery of highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's research program, as well as components for its power program;

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-- once this is done, undertake a review of the conditions under which we could facilitate expanded participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program. (A major case currently at issue is an export license application for the sale of a pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor.)

#### 5. Other Cooperative Steps

In addition, we would:

--Sign the pending U.S.-Argentine Agricultural Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs;

--Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral income tax treaty;

--Seek to negotiate a consular convention.

#### 6. Consultations with Other Allies

The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether and in what form the Administration should consult our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern such as human rights and recent Soviet initiatives toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere. These subjects and our policies thereon could be discussed within NATO fora such as the Political Advisors Committee, the Permanent Council, and the NATO experts group on Latin America. Depending on the results of these consultations, we could consider further actions in Buenos Aires. A majority of the Interagency Group recommended against new high-level bilateral approaches to our Allies on these issues. We would continue the practice of consulting on human rights in the appropriate UN fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission.

#### 7. Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and Chile

The Group also considered the implications for neighboring countries, especially as regards security consultations.

With respect to Brazil, the Group noted that many of these steps will restore a better balance

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in U.S. relations with the two countries, since the U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations).

Chile is concerned about our improving relationship with Argentina, which it sees as threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoidance of war. This issue will be more fully addressed in the review of our relations with Chile later this year.

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- 7 -

Concurrences:

H - Mr. J. Brian Atwood  
 EB - Mr Deane Hinton  
 HA - Ms. Patt Derian  
 OES - Mr. Louis Nosenzo  
 PM - Mr. Daniel O'Donohue  
 EUR/SOV - Mr. Robert Perito  
 EUR/RMP - Mr. Stephen Ledogar  
 S/P - Mr. Anthony Lake  
 IO - Mr. Michael Newlin  
 S/AS - Mr. Allen Locke  
 USOAS - Mr. Herbert Thompson  
 AID/RDP - Mr. David Raymond  
 NSC - Mr. Thomas Thornton  
 OPIC - Ms. Caryl Bernstein  
 STR - Mr. Robert Hormatz  
 DOD/ISA - Col. Patrick Briggs  
 JCS - Admiral J.A. Lyons 25X1  
 CIA -  
 Commerce - Mr. A. Katz  
 Treasury - Mr. Fred Bergsten  
 USDA - Mr. Dale Hathaway  
 DOE - Mr. Les Goldman  
 EXIMBANK - Mr. Crafton  
 ACDA - Mr. Charles Van Doren  
 ICA - Mr. Victor Olason  
 L/PM - Mr. T. Borek

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 21, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor) *MP*  
SUBJECT: Weekly Report

Beagle Channel

Within a few hours time, an important switch by the Argentines seems to have averted hostilities, once again, over the Beagle Channel dispute. This morning Ambassador Castro in Buenos Aires was informed by General Viola that it was the view of the GOA that "no option other than war remained." The decision had apparently been taken following the receipt of a Chilean note which agreed to accept the Pope as mediator, but which did not bend on the terms of the mediation. (C)

We sent a flash cable instructing Castro to express our deepest concern over the Argentine position and to remind them that should they take hostile military action, we would view it as "aggression." We took concurrent action with the Pope in Rome, who responded by offering to send a papal emissary to Argentina immediately to explore the possibilities of mediation. The Argentines accepted the Pope's offer, and barring a last minute change of mind by the Chileans, the emissary's presence should serve to defuse the situation sufficiently to enable both sides to stand down and start talking again. (C)

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Review on December 21, 1984

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
Authority NLC-24-117-10-13  
NARA EF Date 7/9/06

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 21, 1978

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DAVID AARON

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR 

SUBJECT: Nicaragua Update (U)

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Review on December 21, 1984

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-2-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

5

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

WASHINGTON December 21, 1978

NSS Rvw Completed - Released in Full - Refer to OOS - 11/13/12

1. Beagle Channel Conflict Looms Closer: General Viola called in Ambassador Castro this morning to advise him that in view of Chile's latest communique, Argentina had no other option but to resort to military action. The general went on to ask that the U.S. help explain to the world why Argentina had no other recourse. Castro recommended patience and pointed out that papal mediation was still a possible option. Viola, however, did not desist from his line that Chile's response had terminated any prospects for further diplomatic movement. (Buenos Aires 9958, PSN 54104)

DOS REVIEWED 11-Jan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

2. Meeting with Von Staden on Cruise Missile Definition: During a meeting with Deputy Secretary Christopher yesterday, Ambassador Von Staden expressed his government's serious concern with the possibility that the U.S. might consider agreeing that ALCMs on non-heavy bombers would fall under the same limits as nuclear ALCMs as a solution to the cruise missile definition issue. He said the Germans would see serious problems with such a solution, since a non-nuclear element would be introduced into the SALT negotiations for the first time. Von Staden asked whether such a solution would create precedents for the Soviets to demand that other non-nuclear elements be included in future negotiations and whether the U.S. would share German concern that the whole non-circumvention question would have to be seen in a different light, with non-circumvention applying to non-nuclear weapons. He also asked whether the new U.S. language in the "Declaration of Intent" could lead to a situation in which the Soviets could demand nuclear elements not subject to the negotiations be taken into account. Christopher assured Von Staden that his questions and comments would be transmitted to the U.S. delegation before they left, and also pointed out that if an agreement was reached, the President would take great pains to make clear that what was in the agreement and the protocol would not constitute precedents for future negotiations. (State 320329 TOSEC 150002, NODIS Cherokee, PSN 54076) (S)

~~SECRET~~REVIEW ON DECEMBER 21, 2008  
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES~~SECRET~~

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-1-9-1-2-8

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526Authority NLC-1-9-1-2-8  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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MEMORANDUM

DOS REVIEWED 21 Dec 2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 22, 1978

12

~~SECRET~~NSS Rvw Completed - Released in Full - Refer to DOS - 11/9/12

1. Approach to Sadat on Status of Negotiations: Ambassador Eilts met with President Sadat today to emphasize our hope that he would accept the present treaty text and annexes and also pointed out that his acceptance could be conditional upon satisfactory resolution of a West Bank/Gaza timetable if necessary. Sadat's preliminary reaction was that it would be difficult to accept the treaty as it stands since Boutros Ghali had been careless in the negotiations and had not adequately protected Egyptian interests, particularly with regard to articles IV and VI. Sadat said he was not prepared to give a firm answer at this time and that he planned to discuss the matter with Mubarak and other advisers before giving us his considered judgment. Eilts comments that with the November 19 anniversary over, Sadat is in no great rush to complete the treaty negotiations until he is satisfied that they will adequately protect his interests, as he sees them, in the Arab world. (Cairo 25496 NODIS, PSN 17793, 17800)
  
2. Iranian Opposition Proposals for Political Crisis: Dr. Nasser Minatchi informed an embassy officer today that all religious leaders in Iran, including strong Khomeini supporters, have agreed to urge Khomeini's acceptance of a solution which involves the Shah giving powers to a regency council which would then appoint a prime minister and coalition cabinet. He claimed the members of a cabinet had been agreed on by the opposition but would not provide any names. Minatchi also said a vast majority of the religious faithful and "all leaders except Khomeini" wanted the monarchy to remain, and that the goal of his group was a constitutional monarchy. Sullivan comments that in spite of intense talk over the past days, Minatchi's effort has not advanced much, but that perceived time pressures of the approach of Moharram are beginning to work on the moderate opposition as well as the Iranian government. (Tehran 11501, PSN 17503, 17507)

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-8-6-5-1

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-1-8-6-5-1NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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- 3. Beagle Channel Dispute: Ambassador Castro reports that he is more concerned than at any previous point about the Beagle Channel dispute. He is doubtful that the Argentines retain enough confidence in the negotiating process to follow a conciliatory path and adds that they are close to becoming a prisoner of their tactic of the threat of force. He also speculates that the brusqueness of the recent Chilean reply to Argentina could indicate that the Chileans view the possibility of limited hostilities as being beneficial in rebuilding their international image. He strongly recommends that we take a firm and active position at this point to induce the parties toward serious mediation in order to reverse the current trend. (Buenos Aires 9239, PSN 17500, 17501)
  
- 4. Reestablishment of Relations with Iraq: According to Ambassador Veliotes, Senator Cranston asked King Hussein yesterday for his estimation of the possibility that Iraq might be ready to reestablish relations with the U.S. Hussein responded that although the Iraqis might be receptive to the idea, he would be reluctant to recommend such an initiative unless he could be certain they would respond positively but added, however, that he would be willing to probe Iraqi attitudes on the matter. Veliotes, commenting that Saddam Hussein's visit to Jordan next week would provide an excellent opportunity for Hussein to broach the subject, requests guidance as soon as possible on Hussein's offer. (Amman 8915 NODIS, PSN 17494)
  
- 5. Soviet DCM in Havana Comments on MIG-23s: U.S. Interest Section Havana reports that the Soviet DCM yesterday indicated that the MIG-23 problem will be "solved positively." He commented that the Soviets are aware of U.S. concerns, however, the Cubans now "are not like they were in 1962." The Interest Section comments that the Soviet official may have been trying to create the impression that the USSR is highly interested in the conclusion of SALT and that this desire will be translated into efforts to solve small scale problems. He said the U.S. should note carefully the statement by Ponomarev to U.S. Senators that conditions must be created for prompt signature of a SALT treaty by Brezhnev and President Carter. (Havana 3786, PSN 17833)

November 28, 1978

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~~SECRET~~NSS Rvw Completed - Released In Full - Refer to DJS - 11/9/12

1. Embassy Tel Aviv Comments on the Egyptian-Israeli Talks: Ambassador Lewis believes that indications be slowing down the pace of negotiations raises the question of how the U.S. should proceed following Khalil's visit, especially if it turns out that the Egyptians want to reopen the text of the treaty and continue negotiations on the linkage issue. If Egypt accepts the treaty, there is some chance of persuading Israel to find a formula on linkage; however, if Egypt equivocates, the hope of getting the cabinet to accept something further on linkage will shrink to about nil. Lewis also has "the gravest doubts" that a slowdown by Sadat will produce what he wants from the Israelis; it will have the opposite affect. Lewis adds that Begin agreed to only a ninety day settlement freeze and that, with the conclusion of this period in mid-December or January, Begin might renew settlement activity. The U.S. cannot afford an extended delay and Lewis recommends that a new U.S. initiative, obviously required to break the impasse, be launched no later than mid-December. (Tel Aviv 18266 NODIS, PSN 24694, 24695)
  
2. Somoza Discusses His Difficulties: A Nicaraguan official informed Ambassador Solaun today that Somoza, for the first time, openly admitted to his cabinet on Monday that he was under tremendous pressure. Somoza allegedly characterized the plebiscite proposal as a means to "kick him out of the country" and raised as alternatives the calling of a national constituent assembly or simply his resignation. Solaun comments that, if true, the apparent change of attitude by Somoza could augur well for a resolution to the Nicaraguan problem. Somoza is apparently starting to believe that the U.S. means business. (Managua 6156, PSN 24866)
  
3. Beagle Channel-Ambassador Castro Talks with General Viola: General Viola told Ambassador Castro yesterday that, although there were still serious problems ahead, the Argentine government intended to negotiate in good faith and would strive to settle the channel dispute

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-8-6-18-7

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Authority NLC-1-8-6-18-7  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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by peaceful and honorable means. Viola emphasized that Argentina wants a peaceful solution and not a confrontation and indicated that the recent troop movements were carefully controlled so as not to place them close enough to the border where "temptations" could cause an incident. Viola again stressed the defensive nature of the troop deployments and made the suggestion that, during the negotiating or mediation period, there should be a mutual freeze on troop movements or even perhaps a withdrawal. (Buenos Aires 9361, PSN 24704, 24706)

DOS REVIEWED 10 Mar 2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

SENSITIVE

PAGE 36 SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 01/23/80//023

SITUATION: AFGHAN  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT IV

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

FLASH  
Z 111817Z JAN 80 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES FLASH 6975

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 008295

EXDIS  
E.O. 120651 N/A

TAGS: ESTC, ETRD, AR

SUBJECT: ARGENTINE COOPERATION ON GRAIN EMBARGO

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. CHARGE REQUESTED URGENTLY TO TRANSMIT FOLLOWING  
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR CASTRO TO GENERAL VIOLA:  
QUOTE:

TENENTE GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA  
DOMICILIO CONOCIDO  
BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

DESPUES DE SALUDARLO EN UNA FORMA MUY ATENTA, SE LE  
SOLICITA SU INTERVENCION PERSONAL CON SUS COMPANEROS  
DEL GOBIERNO ARGENTINO, MUY ESPECIALMENTE AL SEÑOR  
PRESIDENTE VIDELA Y LOS INTEGRANTES DE LA JUNTA,  
REFERENTE A LO POSIBLE COLABORACION CON E.E.U.U. EN  
EL CONTROL DE LA EXPORTACION DE GRANOS A LA UNION  
SOVIETICA, QUISIERA ACLARAR QUE ESTA COLABORACION NO  
CONTEMPLA LA SUSPENSION DE CONTRATOS YA FIRMADOS SINO  
MAS BIEN LA IMPORTANCIA DE NO ENTRAR EN NUEVOS CONTRATOS  
QUE TENDRIAN EL PROPOSITO DE COMPENSAR POR EL EMBARGO  
DE MI GOBIERNO.

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENTS \*\*\*\*\*

EOBIDEAL, THORN, BREM

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Authority NLC-16-4-2-15-2  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

PSN1028675

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 01/23/80//023

SITUATION: AFGHAN  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT IV

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RECUERDO MUY CLARAMENTE QUE DURANTE SU PARTICIPACION EN LA JUNTA USTED SIEMPRE ME MANIFESTO SU APOYO AL CONCEPTO DE NO INTERVENCION Y SU ODIIO HACIO AQUELLOS PAISES QUE TOMABAN PASOS E INCURSIONES AGRESIVOS CONTRA OTROS PAISES. TAMBIEN RECUERDO SU ADHESION Y RESPETO A AQUELLOS PRINCIPIOS QUE PREVALECCEN EN DERECHO INTERNACIONAL.

TOMANDO EN CUENTA LA RECIENTE LLAGRANTE INDEBIDA AGRESION DE LA UNION SOVIETICA HACIA AFGANISTAN, LE SUPLICO MUY ENCARECIAMENTE EJERZA SU INFLUENCIA CON LOS MANDATORIOS DE SU GOBIERNO PARA QUE PRESTEN SU COLABORACION EN EL SENTIDO MANIFESTADO EN LOS PARAFOS ANTERIORES.

SIEMPRE HE AGRADECIDO SUS EXPRESIONES DE CARINO HACIA MI PAIS Y LA MISMA VEZ RECONOZCO QUE DURANTE SU ESTANCIA COMO MIEMBRO DE LA JUNTA Y COMANDANTE EN JEFE DEL EJERCITO SU ACTUACION SIEMPRE FUE UNO DE HACER TODO LO POSIBLE PARA CONTINUAR MEJORANDO LAS TRADICIONALES BUENAS AMISTADES ENTRE E.E.U.U. Y ARGENTINA.

AGRADECIENDO SU AMISTAD Y GENTILEZA, RECIBE LAS SEGURIDADES DE MI ATENTA CONSIDERACION; REGRESARE A BUENOS AIRES EL PROXIMO JUEVES, PERO ANTES DE ESO LE AGRADECERIA SUS COMENTARIOS SOBRE EL TEMA AQUI PLANTADO.  
END MESSAGE. VANCE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 01/23/80/023

DOS REVIEWED 10-Mar-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

SITUATION: AFOHAN  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT IV

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATEO 111847Z JAN 80  
PM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6411

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 8256

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 00607

EXDIS  
PNGED SO FAR AS FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS WERE CONCERNED.  
9. KORNIYENKO REJOINED THAT IF WE WERE IN FACT INSISTING THAT THE NYAP PEOPLE COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO FILL VACANCIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN WASHINGTON OR SAN FRANCISCO THAT IN EFFECT WOULD AMOUNT TO PNG ACTION--AND WOULD, OF COURSE, BE AN EXTRA COMPLICATION FOR BOTH SIDES. KORNIYENKO THEN ADDED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES AT THE MOMENT FOUND THEMSELVES WITH THEIR AMBASSADORS AT HOME. IF WE WERE TO DECIDE TO FREEZE EMBASSY STAFFS AT PRESENT LEVELS, WOULD THAT MEAN THE AMBASSADORS COULD NOT RETURN? CHARGE COMMENTED HE THOUGHT IT CLEAR THAT THAT WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE U.S. POSITION, AND KORNIYENKO HASTENED TO ADD THAT IN MENTIONING THE AMBASSADORS HE INTENDED NOTHING MORE THAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE ABSURDITY OF THE U.S. POSITION.

10. KORNIYENKO ONCE MORE MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS NOT PERMISSIBLE TO SPEAK TO EACH OTHER IN LANGUAGE SUCH AS THAT USED BY THE U.S. IN UNILATERALLY DETERMINING HOW THE ISSUES WOULD BE RESOLVED. AS WAS STATED IN THE SOVIET NOTES, HE ADDED, THE SOVIETS RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THE QUESTION OF MATERIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE U.S. ACTIONS WHICH WERE IN VIOLATION OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS.

11. CHARGE REPEATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK RESPONSES TO KORNIYENKO'S QUESTIONS ON LEGAL AND PRACTICAL MATTERS; BUT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE REASON

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 01/23/80//023

SITUATION: AFGHAN  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT IV

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR THE ACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN, THEY HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN FRIVOLOUSLY; THEY WERE SERIOUS MEASURES WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, TAKEN FOR THE REASON STATED BY THE PRESIDENT.

12. KORNIYENKO RESPONDED THAT THE REASONS GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT PROVIDED NO BASIS FOR THE MEASURES TAKEN AND THAT THERE WERE IN FACT NO GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTIONS UNDER ANY INTERNATIONAL LAW OR AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE, HE CONTINUED, COULD SAY A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE MATTER AND COULD FIND EXPLANATIONS NO LESS HARSH THAN THOSE USED BY U.S. OFFICIALS, BUT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THOSE ASPECTS AT THIS TIME. CHARGE AGREED.

13. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF NOTE CONCERNING

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PAGE 89 SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING DATE 01/23/80/1023

SITUATION: AFGHAN  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT IV

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATEO 111847Z JAN 80  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6412

INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad 8297

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 00607

EXDIS  
CLOSURE OF KIEV AND NEW YORK ADVANCE PARTIES  
BEGIN TEXT.  
NO. 1/055HA  
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, REFERRING TO THE NOTE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE USA OF JANUARY 7, 1980, CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FOLLOWING:  
THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA CONCERNING THE SUSPENSION OF THE OPENING OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE USSR IN NEW YORK AND THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THERE OF THE SOVIET ADVANCE PARTY IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE RELEVANT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THAT REACHED DURING THE SOVIET-AMERICAN MEETING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN JULY 1974. THE SAID UNILATERAL ACTION OF THE AMERICAN SIDE TESTIFIES TO THE FACT THAT IT IS ACTING IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF ITS OBLIGATIONS WHICH ENSUE FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WHICH IT CONCLUDES. THE SOVIET SIDE RESOLUTELY CONDEMNS THESE ILLEGAL ACTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA AS DIRECTLY HOSTILE TO THE INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRACTICE OF THE MAINTENANCE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS.  
THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SAID ACTION ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA,

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DTG:111847

TOR:0112225

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 01/23/80//023

SITUATION: AFGHAN  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT IV

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RESERVING TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO FULL RESTITUTION OF MATERIAL DAMAGE CONNECTED WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN SIDE, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE POSITION THAT PRACTICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE GUARANTEEING OF THE SECURITY AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE PREMISES AND PROPERTY OF THE SOVIET CONSULATE GENERAL IN NEW YORK WILL BE AGREED UPON IN THE PROPER MANNER.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE SAID UNILATERAL ACTIONS OF THE USA, THE SOVIET SIDE INTENDS TO DETERMINE AT A FUTURE TIME ITS GENERAL POSITION TOWARD THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT ON THE OPENING OF CONSULATES GENERAL OF THE USSR AND THE USA IN NEW YORK AND KIEV, RESPECTIVELY.

MOSCOW, JANUARY 11, 1980, END TEXT.

14. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE NOTE CONCERNING AEROFLOT FREQUENCIES:

BEGIN TEXT:

NO. 2/OSSHA

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR REFERS TO THE NOTE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE USA OF JANUARY 7, 1980, AND CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FOLLOWING. THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA TO POSTPONE FOR AN UNDETERMINED PERIOD THE CONDUCT OF BILATERAL CIVIL AVIATION TALKS, WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE ITSELF, AND UNILATERALLY TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF REGULAR FLIGHTS TO THE USA OF AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT IS COMPLETELY ILLEGAL AND IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH IT HAS ACCEPTED, INCLUDING THOSE RESULTING FROM THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN AN EXCHANGE OF AIDE-MEMOIRES IN MARCH 1979. SUCH PROVOCATIVE CONDUCT CAN ONLY BE VIEWED AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SAID MEASURES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND RESERVES TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO DEMAND FULL RESTITUTION OF MATERIAL DAMAGE.

MOSCOW, JANUARY 11, 1980, END TEXT.

15. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE NOTE CONCERNING FISHERY ALLOCATIONS:

BEGIN TEXT:

NO. 3/OSSHA

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, REFERRING TO THE NOTE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE USA OF JANUARY 7, 1980, CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FOLLOWING.

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PAGE 07 SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING DATE 01/23/80/023

SITUATION: AFGHAN  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SIT IV

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:  
IMMEDIATE

O 111847Z JAN 80  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6413

INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad 8258

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 00607

EXDIS  
THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA CONCERNING A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE QUOTAS CUSTOMARILY ALLOCATED TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR FISH CATCH IN COASTAL WATERS OF THE USA CANNOT BE QUALIFIED AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN AN ILLEGAL ACTION IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE USSR. THIS STEP IN REALITY SIGNIFIES THE INTRODUCTION OF A BAN ON THE FISHERY OF SOVIET SHIPS AND WILL LEAD TO A PREMEDITATED WRECKING OF THE MUTUALLY PROFITABLE COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD WHICH HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE CORRESPONDING SOVIET AND AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS. THE SAID ACTIONS BY THE AMERICAN SIDE ARE THUS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA CONCERNING FISHERIES OFF THE COASTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF NOVEMBER 16, 1976. THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A UNILATERAL STEP AND RESERVES TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO DEMAND FULL COMPENSATION FOR DIRECT AND INDIRECT DAMAGE CONNECTED WITH IT.  
MOSCOW, JANUARY 11, 1980,  
END TEXT, GARRISON

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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DOCS REVIEWED 02-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

May 30, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Cyrus Vance C.V.

Genscher. At breakfast today, I briefed Genscher on SALT and recent developments in the Middle East. We discussed MBFR and agreed that progress on a forthcoming response from the Soviets on our proposal is a necessary precondition to a meeting of Foreign Ministers. Neither of us had a clear picture of what the French are trying to do -- especially to MBFR -- with their new proposals for a European disarmament conference. We agreed the subject should be discussed at our next four power meetings with Owen and De Guiringaud in Paris and Bonn. We decided to raise the question of an appropriate forum for negotiation of grey area systems at the same time.

Genscher underlined the importance he attaches to your forthcoming visit to Germany. He urged that enough time be allowed in your schedule for "intensive political discussions," and expressed his hope that you will agree to meet separately with the leaders of the four political parties represented in the Bundestag.

Ecevit. An exclusive interview with the New York Times and an appearance on the Today Show unfortunately focused attention on Ecevit's visit to Moscow next month and his belief that detente has diminished the Soviet threat to Turkey. Ecevit did stress that Turkey is not seeking to obtain military equipment from the Soviet Union and he emphasized Turkey's continuing commitment to NATO. His opening address at the NATO Summit conveyed a much more helpful and balanced position, and will be helpful on the Hill.

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NARA 7/9/16 EF Date 7/9/16

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Ecevit's two-hour meeting last night with Karamanlis at Blair House resulted in an agreement that senior officials from the two Foreign Ministries will meet in Ankara July 4-5 to continue the Greek-Turkish dialogue. This is a favorable development, although we doubt that Cyprus was discussed at any length. Ecevit will meet with the HIRC on Thursday and address the National Press Club before going to New York to speak at the Disarmament Session and meet with Waldheim, bankers, and journalists. He will return to Washington next Monday for a session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before returning to Turkey.

Four Power Meeting. I met with my colleagues from the UK, France and Germany on Sunday evening to consider matters relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole. We noted that the Berlin situation was essentially calm and that the Soviets had shown relative restraint on Berlin over the past few months. Genscher reported that, while no progress was made on specific Berlin issues during Brezhnev's visit to West Germany earlier this month, the Soviets had discussed Berlin in a non-polemical way and had sought to avoid friction. Genscher thought it a positive sign that Brezhnev had resisted East German entreaties to stop in East Berlin on his way home and had sent Gromyko instead. Genscher expressed concern that East Germany is seeking a voice in the interpretation of the Quadripartite Agreement (US, UK, France, USSR) and urged the Allies to take every opportunity to rebuff their efforts.

Argentina. We have had our first indication that Under Secretary Newsom's trip to Argentina may be sparking needed action on human rights. Subsequent to Newsom's return, Ambassador Castro informed Videla that military training would be resumed when Argentina announced publicly that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was being invited. Videla was obviously pleased, and responded that in addition to the announcement, positive strides would be made in prisoner releases before September 30, and that by year end an impressive number of people would be released. Such action could enable us to resume some

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shipments to Argentina and hopefully ultimately create conditions which could allow us to recommend repeal of the Kennedy/Humphrey new arms embargo. Videla seems genuinely to want improved relations with the US, and the question is whether his political situation will give him room to take the necessary steps.

Icelandic Elections. Prime Minister Hallgrimsson's Independence Party, traditionally the cornerstone of pro-American, pro-NATO views as well as Iceland's largest political party, suffered heavy losses in Sunday's municipal elections. The big winner is the communist-dominated Peoples Alliance which polled 24.5%, up from its 17.1% in 1974, while the Independence Party dropped from 49% to 39.9% and the other coalition partner in the present government, the Progressive Party, fell 3.6% to 15.2%. The setback for the coalition partners could have an important psychological and political effect on the national elections scheduled for June 25 and is certain to alter the nature of the campaign now underway.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDS

August 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
DAVID AARON

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT: Argentina: Your Questions

You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S. policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President. The item for the President is at Tab A. The other questions are answered below.

I. Argentina's Human Rights Situation

Argentina is still one of the world's most serious human rights problem countries. Just this month, Amnesty International launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000 political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented stories of arrest and torture. (One report from our Embassy is at Tab B.) On human rights-related matters, world opinion always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to correct that.

While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere, there has been some improvement in recent months. We understand that the Minister of Interior has instructed the police, and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under executive power have decreased and lists of those detained have been published; and a limited right of option for political prisoners to request exile has been reinstated. On a number of cases in which we have expressed special interest -- Jacobo Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family -- the Argentine Government has released them.

II. U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting "no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining.

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NARA EF Date 7/9/16

We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another group of requests.

We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human rights situation, we will go ahead with military training to them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two major credit sales.

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps which would permit the enormous backlog of credit to be committed before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for \$50 million and \$150 million on the munitions control lists.) There are also funds for military training, which are being held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving.

Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the IAHRG to visit in accordance with the IAHRG's regulations; (2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without re-arresting them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule of law.

Everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance with various legislative requirements, was made by State without consulting NSC.

### III. Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify the repression?

The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all, President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless, a central tenet of our human rights policy is that government-sanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice. . . Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence..."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDS

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I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union, there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed, it is even more difficult to change direction than with the Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find ourself, would be judged as a Presidential retreat just as surely as a different decision on Dresser.

Personally, I am most disturbed about the decision not to finance \$270 million worth of Export-Import Bank credits. I don't believe that this is either a legitimate or an effective instrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us little choice. The decision did have an unintended positive impact in that it has finally aroused the business community (there are \$600 million worth of credit applications pending in X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive amendments to the X-M bill last week.

I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom told me he had decided to hold everything up until the Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission. Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if it is we who blinked first.

It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first. For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March, and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least \$1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image. Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time, is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps, I will make sure that we are quick to respond.

So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around, and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.

#### IV. The Southern Cone: Are We Winning or Losing?

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against

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us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short time, in early 1977, the Southern Cone countries -- led by Brazil but including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay -- tried to establish a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these governments distrusted each other more than they despised President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly.

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with extremely narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things, the pettiness of their international disputes with one another. Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle Channel, and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.

Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have tried through the working groups and the visits by the President and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will have to await Brazil's new government next year.

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans; no other American President in this century has done that. Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected in the universities because of his strong anti-Communism and the Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike anything the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America, which we had almost lost.

The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our relations. They use every opportunity and every channel -- including Kissinger -- to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty, twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real.

The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated

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than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scape-goats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt, and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy around at this time.

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MEMORANDUM

NSS REVIEWED 08/23/2012 DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL BY MIR EO 13526

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REFER TO DOS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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January 24, 1980

DOS REVIEWED 04-Jan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

1. Chaban Delmas' Meeting with Brezhnev: French National Assembly President Jacques Chaban met with an embassy officer prior to his departure yesterday from Moscow and confirmed that he had cut short his official visit to the Soviet Union because of the Soviet actions against Sakharov. He commented that he had little choice but to do so and quipped that "this shouldn't upset you Americans." Concerning his conclusions on the Soviet leadership, Chaban believes that Brezhnev is still very much in charge and that there is no critical power struggle going on within the Politburo. He does not interpret the decision to go into Afghanistan as proof that the military has ascended to power within the Soviet leadership. In his opinion, it is more a question of military advice tipping the balance within the leadership in favor of the decision. Chaban noted during his meeting on Tuesday that Brezhnev displayed a great deal of sensitivity to the international reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The major thrust of Brezhnev's approach was that the Soviet Union has not changed its basic policy orientation toward establishing a more stable international environment and avoiding the risks of war. He repeatedly returned to the theme of the necessity of maintaining equilibrium in world affairs and avoiding "disequilibrium." Responding to Chaban's remark that the Soviet move in Afghanistan represented a departure in Soviet policy that has had a major impact on international relations, Brezhnev reverted to the basic Soviet argument that there was "major external intervention in Afghanistan's affairs aimed at establishing a 'command post' by the forces of imperialism on the Soviet Union's southern borders." The "other major factor" which compelled the Soviet Union to act decisively was the Muslim question and the effect this would have on the Soviet Union itself. On U.S.-Soviet relations, Brezhnev was highly critical of U.S. actions and decisions aimed at destroying the carefully structured fabric of East-West relations. He cited for particular criticism the Soviet brigade issue in Cuba and the NATO TNF modernization decision. (Moscow 1226, PSN 46216, 46218) (S)

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REVIEW ON JANUARY 23, 2010  
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2. UK Forces East of Suez: British receptiveness toward the possibility of an increased UK military presence east of Suez has recently become more apparent, according to Charge Streater. Embassy soundings continue to indicate that at the military, official and ministerial levels, the UK is well disposed to some expansion in the UK military presence in the Indian Ocean, although no real planning has yet been initiated. The general assumption is, as Lord Carrington has suggested, that any such expanded presence would largely take the form of naval visits. FCO Defense Department head Gillmore, who formerly downplayed the possibility of any significant shift in British resources, now favors such a move and indicated that a basic review of the UK's posture in this regard was very much in order. Charge Streater comments that the January 26 Bartholomew/McGiffert consultations on the Indian Ocean provide a well-timed opportunity to stimulate Britain's review of the UK role "east of Suez," and recommends that we use the occasion to assert support for an expanded UK presence. (London 1658, PSN 46469) (S)
  
3. Iranian Ambassador Assessment of Iran Crisis: Ambassador Haynes reports from Algiers that Iranian Ambassador Razi contrived a meeting with him this past Monday in order to relay his reading of the situation prevailing in Iran. Razi contends that Khomeini, quite apart from having control in Iran, has actually been swept along by events over which he knows he has no control. The detention of the hostages is a case in point. In order to give his countrymen and the world the impression that he does control, Khomeini has adopted the pattern of endorsing whatever is done in the name of the Iranian revolution. In this sense, Razi said, Khomeini is very much in touch with reality, but that reality is limited to his complete preoccupation with internal developments. In Razi's opinion there is no government in Iran; what reigns is anarchy. It is clear to Razi that Khomeini is fast losing popular support, noting that fewer and fewer mass gatherings are taking place in front of his Qom residence. Hence, Khomeini's present two-week vacation will undoubtedly be devoted to figuring out how he can salvage this situation which is personally threatening to him. Razi said that our patience and restraint in this matter is paying off over time as the international situation in Iran disintegrates. Prospects for the ultimate release of the hostages should improve. (Algiers 268, PSN 45474, 45483) (S)

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4. Greek Reintegration into NATO: Senior CDU member Leisler Kiep told Embassy Bonn officers that he believes one of NATO's highest priorities now should be a high-level political impetus to reintegrate Greece into NATO. With Tito seriously ill, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and growing economic and political problems in Greece, Kiep believes time is running out for a successful reintegration. Kiep's observations were the result of his pre-Christmas trip to Greece during which he met with Rallis and Karamalis. Rallis told Kiep that Greece is willing to issue a solemn and binding declaration upon reintegration to the effect that it does not consider the reintegration as prejudicing in any way other negotiations pending with Turkey. Rallis claimed that recent events made this a propitious time to act, especially since Athens had received favorable signals from Turkey. Now Greece needs a reply from NATO to its signal of cooperation. (Bonn 1351, PSN 46450) (C)
5. Argentine Proposal on Grain Export Restraints: General Goodpaster met with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor and Minister of Economy Martinez de Hoz yesterday during which de Hoz outlined an approach for informal Argentine cooperation, to be kept on a confidential basis, while refusing to consider formal controls. Pastor and de Hoz initially presented a negative position and questioned U.S. grain sales into traditional Argentine markets. After thorough discussions de Hoz proposed that the Argentine government reach an understanding with the Soviet trading companies under which the Soviets would agree to limit their direct purchases from Argentina to historic levels. The problem of resale of Argentine crops would be one between the U.S. and other governments. Buenos Aires would not object if we approached those governments (e.g. Italy) and obtain their agreement not to resell Argentine crops. De Hoz emphasized that once this arrangement became known in the trade, it would cost Argentina money since the present premium on Argentine contracts would presumably disappear. While Argentina wished to be helpful in the West's response to the Soviet challenge, de Hoz felt that such an arrangement, entailing substantial economic sacrifice, should be part of a broader political understanding between Argentina and the U.S. Martinez de Hoz stressed that time was of the essence, and Ambassador Castro asked that Washington respond promptly as to whether de Hoz's proposal is an acceptable basis for an understanding with the Argentine government. (Buenos Aires 692 NODIS, PSN 46586) (C)

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REFER TO DOS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 21, 1980

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Daily Report

DOS REVIEWED 10-Jan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

Information

Proposed Hussein Visit and Subsequent Integrity Problem: According to Ambassador Veliotos, the invitations to Begin and Sadat present us with an "integrity problem" in addition to our already difficult one of retaining credibility as a mediator. He believes Hussein will conclude that we were trying to "set him up" by extending the April 17 invitation, especially in view of media reports which are conveying the impression that the Sadat/Begin/Hussein invitations are linked, and that Hussein's acceptance was a foregone conclusion. He adds that Hussein was clearly upset with the situation yesterday after learning of your invitations to Begin and Sadat, and asked that his counter proposal for a late May-early June visit be withdrawn. Hussein added that "it would be best under the circumstances just to leave it open to see what develops." (S)

Letter from Sadat to Begin: Ambassador Atherton forwards the text of a letter dated March 17 from President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin. In conveying the letter yesterday, Vice President Mubarak stressed that it was being provided to us in confidence and that Egypt had no intention of publicizing it or telling the Israelis that it was given to us. Sadat's letter consists of an expression of deep concern over the present state of the negotiations, especially over the likelihood that agreement will not be reached before May 26. He notes that failure to do so will make it difficult for Egypt to oppose or prevent any moves within the UN for the purpose of establishing new terms of reference, and will give credence to allegations that the peace accords constitute a separate peace agreement. Sadat concludes by calling for the establishment of a committee that would be charged with the task of resolving the issue of security. (S)

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~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~NSC ActivityMeeting with HFAC

At Chairman Zablocki's request I met informally with 12 members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Thursday morning. The discussion went extremely well. Given the fact that there has been a spate of articles critical of our foreign policy, I expected to be grilled. I was asked to respond to Bundy's and Ball's comments, but the reaction was not at all hostile. I believe I was fairly successful in explaining that we had not deliberately shot ourselves in the foot by offering the Paks aid. Interestingly enough Solarz said that he did not understand why we had to reverse ourselves on the UN vote given the fact that it had not gone beyond the Yost statements on Jerusalem. Fenwick was particularly disturbed about leaks and willing to admit that the Hill shared responsibility; she hoped we were investigating. (C)

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1980

1. Alternate Market for Italian CH-47 Helicopters: Ambassador Gardner reports that the subject of the remaining CH-47 helicopters originally included in the contract with Iran was raised yesterday by Count Agusta, who said he would have to lay off 2,500 workers if an alternate market was not found within the next few days. Agusta pointed out that this would precipitate a major furor and seriously exacerbate the situation for everyone involved. Even allowing for exaggeration, Gardner believes Agusta's estimate of the difficulties resulting from such a layoff deserves to be taken seriously. He adds that, if there is a possible deal with Egypt in the works, it would be distinctly to our advantage to initiate discussions as soon as possible. In addition to increasing the chances of averting a layoff at Agusta, Gardner believes this would serve as a positive indication of our intentions and would do more to encourage Agusta's continued cooperation in withholding shipments of spare parts than our continued blandishment of the consequences of this failure to do so. He is fully satisfied with Agusta's role in this episode and would like to be able to tell him precisely what the current prospects are for a sale to Egypt. (Rome 7620, PSN 12483) (S)
  
2. Visit of Senior PLO Official to Amman: According to Ambassador Veliotes, PLO "foreign minister" Qaddumi visited Amman earlier this week for political discussions outside of the context for regular meetings of the joint PLO-Jordanian committee on the West Bank. Various sources have reported that the major topics of Qaddumi's discussions were Giscard's visit to Amman, next political steps by the PLO and Jordan, Lebanon, and a PLO request for Jordanian assistance on documentation of Gazans. In comments to Veliotes, King Hussein said the conversations were in the context of a PLO policy review involving the recall for consultations of UN representative Terzi. Hussein said he cautioned the PLO to go slow during the U.S. pre-election period, drawing Qaddumi's attention to the lack of utility of pushing for a new UN Security Council resolution. Hussein also said he and Qaddumi had agreed to an early Arafat visit to Amman. In separate remarks, Prime Minister Sharaf told Veliotes that Qaddumi had expressed PLO support for the EC initiative. Veliotes comments that

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Hussein's advice to Qaddumi reflects the king's constant general concern that the PLO avoid uncoordinated "knee jerk" initiatives in the UN which could harm, rather than help, the Arab cause. He adds that Hussein is obviously pinning his hopes on an eventual EC initiative after May 26 and believes a move to the Security Council now by the PLO would introduce needless controversy with the U.S. and possibly some Western Europeans which could complicate a later EC move. (Amman 1918, PSN 12437) (S)

3. Thai Refusal to Participate in Khmer Relief Meeting: Foreign Minister Sitthi told the press today that Thailand would not participate in the forthcoming March 26 conference of donors to the Khmer relief program. He reportedly expressed Thai unhappiness that the UN had not responded to a number of pending Thai proposals related to Cambodia and Khmer relief. According to Ambassador Abramowitz, senior Foreign Ministry officials have given a different cast by claiming that the UN did not invite Thailand to attend the meeting. They asserted that Thai officials in New York had been told that the meeting was for donors and unless Thailand wished to consider at least a "token contribution" to program funding, they were not in the "right category" to attend. The foreign ministry's immediate reaction was that Thailand had long done a great deal to help the refugee relief effort and the question of even token contribution verged on insult. Abramowitz cannot explain the inconsistency between the foreign minister and the working level on this issue, but suspects the Thais would participate if the invitation question is resolved. He believes the presence of Thailand would be very useful and hopes it can be achieved in the end. (Bangkok 13021, PSN 12357, 12360) (C)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

March 21, 1980

1. Iran Hostages: During a meeting with Ambassadors McHenry and Vanden Heuvel on Wednesday, Algerian Ambassador Bedjaoui, co-chairman of the UN inquiry commission, said he was convinced the hostages would be released within fifteen days. Bedjaoui deplored the fact that the commission's work appeared so rapidly in the press, and directly accused the French lawyers of being unhelpful on this score. He expressed belief that Bani-Sadr was acting in good faith and had Khomeini's backing in his desire to effect a rapid release of the hostages. In Bedjaoui's view, Khomeini's announcement that the newly elected parliament would decide the fate of the hostages amounted to a concession on his part, since the militants would no longer retain control over the hostages. Bedjaoui agreed that different channels must be explored in attempts to reach Khomeini directly, but he underscored the need to work in conjunction with Waldheim "who was deeply engaged in seeking a solution to the crisis." (USUN New York 1048 NODIS Cherokee, LDX Copy) (S)
  
2. U.S.-Argentine Relations -- A Rocky Road: According to Ambassador Castro, Gerard Smith's mission will be seen by the Argentines as one more important event in what is viewed in Buenos Aires as a U.S. "courtship." He adds that the Argentines have read the series of high level American visitors as a sign that times have changed, and the government, which no longer feels itself under global siege as a human rights pariah, has faced the prospect of better U.S.-Argentine relations with a combination of hope and rising self-confidence. Castro adds that in some quarters, this hope has become so unrealistic as to cause serious speculation that the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment may soon be repealed. He notes, however, that the dominant theme in our bilateral relations remains one of uncertainty. The atmosphere is warm, but there are major and serious differences on matters of substance. Castro does not believe the U.S. has anything to lose in accepting this two-tiered approach -- so long as we make sure that the Argentines understand we will not sacrifice our interests or concerns simply to keep a diaphanous spirit of friendship alive. (Buenos Aires 2469, PSN 12705, 12707) (C)

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3. Cutler's Meeting with British Olympic Official: During a brief meeting with Lloyd Cutler on Wednesday, Sir Denis Follows indicated that the British Olympic Association would definitely reach a decision on the Moscow invitation at its March 25 meeting. He remained unconvinced by arguments in favor of postponing a decision and left little doubt that the invitation would be accepted. In a meeting with Follows today, Foreign Secretary Carrington and Michael Heseltine strongly urged the BOA to either postpone a decision, or to hedge acceptance by including the proviso that the ultimate decision would depend on the situation in Afghanistan nearer the time for the games. Heseltine stressed to Follows that precipitate action by the BOA would undercut efforts by the British government to find a solution to the Afghan dilemma and could seriously damage British standing in the West and the world. Follows made no promises as to his ultimate recommendation, however, he agreed to present the government's strong views at the March 25 meeting. (London 6363, 6366, PSN 12712m 12723, 12725) (C)
  
4. Pershing Guidance Components and Pakistan: In response to our information that the Pakistanis were still in contact with Mueller's export firm concerning the purchase of Pershing guidance components, FRG foreign office official Pabsch informed our Embassy today that he had discussed the possibility of calling in the Pakistani ambassador with colleagues at the deputy assistant secretary level, who agreed they were prepared to recommend this course if the U.S. agreed. Pabsch said they would like to be in a position to cite to the Pakistani ambassador the conversations between Ambassador Hummel and Foreign Minister Shanawaz. According to Ambassador Stoessel, there are advantages in this idea, which would reinforce the level of warning to the Pakistani government, and might provide an avenue for confronting Mueller with sourceable evidence concerning activities which he has denied to German officials. He requests immediate guidance. (Bonn 5548, NODIS, PSN 12908, 12909) (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE SITUATION ROOM CHECKLISTCONFIDENTIAL

March 21, 1980

1. Mexican Commerce Official Comments on GATT Decision: While discussing the GATT decision with our economic officers, Under Secretary of Commerce Hector Hernandez expressed his disappointment about the Portillo decision, noting that "a lot of work involving government officials had gone down the drain." Hernandez emphasized that both the U.S. and Mexico should avoid hasty reactions and that if a decision affecting U.S.-Mexican trade is made it should be explained in sufficient depth and detail so that the Mexican public does not perceive the action as a U.S. retaliatory measure against the GATT decision. He acknowledged that the MTN bilateral agreement with the U.S. was dead and that the Japanese and EC also appeared to be viewing their MTN agreements with Mexico as null and void. Hernandez emphasized that the initiation of a bilateral trade negotiation with the U.S. would be a major political step for Mexico and suggested that a formal meeting of the trade working group be held at the end of April or in May. The embassy officers comment that Hernandez left them with the clear impression that he intends and expects to continue to manage Mexico's foreign trade policy within the guidelines President Portillo has delineated. Hernandez clearly indicated that he places a priority on managing the difficult trade issues with the U.S. in such a way as to avoid possible reactions and counter-reactions as fallout from the GATT decision that would disrupt the orderly mutually advantageous trade relationships with the U.S. (Mexico 4853, PSN 11786, 11817) (C)
2. Implications for U.S. Over Mexican Decision on GATT: In determining how Washington should proceed with our bilateral trade relationship with Mexico, Charge Ferch comments that Mexico's decision has far reaching implications for the U.S. and requires us to make far reaching decisions regarding both our relations with Mexico and our broad trade policy. Ferch believes that because of the dominance of the U.S. market in Mexico trade it is probable that Mexico's new policy will be directed first at the U.S. He feels that Mexico should "pay a higher price" than they paid in the 1979 MTN negotiations and that we should make it clear that special and differential treatment as enunciated in the Tokyo declaration would not apply to a new negotiation with

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REVIEW ON MARCH 21, 2010

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Mexico. Ferch asks for guidance as how to proceed in approaching the upcoming scheduled textile consultations, winter vegetable negotiations and setting the date for the trade working group meeting. He notes that these meetings will take on new and considerable more importance as a consequence of Portillo's GATT decision. (Mexico 4795, PSN 11514, 11500) (C)

3. Saudi Egyptian Press Attacks: Ambassador Atherton reports that there has been a lull in the personal attacks on the Saudi leadership over the past two weeks but believes it might still be useful for him to raise the issue again with Vice President Mubarak to prolong the trend. In light of Egyptian moderation and relative escalation by the Saudis he recommends that the Egyptians be informed that we are also making clear our concerns with the Saudi government. (Cairo 6336, PSN 11912) (C)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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January 17, 1980

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1. Afghanistan Expels All American Journalists: Embassy Kabul was informed today by the foreign ministry that all American journalists have been ordered to depart Afghanistan on the first available aircraft. The Afghan official stated that this action had been taken because of the "American journalists' interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and their biased reporting." Our embassy estimates that there are 30 to 50 American journalists and cameramen in Afghanistan, and it is now in the process of informing the journalists and assisting them to exit the country. (Kabul 175, PSN 36409) (C)
  
2. Christopher/Genscher Meeting: Christopher outlined to Foreign Minister Genscher yesterday our strategy toward Iran, explaining the need to implement economic sanctions and requesting FRG assistance. He clarified that we hope sanctions will obviate the need for other, more risky measures, and stressed the importance of European support. Genscher expressed an FRG willingness to help as much as possible on sanctions, indicated coordination with the other Europeans, and promised an early decision. The foreign minister stressed the need to consider our decisions and the developments in Iran carefully to ensure that European nationals are not taken hostage. The foreign minister stated it is important that Iranian leaders not see the conflict with the U.S. as more important than the Soviet threat; therefore, Western public statements should not diminish the Soviet conflict with the Islamic world. Genscher proposed that the Western reaction to the events in Afghanistan be incorporated into an overall political strategy, and outlined some steps the EC is considering in this regard, including new arrangements with Yugoslavia and consideration of a possible political arrangement with the Gulf states and Iraq modeled on the EC-ASEAN cooperation agreement. Genscher further stressed the need to reach a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement, and described Israel's security concerns as small compared to the threat now posed by the Soviets to all countries of the region. (Bonn 916, PSN 35795, 35800, 35802, 35806, 35810) (S)

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3. Cooper Meeting with French Economic Officials: On Iran, the French identified legal problems in applying the Security Council resolution in the face of the Soviet veto, and recommended we consider putting the Soviets in a corner tactically by pressing them on what "measures" they would be prepared to take under Resolution 461. They questioned the tactical advisability of countries other than the U.S. imposing further measures at this time, but conceded that they probably have the legal ability to take some additional actions. Cooper proposed three areas where concrete support from our allies would be extremely useful in the Soviet/Afghanistan situation: no undercutting of U.S. actions; no new official export credits; and, strict application of COCOM criteria. The French will not undercut U.S. measures; will continue normal commercial relations, will not cut off official credits, and will take a tough line but act slowly in renegotiating the Franco-Soviet credit agreement. On COCOM, the French did not know what cases they might be submitting and promised to get back to us soon. (Paris 1739, PSN 35768, 35772, 35776, 35780) (S)

4. U.S./Argentine Relations: Ambassador Castro met on Tuesday with former Junta member General Viola, who is expected to succeed Videla as president in 1981, for a general review of U.S. Argentine relations. Viola appeared deeply perturbed about the adverse turn of events in our bilateral relations, and attributed this to the lack of communication between the executives and foreign ministers of both countries. He feels it is imperative that a dialogue be established as soon as possible between the President and President Videla and also between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Pastor. Viola stated that both countries should see each other on the basis of conditions as they exist on and look into the future rather than base their policy on past acts. The general expressed serious concern over the State Department's human rights report on Argentina and felt the wording of the report could precipitate a wave of emotionalism and anti-Americanism if Argentines felt the report was an unfair evaluation of their country. Viola agreed to do whatever he could to get the government's cooperation on the restriction of grain sales to the USSR. (Buenos Aires 472, PSN 35961) (C)

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MEMORANDUM

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REFER TO DOS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

10

December 3, 1979

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DOS REVIEWED 09-Jan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

1. President Videla's View on Entry of the Shah into Argentina: In a meeting with Ambassador Castro, President Videla indicated his mind remained open on entry of the Shah but at present the negative aspects appear to outweigh the positive. Videla questioned Castro on the need for urgency in considering this matter. Castro responded that the Shah was "a very sick man who had to find a place to land permanently for continuity of medical care" and the Shah felt guilty for the present problem with the hostages. Concerning the negative aspects, Videla noted such a decision would cost Argentina support of nonaligned and Arabic countries; though economically the move would have little effect, he had to consider the political implications. He added that the military might be concerned, especially in light of the Timerman, Lorman and Campora releases. In essence, the "Shah was an added burden Argentina didn't need." Castro pointed to the potential positive factor in improving Argentina's "tarnished" image and noted that humanitarian reasons far outweigh everything. Castro believes that Videla is "shaken-up" over this problem and finds himself in a quandry about his decision. Videla wants to discuss this issue with Castro again this week and it is likely that an Argentine decision will come before the ambassador leaves for consultations in Washington on December 7th. (State 310239 NODIS Cherokee, PSN 31418; and Buenos Aires NODIS 9815) (S)

2. Hussein's Views on Situation in Saudi Arabia: In briefing Ambassador Vellotes on his recent trip to Saudi Arabia, King Hussein indicated that the Saudi authorities are confident of their ability to control the security situation. However, Hussein observed that recent events have taken a heavy physical and mental toll on King Khalid. Additionally, Khalid appreciated, but refused Hussein's offer of military assistance. From his conversations with the Saudi hierarchy, Hussein believed it significant, that the dissidents were from Nejd. Since the incident happened in a Hejazis area, little sympathy for the insurgents occurred; however, if the revolt had erupted within the Nejd area, Khalid had doubts whether a significant number of Saudi soldiers would fight. Hussein is convinced that communists are manipulating the religious fanatics and has found only tenuous evidence of any Shia involvement in the current events. Hussein noted that the Saudis remain confident in their ability

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to handle their internal security situation; however, any precipitous American evacuation would gather wide-spread media coverage and be "a devastating blow to Saudi self-confidence at this time." (Amman 7527, PSN 31423, 31426, NODIS) (S)

3. King Hussein and Iran: Responding to Ambassador Veliotes concern that the Jordanian government has yet to officially address the Iranian situation, Hussein stated his intention to meet with the local media to "set the record straight" and plans to make a "broader declaration" which would focus on "the current problem in the Islamic and Arab world stemming from Iranian attitudes...and the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca." Veliotes provided Hussein with copies of the President's statement and press conference of November 29 which he had not yet read. (Amman 7525, PSN 31439) (S)

4. King Hassan and OAU Summit: President Tolbert and Foreign Minister Dennis expressed their disappointment Sunday to Ambassador Smith over King Hassan's apparent decision not to attend the OAU Wisemen's meeting on the Saharan dispute. The foreign minister predicted that Hassan's "no show" would generate an angry African response which could result in decisions by the wisemen more harmful to Morocco than would otherwise have been the case. Dennis again appealed for U.S. assistance in reversing Hassan's decision. Liberian ambassador-at-large Mitchell, who had just returned from Rabat, indicated that Hassan had not told him that he would not go to Monrovia but reiterated Morocco's earlier request for a postponement. Nevertheless, Mitchell stood firm in his belief that Hassan had no intention of going and never had any intention of doing so. Ambassador Smith, noting the linkage in some African minds between our arms decisions and the King's present intransigence, underscores the need to stress to King Hassan that it would be in both our interest and the Moroccans for him to attend the Monrovia meeting. (Monrovia 9356, PSN 32400, 32403) (S)

5. Charge Eagleton's Initial Assessment of Embassy Tripoli Incident: Charge Eagleton believes that while evidence exists that a well-organized group was behind the demonstration, the extent and level of government involvement

remains unclear. Eagleton speculates that the Libyan authorities did not expect the compound to be penetrated, especially in light of recent attempts of at least part of the government to improve relations with the U.S. Eagleton has informed the American community that it can no longer rely on Libyan assurances of protection and recommended immediate thinning of staffs and dependents; further, he has told Libyan authorities that if another demonstration occurs, we will have to "close the embassy." Eagleton recommends that we maintain formal relations at least until our nationals have departed. He concluded that Qadhafi's role remains uncertain, but the next 24 hours should indicate the nature of the Libyan government involvement in this incident. (Tripoli 0001, PSN 32923) (C)

6. Assessment of Sino-American Relations Vis-a-Vis Kampuchea: In an overview of how the Kampuchea problem impinges on Sino-American relations, Ambassadors Abramowitz and Woodcock believe that for the present we should continue cooperation with the PRC by placing maximum diplomatic pressure on the SRV, pursue the concept of safehavens and preserve the psychological and political stability of Thailand. Though the PRC and U.S. both seek to generate diplomatic pressure on the SRV, the U.S. diverges in terms of the ultimate fate of the SRV leadership and the use of force in achieving our goals. In the area of humanitarian relief of the Khmer people, the PRC has little concern for their fate; further, a difficulty remains in finding a leadership alternative to Pol Pot, who the Chinese continue to support. At present, both countries are working to preserve the stability of Thailand; however, U.S. interests are not tied as closely to the Kriangsak government as are the Chinese. In general, the U.S. should avoid too close an association with the PRC in dealing with Kampuchea to prevent both a restriction of options and maneuverability for our diplomatic efforts and a perception of Sino-American collusion by the ASEAN states. Our immediate objective -- reduction of Vietnamese influence in Cambodia -- remains parallel to the PRC's; however, in pursuing our efforts in a still "fluid" situation, we should place some distance between ourselves and the Chinese. (Bangkok 9427, PSN 31725) (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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August 14, 1979

DOS REVIEWED 08-Dec-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

1. Israeli Protest Over Young-PLO Encounter: Ambassador Evron has been instructed to deliver to Secretary Vance as soon as possible today the "protest and deep regret of the Israeli government" over Ambassador Young's meeting with PLO representative Terzi. Bar-on told Viets that after Vance had explained the chance encounter to Bar-on, Ambassador Blum reported on a conversation with Ambassador Young which gave an entirely different version of the meeting. Blum's report "made the situation look entirely different today than yesterday." According to Bar-on, the protest is entirely based on what Young told Blum. Young reportedly initiated the meeting with Blum "simply to inform him that the call on Bishara was not social." A telephone call from Embassy Tel Aviv to State indicates the Israelis will make the protest public at 0700 EDT. (Tel Aviv 17487, PSN 6561) (S)

2. Approach to Cubans Over Presence in Nicaragua: Following State Department's instructions to make an oral demarche to Havana over Cuba's military presence in Nicaragua, Acting Principal Officer Smith has asked for a meeting with Viera and hopes it will be granted soon. Smith anticipates that the Cuban response will be to deny that there is any significant Cuban military presence in Nicaragua. He comments his demarche would be more effective if he were in a position to refute this with one or two specific examples of a larger Cuban military presence. Smith has asked Embassy Managua and State for some hard evidence on the presence of rockets and machineguns that have arrived from Cuba. (USINT Havana 7222, PSN 5989) (S)

3. U.S. Military Assistance to Nicaragua: Ambassador Pezzullo notes that the arrival of a small U.S. military advisory team in the next few days will stimulate requests from the FSLN leadership for military items ranging from uniforms to equipment. He urges that we be in

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a position to be responsive to the more realistic requests. Pezzullo asks that he be provided a selected list of available military surplus items and be provided \$750 thousand to \$1 million in grant funds to satisfy some priority needs. He requests that he have enough operating flexibility to take advantage of the opportunities which will demonstrate our willingness to meet the GRN priority needs, which will help us develop close relations and offer opportunities to influence key military figures. Pezzullo comments that although there is very limited grant assistance money available, Nicaragua must be viewed as an exceptional case which requires urgent and imaginative responses. A small investment now is essential. (Managua 3709, PSN 6257) (C)

4. Senator Kennedy Letter to President Park: Senator Kennedy has written a letter to ROK President Park congratulating him for his pledge to assist with the Indochinese refugee problem and urging him to continue to seek means for further assistance possibly to include rescue efforts by the ROK navy and some resettlement. Kennedy also commends Park for his recent release of political prisoners and expresses hope that it represents a trend which will strengthen both the ROK and our cooperation. Kennedy expresses full support for the U.S. commitment to ROK security which "extends beyond any particular present deployment of U.S. forces." (State 211280, PSN 6232) (S)

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August 14, 1979 12~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

1. Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Plans to Visit Washington: During discussions with Ambassador Pezzullo today, Foreign Minister d'Escoto said he was very pleased by the reception the Nicaraguan delegation received in Quito, and by the cordial discussions held with Mrs. Carter and other members of the U.S. delegation. D'Escoto then indicated that he would be traveling to Washington next week with some members of the junta, and hoped to meet with the President and members of the banking community. At Pezzullo's urging, he agreed that it might be best to make the visit alone and to consider a meeting with the President at a later time. Pezzullo comments that the foreign minister clearly wants to take immediate advantage of the spirit of Quito to cement closer ties with the U.S. He recommends that we not delay in offering an invitation to the junta to visit Washington in September, and that it should include a call on the President since he is an important symbol of change in U.S.-Nicaraguan policy. He believes now is the best time to extend an invitation, before d'Escoto's trip, and requests immediate authorization to do so. (Managua 3723, 3713, NODIS STADIS, PSN 7203, 6854) (C)
  
2. Implications of Israeli Cabinet Decision on 242: According to Charge Viets, the Israeli cabinet statement on UN resolution 242 constitutes an open-ended warning that Israel may consider some passages in the Camp David framework to be "null and void" if the U.S. fails to veto a Palestine rights resolution. While the statement does not appear to suggest that Israel will terminate the autonomy negotiations, they could choose to make the point that the provisions in 242 on the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" would explicitly be rejected by them in the negotiations. Thus, Israel could still claim to accept the goals it committed itself to in the joint letter of March 26, 1979, and at the same time adopt the position that the "changing" of 242 no longer obligates them to withdraw from the occupied

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territories. In conclusion, Viets suggests that on the basis of the cabinet statement, the Israelis could justify virtually any action, from selective negotiation of portions of resolution 242, to outright suspension of the autonomy negotiations on the basis that the operative paragraph of the Camp David framework has been "nullified." (Tel Aviv 17542, PSN 7033, 7036) (S)

3. Dayan Keeps the Pot Boiling: Charge Viets reports that Foreign Minister Dayan made a vigorous effort yesterday to keep the political pot boiling with his remarks to a meeting of the Likud Knesset faction. Among other things, Dayan informed the group that the U.S. was prepared to "replace" resolution 242 as a means of bringing the PLO into the peace process; claimed that the U.S. accepted Israel's policy of preemptive strikes at terrorist bases in south Lebanon; and asserted that the U.S. was willing to permit Soviet observers to participate in supervision of the peace treaty implementation. Dayan did admit, however, that the U.S. had reservations about hitting civilians in Lebanon, "mainly when this is done with U.S. equipment." Viets comments that Dayan managed to insinuate a distorted U.S. angle into each of the topics addressed. He concludes that the Israeli foreign minister evidently believes there is still political capital to be made in the Likud by continuing to ping away at America at every opportunity. (Tel Aviv 17555, PSN 6923, 7924) (C)

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WASHINGTON

August 14, 1979

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1. Pakistani Protest of U.S. Actions: Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz summoned Ambassador Hummel to the foreign ministry today to deliver a strong protest over Richard Burt's recent New York Times article. Shahnawaz expressed Pakistan's "deep disappointment," stating that such threats of commando raids, economic reprisals, and other strong U.S. sanctions against Pakistan would only serve to further Soviet interests in the region. He cited a number of incidents as "evidence of the U.S. propaganda campaign" against Pakistan, including Gerard Smith's statement to Agha Shahi on May 4 that "Pakistan was risking its total relationship with the U.S.," and "entering into the valley of death." The foreign secretary said Pakistan may take the matter to an international fora and closed his formal protest by appealing to the U.S. to "stop these attacks forthwith as it is in neither country's interest." Hummel comments that although most of Pakistan's "evidence" is from press and unsubstantiated rumors, it is unfortunate that they were able to use statements such as Gerard Smith's as evidence from a U.S. official source that there is a danger of preemptive strikes against Pakistan's nuclear installations. He requests immediate guidance for responding to the protest. (Islamabad 9257 NODIS, PSN 6815, 6820) (S)

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MEMORANDUM

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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August 15, 1979

1. Effects of Kraft Article on Gas Negotiations: Charge Ferch comments that yesterday's Joseph Kraft article on the recent gas negotiations is particularly unfortunate in view of the Mexican request that we keep the negotiations private and keep the details out of the press. The revelation of details of the talks will almost certainly, perhaps very seriously, complicate Mexico's ability to deal with the domestic sensitivities of the gas issue. Ferch continues to believe, however, that Mexico wants to reach an agreement on the gas issue. He recommends that Katz/Vaky make a high-level call on the Mexican ambassador to reassure his government that the leak was unauthorized, that we continue to hope for a mutually beneficial agreement, and that we have no intention of carrying on these negotiations in the press. (Mexico 13778, PSN 7739) (C)
  
2. Argentina on Verge of Crucial Nuclear Decisions: Ambassador Castro notes that within the next few weeks Argentina will make several crucial decisions regarding its nuclear development. He suggests that the State Department contact the governments of Canada, Switzerland and Germany in a final effort to coordinate safeguard requirements. Castro feels that Argentina will ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco in order to negotiate a FSS agreement with the IAEA on Tlatelolco language. (Buenos Aires 6637, PSN 7741) (C)

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NODIS  
E.O. 12065: XDS-1 1/29/10 (CHAPLIN, MAXWELL) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, AR, US  
SUBJECT: (U) FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL REVIEWS GOODPASTER MISSION

1. (U - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. POLCOUNS (HALLMAN) TALKED WITH OFFICER ON THE STAFF OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER CAVANDOLI (BRAUGE) ON JANUARY 29 ABOUT RESULTS OF GOODPASTER VISIT. BOTH WERE NOTETAKERS DURING GOODPASTER-PASTOR-MARTINEZ DE HOZ CONVERSATIONS.

3. BRAUGE WAS PLEASED THAT BUENOS AIRES PRESS COVERAGE OF THE VISIT HAD BEEN SYMPATHETIC -- "NO PROBLEMS HERE FOR THE GOVERNMENT," HE SAID.

4. HE WAS LESS SANGUINE ABOUT BEHIND-THE-SCENES FALLOUT -- NOT, HE SAID, BECAUSE ANYTHING HAD GONE WRONG, BUT BECAUSE HE SENSES THAT EXPECTATIONS WERE BUILT WITH HIS BOSSES HE FEARS WILL NOT BE SATISFIED. THESE DEAL WITH:  
A. THE DEPARTMENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO THE CONGRESS. THIS, BRAUGE SAID, IS SOMETHING PASTOR AND CAVANDOLI BELIEVE THE ADMINISTRATION DEFINITELY CAN CONTROL. THEY WILL BE BITTERLY UNHAPPY IF THE REPORT IS "UNFAVORABLE."  
TALK OF "CONSTITUENCIES" WITHIN OUR ADMINISTRATION AND BUREAUCRACY SIMPLY FALLS ON DEAF EARS, BRAUGE SAID. (BRAUGE LIVED SEVERAL YEARS IN WASHINGTON AND UNDERSTANDS THE WORKINGS OF OUR GOVERNMENT.) ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WHAT THE U.S. BELIEVES IS SCRUPULOUSLY FAIR MAY BE INFURIATING HERE.  
B. ACTION BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS

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COMMISSION. BEAUGE SAID CAVANDOLI HAD GIVEN TOO MUCH WHEN HE SAID THAT GOA COULD ACCEPT KEEPING ITEM 12 B UNDER REVIEW. ON REFLECTION, THAT COURSE WOULD KEEP OPEN THE "ARGENTINA CASE," AN INDIVIDUALIZATION GOA DOES NOT WANT. GOA WILL TAKE THE POSITION THAT REJECTION IS THE ONLY PRACTICABLE COURSE IN ORDER NOT TO MIX THE MATTER WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH, AFTER ALL, WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE COMMISSION'S REPORT IS ACTED UPON AT THE NEXT OAS MINISTERS MEETING. GOA WANTS U.S.G. HELP IN THIS POSITION. WHEN HALLMAN ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS AN OFFICIAL CLARIFICATION OF CAVANDOLI'S PRESENTATION BEAUGE SAID THAT YES IT WAS.

C. THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION'S REPORT. BEAUGE SAID HE AND HIS BOSSES KNOW THAT ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S.G. TRY TO SWAY FARER FROM HIS STERN VIEWS ON ARGENTINA IS A NON-STARTER. HE ADMITTED HOWEVER THAT A STRATEGY OF TRYING TO PERSUADE OAS MEMBERS TO VOTE MODIFICATIONS TO THE REPORT MAY EMERGE -- ESPECIALLY COUNTRIES HAVING CITIZENS WHO PARTICIPATE IN THE COMMISSION. I RECALL THAT PASTOR SAID, BEAUGE REMINDED, THAT IT SEEMS POINTLESS FOR A GOVERNMENT TO CHOOSE BAD RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA JUST BECAUSE OF THE VIEWS OF A CITIZEN OF THAT COUNTRY. MEANWHILE, BEAUGE SAID, THE "OFFICIAL GROUP" NAMED TO WRITE ARGENTINA'S REPLY TO THE COMMISSION'S REPORT LABORS MANFULLY WITH LEGAL ARGUMENTS.

5. ASKED HOW HE FORESEES ARGENTINA WILL APPROACH UNDERTAKINGS ON GRAINS EXPORTS MADE DURING GOODPASTER'S VISIT, BEAUGE AT FIRST FOUND IT PUZZLING SOMEONE SHOULD BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A PRECISE SUM DETERMINED FOR ARGENTINA'S COARSE GRAINS SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION. CONCLUDING AT LAST THAT MARTINEZ DE HOZ'S AGREEMENT TO PUT A LIMIT ON SALES TO SOVIET GRAIN TRADING COMPANIES INDICATED THAT AN AMOUNT ACTUALLY BE FIXED, BEAUGE WENT ON TO SAY HE DOUBTED THAT MANY BEYOND THE ECONOMY MINISTER HIMSELF WOULD EVER LEARN WHAT WAS THE DETERMINED SUM. BEAUGE WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT MODALITIES OF ARGENTINA'S PRESENTING INFORMATION ABOUT GRAINS EXPORTS TO THE MONITORING GROUP, BUT SAID THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT HIS MINISTRY.

6. ONE OTHER SUBJECT CAME UP: ARGENTINA'S PARTICI-

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PATION IN THE OLYMPIC GAMES. AFTER ARGENTINA'S STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO "DE-POLITICIZE" THE WORLD CUP GAMES HELD HERE IN 1978 AND THE WORLD CANCER CONFERENCE HELD THE FOLLOWING YEAR IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO BACK AWAY FROM THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. BEAUGE KNEW OF NO CURRENT DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT ARGENTINA BOYCOTT THE GAMES, BUT ALSO SAID THAT A RECENT STATEMENT BY THE ARGENTINE OLYMPICS COMMITTEE PRESIDENT THAT ARGENTINA DEFINITELY WOULD PARTICIPATE HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH HIGHEST GOA AUTHORITIES.

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E.O. 12065: XDS-1 1/28/10 (CASTRO, RAUL H.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, AR  
SUBJECT: (C) DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S  
VISIT TO ARGENTINA: GENERAL TRADE/GRAINE TOPICS: JANUARY 23

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

3. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA:  
LIMITING ARGENTINA'S GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS: BRIGADIER (RET) CARLOS PASTOR,  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DR. JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY  
COMODORO CARLOS CAVANDOLI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER  
MR. VICTOR BEAUCE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NOTETAKER)  
GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY  
RAUL H. CASTRO, U.S. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA  
CLAUS W. RUSER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/ECA)  
WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, U.S. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES, (NOTETAKER)

5. TIME AND PLACE: JANUARY 23 AND 24, 1980; THE  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUENOS AIRES

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. GENERAL GOODPASTER  
MET ON TWO CONSECUTIVE DAYS AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS. THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY LED ARGENTINA'S  
PART OF DISCUSSIONS DEALING WITH SHIPMENTS OF GRAINS  
FROM ARGENTINA TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR EFFORTS  
TO GET ARGENTINA TO LIMIT THESE SHIPMENTS. THE  
MINISTER FOUND MANY REASONS FOR ARGENTINA'S NOT  
ATTEMPTING LIMITATIONS, THE GREATEST BEING HIS

\*\*\*\*\* WHER COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

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BELIEF THAT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO DENY GRAINS TO THE SOVIET UNION WERE BOUND TO FAIL AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO INTERRUPT ARGENTINA'S POLICY AND PROFITS TO THIS END. HE AGREED HOWEVER TO MAKE PRIVATE REQUESTS TO THE SOVIET GRAINS TRADING COMPANY TO LIMIT PURCHASES IN ARGENTINA TO PAST LEVELS (PLUS A "GROWTH FACTOR") AND TO COOPERATE IN SHARING INFORMATION REGARDING ARGENTINA GRAINS SHIPMENTS.

7. A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PRESENTATION OF POLITICAL SUBJECTS. END MEMCON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

8. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FIRST PRESENTATION. GENERAL GOODPASTER LED WITH PRESENTATION OF OUR RECKONING OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION THAT EVOLVED WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO EXPLAIN HOW WE BELIEVE RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORTS OF GRAIN TO THE SOVIET UNION FIT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER ACTIONS OUR GOVERNMENT IS TAKING TO FACE THIS NEW SITUATION. HE SAID THAT HE ALSO HAD SOME TO DISCUSS WAYS TO DEEPEN AND STRENGTHEN ARGENTINE-U.S. RELATIONS.

9. IT WAS URGENT, GOODPASTER CONTINUED, TO TAKE AN IMMEDIATE, FIRM AND SUSTAINED STAND IN FACE OF THE SOVIET ACTION — AND NOT TO REPEAT THE COURSE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET UNION'S EARLIER INCURSION INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHEN IMPETUS HAD BEEN LOST. THIS LATEST SOVIET ACT WAS FAR MORE BLATANT IN THAT IT WAS THE FIRST MILITARY INVASION OUTSIDE EASTERN EUROPE, AND PRACTICALLY FROM THE BEGINNING INVOLVED SIX ARMY DIVISIONS AND ULTRA-MODERN AIRCRAFT. THOUGH WE CONCEDE THAT IMMEDIATE GOALS AND LOCAL CONCERNS MAY HAVE MOTIVATED THE SOVIET UNION, THE STRATEGIC-DYNAMIC EFFECT WAS NEVERTHELESS ONE OF THREAT TO PAKISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF REGION AND, FROM THAT, TO ALL THE WEST.

10. OUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE, USING GRAINS SHIPMENTS AND THE PROSPECT OF BOYCOTTING THE OLYMPIC GAMES, WAS A QUICK SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR ALLIES THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT TOLERATE SOVIET CONDUCT. NOW WE ARE INVOLVED IN EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH ALL OUR ALLIES, INCLUDING PAKISTAN AND NATO — PLUS THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA — TO COORDINATE ACTION. WE BELIEVE A SOVIET TACTIC WILL NOW BE TO PLAY A WAITING GAME, EXPECTING THAT THE ALLIES CAN BE DETACHED ONE FROM ANOTHER. THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN.

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11. LIMITATIONS OF GRAINS SHIPMENTS ARE SIGNIFICANT, EVEN IF THE RESULTS OF THESE ARE PRINCIPALLY TO PROCLAIM INTENTIONS. OUR BEGINNING, WE ADMIT, WAS CLUMSY IN THAT WE FAILED TO CONSULT FULLY. BUT NEITHER SECRETARY VANCE NOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTOR INTENDS TO ABUSE FRIENDSHIP. WE LOOK TOWARD TO EXTENSIVE, TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ARGENTINA REGARDING SUPPLY, STORAGE, SHIPMENT AND POSSIBLE DIVERSIONS OF GRAINS.

12. GENERAL GOODPASTER WENT ON TO REMIND THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT CALLED FOR A "BOYCOTT" AND WOULD FULFILL COMMITMENTS MADE BACK IN 1975 TO SHIP THE USSR 8 MILLION TONS OF GRAIN. ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ ASKED FOR A LEGAL EXPLANATION OF "COMMITMENT" AND HOW WE JUXTAPOSED THIS WITH "AUTHORIZATIONS" ALSO FORESEEN IN THE 1975 AGREEMENT. MR. RUSER EXPLAINED THAT STATE DEPARTMENT LAWYERS HAD STUDIED THE QUESTION AND MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT WAS PROMISED AND WHAT HAD BEEN MADE CONDITIONAL ON FURTHER AGREEMENT.

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13. PASTOR ASKED WHETHER IT WAS NOT TRUE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS STOCKS PERHAPS EVEN AMOUNTING TO TWO OR TWO AND ONE HALF YEARS OF CONSUMPTION, AND IF THIS WERE TRUE NOW U.S. LIMITATIONS COULD BE MADE EFFECTIVE, GENERAL GOODPASTER REPLIED THAT WHILE WE WERE NOT CERTAIN ABOUT THE QUANTITY OF SOVIET GRAINS CARRYOVER WE ESTIMATE A SOVIET PRODUCTION-HOLDING CAPACITY OF TWO HUNDRED MILLION TONS, AGAINST A SOVIET WISH TO DISPOSE OF FOUR HUNDRED MILLION, AT VERY LEAST OUR ACTION PLUS LAST YEARS SHORT SOVIET PRODUCTION WOULD LEAD TO HEAVY PRESSURE AND DRAWDOWN OF ANY EXISTING STOCKS.

14. LIMITATIONS ON EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION, GENERAL GOODPASTER CONTINUED, WOULD HAVE EFFECT ON ACTIVITIES ON THE MARGINS OF GRAINS TRADE: POULTRY AND PORK PRODUCTION WILL HAVE TO BE REDUCED. THIS CREATES DOMESTIC PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, DISAFFECTION.

15. FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR ASKED WHETHER DENIAL OF GRAINS TO THE SOVIET UNION BETRAYED PRESIDENT CARTER'S PROMISE NOT TO USE FOOD AS A WEAPON, TO WHICH MR. RUBER REPLIED THAT BASIC HUMAN CONSUMPTION WILL NOT BE AFFECTED. A TEN PERCENT CUT, FOR EXAMPLE, IN GRAINS WOULD, RATHER, AFFECT SOVIET EFFORTS TO DIVERSIFY CONSUMER PATTERNS.

16. PASTOR WENT ON TO OBJECT THAT BASICALLY IT WAS WESTERN WEAKNESS DEMONSTRATED IN THE PAST THAT HAD ALLOWED INROADS INTO AFGHANISTAN -- JUST AS IT HAD, HE ASSERTED, INTO CENTRAL AMERICA. WOULD IT NOT BE MORE EFFECTIVE TO USE MILITARY MEASURES TO COUNTER

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MILITARY THRUSTS? PASTOR ADDED THAT HE WAS EQUALLY DUBIOUS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN OLYMPICS BOYCOTT.

17. MARTINEZ DE HOZ TOOK THE FLOOR TO DEVELOP THESE THEMES. HE DISAPPROVES, IN PRINCIPLE, OF USING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN MILITARY-POLITICAL CONFRONTATIONS BECAUSE THE ONLY REALLY CERTAIN EFFECT IS TO DESTROY AN ECONOMIC ORDER. IF ANYTHING, HE SAID, LET ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BE USED AGAINST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES.

18. FURTHER, THE MINISTER DOUBTED WE HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT ONLY THE U.S. AND ARGENTINA ARE SIGNIFICANT FEED GRAINS EXPORTERS. HE VIEWED AS HOLLOW THE WILLINGNESS OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO ABIDE BY GRAINS EXPORT LIMITATIONS, SINCE THE EXPORTABLE SURPLUS OF THOSE AREAS WOULD IN ANY EVENT BE DESTINED TO OTHER KINDS OF MARKETS.

19. PERFECTION OF A LIMITATIONS POLICY WILL BE DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE, THE MINISTER SAID. HE PREDICTED THAT "LEAKAGE JUST FROM U.S. SUPPLIES COULD AMOUNT TO THREE OR FOUR MILLION TONS. AND IF THIS WERE TRUE OF THE U.S., IT WOULD BE EVEN LIKELIER IN THE CASE OF ARGENTINA AND OTHER EXPORTERS. HE DOUBTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE HURT TO THE POINT OF CHANGING ITS POLICY FOR A FEW MILLION TONS OF GRAIN.

20. MARTINEZ DE HOZ WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THE WORKINGS OF THE ARGENTINE GRAINS TRADE. THIS GOVERNMENT DELIBERATELY SOUGHT TO DISMANTLE THE GRAINS MONOPOLY INHERITED FROM EARLIER GOVERNMENTS. THE POLICY IS FUNDAMENTAL, AND IT HAS LED TO THREE CONSECUTIVE BUMPER CROPS. SUPPORT PRICES ARE USED TO THE SMALLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE AND, GENERALLY SPEAKING, THERE ARE NOW OUTSIDE THE WHEAT TRADE. UNLIKE IN SOME COUNTRIES (THE MINISTER CITED CANADA) THE GRAINS BOARD DOES NOT BUY UP CROPS BUT MERELY REGISTERS INTENDED EXPORTS WITHOUT REGARD TO DESTINATION. EXPORTERS BUY DIRECTLY FROM PRODUCERS, USUALLY ON F.O.B. (BUENOS AIRES OR ROSARIO) TERMS. IT IS THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES THAT USUALLY PURCHASE ON C.I.F. TERMS AND DOING THIS ACQUIRE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINAL DESTINATIONS. THE SOVIET GRAINS TRADING ENTITY BUYS IN ARGENTINA LIKE ANY BIG INTERNATIONAL DEALER.

21. A SUGGESTION THAT THIS PATTERN BE ALTERED IS VERY SERIOUS BUSINESS. "HAD YOU ASKED US WE COULD HAVE EXPLAINED ALL THIS," MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID. "AT AN EARLIER POINT PERHAPS WE COULD HAVE TAKEN INTO

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ACCOUNT THESE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES, BUT AT THIS POINT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ADOPT MEASURES THAT COST US REVISION OF THE BASIC PREMISES OF OUR SYSTEM. MARTINEZ DE HOZ WENT ON TO SAY THAT NEW CIRCUMSTANCES SPEAKING AGAINST THIS FORECLOSURE WERE DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE — GIVEN ESPECIALLY HIS CERTAINTY THAT THERE WILL BE DIVERSIONS, AND THAT WHATEVER ARGENTINA MIGHT DO WOULD LITTLE AFFECT WHAT PRIVATE TRADERS DO IN ITALY, SPAIN, GERMANY OR SWITZERLAND.  
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22. THE MINISTER POINTED TO OTHER PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES. HE ASSERTED THAT ON THE DAY OF THE CONVERSATION THERE WAS A THIRTY DOLLAR SPREAD BETWEEN "EMBARGOED" AND "FREE" GRAINS. THIS CREATES SEVERE TRADE AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS, AND IT ALSO CREATES THE QUESTION WHETHER ARGENTINE FARMERS MIGHT NOT LOSE THIS PRICE ADVANTAGE -- NOT TO AN EFFECTIVE POLICY OF LIMITATIONS BUT RATHER TO PRIVATE TRADERS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

23. MARTINEZ DE NOZ COMPLAINED THAT CURRENT MARKET DISTORTIONS CREATED BY U.S. POLICY ALREADY HAD COST ARGENTINA MARKETS. BOLIVIA, HE SAID, HAD CANCELLED GRAINS CONTRACTS WITH ARGENTINA WHEN OFFERED "EMBARGOED" U.S. GRAINS ON CONCESSIONAL TERMS. THIS TOOK PLACE, HE SAID, AFTER ARGENTINA HAD COMPLAINED TO THE U.S. DURING BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. CONVERSATIONS WITH MEXICO HAD STOPPED WHEN MEXICO FOUND IT COULD GET U.S. WHEAT PUT SUDDENLY ON THE MARKET. ARGENTINA'S TRADITIONAL SORGHUM MARKET WITH JAPAN SLUMPED WHEN U.S. SORGHUM PRICES FELL.

24. GOODPASTER DEFENDED: WE HAD NOT SAID THAT GRAINS LIMITATIONS WOULD PULL THE SOVIET UNION OUT OF AFGHAN-ISTAN. BUT EFFECTIVE RESTRICTION -- RESTRICTIONS, THAT IS, NOT OFFSET FROM OTHER SOURCES -- SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL OF SOLIDARITY TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. IT IS SOLIDARITY, AFTER ALL, THAT RESTRAINS THE SOVIET UNION FROM USING FORCE TO GAIN ITS ENDS IN EUROPE. HOW ELSE SHOULD SOVIET ATTENTION BE COMMANDED? WITH REGARD TO ARGENTINA'S LOST SALES IT WAS CLEARLY NOT THE INTENTION OF THE U.S. TO ADOPT A BEEGAR-THE-NEIGHBOR POLICY. THE MINISTER'S PRESENTATION ALREADY MAKES ARGENTINA'S CONCERNS

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A SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE U.S. CLOSE, CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS MUST FOLLOW. WHAT WE SEEK BASICALLY IS MEANS OF MAINTAINING ARGENTINA'S SALES AT HISTORIC LEVELS -- ALREADY THE ANNOUNCED POLICY OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

25. MARTINEZ DE HOZ REPLIED THAT THIS POLICY IMPLIED NOT SEEKING TO CHANGE THE MARKET -- AND THAT THIS INCLUDED A RESOLUTION NOT TO INTERVENE. HE OFFERED HOWEVER THAT INFORMAL MEANS, SHORT OF "INTERVENTION" MIGHT BE FOUND. ARGENTINA COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, GO TO THE SOVIET GRAIN TRADING ENTITY AND ASK THAT IT LIMIT PURCHASES TO "X-QUANTITY." THIS WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF WHAT ULTIMATELY HAPPENS TO ARGENTINE GRAIN SOLD F.O.B. TO A LARGE ITALIAN FIRM.

26. GENERAL GOODPASTER PROBED MARTINEZ DE HOZ'S ADMISSION THAT SOME PRIVATE WORD COULD BE GIVEN TO THE SOVIET TRADING COMPANY. GIVEN THAT ARGENTINA BELIEVES THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF DESTINATION CONTROL ARE SO GREAT THAT YOU ARE UNPREPARED TO TRY, DO YOU IN FACT AGREE TO HOLD U.S.S.R. PURCHASES TO "HISTORIC LEVELS"?

27. MARTINEZ DE HOZ REPLIED THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE IN SECRECY BECAUSE, HE SAID, SO MUCH HAD GO AWRY ALREADY: PUBLIC OPINION WAS OFFENDED AT THE U.S. DELIBERATELY MISREPRESENTING ARGENTINE VIEWS ABOUT AN EARLIER AGREEMENT. THE DAY'S "GLAIN" NEWSPAPER CONTAINED A SKRILL STATEMENT BY AGRICULTURE UNDER SECRETARY KATHAWAY ABOUT MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA IF THE COUNTRY FAILED TO JOIN IN UNITED STATES PLANS. MEANWHILE, ARGENTINA HAD CLOSED GRAINS BOARD REGISTRATIONS AS OF JANUARY AND THEN KEPT THE BOARD CLOSED IN ANTICIPATION OF THE GOODPASTER VISIT. EXTENSION OF THE CLOSURE WOULD DISTORT THE LOCAL MARKET FURTHER.

28. GENERAL GOODPASTER TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO POSSIBILITIES WITHIN THE EXISTING ARGENTINE SYSTEM FOR AVOIDING DIVERSIONS. MARTINEZ DE HOZ CORRECTED THAT THE CONVERSATION SHOULD NOT TURN ON "DIVERTING COUNTRIES," BUT RATHER ON "DIVERTING COMPANIES" OF RATING IN SITUATIONS OF GREAT FLUIDITY. ARGENTINE BILLS OF LADING DO SHOW DESTINATIONS BUT, MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID, NOT FINAL ONES. THUS AN ENORMOUS COMMERCE APPEARS HEADED FOR ROTTERDAM -- BUT ONLY BECAUSE THAT INTERMEDIATE POINT IS EUROPE'S LARGEST ENTREPOT.

29. GENERAL GOODPASTER ASKED WHETHER ARGENTINA COULD

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SOME TO SOME AGREEMENT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES REGARDING  
DIVERSIONS OF ARGENTINE GRAINS. MARTINEZ DE HOZ  
REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD, AS ITS  
INITIATIVE, TAKE UP THE MATTER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.  
CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN THOUGH NOT TO TAKE ACTION WHICH  
WOULD HURT ARGENTINE FARMERS, AND ANY SUCH CONSULTA-  
TIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN AGREEMENTS EXISTING  
JUST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THOSE OTHER COUNTRIES.  
MEANWHILE, MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID, 'WE WILL NOT OURSELVES  
PULL STRINGS OR TRY TO MANIPULATE MARKETS.'

58. (COMMENT: THE CONVERSATION ENDED AT 2015 TO BE  
TAKEN UP AGAIN ON THE FOLLOWING DAY.)

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~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR VAKY ✓  
Assistant Secretary and US Coordinator Alliance  
for Progress, Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

Pete, as promised I am forwarding a written report of the Vice President's meeting with President Videla for yourself and Under Secretary Newsom. I would stress our belief that distribution of this document should be tightly controlled, on a need to know basis.

A. Denis Clift  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

cc: David Aaron ✓  
Robert Pastor

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

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Authority NLC-7-34-5-2-9  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

September 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR GARDNER'S RESIDENCE,  
ROME, ITALY

September 4, 1968, 1:50 p.m.

ARGENTINE SIDEPresident Jorge Rafael Videla  
Col. Miguel A. Mallea Gil  
Dr. Ricardo YofreU.S. SIDEVice President Walter F. Mondale  
A. Denis Clift  
Anthony J. Hervas, Interpreter

The Vice President opened saying he was pleased to have the pleasure of the meeting. He recalled the meeting with Videla in the White House at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty ceremony. He said we want good relations but there are strains now -- human rights are a central concern. He added that he would report to the President personally on Videla's views.

President Videla thanked the Vice President for the meeting -- an extremely important opportunity to discuss these matters because he feels our relations are deteriorating. He fully concurs with President Carter's position on human rights. Argentina has belief in the democratic process so that men can live with dignity and freedom. He said Argentina is with the United States and not troubled by criticism when it is objective. However, he is concerned by attitudes projecting intervention in domestic affairs. He spoke with President Carter about this at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty signing, but since that time he has had to delay announcement of an invitation to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights because of U.S. criticisms projecting intervention.

A second problem -- Argentine politicians were invited to visit the United States, but they, too, did not visit because of the U.S. statements intervening in our affairs. Mrs. Darien's statements are contributing to a deterioration in our relations.

The Vice President asked if these were statements made in Argentina or in Washington.

President Videla said in Washington before Congress. He said the western world must be united, and the United States must lead the western world. At the same time, the people of Argentina cannot tolerate intervention. This is his concern.

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The Vice President said we want to work with you to have good relations. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment is coming into effect. We must soon take decisions on the Allis-Chalmers deal. We want to be helpful. It would be important if Videla could have the Inter-American Human Rights Commission received in Argentina on terms acceptable to the commission. We would not link Argentine actions with our own.

The Vice President added that the U.S. press covers developments in Argentina closely. There are certain human rights cases with the people known to the press -- people such as Jacobo Timerman. To the extent that Videla makes progress on these cases, it will help us to make progress.

Videla said he understood, and government-to-government relations are not easy. His concern is when a problem is raised to the level of a public or popular issue. This leads to situations where Argentine citizens adopt partisan positions against the United States, to situations where Argentine businessmen adopt partisan positions because they cannot conclude deals when Ex-Im does not grant a loan.

The Vice President repeated that it was important to put our relations on a more positive course. He suggested that it would be good if Assistant Secretary Vaky could come to Argentina to meet with Videla or with a person of his choice for a review of our relations. Videla asked if this would be after the Inter-American Commission or before. The Vice President said he thought it should be as soon as possible. Videla said perhaps he could arrange a visit by the Commission by mid-October. The Vice President asked if he could announce the visit earlier.

Videla then said he would like to point out that since the meeting at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of events showing the efforts on the part of the Argentine government:

- they have issued a list and names of all the detained;
- they have published a list of all of those who disappeared and then reappeared;
- last Christmas they released approximately 500;
- this last week, 65 individuals were freed;
- they have indicated that they are prepared to give a favorable response to the Commission on Human Rights;
- Timerman's situation has changed; he is now out of jail and under house arrest;

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-- Professor Bravo is now under house arrest and they expect the court to lessen the charges against him.

He said officials of the U.S. government are welcome in Argentina, but they cannot give the impression that they are coming to inspect Argentina.

The Vice President said Mr. Vaky was a man of experience and would exercise discretion. He said it will be important to have the announcement on a visit by the Human Rights Commission on the terms acceptable to the Commission.

Videla said he we could have done so last month, but Mrs. Darien's statement before the Congress forced him to suspend the announcement. In the course of a few days, he believed he could develop a satisfactory announcement.

Mr. Clift said that in considering the announcement, it is important to remember the timing in the United States. The Ex-Im Bank must take its decision by September 15. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment comes into effect on October 1. The Vice President said we would hope the announcement could be taken care of before then. He said this might enable us to move on the Ex-Im letter before the 15th deadline. Videla said this was his intention. He did not think it could be done, however, before September 15.

The Vice President said we are encouraged that you will receive the Commission. Will you authorize me to tell the President that this will be done. Videla said yes. The Vice President asked when Assistant Secretary Vaky may come. Videla said after his announcement on the commission. He said he would prefer to have Vaky to visit Argentina alone. The Vice President said he wouldn't give a yes on this, but he would recommend it. Videla asked if the U.S. will let him know ahead of time what Vaky's mission will be to permit him to prepare for it. The Vice President said we would communicate this.

President Videla observed that US-Argentine relations proceed in multiple channels -- economic, political, cultural. Now our relations are focused solely on human rights. He said he can understand this problem if it is addressed in the broader spectrum of our overall relations and is not the single focus.

The Vice President said that if we can get on the road to progress in human rights, this whole other vista will open. He said he thought we are now at a point where we can turn the right way.

Videla said "I think we can. Mr. Vice President, I know your time was limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my greetings and best wishes to President Carter."

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Human Rights Cases

There has been widespread civil violence in Argentina since 1970. The unique quality of the present situation is the very large number of people detained and "disappeared" since the military came to power in 1976. A worldwide storm of criticism has resulted. Some of the cases of greatest interest are:

Detained

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Deutsch Family: Jewish groups, human rights organizations and some 25 Congressmen have asked our assistance for the family. President Carter raised the case of the Deutsches with President Videla during their bilateral.

The father, mother and three daughters were arrested in September. A son and his family fled and are now in the U.S. The Deutsch home was looted by the troops that arrested the family and there are reports that the family was tortured during the first weeks of confinement. In October, the mother and two daughters were released, but the youngest daughter and the father are still held. President Videla wrote to President Carter in October to say that the detained daughter was a member of a terrorist organization and that the father had known this yet had covered up for her. They would both be tried by military courts, the President said.

Jacobo Timerman: Editor and publisher of one of Argentina's largest newspapers, Timerman has become a cause celebre for Jewish groups and newspaper editors worldwide. Five Senators--Javits, Case, Sarbanes, Stone and Church--wrote you asking for your intercession on Timerman's behalf while you are in Argentina. He was arrested in April and there are reports that he was mistreated. No charges have been placed against him, and his arrest is more surprising in that his paper generally took a pro-military line. Last week, Timerman's civil rights and control over his property were cancelled by the government. The U.S. Jewish community sees Timerman's case as a specific example of the anti-semitism which they believe is rampant in Argentina. The government forcefully denies it is anti-semitic and has passed a law prohibiting the incitation of racial violence.

Alfredo Bravo: Vice President of a major Argentine human rights group and President of the Argentine Teachers Union, Bravo was arrested in September. Because

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NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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he had met a few days before his arrest with a visiting AFL-CIO delegation, the U.S. labor movement is very interested in his case.

Adolfo Perez Esquivel: A deeply religious and non-violent man, Perez Esquivel was the Coordinator of the ecumenical movement "Peace and Justice." He was arrested in April and has been imprisoned without charges since then. The Catholic Church and human rights groups have pressed strongly for his release.

Vogler Family: Lilliana Vogler was arrested in June 1975 and her father was arrested later that year, reportedly because he was making inquiries on her behalf. Lilliana was tried on charges of subversion, but not allowed to renounce a confession which had been obtained under torture. The sentence should be given in the next few months. Guillermo Vogler has been granted permission to leave the country, (he will come to the U.S.) but has not actually been released. The Foreign Ministry has promised to try to speed up his release. There has been White House and Congressional interest in the case.

#### Disappearances

Mauricio Lopez: Another ecumenical leader, Lopez was rector of San Luis University when he disappeared in January. Church groups in the U.S. and Europe have shown great interest in his case.

Eduardo Sajon: The former press secretary to Argentine President Lanusse, Sajon disappeared in April.

Dagmar Hagelin: A dual national Swedish-Argentine student, Hagelin disappeared in January. The Swedish Prime Minister wrote to Videla about her, but was told the Argentines had no information. The Swedish government has now appealed to us for assistance.

#### Procedures for Reporting Human Rights Cases

The Argentine Foreign Office Working Group on Human Rights, to which we have made known our interest in specific cases, has been generally unresponsive to our requests for information. This week, however, they did reply to a backlog of our requests, but provided little new information. Their failure to provide information may be a reflection of the GOA's indecision as to how to handle the cases of the "disappeared."

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## MEMORANDUM

NSS Rvw Completed - Released In Full - Refer To DOS - 11/6/12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 24, 1978

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IS REVIEWED 06 Nov 2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION:

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Information Items

Information

Weizman's Visit to West Bank: Our Jerusalem Consulate General reported that Weizman, during his June 20 visit to Nablus, Hebron, and nearby Israeli settlements exhibited unprecedented Israeli flexibility.

-- In Nablus, he approved the purchase of new generators to expand the municipal electrical plant, reversing Israel's longstanding policy. He also gave the go-ahead for the drilling of new water wells, and promised to curb the overzealous security searches conducted by IDF troops in the area.

-- In Hebron, he approved the return of two prominent deportees, local hospital improvements, and increases in electrical power.

Regarding the Jewish settlements, he gave his general support, but affirmed the Israeli government's respect for private Arab property. West Bank mayors were very pleased with Weizman's pronouncements, but the West Bank press took pains to disassociate municipal cooperation with Weizman from collaboration with Begin's autonomy scheme.

Trends in Human Rights in Argentina: According to a State analysis, Argentina's human rights record in 1978 displays some improvement over the 1976-77 period, but conditions have changed little in the last six months. Serious abuses still occur, despite reports of efforts by military officials to curb renegade counterterrorist activities. There is a reasonable prospect for gradual but significant improvement over the next year or so, however. In the meantime, the Argentines will probably pursue a damage-limiting strategy in their relations with the U.S.

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In recent weeks, President Videla's government has taken several noteworthy steps that are designed primarily to defuse human rights criticism during the OAS General Assembly.

-- On June 20, the IAHRIC was invited to pay a "special visit" to investigate "legal-judicial conditions."

-- President Videla is said to have informed an archbishop on June 19 that 14 labor leaders would be released and the cases of others reviewed.

-- Alfredo Bravo, a well-known labor leader and rights activist, returned home on conditional liberty on June 16 after 10 months in jail.

-- Two restrictions on press freedom were rescinded on June 5.

State notes that implementation of well-timed human rights "concessions" has been a consistent Argentine tactic over the past two years. The prospects for gradual improvement over the coming months will be enhanced by the continued diminution of the terrorist threat and the likelihood that Videla and his fellow moderates in the armed forces will consolidate their control over the security forces.

Your OAS Speech: Latin American media headlined and commented on your address to the OAS meeting, emphasizing your comments on human rights.

-- Gazeta Mercantil of Sao Paulo considered the speech "one of the most important, if not the most important," you have ever delivered before a Latin American audience." The article said you made one of your strongest defenses of human rights, not only reaffirming your human rights principles, but pronouncing them with even greater energy.

-- Headlines in Buenos Aires read: "Carter's Stern Warning -- Governments Violating Human Rights Will be Punished". "Carter Reaffirms Human Rights Policy".

-- Leftist-nationalist Excelsior of Mexico City approved of the proposal "to create a technical committee" to help raise living standards, but noted that to do this it would be necessary "to overcome the very powerful interests of those who uphold exploitation, frequently by U.S. companies."

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-- The English language daily Journal of Caracas stated:  
"Latin America is one part of the world where the push  
for human rights seems to be going well....even some  
of the worst violators of human rights in the hemisphere  
appear to be restraining themselves..."

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5. A DECISION ON ANY POSITIVE COMMENTS ON THE LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS SCENE SHOULD AWAIT THE REACTIONS OF THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY. CHAPLIN

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TAGS: SHUM, AR, PDIP  
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS IN ARGENTINA

LINDIS

DO5 REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

REF: STATE 182282

1. ALL OF US HERE WHO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOTING ARGENTINE PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE, AND THOSE IN MISSION WHO HAVE THE BEST MEANS OF OBSERVING THE ARGENTINE WAR AGAINST THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO REFTEL AND TO POSSIBLE EFFECTS SOME STATEMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF IMPROVEMENT HERE MIGHT HAVE. WE CONCLUDE THAT AN INITIATIVE INVOKING THE PRESIDENT'S NAME WOULD NOT BE ADVISABLE AT THIS TIME. THIS COURSE IS, HOWEVER, ONE WE MAY WANT TO TAKE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

2. WE AGREE THERE ARE ENCOURAGING SIGNS IN FACT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND ARGENTINE EXCESSES IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM HAVE DIMINISHED. IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO COMMENT ON A SIGNIFICANT SAMPLING OF THE 342 NAMES LISTED RECENTLY AS THOSE OF PERSONS RELEASED FROM CUSTODY HERE AND CITED BY REFTEL. WE CAN POINT, HOWEVER, TO KNOWLEDGE THAT THREE PERSONS ON THIS LIST HAVE IN FACT GAINED THEIR FREEDOM. WHAT INTERESTS US EQUALLY IS FACT THAT THERE IS INCREASING OFFICIAL RECOGNITION THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES HAVE OCCURRED. AS WAR AGAINST TERRORISM WINDS DOWN, IT APPEARS TO US THAT THERE IS BETTER CONTROL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THOSE OF ITS OWN FORCES WAGING THE WAR. WE FURTHER BELIEVE THAT GENERAL VIDELA AND HIS MODERATE MILITARY COLLEAGUES ARE GAINING INFLUENCE IN THE LONGER AND LARGER QUESTION OF WHO ULTIMATELY WILL RULE IN ARGENTINA. (SEE BUENOS AIRES 9281)

3. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS MUCH THAT DISTURBS US. DISAPPEARANCE OF EIGHT PERSONS FROM MAR DEL PLATA, ALL LAWYERS OR WIVES OF LAWYERS, IS A BROODING SCAUDAL WHICH DAILY ATTRACTS MORE ATTENTION HERE. OVER WEEKEND EMBASSY WAS GIVEN NEW INFORMATION CONCERNING HARASSMENT BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF RANKING UNION MEMBERS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO FIRM DATA ON THIS, WE CREDIT STORIES TO EFFECT THAT AT LEAST FIVE LABOR UNION LEADERS HAVE BEEN THREATENED WITH HARM UNLESS THEY PULL OUT OF LABOR AFFAIRS AND, ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE, LEAVE THIS COUNTRY. THE GRAIVEN AFFAIR APPEARS TO BE HEADED TOWARD A RESOLUTION WHICH WE FEAR WILL BE UNSYTTLING FOR THOSE WATCHING HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS IN ARGENTINA. "LA OPINION" FORMER EDITOR TIMPERMAN HAS, WE ARE T.O.D, BEEN RECENTLY TRANSFERRED TO LA PLATA WHERE HE IS AGAIN BEING HELD INCOMMUNICADO AND AGAIN WE FEAR THE OUTCOME WILL BE DISTRESSING.

4. ALL THIS LEADS US TO HESITATE IN USING A PRESIDENTIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF AN IMPROVING SITUATION, LEST SUBSEQUENTLY WE DISCOVER THAT HUMAN RIGHTS GAINS HERE WERE ILLUSORY. CHARGE WILL BE SEEING MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ TO QUESTION THE MINISTER WHAT ADVANCES IN HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCES ARE, IN HIS OPINION, WORTH OUR TAKING NOTE OF AND REPORTING TO OUR GOVERNMENT. CHARGE WILL AT THAT TIME TAKE NOTE OF SEVERAL "STRAWS IN THE WIND" WHICH LEAD US TOWARD ENCOURAGEMENT.

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-2-

Pakistani Military Assistance: Ambassador Hummel advises that whatever military assistance package is developed in Washington for Pakistan should be tailored for the locale of the threat and must be funded, since Pakistan has no money for the large-scale cash purchases it will need to engender a feeling of political support and security. After enumerating a list of equipment that would remedy glaring Pakistani military deficiencies, the ambassador asks that we not indulge in the familiar American desire to rely only on our own decisions on what is best for Pakistan. Thorough consultations with the Paks are essential before we reach final conclusions, not only because they will have useful ideas, but also because we know little about Pak capabilities due to their secretiveness. This includes Pak production capability; Chinese inputs past and future; and other Pak plans for procurement. (S)

Proposed Japanese Response to Moscow's Invasion of Kabul: According to foreign ministry official Donowaki, Tokyo's proposed answer to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will include negative responses to Moscow's request for conclusion of a comprehensive credit line, trade representative offices, joint ventures and offices of public corporations, and increased aviation flights. In addition, Donowaki said Tokyo will suspend new aid and technical cooperation with Kabul, as well as refuse to recognize the new government. He added that Japan supported efforts to tighten technological exchanges, but said they need clarification on whether we intend to strictly relate this to COCOM, or go beyond that to high technology in general. Regarding other suggested actions, Donowaki said Japan was not contemplating recalling their ambassador from Moscow, scaling down their embassy in Kabul, boycotting the Moscow olympics, or restricting Soviet fishing. (C)

Possible Australian Reaction to Afghan Crisis: A member of my staff has learned from the Australian embassy that the following are some of the responses under consideration by Canberra in response to the Afghan crisis:

- to divert some 5000 tons of wheat intended for Afghanistan to Pakistan (possibly for Afghan refugees there);
- possibly to provide additional commodity support for Afghan refugees;
- to look sympathetically at an application by Pakistan to rejoin the Commonwealth. (C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

-3-

NSC Activity

President Nimeri's Support for Middle East Process

In response to your question concerning Sudan's commitment to support Egypt and the peace process, Ambassador Bergus saw President Nimeri, who reaffirmed support for Egypt and asked that you be told, "Sudan will not hinder the process of peace." As a result of State's belief that Nimeri's commitment is sufficient to warrant \$130 million in bilateral assistance, OMB has been instructed to include it in the FY-81 budget. (S)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

38

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

January 8, 1980

1. Australian Reaction to Wheat Embargo on USSR: Embassy Canberra reports that there are sharp differences of opinion among senior level officials on the proposed embargo of wheat sales to the Soviet Union. Afghan coordinator Dalrymple commented that "it was not within Australia's power to ensure shipments denied by the U.S. to the Soviet Union will not be replaced by other suppliers." While the option paper for the prime minister's action has been forwarded, it is unlikely that any decision will be reached til after the meeting of major grain exporting nations in Washington on January 12. In another cable, the embassy reports that opposition party leader Bill Hayden has issued a statement calling the proposed embargo on wheat sales to the Soviet Union "an empty gesture." Hayden believes that the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan is essentially complete and any embargo will have only a very limited punitive impact on the Soviet economy. (Canberra 0170, PSN 23293; Canberra 0174, PSN 23317) (S)
  
2. Australian Wheat Sales to Iran: Dalrymple also relayed Australia's serious misgivings about fulfilling our request that they not negotiate any new sales of wheat to Afghanistan. Canberra is primarily concerned about the effectiveness of such steps because of the failure of past efforts to embargo trade; Iran has ample resources to obtain food on the world market; and, the fact that grain importers in France and Turkey have already entered into new contracts to sell grain to Iran. Additionally, he felt the U.S. policy was inconsistent in declaring its intent not to embargo food sales then ask the Australian government to embargo new sales. Dalrymple concluded that Australia understands the problem posed for the U.S. by a public perception of an ally improving its grain exports at the expense of the U.S. and will delay any decision on new grain sales to Iran until February 1. (Canberra 0172, PSN 23417) (S)
  
3. Egyptian Response to Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: In response to the Soviet invasion, Egypt will implement a drastic cut-back of Soviet personnel, expel remaining Syrian and South Yemen diplomats, close the Afghan interest section, and offer Afghan insurgents military material and economic assistance. Egypt has already begun discussions with Pakistan

~~SECRET~~

REVIEW ON JANUARY 8, 2000

CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

-2-

concerning developing channels to direct military and economic aid to the Afghan rebels; however, no consideration is being given to despatching troops. Sadat is also seeking a means to convene an Islamic conference to condemn Soviet intervention and "bring home the Soviet threat to Islam." Sadat feels the timidity of Islamic governments is inexcusable and will do everything possible to shame them into action. One Egyptian cabinet official adds that any thought of rapprochement with the Soviets "is in the deep freeze." (Cairo 0364, PSN 22685, 22687, 22688) (S)

4. Argentina and Human Rights: Ambassador Chaplin believes the Argentine government would be open to a U.S. effort to negotiate some specific human rights improvements in exchange for a U.S. vote not to condemn them in the forthcoming UNCHR meeting. Their behavior on the Cuban UNSC seat issue and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan combined with the recall of their representatives to the UN, the OAS and European countries reveal a great anxiety over the possibility of condemnation and a willingness "to go almost any lengths to escape the consequences of their human rights violations. Chaplin believes Buenos Aires' concern with avoiding censure opens an avenue for the U.S. to offer to trade support for the milder resolution in exchange for parole or release of political prisoners, improvement in prison standards and a beginning in dealing with the problem of the "disappeareds." The ambassador concludes this is an "opportunity which we should not let get away." (Buenos Aires 0163 NODIS, PSN 23387) (C)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

October 28, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Follow-Up Letters to Your Bilaterals  
With Latin American Leaders

*6627*  
*3015 - ok -*  
*Bolivia - The verbage is excessive. Did Fellows*  
*ok them? (3 or 4 "I was pleased" in Suarez letter)*  
*JC*

The memoranda of your eighteen conversations with Latin American leaders during the Canal Treaty signing have just been completed. For a number of your bilaterals, State and NSC felt it would be very useful for you to follow up your conversations with letters which confirm the commitments made during the meeting and underscore areas where we have a continuing interest.

In certain cases -- for example, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay -- our intelligence indicates that their Presidents may have gained an inaccurate impression of your concern about human rights. Apparently Pinochet, Stroessner, and Mendez felt that you were in agreement with them that their countries were victims of politically-motivated and inaccurate propaganda, and that the human rights policy which is being implemented in your name does not really reflect your views. No doubt this may be a result of wishful thinking on their part. Nevertheless, our Ambassadors in the field, State, and NSC believe it would be useful for you to re-state clearly your continuing commitment in this area.

Since the drafting of these letters had begun, you have received letters from the Presidents of Argentina, Chile, and Peru, and we have included references in your letters. The letter from President Videla was delivered directly to the White House on October 18, and it refers to the Deutsch case which you raised with him.

There are a number of specific commitments made or repeated in the letters. Let me outline them briefly for you here, and flag any potentially controversial sections:

*ok*  
*Pinochet - State & NSC*  
*obscure -*  
*Videla - approve that*  
*this year -*

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Authority NLC-24-49-4-1-6  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Issues Or Points Which Are Noted In The Letters

Argentina

1. While not deciding to invite representatives from human rights organizations, Videla did say that he was not troubled by such visits. Your letter repeats that point.

2. Argentina and Chile are involved in an effort to try to curb or prohibit the activities of non-governmental organizations -- particularly human rights groups -- at the United Nations.

3. Videla said that he hoped the problem of people being detained by the emergency laws would be resolved by the end of the year. Your mentioning this point will add an additional incentive for him to do it.

4. With regard to Videla's statement that Argentina would ratify Tlatelolco when the political timing was opportune, which he hoped would be by the end of the year, there may have been some misinterpretation. The Argentines are reported to believe that he only said that he would "consider" the possibility of ratification at the proper time. Nonetheless, we believe that it would be helpful to re-state our interpretation of his statement so as to insure his awareness of our continuing concern on that issue.

Bolivia

1. Your letter reiterates the continued interest of the U. S. in the peaceful settlement of the problems related to Bolivia's desire to achieve access to the sea.

2. It states U. S. continued support for integration in Latin America by congratulating him on the new Andean Pact agreement on the automotive industry.

3. Most importantly, it reminds Banzer that he promised you to give priority attention to seeking the release of those American prisoners whose circumstances warrant special treatment. We have already given the Bolivians the list of names.

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3

Chile

1. The letter states that "friendly and close relations" between the U. S. and Chile can only occur if there is increased evidence of improvements in the human rights situation in Chile.

2. On the question whether Chile would permit two UN human rights observers to visit, the Chileans are currently negotiating with the United Nations, and both parties may have some problems in agreeing to the procedures which Chile requires for their visit. We believe that Pinochet promised to permit two UN observers to visit provided they do so "without publicity" and meet with Pinochet before returning to the UN. The Chileans (would like to) believe that they agreed to such a visit only "under certain circumstances," which might include comparable visits by the UN to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Similarly, Pinochet worked out an agreement with the UN on providing a report on the people who "disappeared," but his report is not considered satisfactory. Your note of continued interest in both matters should help.

3. Finally, you note Pinochet's pledge to bring Tlatololco into effect if Argentina ratifies the treaty.

Paraguay

1. Stroessner's pledge to receive the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights if they desire such a visit is noted, and you add that U. S. officials would also like to meet with Paraguayan officials "should that be helpful."

On the loans from the Inter-American Bank and A.I.D., you re-state decisions which were made by the Christopher Committee to approve a number of loans for the needy in recognition of Paraguay's decision to permit a visit of the IACHR, but others are withheld until the visit, in fact, occurs.

Peru

1. You repeat your interest in the Bolivian corridor issue, the Ecuadorean-Amazon issue, the limiting of arms purchases, and your hope for the continued success of Andean integration. Morales needs to

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hear of your interest in the first three, and will be glad to hear of the fourth.

2. You reiterate U. S. interest in Peru's economic difficulties, and mention your hope that we can help Peru in obtaining food assistance. This is currently under review, but our expectation is that we will be able to give \$5-10 million of food assistance.

Uruguay

1. You state the difficulty because of human rights considerations of having close relations with Uruguay.

2. Mendez's assurance of removing the "special security authority" and establishing an information commission, which will hopefully cooperate with our embassy, are good decisions which necessitate the comment in the letter.

3. You repeat your hope that Uruguay will invite a human rights commission.

\* \* \* \* \*

These letters were coordinated and drafted by State and NSC, and cleared by Jim Fallows.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ ✓ \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*[Handwritten signature]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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JACOBINI CHARLES  
7 BUENOS AIRES 4638

50

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ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-07 DHA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04  
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01  
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00  
IO-13 ( ISO ) W

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R 221858Z JUN 77  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1040  
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4638

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, SHUM, AR, US, EPIN

SUBJECT: GOA NOTES HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS

REF: (A) STATE 138380, (B) BUENOS AIRES 4444, (C) BUENOS AIRES 4483

SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN DEMARCHES BY MARTINEZ DE HOZ IN  
BUENOS AIRES (REFTEL B) AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL IN  
WASHINGTON (REFTEL A), ARGENTINE OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED A  
NUMBER OF ACTIONS JUNE 14 THAT BEAR ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN  
RIGHTS IMAGE OVERSEAS. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS INCLUDE THE RELEASE  
OF 342 PERSONS FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY, PROCESSING OF ALMOST  
1,000 SUBVERSIVE CASES IN FEDERAL AND MINITARLY COURTS,  
POSSIBLE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF  
OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, AND BANNING OF TWO ISSUES  
OF A FAR RIGHT, RACIST MAGAZINE. WHILE THE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN  
THEMSELVES SHOW LITTLE BY WAY OF CERTIFIABLE SUBSTANTIVE  
CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, THE  
GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO COMPILE EXAMPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES ITS RISING SENSITIVITY TO THE  
SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION AND OUR  
ADVERSE VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

END SUMMARY

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z

1. AS NOTED IN REFTTEL B, GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA'S (GOA'S)  
PRESENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES BASICALLY  
FRIENDLY GESTURES AND INCREASED CONCERN ON THE PART OF GOA  
OFFICIALS TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN  
RESPONSE TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. THE  
LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN, HOWEVER, SHOWS LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE.  
AS ANTICIPATED, THE GOA ACTIONS AND COMMUNIQUE WERE RELEASED  
JUNE 14 AND PUBLISHED IN JUNE 15 PRESS.

2. AS A 15-DAY COMPENDIUM THE LISTING OF 342 PERSONS CITED AS  
NO LONGER BEING HELD AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE IS  
CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THE TYPICAL WEEKLY LISTS PUT OUT BY  
THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. FURTHER, THERE IS NO WAY IMMEDIATELY  
TO VERIFY THAT PERSONS LISTED HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN RELEASED.  
(MARTINEZ DE HOZ DID, HOWEVER, TELL CHARGE THAT THE PERSONS  
LISTED WERE DEFINITELY BEING PHYSICALLY RELEASED FROM  
DETENTION AND NOT JUST PASSED TO OTHER AUTHORITIES.)

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PAGE 1

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NARA EF Date 7/9/16



JACOBINI CHARLES  
77 BUENOS AIRES 4638

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PAGE 01 BUENOS 04638 02 OF 02 222035Z

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-07 DHA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04  
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01  
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00  
IO-13 ( ISO ) W

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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1041

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4638

4. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT 667 SUBVERSIVE CASES HAVE BEEN REMANDED TO THE FEDERAL COURTS (WITH 327 SENTENCES PASSED) AND 305 CASES SENT TO SPECIAL MILITARY COURTS MARTIAL. (WITH 158 SENTENCES HANDED DOWN) APPEARED IN PRESS WITHOUT NAMES OR COMMENTARY. AS VERY FEW OF THESE TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS OR INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED BY EMBOFFS, WE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

5. PRESIDENT VIDELA'S REPORTED INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORITIES TO ANALYZE THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE SUSPENDED CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION FOR PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY RECALLS HIS EARLIER APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION CHAIRED BY INTERIOR MINISTER HARGUINDEGUY TO REVIEW THE SUSPENSION LAST APRIL. AS A RESULT OF THE COMMISSION'S DELIBERATIONS AT THAT TIME, LEGISLATION WAS PASSED TO EXTEND THE SUSPENSION FOR ANOTHER 150 DAYS BEGINNING MAY 1, 1977. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS MEAN THE OPTION WILL BE CONSIDERED MORE FAVORABLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE OR WILL ACTUALLY BE REINSTATED BEFORE THE PRESENT 150 DAYS SUSPENSION IS UP IN SEPTEMBER.

6. GOA SUSPENSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION, SALE, AND CIRCULATION OF THE MAY-JUNE CABILDO ISSUE NO. 8 WAS OF INTEREST. THE MAGAZINE

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 04638 02 OF 02 222035Z

WAS ACCUSED OF "PROPAGATING IDEOLOGICAL-RACIAL CONFLICT IN OPPOSITION TO THE NATION'S OBJECTIVES." THE DECREE FURTHER PROHIBITED THE PRINTING AND CIRCULATION OF THE JULY ISSUE AND "ANY OTHER THAT ATTEMPTS TO REPLACE IT." THE BAN DOES NOT, HOWEVER, AFFECT THE MAGAZINE'S ADMINISTRATIVE OR PUBLISHING CAPACITY BEYOND THE TWO ISSUES, AND THIS SHORT TERM SUSPENSION DOES LITTLE TO UNDO THE STRIDENT ANTI-SEMITIC RHETORIC OF THE APRIL CABILDO, ISSUE NO. 7. IT WAS THIS WHICH PROMPTED PROTESTS BY JEWISH GROUPS IN ARGENTINA AND OCCASIONED LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS COMMENTARY (SEE BA 3370 AND 3631).

7. COMMENT: THIS FLURRY OF STATEMENTS TO THE PUBLIC ON HUMAN RIGHTS WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING THE U.S. VOTE ON TWO LARGE BANK LOANS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THIS COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT-INTERVENED LA OPINION ON JUNE 16 PLATLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT ACTIONS WERE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 3



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

Memo No. 510-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 1, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTINE DODSON

FROM:

Denis Clift 

SUBJECT:

Ambassador of Argentina's Appointment Request

Further to your memorandum of June 10 (NSC Log 3448) would you please ask the Department of State to inform Ambassador Espil of Argentina that regretfully it will not be possible to arrange for an appointment in the near future because of other scheduling demands. As the Ambassador may know, Mrs. Mondale's staff has already regretted an invitation to Mrs. Mondale to visit Argentina this year in connection with the visit of the US National Symphony Orchestra.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON JULY 1, 1986

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E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-133-43-6-5-5  
NARA E.F. Date 7/9/16

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 10, 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: DENIS CLIFT  
FROM: CHRISTINE DODSON  
SUBJECT: Request for Appointment with the Vice  
President from the Ambassador of Argentina

We concur with State Department's position that, because of the Vice President's heavy schedule, Ambassador Aja Espil be informed that the request for appointment must be declined.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 7, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Appointment with the Vice President  
from the Ambassador of Argentina

Argentine Ambassador Jorge Aja Espil has asked for an appointment with the Vice President. We understand the Ambassador wants to discuss a possible visit to Buenos Aires, Argentina, by Mrs. Mondale to coincide with the visit of the U.S. National Symphony Orchestra on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the City of Buenos Aires. The Argentine Embassy believes Mrs. Mondale's presence will make an important cultural and political impact contributing to better U.S.-Argentine relations.

We understand from the NSC that the Vice President's office has been made aware of the invitation and that Mrs. Mondale will be unable to visit Buenos Aires. We therefore recommend that Ambassador Aja Espil be informed that, because of the Vice President's busy schedule, the request for appointment has been declined.

*for R. Tarnoff*  
Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 6/6/86

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

Memo No. 453-80

June 4, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTINE DODSON

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment with Vice President from  
Ambassador of Argentina

Argentine Ambassador Jorge Espil has asked for an appointment with the Vice President. May we please have a State/NSC recommendation on this request.

*313*  
*AP*  
*C*

6-10 -

*Secretary's X4996*  
*(Executive - Sec'y)*

*X 3448*

*(per Embassy  
acc to Perry)*

15

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 18, 1980

~~SECRET~~  
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: THOMAS THORNTON  
SUBJECT: M-B-B Lunch -- Argentina and Chile (U)

Argentina

As you will remember, there was an exchange of memos between Muskie and Brown -- the former wanting to leave our relations with Argentina essentially on ice, the latter wanting to proceed with some military cooperation gestures (see attached package). An IG was held last week to confirm the State position, with the understanding that Brown could appeal if he wants to. He apparently does. (C)

The issue is whether we should show willingness to move ahead with various minor military cooperation matters (e.g. joint talks, inviting an Argentine instructor to our school in Panama) despite the Argentine position on grain and their actions in Bolivia. Nobody sees the possibility of taking any major steps (e.g. the repeal of Kennedy-Humphrey) even if we wanted to. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: Support State's position that there should be no further moves made towards Argentina by this Administration, on the following grounds:

- They have behaved very poorly towards us.
- There is no time urgency to any of the issues at stake.
- The Argentines are unlikely even to respond to feelers from this Administration, preferring to wait for the Republicans.
- To the extent that we have cards to play, let's leave them for the next administration, who might get something in return for them. The Carter Administration certainly won't. (S)

~~SECRET~~  
Review on Nov. 18, 1986

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Authority NLC-24-99-3-7-6  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

~~SECRET~~

2

Chile

A year has passed since the Letelier sanctions were imposed and we had agreed among ourselves to review policy towards Chile about now. State had, in fact, begun to do so, when Christopher put a stop to it. I asked to have this item put on the agenda so that we could get a determination whether or not we want to go through with the policy review or simply leave matters for the next administration to deal with. It is a fairly close call:

Con

- There are no pressing issues at stake for the next several months.
- The Chilean Government remains fairly odious and has recently perpetrated a mockery of the democratic process, perpetuating the rule of Pinochet. It may also be retrogressing on human rights.
- By leaving changes to the next administration, we give them some cards to play.

Pro

- The Letelier sanctions have had no effect, were never intended to be kept on permanently, and are now counterproductive to our own interests (e.g. the UNITAS issue).
- Despite some recent setbacks, Chilean human rights performance with regard to violation of the person has improved greatly and in the course of events this should have been recognized. The Letelier sanctions have overlaid this, however, with the result that we are much tougher on Chile than on Argentina where Basket I violations are much worse. This is anomalous and discredits our human rights policy. It also leaves us badly out of balance as between these two Beagle Channel contestants.
- Since we said that we would review our policy, let's do it. We are still the Government. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: I think we should go ahead with the review on two grounds:

- Let's leave a credible policy behind, and

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

3

-- If we don't sort things out better, we will be inviting the next administration to throw the baby out with the bathwater, for we should continue considerable restraint in our relationships. (S)

I am not disturbed by the idea that there may be no specific actions that this Administration will be taking towards Chile; what I am concerned about is leaving behind appropriate guidelines (e.g. reaffirming the President's decision on 1981 UNITAS participation; how to vote on IFI loans to Chile). (S)

SECRET

# 3H

OP IMMED DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 0828

NODIS

E.O. 12958: XDS-1 1/28/10 (CASTRO, RAUL H.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, AR

SUBJECT: (C) DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S  
VISIT TO ARGENTINA; GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS: JANUARY 23

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

3. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA;  
GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS:

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS: BRIGADIER (RET) CARLOS PASTOR,  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
DR. JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE ROZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY  
COMODORO CARLOS CAVANDOLI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER  
MR. VICTOR BEAUGE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NOTETAKER)  
GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY  
RAUL H. CASTRO, U.S. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA;  
CLAUS W. RUSER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/EOA)  
WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, U.S. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES (NOTETAKER)

5. PLACE AND TIME: JANUARY 23 AND 24, 1980; THE MINISTRY  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUENOS AIRES

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. GENERAL GOODPASTER  
MET ON TWO CONSECUTIVE DAYS AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LED GENERAL POLITICAL  
DISCUSSIONS FOR ARGENTINA, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS  
CONCERNS, POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS AND MATTERS  
HAVING TO DO WITH NUCLEAR COOPERATION. IT WAS HIS  
GENERAL CONTENTION THAT AN ACCRETION OF MISUNDERSTAND-  
INGS TROUBLES U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS, AND THAT U.S.

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PAGE 01

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DTG:291417Z JAN 80

\*\*\*\*\*C O N F I D E N T I A L\*\*\*\*\* COPY

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E.O. 13526

Authority NLC 24-91-3-3-8

NARA EF Deto 7/9/16

MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF ARGENTINA HAVE LED US TO MISCALCULATIONS IN POLICY. MOST TROUBLING, HE ASSERTED, HAS BEEN OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. IN HIS SECOND PRESENTATION, ON JANUARY 24, BRIGADIER PASTOR SUGGESTED SPECIFIC REMEDIES FOR RESTORING FULL CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION.

7. A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ'S RESPONSE TO OUR EFFORTS TO ENLIST ARGENTINA'S HELP IN KEEPING GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION AT EARLIER EXISTING LEVELS. END MEMCON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

8. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR'S FIRST PRESENTATION. PASTOR RESPONDED TO GENERAL GOODPASTER'S EXPLANATION OF PROBLEMS RISING FROM THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GENERAL'S PROPOSED AGENDA FOR DISCUSSING ARGENTINA'S ROLE IN THESE, WITH THE WISH AT SOME POINT TO COVER THE FULLEST RANGE OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS EXISTING BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES.

9. LATER PASTOR LED INTO HIS SUBJECT WITH A RHETORICAL QUESTION: IF GRAINS SHIPMENT COOPERATION IS SO IMPORTANT JUST NOW IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS -- EVEN AS WE ADMIT THAT THIS PROBLEM IS TRANSITORY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL -- HOW MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS IT TO HAVE RELATIONS ON SUCH BASIS THAT IN FAR MORE SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, WAR FOR EXAMPLE, THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA WOULD STAND TOGETHER?

10. WE CANNOT ARRIVE AT THIS HOWEVER WITH "ON-THE-SPOT" DISCUSSIONS. WE NEED TIME, AND IT IS REQUIRED THAT WE ADDRESS A SERIES OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AND OTHER QUESTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, PASTOR CONTINUED, MEDIOCRE OR BAD RELATIONS ARE THE "NORM" BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE U.S.; THE UNITED STATES HAS SELDOM UNDERSTOOD ARGENTINE REALITIES, AND BAD INFORMATION AND MISJUDGMENT HAVE LED TO ERRORS OF U.S. POLICY, AND "INADMISSIBLE" U.S.G. ACTIONS.

11. A GREAT U.S. ERROR WAS FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT ARGENTINA FOUGHT A WAR AGAINST TERRORISM-COMMUNISM THAT LASTED BETWEEN TWO AND THREE YEARS. AND ARGENTINA WON THE WAR -- UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, NICARAGUA. THE U.S. SHOULD BE PROUD OF ARGENTINA FOR HAVING DONE THIS -- RATHER THAN ASSUMING THAT "VIOLENT REPRESSION" WAS THE HALLMARK OF THIS GOVERNMENT. YET IS IS THIS SYMBOLISM, PASTOR WENT ON, THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN SO

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SERIOUSLY BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES --  
RATHER AS THOUGH "ATOMIC BOMB DROPPER" SHOULD  
CHARACTERIZE THE UNITED STATES BEFORE ARGENTINES,  
WHEN THE U.S. HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO USE THAT  
INSTRUMENT ONLY IN ONE BRIEF SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

12. FURTHERMORE, THIS U.S. CHARACTERIZATION OF  
ARGENTINA LED TO MANY UNFAIR POLICY DECISIONS: TO THE  
HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, TOWARD CONDEMNATION OF  
ARGENTINA AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND  
OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS -- EVEN, PASTOR ASSERTED,  
TO U.S. OPPOSITION TO ARGENTINE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT.

13. COULD THE U.S. NOT HAVE RECALLED THAT IN 1962  
ARGENTINA WAS FIRST TO SEND SHIPS TO HELP THE FREE  
WORLD IN THE CARIBBEAN? ("WE DIDN'T EVEN GET A  
THANK-YOU NOTE.") ARGENTINA BACKED TH U.S. IN  
PAKISTAN'S DISPUTE WITH INDIA; THIS COUNTRY HELPED  
DEFEAT AN UNFRIENDLY MOTION ON PUERTO RICO AT THE  
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFERENCE; WE WERE THE FIRST  
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY TO TAKE IN EAST ASIAN REFUGEES;  
WE VOTED WITH THE U.S. IN TOKYO ROUND TRADE MEETINGS;  
WE ALIGNED WITH THE U.S. AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN A  
RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN.  
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14. U.S. LACK OF APPRECIATION IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE TO THE ARGENTINE "MAN ON THE STREET," WHEN HE LEARNS FOR EXAMPLE THAT YOU WANTED TO USE US TO TAKE IN THE SHAH OF IRAN. GOVERNMENTS CHANGE, BUT ARGENTINES REMEMBER ALL THESE PROBLEMS.

15. FOR THIS REASON, PASTOR CONTINUED, GOA MUST ASK NOW FOR PROFOUND CHANGES IN U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD US, PASTOR SAID. AND NOT ONLY MUST ATTITUDES TOWARD ARGENTINA BE CHANGED, BUT ATTITUDES TOWARD MOST OF LATIN AMERICA. THESE CHANGES OF ATTITUDES IN POLICY HOPEFULLY WILL BE REFLECTED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, IN THE CONGRESS, AT INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS. PASTOR ASKED THAT THE U.S. STOP PRESSING ARGENTINA SO HARD IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS ("IN RESPONSE TO WHICH WE COULD CONSIDER RECOMMENDING THAT THE PRESIDENT POSTPONE A TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION HE PLANS TO MAKE LATER THIS YEAR").

16. (AT THIS POINT PASTOR TOUCHED ON SEVERAL OTHER SPECIFIC POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HE DEVELOPED MORE FULLY THE FOLLOWING DAY. THEY ARE RECORDED IN THAT CONVERSATION.)

17 PASTOR THEN ADDED: AND YOU MUST NOT CATEGORIZE US AS JUST ANOTHER ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THIS GOVERNMENT IS WORKING HARD TO ARRIVE AT REAL DEMOCRACY — AND NOT OF THE LAUGHING STOCK KIND OF THE LAST PERONIST PERIOD, EVEN THOUGH THAT "DEMOCRACY" BOASTED A CONGRESS AND OTHER TRAPPINGS. IT WAS THAT GOVERNMENT WHOSE FIRST ACTS WERE CO-SIGNED BY CUBAN PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT ALLENDE; ITS LATER DAYS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY DISORDER AND KIDNAPPINGS. NOW WE HAVE NO HUNGER, RACE PROBLEMS OR SERIOUS CRIME. "WE WANT TO BE CONSIDERED AS A SERIOUS

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COUNTRY" PASTOR SAID.

18. A NEW PATH WILL LEAD TO A FULL ALLIANCE; THE EXISTING COURSE WILL LEAD TO A "NEW NEUTRALITY" WITH WHICH NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE ARGENTINES WILL FEEL COMFORTABLE, PASTOR CONTINUED. THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE "UNCERTAIN." THEN HE ADDED: YOUR REVISIONS OF THOUGHT MUST BE TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN MEXICO AND VENEZUELA -- ALL OF LATIN AMERICA NEEDS U.S. ATTENTION, HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY APPRECIATE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE MID-EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND OTHER TROUBLE SPOTS.

19. IN RESPONSE, GENERAL GOODPASTER ASSURED PASTOR THAT ARGENTINA HAD EARNED ITS PLACE AMONG RESPECTED NATIONS, AND THAT WE SHOW THIS APPRECIATION IN WORKING WITH ARGENTINA IN THE OAS, AS WE DID EARLIER IN THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. WE UNDERSTAND ARGENTINA'S TRADITIONAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN DIGNITY -- IT IS PART OF OUR SHARED HERITAGE -- AND CURRENT EFFORTS TO RESTORE THIS SITUATION.

20. FURTHER, GOODPASTER CONTINUED, PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SAID HE SHARES HOPES FOR BETTER RELATIONS. THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF PAST UNITED STATES ERRORS. IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS FOR EXAMPLE: KNOWING OF ARGENTINA'S LACK OF INTENTION TO DEVELOP A WEAPON WE WANT ARGENTINE PROGRESS -- BUT WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS. WE MADE THE POINT OF PROPER SAFEGUARDS WITH EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS NOT TO DELAY ARGENTINE PROGRESS, BUT TO ACHIEVE AN OBJECTIVE SHARED BY ALL. SHORTLY ARGENTINA WILL RECEIVE A LETTER FROM THE UNITED STATES REGARDING PROVISION OF FUEL FOR RESEARCH REACTORS.

21. RECOGNIZED TOO ARE STRIDES MADE IN RESTORING AUTHORITY AND SUPPRESSING TERRORISM, GOODPASTER WENT ON. UNFORTUNATE MEASURES WILL SURELY CONTINUE TO BE DISCARDED AS THE ARGENTINE SITUATION BECOMES LESS EXTRAORDINARY. DISAPPEARANCES WILL BE STOPPED AND POLITICAL PRISONERS FREED OR GIVEN RIGHT OF OPTION. (COMMENT: PASTOR LET THE TERM "POLITICAL PRISONER" GO BY AT THIS MOMENT, BUT PROTESTED ITS USE ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. "YOU WERE REFERRING TO TERRORISTS AND GUERRILLAS", HE SAID.)

22. FURTHERMORE, GENERAL GOODPASTER SAID, WE ARE MAKING EFFORTS TO BE SCRUPULOUS AND FAIR IN IMPORTANT AREAS: THE LEGALLY REQUIRED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN ARGENTINA WILL BE REVIEWED

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AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. "I TALKED WITH SECRETARY VANCE ABOUT SOME OF THIS THE DAY BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON. HE IS CONCERNED FOR BASIC LEVELS OF HUMAN TREATMENT, BUT KNOWS TOO OF YOUR PAST DIFFICULTIES AND ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE LEGAL PROCESSES." (COMMENT: GENERAL GOODPASTER ADDRESSED OTHER SPECIFIC POINTS. THESE TOO ARE INCLUDED IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION.)

23. GENERAL GOODPASTER REFLECTED ON THE NEED FOR TIMELY CONSULTATION, AND RECALLED WHAT THE LACK OF IT CAN DO TO AN ALLIANCE. HE SPOKE OF BETTER COORDINATION AND USING THE EMBASSY AS A CONSULTATIVE DEVICE. HE CONCLUDED: "WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO BE PROTECTED FROM VIOLENCE IS AN IMPORTANT RIGHT, AND WE FEEL ARGENTINA HAS COME FAR TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING THIS. THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THIS -- BUT YOU MUST UNDERSTAND SOME OF THE INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE MADE THE U.S. STRONG. AMONG THEM IS A FREE PRESS, VITAL TO OUR SOCIETY EVEN WHILE WE ADMIT THE PRESS TENDS TO 'ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE.'"

24. (COMMENT: THIS CONCLUDED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON JANUARY 23. SEPTEL WILL CONTINUE WITH PASTOR'S PRESENTATION AND GENERAL GOODPASTER'S RESPONSES ON JANUARY 24.)  
CASTRO  
BT

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DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

*Argentina*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 29, 1980

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DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: REFER TO OSD

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

FROM: Luigi R. Einaudi, *LE* Staff Director, ARA/NSC-IG

SUBJECT: Revised Report on ARA/NSC-IG Meeting on Argentina

The Interagency Group for Latin America met November 14 under the chairmanship of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John A. Bushnell and reached agreement on the following:

OSD REVIEWED 18-Jan-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

1980 Action Plan

It was agreed that the timing of the more highly visible initiatives (ARA Assistant Secretary visit, periodic security consultations, periodic policy talks, and high-level military visits) could not be addressed. The Defense representative planned to consult further within DOD on this point. DOD will also decide whether to seek Inter-agency agreement for early action on certain lower-visibility steps, such as an invitation to an Argentine guest instructor for the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

IAHRC Resolution on Argentina at the OASGA

In view of Argentina's active lobbying for a non-country specific resolution on the IAHRC Report on Argentina, the IG decided to instruct our Ambassadors to make a high-level demarche in favor of specific resolutions on individual IAHRC reports. If separate resolutions are out of reach, it was agreed to work for an omnibus resolution with country-specific paragraphs.

U.S. Military Sales to Argentina

It was decided that possible initiatives in this area should await the new Administration. Such sales are prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment, and any future sales would be dependent on modification of that legislation. DOD urged that planning for possible modification be undertaken in timely fashion.

President-designate Viola's Visit to Washington

There was a consensus that December was not a propitious moment for General Viola to visit Washington. However, should General Viola decide to visit Washington during his visit to the United States, USG officials will receive him cordially.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1980

*Ed -  
Good idea  
Some process  
Should be  
followed w/it.  
other  
difficult  
countries  
J*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: Warren Christopher, Acting W.C.  
Subject: Steps To Improve U.S.-Argentine Relations

SC review(s) completed

STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMPLETED

Pursuant to your instructions, the Inter-Agency Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan of action for 1980, which I am submitting for your approval.

I. OBJECTIVES

State Department review completed

Our principal objectives in moving to improve our relationship with Argentina are to:

- foster Argentina's identification with the West and thus to contain Soviet political and economic influence;
- encourage further specific improvements in human rights practices;
- seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues (e.g. grains); and
- obtain progress on nonproliferation objectives, particularly full-scope safeguards and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and foster increased sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation concerns.

MORI/CDF per C03337518

We also wish to encourage continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal mediation of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive role with respect to developments in Central America and other Hemispheric issues.

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## II. ACTIONS FOR 1980

### 1. The Consultative Process

We will continue the process of political and economic consultations begun with General Goodpaster's visit to Buenos Aires in January. We contemplate:

-- a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to Buenos Aires, possibly about August 1, during which he will review our policy concerns and the state of our relations and will be prepared to discuss steps we would plan to take to strengthen cooperation in selected areas, depending on the nature of the Argentine response.

-- a meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission in October, the U.S. delegation possibly to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The meeting would include discussion of ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and to expand commercial relations.

-- periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues, with the first round to be held during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

### 2. Military Relations

We will begin to rebuild relations through increased contact and consultations, while stressing that further progress on human rights will be essential to the more fundamental improvement in these relations (including consideration of modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy Amendment, as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting). We plan to:

--begin periodic security consultations with Argentina; the first round, to be held this year in Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in the South Atlantic;

--invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make a return visit to Washington later in the year to discuss global defense issues;

--invite Argentina to send a guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas after consulting

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with members of Congress to ensure that this initiative would not be regarded as conflicting with the spirit of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.

Other issues are:

--High-Level Military Visit.

We will keep under review the desirability of proceeding with an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to visit Washington this year. A final decision on this (including the question of timing) should take into account the implications of such a move on the selection of the next Argentine president now under way within the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as continued improvements in the observance of human rights and developments in U.S.-Argentine relations.

--Sale of P-3 Aircraft.

In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA. We see no possibility, however, of seeking special legislation which would modify the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina this year.

3. Human Rights

We will continue the dialogue on human rights with Argentine leaders, principally but not exclusively through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Ambassador Bowdler. In these consultations we will attempt to obtain assurances that:

-- the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which recognizes the role of the OAS Commission on Human Rights and which encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina;

-- there will be no new disappearances, including no disappearances of persons alleged to be terrorists;

-- all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive activities, including unacknowledged detainees, will

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be processed through normal judicial channels and ensured due process;

-- guarantees will be instituted to prevent the torture of detainees; and

-- there be substantial progress, in advance of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political prisoners held without charges through release, trial, or exile (during his recent visit, Ambassador Smith was assured that half of these prisoners--1,300 at the time--would be released or sentenced by the end of the year).

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed in UN fora and concluded that, while this should not be a central requirement for the improvement of our bilateral relations, it should remain an important U.S. objective. We should urge Argentina, in bilateral discussions, to cooperate with these multilateral efforts, particularly with the UN Human Rights Commission's new expert working group on disappeared persons and with other groups such as the Catholic Church.

In addition to human rights discussions initiated by the Ambassador and by Assistant Secretary Bowdler, the U.S. side of the Mixed Economic Commission will be prepared to raise or respond to human rights concerns in discussions with their Argentine counterparts, and will be fully briefed for this purpose.

#### 4. Nuclear Relations

We want to move Argentina over time to accept IAEA safeguards on future as well as current facilities (including the reprocessing facility) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To do this, we need to keep open the door for continued cooperation with Argentina's nuclear program to the extent commensurate with your policy. We should:

-- try to resolve promptly, in accordance with U.S. law and our nonproliferation objectives, the remaining safeguards issues to permit delivery of highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's research program, as well as components for its power program;

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-- once this is done, undertake a review of the conditions under which we could facilitate expanded participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program. (A major case currently at issue is an export license application for the sale of a pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor.)

#### 5. Other Cooperative Steps

In addition, we would:

--Sign the pending U.S.-Argentine Agricultural Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs;

--Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral income tax treaty;

--Seek to negotiate a consular convention.

#### 6. Consultations with Other Allies

The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether and in what form the Administration should consult our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern such as human rights and recent Soviet initiatives toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere. These subjects and our policies thereon could be discussed within NATO fora such as the Political Advisors Committee, the Permanent Council, and the NATO experts group on Latin America. Depending on the results of these consultations, we could consider further actions in Buenos Aires. A majority of the Interagency Group recommended against new high-level bilateral approaches to our Allies on these issues. We would continue the practice of consulting on human rights in the appropriate UN fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission.

#### 7. Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and Chile

The Group also considered the implications for neighboring countries, especially as regards security consultations.

With respect to Brazil, the Group noted that many of these steps will restore a better balance

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in U.S. relations with the two countries, since the U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations).

Chile is concerned about our improving relationship with Argentina, which it sees as threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoidance of war. This issue will be more fully addressed in the review of our relations with Chile later this year.

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Concurrences:

H - Mr. J. Brian Atwood  
EB - Mr Deane Hinton  
HA - Ms. Patt Derian  
OES - Mr. Louis Nosenzo  
PM - Mr. Daniel O'Donohue  
EUR/SOV - Mr. Robert Perito  
EUR/RMP - Mr. Stephen Ledogar  
S/P - Mr. Anthony Lake  
IO - Mr. Michael Newlin  
S/AS - Mr. Allen Locke  
USOAS - Mr. Herbert Thompson  
AID/RDP - Mr. David Raymond  
NSC - Mr. Thomas Thornton  
OPIC - Ms. Caryl Bernstein  
STR - Mr. Robert Hormatz  
DOD/ISA - Col. Patrick Briggs  
JCS - Admiral J.A. Lyons  
CIA -  
Commerce - Mr. A. Katz  
Treasury - Mr. Fred Bergsten  
USDA - Mr. Dale Hathaway  
DOE - Mr. Les Goldman  
EXIMBANK - Mr. Crafton  
ACDA - Mr. Charles Van Doren  
ICA - Mr. Victor Olason  
L/PM - Mr. T. Borek

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ISSUES PAPER - ARGENTINA

I. THE SETTING

The United States has three major interests in Argentina: East-West relations, nuclear nonproliferation, and human rights. It also has significant interests in a peaceful solution of the Beagle Channel dispute, Argentine support in Hemispheric matters, and in trade and investment relations.

The Goodpaster, Hodges and Smith visits have introduced new balance into our relations with Argentina. They have substantially improved the tone of the relationship while making a promising start at reducing the differences. The current status of our interests is as follows:

East-West Relations. As part of its probings to expand political and economic influence in South America, the Soviet Union is consciously courting both Argentina and Brazil. Argentina has responded to a limited degree because of:

- a strong interest in Soviet trade opportunities;
- a strong desire for Soviet support in international fora on human rights matters;
- an interest in keeping open the possibility of nuclear supplies; and
- some desire for greater balance in its foreign relations between East and West.

However, the Argentine military regimes in prospect for at least the next four to seven years have no desire to emulate the Soviets or to align themselves with the Soviet Union, although there is a natural inclination for economic and political reasons toward warmer bilateral relations. Our improved dialogue with Argentina since January has produced:

- repeated affirmation of Argentina's basic commitment to the West;

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-- a degree of cooperation on grains exports despite our late start on consultations; and

-- greater evidence of Argentine desire to consult and cooperate on Hemispheric matters, such as accepting Cuban refugees and consulting on Central America.

The dialogue also contributed to Argentina's decision to join the Olympics boycott.

Nuclear Nonproliferation. It is clear that Argentina will insist on the continued development of its nuclear technology capabilities, of which it is very proud, and the maintenance for the foreseeable future of a nuclear explosive option. It has demonstrated that it will not respond to pressure on these matters. Our best hope is that a calmer assessment of its own long-term self-interests will lead it more toward safeguards and away from keeping an explosive option open. Closer Brazilian-Argentine relations, symbolized by President Figueiredo's visit to Buenos Aires scheduled for May 13-15, may be helpful in this regard. Argentina is still considering whether to proceed now with the ratification of Tlatelolco. Although the Argentine interpretation that the Treaty permits the development of peaceful nuclear explosives is unhelpful, its ratification could be an important step. The Smith visit was useful, and we hope to reach agreement with Argentina on arrangements to maintain limited nuclear cooperation.

Human Rights. The status of human rights remains a matter of deep concern. While there is broad agreement on the facts of the situation, views differ on the scope and significance of the improvements that have occurred, especially over the past year. Disappearances, a central human rights concern, have declined, as have the number of political prisoners. We are aware of at least 2 disappearances thus far in 1980. (There reportedly were 44 disappearances last year; 55 a month the year before.) Our Embassy recently reported, however, that suspected active terrorists would continue to be dealt with summarily. There is no present prospect that the Argentine Government plans to respond positively to pleas for information about the fate of the thousands of people who have disappeared in recent years. GOA officials recently told Ambassador Smith that about half of the 1300 remaining political prisoners would be tried or released by the end of the year. GOA officials say that, although there is insufficient evidence to try the others, the security forces regard

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them as dangerous and do not plan to release them. The latter group includes some persons who benefitted from the 1974 amnesty of President Campora (who, elected with Peronist support, opened the door for Peron's return) and therefore cannot be tried. The state of siege and lack of due process continue. The military government has committed itself to eventual return to civilian, democratic rule, but no one expects this to occur before the mid or late 1980s, and few in Argentina are pressing for a more rapid timetable. A basic issue that remains unresolved is the future form of Argentina's political party system, especially the future role and orientation of Peronism. A dialogue with political leaders is now beginning, although political party activity remains prohibited.

In the economic area, the government continues to reconstruct the economy on the basis of free market principles, to remove the burden of controls accumulated under Peronism, curtail the role of the public sector while strengthening the functions of provincial and local governments, progressively bring inflation under control, and encourage foreign investment as part of a drive for greater productivity and a higher rate of investment. In the short term, these policies have resulted in belt-tightening for lower and lower-middle income groups. However, full employment has been maintained as part of a deliberate government policy to cushion the impact of these measures. In the longer term, these policies could produce sustained dynamic Argentine economic performance and a decentralized economic system more compatible with a pluralistic political order than the statist centralism of the Peron period.

Argentine officials and human rights activists have praised our human rights report this year as balanced and objective. There were difficulties between the Argentine and U.S. Delegations to the UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva last February-March. These reflected honest differences over substantive issues such as the new disappearance procedure and the draft torture convention. The Argentines will be very sensitive to what occurs in OAS and UN considerations of their human rights performance later this year and early next year; they want to see an end to the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment against military sales, and positive U.S. votes in the international financial institutions.

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The discussion paper previously distributed described our continued political and economic consultations and military and nuclear relations over the next few months. Is there more that could and should be done in this period?

## II. ISSUES FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

### 1. Significance of Argentine-Soviet Ties and the Appropriate U.S. Response:

The discussion paper draws a distinction between expanding trade ties and political cooperation. The expansion of bilateral trade is a normal phenomenon and will continue, irrespective of U.S. action. The Argentine interest in political cooperation with the Soviets, on the other hand, is related to the Argentine desire to assure Soviet bloc support on human rights issues and reduce the danger of censure in UN fora. A possible interest in Soviet nuclear supplies is related to U.S. safeguards conditions (this issue appears to be approaching solution).

The basic approach proposed in the discussion paper is a political one: to manage U.S.-Argentine relations in a way that strengthens Argentina's sense of identification with the West, to pursue U.S. interests in a balanced fashion and in a manner that takes into account Argentine deep-seated nationalism, and to achieve these goals without compromising our human rights objectives by diminishing or appearing to have diminished our interest in human rights conditions.

Is the approach advocated in the paper an adequate one, in terms of the significance of expanding Argentine-Soviet relations? In terms of the balance of the various U.S. interests?

### 2. How can the U.S. obtain meaningful Argentine cooperation in restraining exports to the U.S.S.R. for the 1980/81 crop year?

The Acting Secretary of State asked the Argentine Economic Minister on May 6 for GOA cooperation in a program of tighter restrictions on grain shipments to the U.S.S.R. in the coming crop year. Strategy and tactics for cooperation among all the major grain exporting countries are currently under consideration in the SCC, including the explicit ceilings we would seek from each exporter.

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a. An Argentine-U.S.S.R. grain agreement is in the offing (contrary to the discussion paper, it has apparently not yet been signed). Reportedly it will state Argentine intentions to supply certain minimum levels of grain. Can the U.S. take advantage of such an agreement to secure an understanding that Argentina will regard the minimum specified in the agreement as a maximum as well? Or would such levels be too high to constitute "meaningful restraint"?

b. How can the U.S. persuade Argentina to announce publicly any ceiling agreed upon? To do so would reinforce the commitment and would help reduce the current premium on prices on Argentine grain which have resulted in the loss of traditional Argentine markets. If the minimum levels contained in the Soviet agreement are consistent with a meaningful Argentine ceiling, the conclusion of the agreement could provide the pretext for a public announcement helpful to the cooperation effort.

3. What is the appropriate human rights stance for the U.S. in this period in the light of Argentine performance and our other interests?

a. In bilateral demarches and contacts with Argentina?

One approach would strongly press for improvements in all areas, including strong pressure for a serious accounting to families, either directly or indirectly, of the fate of disappeared persons; the other would proceed more selectively, with emphasis on further reform of current security and judicial practices rather than an accounting for the disappeared and other past violations. One approach would include occasional strong public criticism of the GOA's practices; the other, while maintaining our public posture of criticism and concern, would do so in a lower key, and place greater emphasis on quiet but persistent dialogue to press for specific reforms, taking advantage of an improving atmosphere and closer bilateral relations.

b. In the OAS and the UN?

The GOA is greatly concerned over the potential work of the new group of experts on disappearances established by the UNHRC with strong U.S., West European,

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and Canadian support. It feels that the group's principal effort will be directed at Argentina, for an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons. The GOA undoubtedly fears that specific data, if available, on disappearances (i.e., torture and summary executions) would lead to demands that those responsible be identified and punished. Although the methods of the working group remain to be worked out, the GOA fears that the group's work will be the basis of moves next year to seek the appointment of a special rapporteur on Argentina and the GOA's public condemnation in UN fora. This fear is a principal reason the GOA seeks to strengthen political cooperation with the Soviets in UN fora.

The OAS has recently released a report on the human rights situation in Argentina based on the visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights last September. The report is highly critical of Argentina and has been attacked by the GOA as biased and an interference in Argentina's internal affairs. The IAHRC report will be taken up at the OAS General Assembly this fall.

The Argentine position on how to deal with the IAHRC report is still under study in Buenos Aires. One view circulating within the regime -- reportedly angered by the report's alleged failure to properly acknowledge the history of pre-1976 terrorism and the improvements accomplished since 1978 -- is that Argentina should withdraw from the OAS, thus perhaps triggering an exodus by other countries, including Brazil. In private conversations, Argentine diplomats have warned of this possibility, stressing the depth of feeling on the issue in Buenos Aires. We have no evidence as of this time, however, that this view is about to be adopted as the Government's policy.

How should we deal with these matters in OAS and UN fora?

c. With our NATO Allies?

One approach would be to initiate a series of high-level consultations with our NATO Allies for the purpose of sharing information about human rights developments and about the Soviet-Argentine relationship, and of discussing the most effective way of dealing with these matters, including possible joint or parallel demarches, public statements, and coordinated action in international institutions (including the multilateral

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banks).

d. With regard to sanctions (vote in the IFI's, military training, and military sales)?

Our abstentions in the IFI's have not prevented ordinary capital loans to Argentina. The prohibition of military sales has shifted Argentine purchases of new equipment to European sources; it is, however, beginning to create problems for the Argentines with respect to spare parts for U.S.-supplied equipment.

On the other hand, our measures have considerable political significance as a tangible expression of disapproval of Argentine human rights violations. Any possible modification of our posture in this area would have to take into account the implications for our stance toward other countries with major human rights violations, as well as the message this would send to human rights groups in Argentina and to other countries who have joined us in criticizing human rights violations in Argentina.

4. How far should we carry military-to-military contact and cooperation under present circumstances?

Cooperation involves three possible levels:

-- visits, joint exercises, consultations on security matters;

-- the sale of military training;

-- a military supply relationship (new equipment and spares).

The sale of training under FMS and military supplies (FMS and Munitions List items) are prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment. In addition, under current policy, the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions List items to the Argentine military and the police through the Commerce export control licensing system.

The PRC discussion paper argues for limited contacts (visits, joint exercises) but opposes a change in our military supply policy at this time.

A second view is that we should avoid the political

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symbolism of support which these contacts imply, or minimize them until there is a definitive breakthrough on human rights. A third view, on the other hand, argues that, because of our strategic interests and the improvement in human rights, we should streamline, liberalize, or lift altogether, the restrictions on the military supply relationship. This would involve a) an elimination of restrictions on Commerce export licences; and/or b) the modification or elimination of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.

The denial of training (the sale of training under FMS is now prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment) involves a separate issue: Argentine officers traditionally sent to the U.S. are officers with promising careers. (Videla, Viola, and Galtieri all received training or served in the U.S.) Shortly the Argentine Armed Forces will have no officers of the rank of major or below who have received U.S. training. One view questions whether the U.S. should continue to deny itself this avenue of influencing the outlook of the next generation of Argentine military leaders. Another view argues that the present generation of military leaders is responsible for the government's repression of the past four years and questions the premise that U.S. training has had a significant positive influence on their outlook. It also argues that a military training relationship is a clearly visible, high-profile means of demonstrating U.S. political support for a government.

5. Are our present policies with regard to nuclear relations with Argentina adequate?

The issues are:

-- At what level can we and should we pursue nuclear cooperation?

-- Is there anything more we can and should do to encourage Argentine ratification of Tlatelolco and acceptance of full-scope safeguards?

-- How would possible actions in these areas impact on our general relationship and would they be worth the cost?

The discussion paper argues:

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-- Nuclear Cooperation. We should try to resolve the pending safeguards issue on the basis of what is required by U.S. law. Official Argentine interest in further cooperation, beyond the research fuel, appears to be modest at this time. Once the safeguards issue is resolved, we would probe to see what interest there might be in Argentine nuclear circles in U.S. cooperation (see also below).

-- Tlatelolco. We should continue a dialogue with Argentina's most senior leaders on global and regional proliferation concerns. Nothing more specific to encourage Argentine ratification appears feasible or desirable at this time. (We should, of course, on appropriate occasions, continue over the next few months to remind the GOA of President Videla's commitment to ratify.)

In addition, looking beyond the issue of safeguards assurances, the Administration must also address the issue of licensing of U.S. components for Argentine nuclear projects. This issue carries with it the possibility of a continuing role of U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program even though the position of prime contractor has been lost to German, Canadian, and Swiss companies. For example:

-- the U.S. firm, Combustion Engineering, working with the Argentine firm, Pescarmona, wishes to bid as a subcontractor for the pressure vessel for Atucha II. Siemens/KWU argues against Combustion Engineering's qualifications on grounds that the U.S. firm, in view of the uncertainties of whether a U.S. export license can be obtained, is not a reliable supplier.

-- Sulzer Brothers, the Swiss prime contractor for the heavy water plant, has approached Canadian firms about components, some of which may be U.S. controlled.

The issue is whether the U.S. should encourage or discourage such industrial collaboration. The current U.S. stance has been to discourage Combustion Engineering, partly because of our concern to keep good faith with the Canadians who -- unsuccessfully -- insisted on full-scope safeguards as a condition of the sale of a nuclear power reactor and heavy water plant.

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Significant U.S. exports, the future of U.S.-Argentine industrial cooperation in this important sector, and U.S. nonproliferation policy are at stake in this issue.

### III. THE BROAD CHOICES

#### Option A. Continue strong concentration on human rights.

We would maintain a cool and correct posture until the human rights situation shows substantial further progress, making clear that we are prepared to improve relations when and to the degree that fundamental human rights problems are solved. Military relations would be kept to a minimum; political relations should be cool and correct.

Rationale: The human rights situation remains exceedingly grave and outweighs the practical significance and relevance of other interests in our relations with Argentina. The essential elements of Argentine human rights violations -- the apparatus of repression, the lack of due process, the prohibition of meaningful political and labor union activity, and the failure to provide information about disappeared persons -- all remain in place. Expanding Argentine-Soviet cooperation thus far has been pragmatic and self-limiting. It is not now a significant threat to U.S. strategic interests, but we should continue to watch Argentine-Soviet relations closely.

#### Option B. Continue the current level of effort for more balance in the treatment of our interests in Argentina.

We would continue the present efforts to strengthen working relations with the GOA, principally through stepped-up political consultations, but also through some increase in cooperation and increased military contact. We would continue to stress the importance of human rights, but need to establish priorities in terms of benefits to Argentine society and attainability. We should seek further specific improvements through dialogue in the improved atmosphere, but maintain our present policy on votes in the IFI's and the restrictions on military supplies. We should, however, seek to reopen the sale of training (which would require modification of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment). Our general approach, especially in the UNHRC, should seek to avoid pushing Argentina into cooperation with the Soviets.

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Rationale: Our approach to limit Soviet influence should be basically a political one. There has been progress in human rights -- notably, few new security cases and a new assertiveness by the judiciary and in public expression and a general decline in violence and repression. Our approach should acknowledge this progress. Certain issues in the relationship which have not been linked in the past should be kept delinked. There is no strategic need to relax military supply restrictions at this time. Training, however, is important to try to influence the next generation of Argentina's military leaders. We do not want to create too much of an imbalance in our relations with Argentina and with Chile, however, while the Beagle Channel issue is still outstanding.

Option C. Move a step further toward normal relations.

We would seek further to strengthen working relations with the GOA by lifting the restrictions on Commerce licences and by initiating a move to lift the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment restrictions on the military supply relationship. We would stress to the GOA that human rights remain important to us and would continue our abstention on IFI loans. But we would more explicitly and unconditionally reaffirm General Goodpaster's general assurances that we were not interested in seeking the GOA's public censure at the 1980 UNHRC meeting, and would not support future moves for censure in UN or OAS fora in view of current and prospective progress.

Rationale: The deteriorating international security situation makes Argentine cooperation important. We must take seriously Soviet probes to establish influence in Argentina and Brazil and to foster mutually profitable economic relations. Argentine fears of public censure in the UN, essentially for past human rights violations, are a principal reason for increasing Argentine-Soviet political cooperation. Many political observers agree that a solution to the problem of past disappearances is not feasible at this time and will come, if at all, as part of a broader political settlement, including a general amnesty. The Smith mission, in its report, noted that no major Argentine political leader is pressing for an accounting at this time. The measures contemplated under this approach are the strongest card we can play to counter Soviet probing for influence, to reestablish close working relations, to obtain Argentine cooperation on grains and other East-West issues, and to elicit further Argentine cooperation in Hemispheric matters.

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MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
DAVID AARON

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT: Argentina: Your Questions

You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S. policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President. The item for the President is at Tab A. The other questions are answered below.

I. Argentina's Human Rights Situation

Argentina is still one of the world's most serious human rights problem countries. Just this month, Amnesty International launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000 political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented stories of arrest and torture. (One report from our Embassy is at Tab B.) On human rights-related matters, world opinion always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to correct that.

While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere, there has been some improvement in recent months. We understand that the Minister of Interior has instructed the police, and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under executive power have decreased and lists of those detained have been published; and a limited right of option for political prisoners to request exile has been reinstated. On a number of cases in which we have expressed special interest -- Jacobo Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family -- the Argentine Government has released them.

II. U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting "no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining.

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We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another group of requests.

We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human rights situation, we will go ahead with military training to them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two major credit sales.

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be committed before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for \$50 million and \$150 million on the munitions control lists.) There are also funds for military training, which are being held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving.

Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the IAHR to visit in accordance with the IAHR's regulations; (2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without re-arresting them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule of law.

Everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance with various legislative requirements, was made by State without consulting NSC.

### III. Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify the repression?

The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all, President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless, a central tenet of our human rights policy is that government-sanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice. . . Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence..."

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I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union, there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed, it is even more difficult to change direction than with the Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find ourself, would be judged as a Presidential retreat just as surely as a different decision on Dresser.

Personally, I am most disturbed about the decision not to finance \$270 million worth of Export-Import Bank credits. I don't believe that this is either a legitimate or an effective instrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us little choice. The decision did have an unintended positive impact in that it has finally aroused the business community (there are \$600 million worth of credit applications pending in X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive amendments to the X-M bill last week.

I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom told me he had decided to hold everything up until the Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission. Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if it is we who blinked first.

It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first. For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March, and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least \$1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image. Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time, is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps, I will make sure that we are quick to respond.

So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around, and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.

#### IV. The Southern Cone: Are We Winning or Losing?

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against

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us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short time, in early 1977, the Southern Cone countries -- led by Brazil but including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay -- tried to establish a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these governments distrusted each other more than they despised President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly.

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with extremely narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things, the pettiness of their international disputes with one another. Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle Channel, and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.

Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have tried through the working groups and the visits by the President and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will have to await Brazil's new government next year.

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans; no other American President in this century has done that. Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected in the universities because of his strong anti-Communism and the Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike anything the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America, which we had almost lost.

The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our relations. They use every opportunity and every channel -- including Kissinger -- to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty, twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real.

The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated

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than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scape-goats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt, and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy around at this time.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MINUTES OF THE CABINET MEETING

Monday, June 20, 1977

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

The nineteenth meeting of the Cabinet was called to order by the President at 9:04 a.m., Monday, June 20, 1977. All members of the Cabinet were present except Mr. Bergland, who was represented by Deputy Secretary of Agriculture John White. Other persons present were:

Joe Aragon	Bob Lipshutz
Zbig Brzezinski	Bunny Mitchell
Doug Costle	Dick Moe
Stu Eizenstat	Frank Moore
Jane Frank	Frank Press
Rex Granum	Jay Solomon
Joanne Hurley	Stansfield Turner
Jim King	Charles Warren
Tim Kraft	Bill Cable
	Jack Watson

The President asked for comments from Cabinet members, beginning with the Secretary of Interior:

1. Mr. Andrus said that he has just returned from several days in the West fully confirmed in his opinion that "Washington, D.C., is not the real world."

-- He does not anticipate any problems with the opening of the Alaskan North Slope pipeline today.

-- The President said that he would like to discuss several water projects with Mr. Andrus.

2. Mr. Califano reported that he addressed the American Medical Association in San Francisco this past weekend on the economics of health care. He also attended several AMA meetings and described that organization as "unhappy with this Administration."

-- Mr. Califano reported that the House lived up to its agreement on the HEW appropriations bill and held additions to \$1.8 billion, \$1.1 billion of which is in the education area. The Senate begins mark-up on the bill today,

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and Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Magnuson has agreed to oppose the add-ons and to try to change certain other language added by the House. For example, Mr. Califano said that he is very troubled by the "affirmative action" rider added by the House which bans "ratios and other numerical requirements" as well as "quotas." Another amendment bars HEW's interpretation of the Byrd amendment pertaining to funds for school desegregation. Mr. Califano noted that the parliamentary situation on the House floor forced a blanket prohibition against abortion. He predicted that the Senate would modify this language.

-- The President inquired about the level of funding for cancer research. Mr. Califano thinks it is too high, despite the testimony of Benno C. Schmidt, Chairman of the President's Cancer Advisory Panel. Mr. Strauss pointed out that Mr. Schmidt is an able and impressive advocate and suggested that it would be helpful for the President to meet with him to discuss the subject. Mr. Califano added that several influential Senators are also advocates of the high funding figures for cancer research. He noted that Congressman Obey, on the other hand, has stated that the funding level is too high.

3. Mr. Vance summarized the comprehensive test ban discussions held in Washington last week: The Soviets seemed more forthcoming in their discussions on the banning of nuclear test explosions. It was agreed that multi-country discussions would begin on July 3, 1977.

-- Talks will begin Wednesday in Moscow on arms control in the Indian Ocean.

-- The Belgrade Conference is underway. The U.S. has suggested dividing the group into three working committees for in-depth review of each of the following topics: 1) principles and confidence-building measures; 2) cooperation in economics, science, technology, and environment; 3) human contacts, information, culture and education. The Soviets want a plenary session, which, according to Mr. Vance, would prevent any detailed focus. He described the general atmosphere of the meeting as "businesslike."

-- Mr. Vance said that Germany has made an important change of position by pledging not to transfer sensitive nuclear technology in the future. This brings Germany into line with France on the subject.

-- Australian Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser will visit the United States later this week.

-- Mr. Vance noted a problem over the weekend with the Canadian Fisheries Agreement. In response to a U.S. communique on salmon fishing in the State of Washington, the Canadians threatened to seize American shrimp boats. The U.S. has forwarded a new proposal which should clear up the situation.

-- The State Department has received a number of unconfirmed reports that Ugandan President Idi Amin Dada has disappeared and possibly has been assassinated.

-- In response to a question from the President, Mr. Vance commented briefly on the recent Organization of American States meeting in Grenada. The U.S. spoke third-- after Argentina and Chile. Both of those countries urged the need to fight international terrorism with counter-terrorism. In his remarks, Mr. Vance stressed that counter-terrorism was not the way to deal with the problem and spelled out the U.S. view on how violations of human rights should be approached. He also spoke about the need for organizational change in the OAS and urged that the three-part structure of the organization be merged into one committee. Additional discussion focused on cutting back the bureaucracy and reviewing the dues structure. Mr. Vance also described his personal discussions with Trinidad's Prime Minister Eric Williams, a senior OAS spokesman, about streamlining the OAS. Mr. Vance suggested that Ambassador Young follow up on the contacts made at the Grenada meeting on his forthcoming trip to the Caribbean.

4. Mr. Schultze was in Paris last week for a meeting of the Economic Policy Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). He summarized the world economic outlook for industrialized countries as follows: Growth of OECD countries will be 4% in 1977 and 3% for the first quarter of 1978. Outside the U.S., unemployment will rise in 1977 and 1978--it now stands at 15 million, approximately half of which is in the U.S. He noted that Japan and Germany are not likely to meet the growth targets they set at the International Economic Summit. The President and Messrs. Schultze and Blumenthal discussed ways to spur countries to meet their growth targets--focusing now primarily on 1978 since it is too late to influence results for 1977.

5. Dr. Brzezinski said that in two major areas the Administration's foreign policy is already having global impacts: nuclear non-proliferation and human rights.

-- Last week, the NSC held internal meetings and worked with the Vice President and members of Congress on the Middle East. The most explicit statement of the U.S. position on the Middle East is contained in the Vice President's speech delivered in San Francisco last Friday.

-- The NSC also reviewed a comprehensive report on reorganizing the Intelligence Community. A review committee is working on legislation in this area. Dr. Brzezinski said that there are eight basic options under review, and that a proposal will be ready next week. Other issues currently being studied by the NSC are arms limitations in the Indian Ocean; chemical warfare (where the NSC proposed and the President approved seeking a total ban); and follow-up on Mrs. Carter's trip to Latin America.

6. Mr. Young said that the Security Council is meeting this week on the Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique.

-- Ambassador Don McHenry is back from South Africa and met with the Vice President and Mr. Vance last week. The Vice President and Mr. Young discussed the new, more flexible attitude of South African Prime Minister Vorster on Namibia and the role that South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) can be expected to play. Mr. Young pointed out that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) will be a key force in persuading SWAPO to accept a settlement in the area. The OAU is meeting in Gabon next week, and several U.S. representatives will be present.

-- Mr. Young described frequent social contacts with the Soviets in New York. Mr. Vance said that the Soviets are also in frequent touch with the State Department in Washington. The President said that he favors our keeping every possible avenue open with the Soviets. He also commented that it was good that Mr. Brezhnev is now the official leader of the USSR. The President indicated his desire to find a convenient time to conduct broad-based discussions with Mr. Brezhnev.

-- Mr. Vance suggested that Cabinet members read an article by Peter Osnos on the USSR in yesterday's Washington Post.

7. Mr. Marshall has just returned from four days at the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conference in Geneva. Although results are "mixed", the U.S. has

accomplished most of what it set out to do at the meeting, and several foreign leaders were publicly supportive of our aims.

-- Mr. Marshall also met in Geneva with the labor ministers of several countries. They expressed a strong desire to keep the U.S. in the ILO and predicted that a U.S. withdrawal from the ILO would, in all likelihood, be fatal to the organization. The labor ministers were also interested in expanding technical cooperation and in our approach to the problems of youth unemployment.

-- Mr. Marshall explained that frequent wildcat strikes have depleted the health and welfare funds of the UMW, and that the union may now be forced to cut health benefits. The UMW board meets today; if such a decision is made, a series of protest strikes might follow. Mr. Marshall said that plans are underway to form a committee within the government to review the situation.

8. Attorney General Bell was in Canada last Friday and Saturday negotiating with the Minister of Justice concerning the extra-territorial effect of U.S. laws.

-- He said that the Korean CIA investigation is still underway in the Justice Department, and that there is absolutely no truth to recent press reports that Justice is "playing politics" with the investigation.

-- The President discussed the burdens imposed by a requirement in the Landrum Griffin Act that the Justice Department monitor union elections. The Attorney General stated that these monitoring requirements were more extensive than in the Voting Rights Act and that he would look into the situation with Mr. Marshall.

9. The Vice President reported that Mr. Andrus' trip to California was extremely well received, and that, during his own recent trip to San Francisco, he heard many compliments on Mr. Andrus.

10. Mr. Blumenthal said that he will testify later this morning on legislation to establish NOW accounts (checking accounts that pay interest). The idea has been tried in New England and will require uniform reserve requirements as well as a role by the Federal Reserve Board regarding initial interest payments. Mr. Blumenthal said that Arthur Burns would also testify on the bill. He estimated that the legislation has a 50/50 chance of passage. There is considerable disagreement among Federal financial institutions on the bill.

-- Treasury officials have been meeting with various groups on the tax reform package. Later today, Mr. Blumenthal will brief Ms. Kreps and Messrs. Califano and Marshall on the subject.

11. Mr. John White said that Mr. Bergland is winding up his Far East trip.

-- The Agriculture appropriations bill is on the House floor today, and the sugar provision will be controversial.

-- Late last Friday, 130 counties in Georgia were declared eligible for drought assistance. The President and several Cabinet members discussed the length and severity of the drought.

12. Ms. Harris described her recent visit to the U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting in Tucson. A resolution was passed unanimously complimenting HUD and the Administration for their urban initiatives.

-- The HUD appropriations bill passed the House.

-- The conference begins this week on the HUD authorizations bill, and Ms. Harris said that some minor questions are complicating the situation.

-- The President noted that virtually every resolution passed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors in the last six to eight years--with the exception of this recent Conference--has condemned the Administration. He expressed sympathy for the difficult problems with which mayors must constantly deal and appreciation for their support.

13. Dr. Schlesinger said that the utilities are lobbying against the coal conversion proposal in the energy plan. The liberals are raising environmental objections, and the Republicans are offering flat opposition. Notwithstanding these problems, results of the recent votes in the Ways and Means Committee were excellent. He asked the President for permission to negotiate on the gas guzzler tax, and the President noted that the Senate was more strongly in favor of the Administration's position than the House.

-- Dr. Schlesinger said that sentiment in the Congress was strongly in favor of retention of the nuclear fission option, and that the Clinch River power plant could only be killed on efficiency grounds. The President said that he has heard comments that the Administration speaks with an "uncertain voice" on Clinch River. Dr. Schlesinger said that ERDA had supported the Clinch River project for five

years, and that although now the top people at ERDA are doing everything they can to reinforce the President's position, there are some problems of support at the lower levels in the Agency. Dr. Schlesinger said that he would speak to the President about additional steps that might be taken to improve the situation.

14. The President told Mr. Strauss that he likes the idea expressed in Mr. Strauss' weekly summary of putting together a trade group to visit Latin American as a follow-up to Mrs. Carter's trip. The President said that concern was expressed about U.S. beef import quotas; he asked Mr. John White to look into our allocation program. The President made it clear that he was not proposing an increase in overall levels, but rather a review of the U.S. allocation among countries.

15. Mr. Lance said that the spring budget review process will be completed this week, and that spending ceilings will be released next week.

-- Employees' ceilings were approved by the President and sent out over the weekend. Mr. Lance said that Jim King will be calling Cabinet Secretaries concerning some people who need to be placed.

16. Mr. Adams will complete work within the next ten days on an automobile legislative package. He asked to meet briefly with the President on the issue of passive restraints in automobiles since a decision on that subject must be made by July 1. He underscored the comprehensive nature of his automobile proposals and said that emissions, mileage and safety features will all be included.

-- In recent speeches, Mr. Adams has tried to illustrate and emphasize the connection between the human rights theme and U.S. energy policy. Basically, he has pointed out that the U.S. is attempting to show by its own affirmative actions that it will conserve the world's resources.

-- The DOT appropriations bill should be finished this week and should be held within the Administration's budget level.

-- Today is the final day for U.S./U.K. air negotiations. Mr. Adams is still optimistic that an agreement will be signed. In his opinion, an extension of time would not be helpful since the basic issues have been under hard consideration for six months. He has conferred with every

-8-

affected U.S. airline, all of which are prepared to move to alternate routes as of midnight Tuesday if an agreement is not reached. The President said he wants to be kept up to date on this issue and stressed that the American people do not yet understand it. Mr. Strauss observed that our positions on these issues and on airline deregulation are extremely politically saleable if they are properly explained. Mr. Adams said that a statement has been prepared in the event that the U.S. and U.K. fail to reach agreement. The President emphasized that a clear and simple explanation of the primary issues will need to be made to the public.

17. Ms. Kreps said that she has sent the President a memorandum on cargo preference.

-- The Commerce Department has been working closely with Stu Eizenstat's staff on regulations to implement the anti-boycott legislation which recently passed the Congress. Mr. Vance said that the reactions of many foreign governments to the legislation have been good, and that the Saudi's need to be kept informed. Attorney General Bell emphasized the importance of letting foreign governments know how they can comment on the regulations. The President suggested that Ms. Kreps invite foreign ambassadors in for a briefing on the proposed regulations, and Mr. Vance said that this procedure would be most helpful. Mr. Califano pointed out that most foreign governments have Washington counsel who represent their interests in formal administrative proceedings, and that any special meetings should not be inconsistent with these formal legal channels. Ms. Kreps said that the legislation is specific and does not leave much flexibility for the regulations, but Mr. Strauss said that perception is the opposite and that most observers believe there is considerable flexibility.

18. Dr. Brown said that plans are going forward regarding his consultations with Korean officials next month. He reported that the Koreans and the Japanese appear to be adjusting well to our new policy in the area. Dr. Brown is also developing recommendations on arms transfers and credits. Congress has set a number of hearings on our Korea policy--both in the House and Senate. Admiral Turner, General George Brown and others have been called to testify. Dr. Brzezinski said that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wants the NSC to release a CIA document on the withdrawal of ground troops from Korea. He has declined the request on grounds that this would compromise the President's decision-making process. He plans to brief the Committee on the subject.

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-- The House and Senate committees have finished hearings on the DOD authorization and are working on their reports. Their money totals are close to Administration figures, but many details are quite different. It is already clear that the appropriations committees will not include everything in the authorizing legislation. The House appropriations committee has reduced the DOD budget by \$2.5 billion; the Senate is waiting to see what the final decision on authorization is before it acts. A key issue will be adding back funds for a nuclear carrier-- presently not in the House appropriations committee draft. Dr. Brown then commented briefly on the length of the House appropriations committee report. Virtually everyone of the 300+ pages in the report contains detailed instructions to the Department. Other members of the Cabinet discussed similar problems their departments have with detailed Congressional directives in committee reports.

-- DOD will meet the OMB employee ceilings.


19. The President described Congressional cuts to his foreign aid proposals as "drastic" and said that some of the restrictions imposed are "debilitating."

-- He reiterated his request to Cabinet members to fill regional appointments promptly.

-- He urged Cabinet members to attend the Democratic fund raiser in New York on June 23. A special plane will be going up in the afternoon, and space may also be available on Air Force 1 and Air Force 2.

The meeting was adjourned by the President at 11:07 a.m.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Jack H. Watson, Jr." The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "J".

Jack H. Watson, Jr.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

NSC#6032

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October 30, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

DOS REVIEWED 01-Feb 2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

Subject: Non-Proliferation: Proposed Public Statements  
on Swiss and FRG Contracts with Argentina

Ref: Your Memorandum to Secretary Vance of October  
18, 1979

We have carefully considered the action proposed in your memorandum of October 18 in the context of further diplomatic efforts we are contemplating to influence the safeguard conditions to be applied by Switzerland and the FRG to nuclear sales to Argentina. Our judgment is that we should hold off public statements until it is clear that our diplomatic efforts have been unsuccessful. We plan to undertake the following next steps:

-- We will consult as called for by the London Suppliers Guidelines with Canada, the FRG, the Swiss and possibly the UK on the safeguard requirements. The FRG has already agreed in principle to such consultations. Gerard Smith, when he is in Bonn this week for post-INFCE discussions, will say to Genscher that we wish to consult with the above states on Argentina. We expect Genscher will assent to this. We will then contact the Swiss and other participants to arrange the consultations.

-- In these consultations we will emphasize that Argentina is an exceptional case in order to avoid a debate about the merits of requiring full-scope safeguards on a generic basis: sensitive heavy water technology as well as reactor sales are involved; Argentina has split its order among a number of suppliers in part to avoid the full-scope safeguard requirement; and suppliers have a shared responsibility to prevent this "divide and conquer" strategy from succeeding.

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-- We are considering letters from the Secretary to Genscher and Swiss Foreign Minister Aubert to reinforce our concerns on this matter.

We believe our diplomatic efforts have some chance for success and would be endangered by going public now with our concerns. Upon Gerry Smith's return about November 8 we will assess whether diplomatic efforts are still worth pursuing and how and when to make this matter public.



Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1978

DOS REVIEWED 01-Feb-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT

From: Cyrus Vance

Subject: Meeting with Argentine President Videla

You are scheduled to meet with Argentine President Videla September 4 in Rome to discuss U.S.-Argentine relations and ways to reverse a precipitous deterioration in our relations. The basic point you should make is that we seriously wish to improve relations as conditions permit and that a comprehensive and thorough review of our total relationship may be desirable. Assistant Secretary Vaky has been designated to undertake this task and is prepared to make arrangements with President Videla for this purpose.

SETTING

Faced with a once severe terrorist threat, the military government in Argentina has seriously abused basic human rights (Attachment 1). The United States has as a result restricted military sales (an embargo on the sale of Munitions List items will go into effect October 1, Attachment 2), held back approval of Argentine transactions in the Export-Import Bank, and voted against Argentine loan proposals in the International Financial Institutions (Attachment 3). We have sought to induce improvement by indicating that Argentine steps in this direction would result in relaxing these restrictions.

Initially, the Argentine Government reacted to our pressure with some restraint and sought to convince us of the necessity of its actions. More recently, however, it has moved rapidly to diversify its international ties, reassess its relationship with us, and prepare to adopt an adversarial course.

In a major attempt to encourage progress in human rights and improve relations, Under Secretary Newsom visited Argentina last May and suggested that some

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relaxation of our restrictive actions would be possible if the Argentine government would take one or more of the following steps (Attachment 4):

- Agreement with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) on a visit to Argentina;
- Try, release, or allow exile for the prisoners held without charge;
- Establish a mechanism to inform families of the fate of the disappeared.

While Mr. Newsom was given a courteous and sympathetic reception, the Argentine authorities have not taken any significant steps forward since his visit. Reaction in Argentina to our pressure, on the other hand, has been severe. Contrary to our own view, many Argentines consider that the situation has measurably improved in the last two years. The recent denial of an Ex-Im letter of interest to Allis-Chalmers for the sale of hydroelectric equipment, in particular, was seen as a deliberate escalation in our sanctions.

As the most powerful Spanish-speaking country of South America, Argentina could become a significant negative force in areas important to us such as nuclear proliferation (Attachment 5), regional security arrangements, conventional arms restraint, and Third World issues.

#### Videla's Approach

We do not know exactly what Videla will say. He may simply give the standard Argentine exposition -- that human rights violations are an unfortunate, if unavoidable and necessary, by-product of the effort to suppress a vicious terrorist campaign, which threatens Argentina with anarchy. On the other hand, there is also the possibility that he might bring some new concrete points, explain steps they are now prepared to take (particularly in regard to the Human Rights Commission), and suggestions on the future evolution of U.S.-Argentine relations.

#### Your Approach

Your approach should be sympathetic. You would wish to avoid commitments in response to specific suggestions, if any, but would note that you will carry Videla's

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message back to President Carter.

We recommend you say specifically:

- On our side, we seriously wish to improve relations;
- As a token of this, we have taken -- and are taking -- some modest steps, such as release of export licenses for ambulance aircraft as well as Army helicopters, airport radar equipment, voice security communications equipment and other items on our Munitions Export Control List.
- While we understand the tragic history of Argentina's domestic political conflict, we remain concerned over the human rights situation, specifically the treatment of the human person.
- We wish to maintain normal relations in as many areas as possible, as is evidenced, for example, by the forthcoming bilateral economic consultations (Attachment 6), and are prepared to expand these relations as conditions permit.
- We believe a thorough and comprehensive review of the whole gamut of our relations would be desirable. The President and the Secretary of State have asked Assistant Secretary Vaky to undertake this.
- The place and format for such consultations would be for President Videla to decide. Assistant Secretary Vaky is willing to come to Buenos Aires, as previously proposed.

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 23, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Mexico. Owen chaired a meeting last evening to task different agencies on follow-up activities after the President's trip. I am combining these tasks into a single follow-up memorandum from you to the agencies, and hope to get that to you by tomorrow. In addition, I have met with Joseph Friedkin, Chairman of the U.S. side of the International Boundary and Water Commission, to discuss the agreement by the two Presidents to find a permanent solution to the sanitation problem. He has a specific proposal, but apparently, ETA must clear it. I drafted a short memo from you to the President on this issue, and subsequently called the EPA Administrator's office to ask that they expedite their clearance of the IBWC proposal. (C)

I met with Governor Askew, who will be the Chairman of the President's Commission on Immigration and Refugees, to discuss his trip to Mexico on March '7. The President has decided to defer making any decisions on legislation until after Askew speaks to Lopez Portillo and reports to him. Askew is learning about these issues very quickly, and intends to run a taut Commission, and although he realizes there is no permanent solution to the problem, he intends to try to press for a consensus report. He has spoken to Rodino and Kennedy, and both agreed on the need to postpone the Commission's report until after the 1980 elections. Stu Eisenstat has apparently changed his position on this issue as a result of his trip to Mexico with us last week; he now supports our position of deferring a decision until the Commission issues its report. (C)

Mexico's first political party, PRI, is celebrating its 50th Anniversary soon, and has invited delegates from the Democrat and Republican Party. I spoke to John White about trying to get some high-level delegates to the Anniversary, but White had already asked three Mexican-Americans to represent the Democratic Party. Ambassador Linowitz called and said that Mexican Ambassador Margain had congratulated Linowitz for being appointed the President's coordinator on Mexican affairs. Linowitz wanted to know what this was all about, and I explained that the idea for a coordinator had been discussed at some length in the past, and of course his name had come up, as it has for many other things, but that no final decision had been made about whether there would be such a coordinator. I was surprised to hear that Linowitz would be interested in a temporary job as such a coordinator. (C)

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Phil Weiss asked me to take care of a problem which has emerged as a result of the President's agreeing to a proposal that Dolph Brisco, former Governor of Texas, be designated the President's personal representative for agricultural programs in Mexico. Lucey and State oppose the idea, but USDA and John White want it. For reasons which go beyond the comprehension of a city slicker like myself, Brisco is also interested in becoming the President's personal representative for the US-Mexico screwworm program, and State Department's objections do not seem to be too valid. I will try to work this out next week. (C)

Feheuer has asked for another briefing on the President's immigration policy, and I have asked whether it would be possible to put it off until after the President gives the briefing next Wednesday. I called Congressman Wolfe to tell him that we had implemented his recommendation on narcotics in the communique as well as in the private conversations and he was pleased. (C)

Francis Mason, Senior Vice President of Chase Manhattan, stopped by and asked whether US policy on three financial issues to Mexico would change as a result of the President's visit. I told him that the three issues, which are quite specific, were not raised, but I will try to follow up with Treasury. (C)

Vice President's Trip. I met with Denis Clift and Pete Vaky to discuss additional papers which the Vice President requested for his trip to Venezuela and Brazil. It looks as if there will be many heads of state and foreign ministers at both inaugurations, and we will try to prepare the Vice President for meetings which are likely to occur in the course of events. (C)

Ecuador. The Ecuadorian Charge Sevilla Borja came in to express great Ecuadorian concern about the increasingly provocative gestures of Peru towards Ecuador as well as towards Chile. He believes that the Peruvian military may be making these gestures for internal political reasons, or perhaps because they have some belligerent intentions. He also said that the Ecuadorian election is on stream and he expects it will be a fair election. (C)

Human Rights. Spoke with John Spiegel of Christopher's office who informed me that Christopher has decided to continue our policy of abstaining on loans to El Salvador until after we receive the response from President Romero to our demarche. On Argentina, he said that Christopher and Vance have been persuaded by a human rights assessment paper which has been prepared in State, and they are prepared to begin voting "no" on loans to Argentina. I asked whether it would be possible to see such a paper, and informed him of your interest and the President's interest in any decision on Argentina, requesting that they suspend a decision until after we have had an opportunity to review the paper. He agreed to send the paper and to try to get a postponement. (C)

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5. Central America. Had a good talk with Erb and Gert Rosenthal, Director of Mexico City office of ECLA, about the impending crisis in Central America. I am working with Vaky on a PRM on Central America, but State is not anxious for a PRM; they would prefer to do it themselves(C)
6. NAM. State has reworked the paper which I sent them on a suggested approach to the NAM, and our differences are very minor at this point. I made some suggestions, and they will send the final version over shortly. I will then distribute it to staff for discussion at that point(C)
7. France/Brazil. A French official of the CNES told a NASA representative in private that his organization is under strict instructions from senior government levels not to assist the Brazilians in developing rockets with military weapons capability. He said that the French were fully aware that the GOB had obtained significant powder technology from an Italian source, filament winding machinery from German sources and so on. The French, he indicated, would not provide the Brazilians with the necessary technology to enable the GOB to put all the components together for a missile with military capability. (S)
8. Mexico/US/Canada. In response to a question from the floor of the Canadian House of Commons about the possibility of a North American Common Market, the Canadian Minister of Energy replied that Canada would want to be "very chary" about such a proposal because it might be no more than a "disguise for a continental energy policy of a different kind." The question arose when an M.P. read the Reston interview with Lopez Portillo who referred to the possibility of creating a common market of customs union. (U)

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Argentina 4D

MEETING

President Carter with President Jorge Rafael Videla  
of Argentina  
September 9, 1977 - 9:00 a.m.  
Cabinet Room - White House

Checklist and Follow-up Items

1. Videla said that as soon as political conditions permit -- perhaps before the end of the year, Argentina would ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
2. President Carter told Videla the USG would talk to the Cubans about signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked whether Argentina would send representatives to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference on October 19 - 21, 1977.
3. President Carter said he would provide the Department of State for onward transmission to the Government of Argentina, a list prepared by a Washington human rights group containing the names of 3,000 individuals being detained in Argentina.
4. Videla said he hoped that the problem of detainees might be resolved by Christmas 1977.
5. In response to President Carter's inquiry whether it might be possible to send representatives of the OAS or UN to confirm human rights progress in Argentina sometime after Christmas, Videla referred to recent visits by USG officials and said such visits are the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed of its record. Videla said he was not troubled by visits by international human rights commissions, which testify to the facts in Argentina.
6. The President and Secretary Vance accepted Videla's invitation for the Secretary to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete bilateral consultations.

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 136133

E. O. 11852: GDS

TAGS: EFIN, AR, US, PORG, SHUM

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE IFIS

1. ARGENTINE POLITICAL COUNSELOR BEAUGE RAISED \$100 MILLION WORLD BANK LOAN FOR ARGENTINA WITH ARA/ECA ON JUNE 13. BEAUGE ASKED HOW U. S. WOULD VOTE. DEPTOFF REPLIED THAT HE COULD ONLY SAY WE WILL NOT SUPPORT THE LOAN. BEGIN FYI: WE ARE PLANNING TO ABSTAIN AND MAKE A STATEMENT. END FYI.

2. BEAUGE ASKED IF IT IS TOO LATE FOR ARGENTINE DEVELOPMENTS TO INFLUENCE VOTE. DEPTOFF ANSWERED THAT IT IS NOT TOO LATE. BEAUGE THEN ASKED WHAT KIND OF EVENTS WOULD INFLUENCE US. DEPTOFF REMINDED BEAUGE THAT WE HAVE BEEN RAISING SEVERAL PRIORITY CONCERNS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. DEPTOFF SPELLED OUT NEED FOR ACTION IN FOLLOWING AREAS:

- NEED TO PUBLISH A LIST OF ALL PRISONERS BEING HELD BY GOVERNMENT.

- NEED TO BRING PEOPLE TO TRIAL OR FREE THEM.

- NEED TO REGULARIZE DETENTION PROCEDURES AND END DISAPPEARANCES.

- DESIRABILITY OF REINSTITUTING "RIGHT OF OPTION," WHICH ALLOWS INDIVIDUALS BEING HELD WITHOUT CHARGES TO OPT FOR VOLUNTARY EXILE AS LONG AS STATE OF SIEGE LASTS.

- NEED TO PUNISH EXCESSES INCLUDING TORTURE.

3. DEPTOFF ALSO RAISED POSSIBILITY OF INVITING INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. BEAUGE ASKED IF U. S. WOULD REFRAIN FROM UNILATERAL CRITICISM WHILE IAHRC WAS STUDYING ARGENTINA. DEPTOFF SAID THAT HE COULD NOT REPLY BUT THAT U. S. SUPPORTS COMMISSION STRONGLY AND WOULD DO NOTHING TO UNDERMINE ITS WORK. FURTHERMORE, AN INVITATION TO THE COMMISSION WOULD TEND TO LESSEN NEED FOR U. S. ACTION. DEPTOFF WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT, ABOVE ALL, EVENTS IN ARGENTINA WOULD DICTATE U. S. ACTION. BEAUGE COMMENTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE POLITICALLY FOR ARGENTINA TO INVITE IAHRC. VANCE

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Weekly Report - Thursday, June 16, 1977

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DOS REVIEWED 08-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

Recent Developments (Pastor)

Mrs. Carter's Trip. Mrs. Carter returned from her seven-country, 12-day junket on Sunday, having won over all the Latin American Heads of State she visited. Relations were improved with every country. U.S. commitment on major issues was restated with great eloquence and forcefulness. Staff work was impeccable.

OAS General Assembly. Secretary Vance's remarks at the OAS General Assembly defined the terms of the conference in his stress on human rights and OAS organizational reform. Costa Rica, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Mexico are the supporting the initiatives mentioned in Vance's remarks, while Argentina, Brazil and Chile rather predicably opposed them.

Panama. Canal Treaty negotiations are moving quite quickly and as a result each obstacle appears major and more difficult than it might were negotiations moving more gradually. The Negotiators, however, have reached a compromise on the issue of whether U.S. Naval vessels should receive preferential treatment over other vessels in times of emergency. The next issue which will cause perhaps the biggest problem will be the problem of compensation. Panama would like \$1.0 billion down and \$300 million on an annual basis while Congress believes that the United States should be compensated for giving up the Canal.

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Alert Items (Pastor)

The Perez State Visit in less than two weeks will probably be the most important State Visit by any Latin American in the next few years. President Perez has given us a quite specific agenda, and we should be prepared to either accept his proposals or offer other equally concrete ones. The United States and Venezuela have much in common on the major issues of human rights, nonproliferation and arms control, and cooperation between our two countries may be the best way to pursue these goals.

Guatemala is becoming increasingly worried that the UK will announce the independence of Belize before there is an opportunity to reach a compromise. If this occurs, Guatemala appears to be prepared to go to war. Guatemala believes that U.S. intervention is necessary for settlement, and we are presently exploring different proposals with Mexico, the UK, and Venezuela. This may be another important item for the State Visit of the Venezuelan President.

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 24, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)  
SUBJECT: Evening Report (U)

Nicaragua: The Nicaraguan Junta has scheduled a meeting with OAS Secretary General Orfila tomorrow to sign the American Convention on Human Rights. Attached is a memcon of the meeting this morning, and a preview of the supplemental. (C)

El Salvador: Attacks on five separate National Guard posts indicate a significant departure from past guerrilla operations and a new capability of guerrilla groups to jointly plan and conduct operations using heavier weapons. (S)

Caribbean: Met with State's Caribbean country director to discuss next steps in our Caribbean Policy. Vaky will chair an inter-agency group to review our bilateral relations with Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada, to discuss how we can contribute to a regional Coast Guard, and to discuss ways to expand ICA's program in the region. A British team will stop in Washington in October to give us its preliminary assessment of the Coast Guard. Then Habib will lead a team to London a week later to firm up security arrangements. (S)

Jamaica: The Cuban Ambassador held a press conference to accuse the opposition Labor Party and Jamaica's major daily of lying about him and Cuba. Labor Party leader Seaga will reply to the Cuban Ambassador in a big rally planned for September 30, when he plans to make public more evidence of Cuban activities. According to Seaga, the press conference was the best thing that happened to the Labor Party in some time. Sent you a memo describing the strategy we are pursuing to react to Manley's new direction. (C)

Panama: Met with the Vice President and his staff to discuss his schedule in Panama and the issues that will come up in his bilaterals. (C)

Press Contacts: None. Worked on Vance's speech on Latin America for FPA on Thursday. It still needs a lot of work. (C)

Argentina: The members of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission certainly succeeded in raising the consciousness of the Argentine public. It will not be easy for the government to slip backwards after this visit. Even the Peronists will be watching closely and will not hesitate. (C)

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Review on 9/24/85

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-54-6-7-2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

April 18, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVID AARON

FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT: Evening Report

Mexico. Attended a meeting chaired by Jules Katz with the industry and consumer representatives interested in the gas negotiations. We briefed them in a very general way and asked as well as solicited some questions. It went well. We are sending the proposal down to the Mexicans tonite with talking points for Lucey to use if the Mexicans initial response is very negative. Two new problems on the horizon on U.S./Mexican relations are: tomatoes and mixed credits -- the French have arranged an agreement on mixed credits with the Mexicans which upsets Treasury and they want to make a demarche to the French. I think that will be as effective as our demarche to Bonn in January 1977 on the Brazil nuclear agreement. I will try to turn Treasury off. (C)

Argentina. Lunched with Ambassador Raul Castro, who informed me of the recent improvement in the human rights situation and said he expects further improvement as Videla gets stronger. The Argentines promised him for the umpteenth time that they would ratify Tlatelolco at the end of this month; we spoke about the possibility of his returning to Argentina with a letter from Vance to Videla repeating our great concern. Labor problems will be more troublesome this year but he thinks the Argentine government will be able to manage it, although they will have to dismiss their Finance Minister. (C)

Nicaragua. Two important leaders of Nicaragua's business sector met with me and informed me of recent developments which have strengthened the middle. They urged us to appoint a good new ambassador soon and I assured them we will. They said that such an ambassador will help the middle in Nicaragua and we should look for additional symbolic ways to strengthen the middle; they suggested a meeting with the Vice President. (At the right time I think this is a good idea.) They also suggested that we should take some steps to counter Somoza propaganda that Solaun's resignation represents a Somoza triumph. I will suggest that State draft a Presidential letter to Solaun thanking him for his excellent service. (C)

Science and Technology. Briefed a group of people from different agencies on the Vice President's conversations with Figueiredo and Herrera on S & T, suggested some ideas for ways to package an over-all approach on S & T to Latin America for Frank Press' trip. (C)

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Review on April 18, 1985

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Argentina

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Bullock

MEETING

President Carter with President Jorge Rafael Videla  
of Argentina  
September 9, 1977 - 9:00 a.m.  
Cabinet Room - White House

Checklist and Follow-up Items

1. Videla said that as soon as political conditions permit -- perhaps before the end of the year, Argentina would ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
2. President Carter told Videla the USG would talk to the Cubans about signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked whether Argentina would send representatives to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference on October 19 - 21, 1977.
3. ✓ President Carter said he would provide the Department of State for onward transmission to the Government of Argentina, a list prepared by a Washington human rights group containing the names of 3,000 individuals being detained in Argentina.
4. → Videla said he hoped that the problem of detainees might be resolved by Christmas 1977.
5. ✓ In response to President Carter's inquiry whether it might be possible to send representatives of the OAS or UN to confirm human rights progress in Argentina sometime after Christmas, Videla referred to recent visits by USG officials and said such visits are the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed of its record. Videla said he was not troubled by visits by international human rights commissions which testify to the facts in Argentina.
6. The President and Secretary Vance accepted Videla's invitation for the Secretary to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete bilateral consultations.

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CONSULTATIONS

The President's OAS pledge to consult closely with our American neighbors in advance of major global policy decisions has been widely welcomed. His personal consultations on sugar and Mrs. Carter's trip demonstrate that prior contacts can advance our interests.

The Latins doubt, however, that we will actually hold prior discussions with them on major issues -- at an adequate level and in a timely manner. They have heard this pledge before. And they know genuine consultations are rare.

Such procedures do not imply a "special relationship" with Latin America; on the contrary, they should be applied to all areas, as a matter of sound diplomatic practice. They do mean, in our own self interest, giving such countries a seat at the table when global issues which affect them are being decided.

Proposed Approach

We should promote informal, businesslike discussions among neighbors on common problems and differing perceptions. This would set a style for Inter-American affairs which all sides have wanted but never achieved. It would greatly strengthen our relations with Latin America.

Action Program

1. to initiate a carefully orchestrated program of high-level visits, including:
  - Andy Young's trip to the Caribbean basin;
  - Bob Strauss' swing to major countries on trade issues;
  - a series of visits to South and Central America later this year by Terry Todman, Gale McGee and Secretary Vance, focused on major political issues; a special visit to Brazil and Argentina this fall by Gerard Smith to discuss nuclear energy

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alternatives; and trips by John Gilligan and Abelardo Valdez to selected countries, on aid matters;

- intensified contacts by Mike Blumenthal and Tony Solomon on financial issues; a similar program by Jim Schlesinger on energy, both with full participation by State; and possible visits by senior officials of NASA and other agencies on scientific matters; and
- a coordinated series of visits by senior civilian and military officials to explain our arms transfer policies and our unified posture on human rights;

Above and beyond the substantive progress we hope to achieve through such visits, they will have a significant public impact which itself should serve to underscore our policy objectives.

2. to establish more effective interagency coordination procedures, to assure that U.S. officials in all agencies convey consistent and up-to-date Administration policy in the many forums in which we interact with Latin America;
3. to strengthen bilateral consultations with major nations: Mexico (already functioning), Brazil (modified meetings are planned for this fall), and Venezuela;
4. to reform multilateral hemispheric institutions (primarily within the OAS system): we plan to review all bodies to determine which should be strengthened -- institutionally and financially -- as a basis for more effective consultations, and which should be dropped;
5. to consult with Latin American and other developing countries, at appropriate levels, regularly and on a meaningful basis, on major issues in advance of multilateral meetings at the UN, IMF, MTN, etc; and
6. to assure that persons representing a broadened spectrum of Latin American opinion have regular access to U.S. policy makers, in all agencies,

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to demonstrate our interest in non-official perspectives (to be developed, also through the cultural initiatives proposed in Tab 4).

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OUTGOING 30  
TELEGRAM

Department of State

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E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EPIN, AR, US, PORO, SHUM

SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE IFIS

1. ARGENTINE POLITICAL COUNSELOR BEAUGE RAISED \$100 MILLION WORLD BANK LOAN FOR ARGENTINA WITH ARA/ECA ON JUNE 13. BEAUGE ASKED HOW U. S. WOULD VOTE. DEPTOFF REPLIED THAT HE COULD ONLY SAY WE WILL NOT SUPPORT THE LOAN. BEGIN FYI: WE ARE PLANNING TO ABSTAIN AND MAKE A STATEMENT. END FYI.

2. BEAUGE ASKED IF IT IS TOO LATE FOR ARGENTINE DEVELOPMENTS TO INFLUENCE VOTE. DEPTOFF ANSWERED THAT IT IS NOT TOO LATE. BEAUGE THEN ASKED WHAT KIND OF EVENTS WOULD INFLUENCE US. DEPTOFF REMINDED BEAUGE THAT WE HAVE BEEN RAISING SEVERAL PRIORITY CONCERNS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. DEPTOFF SPELLED OUT NEED FOR ACTION IN FOLLOWING AREAS:

- NEED TO PUBLISH A LIST OF ALL PRISONERS BEING HELD BY GOVERNMENT.
- NEED TO BRING PEOPLE TO TRIAL OR FREE THEM.
- NEED TO REGULARIZE DETENTION PROCEDURES AND END DISAPPEARANCES.
- DESIRABILITY OF REINSTITUTING "RIGHT OF OPTION," WHICH ALLOWS INDIVIDUALS BEING HELD WITHOUT CHARGES TO OPT FOR VOLUNTARY EXILE AS LONG AS STATE OF SIEGE LASTS.
- NEED TO PUNISH EXCESSES INCLUDING TORTURE.

3. DEPTOFF ALSO RAISED POSSIBILITY OF INVITING INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. BEAUGE ASKED IF U. S. WOULD REFRAIN FROM UNILATERAL CRITICISM WHILE IAHRC WAS STUDYING ARGENTINA. DEPTOFF SAID THAT HE COULD NOT REPLY BUT THAT U. S. SUPPORTS COMMISSION STRONGLY AND WOULD DO NOTHING TO UNDERMINE ITS WORK. FURTHERMORE, AN INVITATION TO THE COMMISSION WOULD TEND TO LESSEN NEED FOR U. S. ACTION. DEPTOFF WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT, ABOVE ALL, EVENTS IN ARGENTINA WOULD DICTATE U. S. ACTION. BEAUGE COMMENTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE POLITICALLY FOR ARGENTINA TO INVITE IAHRC. VANCE

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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DOS REVIEWED 02-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

May 26, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Cyrus Vance *CRV*

Argentina. On Wednesday, Under Secretary Newsom met with President Videla in Buenos Aires concerning human rights conditions in Argentina and the effect they are having on our relations. Newsom reports that there is reason for some optimism that the human rights situation in Argentina will improve, but it is still unclear how fast the government will or can move. He made it clear to Videla that in the absence of genuine human rights improvements, we will not be in a position to approve pending arms transfer requests. Videla confided that at the OAS General Assembly next month Argentina will announce that it is inviting the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit Argentina. In view of this development and as a means of encouraging further human rights improvements, we are informing Videla that when the invitation is announced, and after we have consulted with Congress, we would expect to grant Argentina's pending application for the purchase of military training.

SALT. I testified on SALT before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today with Paul Warnke. Considerable bi-partisan support was expressed for your statements yesterday on the need to separate our interest in a new SALT agreement from condemnation of the Soviet role in Africa. In their questioning, Glenn, Percy and others stressed the importance of our being able to make a strong case that the agreement was verifiable. Percy and Javits emphasized the necessity to build public and Congressional support for SALT.

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Kenya. This week we briefed Kenyan Foreign Minister Waiyaki in Nairobi on our intention to send a military survey team to Somalia as a step toward possible US supply of defensive equipment. Waiyaki was told of the assurances we had received from Siad, and we emphasized Siad had been advised that Somalia's continuing material support for insurgents in the region would prevent our establishing an arms supply relationship with Somalia.

Waiyaki did not object to the step we are taking, but he cautioned that Kenya remained convinced that Somalia would never abandon irredentism. He cited Kenyan intelligence reports that Somalia was continuing its active support for the Ogaden insurgency and that Somalia was maintaining surreptitious contact with the Soviet Union. Waiyaki appeared to appreciate that, as we seek to limit Soviet influence in the Horn, we do not intend to sacrifice Kenya's interests.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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September 1, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY OWEN <sup>VP</sup>  
SUBJECT: Allis Chalmers

The Allis Chalmers bid is to supply 20 turbines worth \$400 million for a \$4.6 billion hydroelectric facility between Argentina and Paraguay. Allis Chalmers says that the contract would provide over 18 million man-hours of employment (in the US, of which 10% would be minorities, primarily in the steel industry).

There is no thought of ExIm Bank giving a commitment at this stage. All that is needed is "a letter of interest", such as ExIm routinely issues, and which says that this is the kind of project in which ExIm generally takes an interest but that it will have to be judged, when application is made (probably about 18 months hence), in light of the situation existing at the time, including whether the requirements of relevant legislation are fulfilled.

We need some Argentine movement to explain why we are issuing such a letter, when we refused to issue it earlier but we should be satisfied with the kind of limited progress that we might reasonably expect Videla to signal in his meeting with you. Then when the issue has to be decided, a year and a half hence, we could judge whether more far-reaching progress has been achieved.

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President Videla and the Decision Making Process

On August 1, Lieutenant General Jorge Videla retired from the Army, resigned his position on the ruling Junta and became the full-time civilian President of Argentina. This new role has modified, but not radically changed, a decision making system in which:

- the tri-service (Army, Navy and Air Force) nature of the government is stressed;
- the Army is, nonetheless, the predominant service (60% of Armed Services personnel) and can enforce its will on the two junior services if it chooses;
- compromise to preserve military unity is generally achieved;
- Videla seems comfortable with the dynamics of the government, which often require drawn-out inter-service negotiations before decisions can be reached.

Since the Junta took power, Videla has had to confront sniping from the politically ambitious Navy CINC, Admiral Massera. Willing to compromise on most issues, Videla has been able to maintain a decent working relationship with Massera, often in the face of considerable provocation. Videla's relations with Massera have mirrored his handling of the rival factions within the Army. The military hard liners, who have opposed the President's relatively moderate stance on human rights, have been restrained from carrying out widespread purges of ex-politicians, but they have been able to maintain their positions in key posts, such as Commander of the Buenos Aires and Cordoba Army Corps.

Because he does reflect a consensus of military views on how to handle terrorists -- eliminate them -- Videla has been able to move on peripheral questions such as publishing lists of prisoners and restoring the right of option (see Human Rights). His thinking on the equally difficult question of how to revitalize the economy has also reflected a military consensus toward the de-emphasis of the role of the state in the economy and a loosening

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of controls over the exchange rate. Again, however, Videla has supported populist-like measures to control unemployment.

Videla rules by compromise; he is not a classic Latin American dictator. Given the potential inter-service rivalries and the divisions within the Army, it is likely that he would not be able to govern in any other fashion.

Videla's latitude to set as well as execute policy will probably be decided in an ad hoc manner over the coming months. Critical to Videla's success will be the degree to which he retains Army support through Army Commander Viola. The two share moderate policy outlooks and have a close working relationship. Viola, however, will have to work assiduously to placate hardline Army elements and maintain their support. If he can do so, the Videla-Viola alliance can be expected to reflect, and wield when necessary, the Army's power edge. The Air Force and Navy, on the other hand, will be seeking to guarantee continuation of the tri-service governing arrangement by ensuring that the Videla-Viola connection is not translated into a de facto government by the Army.

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VIDELA'S STYLE

President Jorge Videla is known as a devoted family man, a devout Catholic and a man who values traditions. These are traits he shares with many of his brother officers. In many other ways, however, he is not at all typical of the Argentine officer establishment. He did not want to be President. Quiet and unassuming, he sometimes gives the impression of being self-effacing rather than forceful, a characteristic some of his military colleagues find hard to understand: they mistake it for weakness.

A moderate, Videla appears genuinely to abhor the excesses of which elements of the military have been guilty during his presidency. Some of these excesses, indeed, have been directed at his own people. The Secretary General of the presidential office was recently bombed by right-wing elements, for example, and Videla's ambassador to Caracas was kidnapped and murdered while on leave in Buenos Aires.

Videla's style is to avoid confrontation. He is a consensus leader. Thus, since most military leaders advocate harsh measures against terrorism, he would have difficulty opposing the consensus. Moreover, he is probably unsure of his own strength in the military and would thus fear to confront and demand obedience of the hardliners, even if he were so disposed, for fear that this might lead to dangerous schisms in the Armed Forces and possibly to his own ouster. He has therefore opted to work quietly and carefully to strengthen his own hand and exert only gradual pressure on the hardliners. Whether this tactic will in the end prove successful is an open question.

Videla is personally disposed to be friendly to the U.S. Growing disagreements over the human rights issues, however, have irritated many of his brother officers and forced Videla's government toward something of an adversary relationship. Videla would probably like to limit this trend to the extent possible.

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VIDELA'S STYLE

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JACOBO TIMERMAN

Arrested in April 1977, Timerman published one of Argentina's leading daily newspapers, La Opinion. There were accusations that Timerman was involved with deceased Argentine financier David Graiver, who reportedly financed La Opinion from money supplied by the Montoneros terrorist group. However the Argentine Supreme Court has ruled that there are no grounds for holding him in custody and ordered his release. A Military Tribunal has cleared him of accusations that he supported radical leftist groups.

Timerman was released to house arrest in April of this year, although this was a considerable improvement over jail, he still is unable to communicate with anyone but his immediate family.

Timerman is a leader of the Argentine Jewish community and his arrest led to public complaints of anti-semitism from the American Jewish community. (Argentine Jewry is very concerned about Timerman, but less outspoken).

The Department has repeatedly brought up his case with the Argentines. President Carter spoke to President Videla about Timerman during their 1977 bilateral and Secretary Vance brought it up when he visited Buenos Aires in November.

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JACOB TIMERMAN

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR VAKY ✓  
Assistant Secretary and US Coordinator Alliance  
for Progress, Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

Pete, as promised I am forwarding a written report of the Vice President's meeting with President Videla for yourself and Under Secretary Newsom. I would stress our belief that distribution of this document should be tightly controlled, on a need to know basis.

A. Denis Clift  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

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NARA EF Date 7/9/16

cc: David Aaron ✓  
Robert Pastor

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1978

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR GARDNER'S RESIDENCE,  
ROME, ITALY

September 4, 1968, 1:50 p.m.

ARGENTINE SIDE

President Jorge Rafael Videla  
Col. Miguel A. Mallea Gil  
Dr. Ricardo Yofre

U.S. SIDE

Vice President Walter F. Mondale  
A. Denis Clift  
Anthony J. Hervas, Interpreter

The Vice President opened saying he was pleased to have the pleasure of the meeting. He recalled the meeting with Videla in the White House at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty ceremony. He said we want good relations but there are strains now -- human rights are a central concern. He added that he would report to the President personally on Videla's views.

President Videla thanked the Vice President for the meeting -- an extremely important opportunity to discuss these matters because he feels our relations are deteriorating. He fully concurs with President Carter's position on human rights. Argentina has belief in the democratic process so that men can live with dignity and freedom. He said Argentina is with the United States and not troubled by criticism when it is objective. However, he is concerned by attitudes projecting intervention in domestic affairs. He spoke with President Carter about this at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty signing, but since that time he has had to delay announcement of an invitation to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights because of U.S. criticisms projecting intervention.

A second problem -- Argentine politicians were invited to visit the United States, but they, too, did not visit because of the U.S. statements intervening in our affairs. Mrs. Darien's statements are contributing to a deterioration in our relations.

The Vice President asked if these were statements made in Argentina or in Washington.

President Videla said in Washington before Congress. He said the western world must be united, and the United States must lead the western world. At the same time, the people of Argentina cannot tolerate intervention. This is his concern.

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The Vice President said we want to work with you to have good relations. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment is coming into effect. We must soon take decisions on the Allis-Chalmers deal. We want to be helpful. It would be important if Videla could have the Inter-American Human Rights Commission received in Argentina on terms acceptable to the commission. We would not link Argentine actions with our own.

The Vice President added that the U.S. press covers developments in Argentina closely. There are certain human rights cases with the people known to the press -- people such as Jacobo Timerman. To the extent that Videla makes progress on these cases, it will help us to make progress.

Videla said he understood, and government-to-government relations are not easy. His concern is when a problem is raised to the level of a public or popular issue. This leads to situations where Argentine citizens adopt partisan positions against the United States, to situations where Argentine businessmen adopt partisan positions because they cannot conclude deals when Ex-Im does not grant a loan.

The Vice President repeated that it was important to put our relations on a more positive course. He suggested that it would be good if Assistant Secretary Vaky could come to Argentina to meet with Videla or with a person of his choice for a review of our relations. Videla asked if this would be after the Inter-American Commission or before. The Vice President said he thought it should be as soon as possible. Videla said perhaps he could arrange a visit by the Commission by mid-October. The Vice President asked if he could announce the visit earlier.

Videla then said he would like to point out that since the meeting at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of events showing the efforts on the part of the Argentine government:

- they have issued a list and names of all the detained;
- they have published a list of all of those who disappeared and then reappeared;
- last Christmas they released approximately 500;
- this last week, 65 individuals were freed;
- they have indicated that they are prepared to give a favorable response to the Commission on Human Rights;
- Timerman's situation has changed; he is now out of jail and under house arrest;

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-- Professor Bravo is now under house arrest and they expect the court to lessen the charges against him.

He said officials of the U.S. government are welcome in Argentina, but they cannot give the impression that they are coming to inspect Argentina.

The Vice President said Mr. Vaky was a man of experience and would exercise discretion. He said it will be important to have the announcement on a visit by the Human Rights Commission on the terms acceptable to the Commission.

Videla said he we could have done so last month, but Mrs. Darien's statement before the Congress forced him to suspend the announcement. In the course of a few days, he believed he could develop a satisfactory announcement.

Mr. Clift said that in considering the announcement, it is important to remember the timing in the United States. The Ex-Im Bank must take its decision by September 15. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment comes into effect on October 1. The Vice President said we would hope the announcement could be taken care of before then. He said this might enable us to move on the Ex-Im letter before the 15th deadline. Videla said this was his intention. He did not think it could be done, however, before September 15.

The Vice President said we are encouraged that you will receive the Commission. Will you authorize me to tell the President that this will be done. Videla said yes. The Vice President asked when Assistant Secretary Vaky may come. Videla said after his announcement on the commission. He said he would prefer to have Vaky to visit Argentina alone. The Vice President said he wouldn't give a yes on this, but he would recommend it. Videla asked if the U.S. will let him know ahead of time what Vaky's mission will be to permit him to prepare for it. The Vice President said we would communicate this.

President Videla observed that US-Argentine relations proceed in multiple channels -- economic, political, cultural. Now our relations are focused solely on human rights. He said he can understand this problem if it is addressed in the broader spectrum of our overall relations and is not the single focus.

The Vice President said that if we can get on the road to progress in human rights, this whole other vista will open. He said he thought we are now at a point where we can turn the right way.

Videla said "I think we can. Mr. Vice President, I know your time was limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my greetings and best wishes to President Carter."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1977

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DOS REVIEWED 08-Feb-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting *we*

Arms Transfer Policy. The text of your statement on conventional arms transfer policy, was sent to all diplomatic posts this afternoon. Embassies in countries where we have supply relationships were instructed to inform their host governments promptly of the nature of the new policy. We provided key Embassies with guidance on matters of special interest to their respective host governments.

Nixon Letter. We told the Vietnamese today in Paris that the Nixon letter to Lester Wolff was not related to the normalization negotiations, and we downplayed the story in today's press briefing. The timing and content of Mr. Nixon's letter to Wolff seems to be part of his effort to regain a measure of public acceptance.

Todman Trip to Latin America. Assistant Secretary Todman returned this week from a quick swing through Latin America. In Colombia, President Lopez Michelsen pressed for the helicopters which we promised him in 1975 under our narcotics assistance program, but which we are hesitant to deliver because of reported narcotics-related corruption in the Colombian Government. Lopez generally supports our human rights policy but warned that we should not try to be the "world's moral policeman." He urges that we internationalize the

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effort (which of course we are trying to do). Colombian officials pressed their view that we should give special preferences to Latin American goods to offset the preferences the European Community extends to former European colonies.

In Venezuela, President Perez, looking forward to his forthcoming state visit, is anxious to cooperate with us in all areas and to take a strong stand on human rights. The Venezuelans stressed that the single most important issue in our bilateral relations is the removal of Venezuela (and Ecuador) from the list of OPEC countries excluded from our system of generalized trade preferences.

Todman talked with President Videla of Argentina who was also visiting Venezuela. Videla said that he understood our human rights position and did not argue with its importance, but that Argentina just could not meet the highest standards until it wins the war against terrorism. Videla asked for our understanding of Argentina's difficulties.

Foreign Minister Silveira stressed that Brazil attaches great importance to the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the United States in 1976. He was obviously concerned that ambiguity on its future would not only hinder bilateral problem-solving, but could lead to a further deterioration in U.S.-Brazil relations. Cy will be meeting with Silveira next week during the CIEC meeting and will try to put his doubts to rest on this score. Although not discussed extensively with Todman, the nuclear issue remains of primary concern to the Brazilians.

Bolivian President Banzer and other Government officials promised to speed up adjudication of the cases of Americans held on narcotics charges. Based on our pledge of assistance, the Bolivian Government is now fully committed to a program of crop substitution for the cocaine-source coca now produced there.

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Japanese Aid Policy. Embassy Tokyo reports that Japan will increase its foreign assistance budget to almost \$2 billion in fiscal 1977, up 21.7 percent over last year. The bulk of the increase will go to multilateral agencies. Actual disbursements lag increasingly behind budget levels, however, causing Japan to look for ways to accelerate use of its aid as well.

Japan's wealth, North-South pressures, and prodding from trading partners are gradually loosening Japan's traditionally tight purse strings. Fukuda reportedly even considered announcing a doubling of aid over five years at the Summit. If Fukuda and the Foreign Ministry continue to win out over the Finance Ministry and its allies, marked improvements in Japan's aid budget and disbursement levels over the next few years will result.

Panama Canal. In discussions yesterday and today, the Panamanian negotiators indicated acceptance, in principle, of a treaty provision under which both Panama and the United States would jointly maintain the neutrality of the Canal in accordance with established rules. The negotiators also indicated an awareness of the U.S. understanding that neutrality provisions would apply to threats to the Canal originating from within Panama as well as from third countries. The talks will continue tomorrow.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1978

DOS REVIEWED 06 Apr 2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting *WC*

Nicaragua. Pete Vaky briefed the House and Senate foreign affairs committees today on Nicaragua. He found a general consensus that a mediation effort initiated or supported by the United States was urgent. Costa Rican efforts to open mediation have thus far been hampered by Somoza's opposition, coolness from other Central American governments, and the alleged attack by a Nicaraguan plane on a Costa Rican border area. We are undertaking steps to revive and promote the Central American mediation effort. We are also lobbying for an OAS call -- sponsored by Venezuela and Costa Rica -- for a meeting of Foreign Ministers which could send a fact-finding mission to review the cross-border attacks.

Argentina. In his meeting with the Vice President, Videla indicated that Argentina will agree to receive the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in return for the issuance by the Ex-Im Bank of "letters of interest" on two projects. (These letters are preliminary steps and do not finally commit Ex-Im to authorize the financing.) The Argentines have said that they would want the letters of interest issued before they announce the IACHR visit, in order to avoid the appearance of responding to U.S. pressure. We are planning to agree to Ex-Im's issuance of the letters this month, and the Argentines have told us that in October they will agree to the visit. Assuming the IACHR visit is announced and assuming there is no deterioration in human rights conditions in Argentina in the interim, Ex-Im would then proceed to make a preliminary commitment to finance the

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projects in question and to resume certain other Ex-Im programs as well. This approach was worked out yesterday in a meeting in which John Moore and Henry Owen participated.

Iran. I asked Ambassador Zahedi, who is just back from Tehran, to come in today to reassure him of our continuing support for Iran and to seek his assessment of the present situation there. Zahedi claimed that the recent highly-organized demonstrations are a new phenomenon, stimulated by the communists and quite different from the disjointed protests led by the religious leaders in recent months. He said the government declared martial law when it appeared that a coup by younger officers was a possibility. I expressed the hope that the current martial law measures and related steps are only temporary; he assured me they were. I assured him unequivocally that the U.S. was not involved in any respect in the plotting against the Iranian Government.

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# Department of State

DOS REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 GUATEMALA 3446

LIMDIS

TREASURY FOR PETER BRIDGES

E.O. 11652 SDS  
TAGS: OCON, EFIN, SHUM, GT  
SUBJ: SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINA

REF: GUATEMALA 3418, BRIDGES-BITTNER TELECOM

AS PER REQUEST BY MR. PETER BRIDGES THERE FOLLOWS MEMCON OF SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINE MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

ARGENTINA: JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY  
ALDOFO CEXAR DIZ, PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK  
DANTE SIMONE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IMF  
U.S.

MICHAEL BLUMENTHAL, SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
C. FRED BERGSTEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
ARNOLD MACHMARCFF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY  
RICHARD ARELLANO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
EDWARD BITTNER, OFFICE OF DEVELOPING NATIONS FINANCE, TREASURY  
TIME AND PLACE: MAY 31, 1977 - U.S. CHANCERY, GUATEMALA

SUBJ: BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINA

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN PERSONALLY TO SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS THAT ARGENTINA HAS MADE SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION OF VIDELA. HE BEGAN BY GIVING A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL MACHINATIONS LEADING UP TO THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN MARCH 1976, EMPHASIZING THAT THE MILITARY RELUCTANTLY ASSUMED POWER WHEN PERON'S WIFE HAD LOST CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE ECONOMY HAD REACHED "POOR BOTTOM". HE SAID HE AGREED TO BE MINISTER OF ECONOMY ONLY IF HE HAD THE COMPLETE POLITICAL BACKING OF THE MILITARY AND IF HE WOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER ALL MINISTRIES INVOLVING THE ECONOMY. THE MILITARY MERITED A LEGACY OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PERON HAD BACKED IN ORDER TO OPPOSE THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS, BUT WHICH ULTIMATELY GOT OUT OF CONTROL.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ REITERATED THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, DIRECTING OUR ATTENTION TO BOOK WITH CHARTS SHOWING INTER ALIA DECREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT, DECREASE IN MONETARY EXPANSION, INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, ENERGY PRODUCTION AND EXPORT SHIPMENTS, REDUCTION IN GOVERNMENT DEFICIT, DECLINE IN RATE OF INFLATION, AND IMPROVEMENT IN EXTERNAL SECTOR. HE SAID HE WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE POPULATION ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF A DECEASED GROWTH IN REAL WAGES AS THE PRICE FOR ACHIEVING STABILITY.

BLUMENTHAL SAID HE ADMIRERED THE PROGRESS IN THE ECONOMY WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AND UNDERSTOOD THE POLITICAL SITUATION STEMMING FROM THE TERRORISM MERITED FROM PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS. HE CITED THE FACT THAT THE BENDIX CORPORATION WITH WHICH HE PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED LOST THREE EMPLOYEES TO THE TERRORISTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE U.S. IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE GENERAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE ASKED MARTINEZ

DE HOZ IF HE SAW A WAY TO MOVE FROM EXTRA LEGAL METHODS OF CONTROL TO THE NORMAL LEGAL PROCESS IN HANDLING TERRORISTS.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID THAT WHILE ARGENTINA ADMIRES U.S. TRADITIONS AND LAWS AND CITED THE COMMON HISTORY, THE PRESENT SITUATION IS HIGHLY ABNORMAL STEMMING IN PART BY INHIBITION OF THE JUDICIARY TO SENTENCE TERRORISTS BECAUSE OF FEAR OF RETRIBUTION AGAINST THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES. THE POLICE BECAME DISCOURAGED WHEN TERRORISTS BROUGHT TO TRIAL WERE ALWAYS SET FREE. THUS, A POLICY OF TAKING NO PRISONERS WAS ADOPTED. LIKEWISE, YOUNG MILITARY OFFICERS TOOK MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID PRESIDENT VIDELA IS COMMITTED TO RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN WIPING OUT THE TWO MAIN TERRORIST GROUPS AND HE ANTICIPATES GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT IN RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.  
BOSTER

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NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

# Department of State

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ACTION AREA-85

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INFO OCT-81 55-14 150-88 SP-82 04A-82 H-81 1MR-85  
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CONGRESS'S POSITION FIRMLY TO MARTINEZ DE HOZ SUBSEQUENT TO THE LATTER'S BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL. U.S. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR RALPH DUNGAN MADE THE SAME CASE ON A DIFFERENT OCCASION TO MARTINEZ DE HOZ.  
BOSTER

O 811841Z JUN 77  
FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA  
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6233  
TREAS DEPT IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 GUATEMALA 3446

LIMDIS

TREASURY FOR PETER BRIDGES

BLUMENTHAL SAID THAT WHILE WE ARE UNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S PROBLEM AND WE DON'T WISH TO INTERFERE INTERNALLY, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION MUST BE CONSISTENT IN THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE HARKIN AMENDMENT REQUIRES US TO VOTE AGAINST LOANS BY THE IBRD FOR COUNTRIES WITH GROSS VIOLATIONS EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE NEEDY. THE BADILLO AMENDMENT, WHICH ALREADY HAS PASSED THE HOUSE WOULD EXTEND THIS LAW TO OTHER IFI'S. WHILE HUMPHREY AMENDMENT WOULD PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY, THE ADMINISTRATION IS AS A MATTER OF ITS OWN POLICY AND CONVICTION, COMMITTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISEABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO POSTPONE APPLICATIONS FOR LOANS UNTIL IT COULD SHOW SOME DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA IS COMMITTED TO RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ARGENTINA HAS TWO LOANS IN THE PIPELINE FOR IBRD CONSIDERATION WHICH COULD BE HELD UP, BUT HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT A \$100 MILLION LOAN FOR THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK WHICH IS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE IBRD. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO UTILIZE ITS \$300 MILLION QUOTA WITH THE IBRD IF THE LOAN WERE DELAYED TO THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THIS LOAN MIGHT GET THROUGH THE "NEEDY" LOOPHOLE ON THE GROUNDS OF EMPLOYMENT GENERATION.

BLUMENTHAL RESPONDED BY INDICATING THAT THE IBRD LOAN IS VERY LIKELY TO PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR US.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ BECAME SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AND ASKED WHO WORRIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE TERRORISTS.

ARELLANO SAID THERE IS NO WAY OF RATIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

IN RESPONSE TO BLUMENTHAL'S QUESTION ABOUT ASSERTIONS OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN ARGENTINA, MARTINEZ CLAIMED THERE WAS NO SUBSTANCE TO THE CHARGES.

BLUMENTHAL SAID HE BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. POSITION IS CLEAR. WE HOPE TO SEE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS MADE QUICKLY AND WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED CONCERNING PROGRESSMADE.

BLUMENTHAL REITERATED U.S. OPPOSITION TO ANY INCREASE IN SALARY FOR IBRD EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND ASKED FOR ARGENTINA'S SUPPORT.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ AGREED TO DISCUSS SALARY ISSUE WITH CRTIZ MENA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF HAVING IT PUT ASIDE. HE THEN BROUGHT UP THE POSSIBILITY OF INTAL BEING ELIMINATED, OR TRANSFORMED. SINCE INTAL IS THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION LOCATED IN ARGENTINA MARTINEZ DE HOZ IS ANXIOUS THAT IT REMAIN THERE IN SOME FORM.

BERGSTEN SAID THAT AS THE SECRETARY INDICATED IN HIS 88 MEETING SPEECH, THE U.S. WISHES TO STUDY THE FUTURE OF INTAL.

MARTINEZ DE HOZ THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR BEING ABLE TO SPEAK FRANKLY ABOUT THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA.

AS REPORTED PETER CONGRESSMAN BADILLO EXPLAINED

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1978

DOS REVIEWED 01-Feb-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT  
From: Cyrus Vance  
Subject: Meeting with Argentine President Videla

You are scheduled to meet with Argentine President Videla September 4 in Rome to discuss U.S.-Argentine relations and ways to reverse a precipitous deterioration in our relations. The basic point you should make is that we seriously wish to improve relations as conditions permit and that a comprehensive and thorough review of our total relationship may be desirable. Assistant Secretary Vaky has been designated to undertake this task and is prepared to make arrangements with President Videla for this purpose.

SETTING

Faced with a once severe terrorist threat, the military government in Argentina has seriously abused basic human rights (Attachment 1). The United States has as a result restricted military sales (an embargo on the sale of Munitions List items will go into effect October 1. Attachment 2), held back approval of Argentine transactions in the Export-Import Bank, and voted against Argentine loan proposals in the International Financial Institutions (Attachment 3). We have sought to induce improvement by indicating that Argentine steps in this direction would result in relaxing these restrictions.

Initially, the Argentine Government reacted to our pressure with some restraint and sought to convince us of the necessity of its actions. More recently, however, it has moved rapidly to diversify its international ties, reassess its relationship with us, and prepare to adopt an adversarial course.

In a major attempt to encourage progress in human rights and improve relations, Under Secretary Newsom visited Argentina last May and suggested that some

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Authority NLC-6-4-6-7  
NARA EF Date 7/9/14

relaxation of our restrictive actions would be possible if the Argentine government would take one or more of the following steps (Attachment 4):

- Agreement with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) on a visit to Argentina;
- Try, release, or allow exile for the prisoners held without charge;
- Establish a mechanism to inform families of the fate of the disappeared.

While Mr. Newsom was given a courteous and sympathetic reception, the Argentine authorities have not taken any significant steps forward since his visit. Reaction in Argentina to our pressure, on the other hand, has been severe. Contrary to our own view, many Argentines consider that the situation has measurably improved in the last two years. The recent denial of an Ex-Im letter of interest to Allis-Chalmers for the sale of hydroelectric equipment, in particular, was seen as a deliberate escalation in our sanctions.

As the most powerful Spanish-speaking country of South America, Argentina could become a significant negative force in areas important to us such as nuclear proliferation (Attachment 5), regional security arrangements, conventional arms restraint, and Third World issues.

#### Videla's Approach

We do not know exactly what Videla will say. He may simply give the standard Argentine exposition -- that human rights violations are an unfortunate, if unavoidable and necessary, by-product of the effort to suppress a vicious terrorist campaign, which threatens Argentina with anarchy. On the other hand, there is also the possibility that he might bring some new concrete points, explain steps they are now prepared to take (particularly in regard to the Human Rights Commission), and suggestions on the future evolution of U.S.-Argentine relations.

#### Your Approach

Your approach should be sympathetic. You would wish to avoid commitments in response to specific suggestions, if any, but would note that you will carry Videla's

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message back to President Carter.

We recommend you say specifically:

- On our side, we seriously wish to improve relations;
- As a token of this, we have taken -- and are taking -- some modest steps, such as release of export licenses for ambulance aircraft as well as Army helicopters, airport radar equipment, voice security communications equipment and other items on our Munitions Export Control List.
- While we understand the tragic history of Argentina's domestic political conflict, we remain concerned over the human rights situation, specifically the treatment of the human person.
- We wish to maintain normal relations in as many areas as possible, as is evidenced, for example, by the forthcoming bilateral economic consultations (Attachment 6), and are prepared to expand these relations as conditions permit.
- We believe a thorough and comprehensive review of the whole gamut of our relations would be desirable. The President and the Secretary of State have asked Assistant Secretary Vaky to undertake this.
- The place and format for such consultations would be for President Videla to decide. Assistant Secretary Vaky is willing to come to Buenos Aires, as previously proposed.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4937

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP  
SUBJECT: HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO ARGENTINA

SUMMARY: FROM ARRIVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS FAMILY WERE WELL RECEIVED BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA LAID OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. DR. KISSINGER SPOKE TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS--FROM BANKERS TO GAUCHOS. IN MOST INSTANCES, HE COMPLIMENTED GOA FOR DEFEATING TERRORISTS BUT HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEM THEN ARE NOT JUSTIFIABLE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS.

**DOS REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL**

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN BA EARLY WEDNESDAY MORNING (JUNE 21). HE WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY A FOMOFF REP WHO DOGGED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT A SPOKESMAN FOR USG.

2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY WAS TO LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, COL. MALLEA GIL (INTERPRETER) AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDELA PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL. IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL AT 1300H LUNCH WAS SERVED.

3. KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT DURING PRIVATE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. ALLEGEDLY VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTIONS FROM DR. KISSINGER AS TO HOW TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USG. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED WHETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS.

4. AT LUNCH, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VIEWS ON LATIN AMERICA. FORMER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT NOW MORE THAN EVER WAS TIME TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE. HE ADDED UNITY OF ACTION AMONG THE LA COUNTRIES IS REQUIRED IF ALL AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE TO SURVIVE. HE STRESSED THAT DURING HIS TENURE AS SECRETARY OF STATE, LATIN AMERICA WAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE NOW. KISSINGER POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A REFLECTION ON ANY ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK OF ATTENTION TOWARDS LA WAS NOT A DELIBERATE ACT ON ANYBODY'S PART. IT WAS JUST A FACT THAT WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD EXPLODING, NEGLECT ENSUED.

5. KISSINGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AMERICAN MAY BE NEXT ON RUSSIA AND CUBA'S SCHEDULE. HE ADDED IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN AFRICA IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA. HE APPLAUDED PRESIDENT CARTER FOR HIS ANNAPOLIS SPEECH. KISSINGER STRESSED HIS SUPPORT OF MOST OF CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND SALES OF AIRCRAFT TO MID-EASTERN COUNTRIES. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS ABOMINABLE THAT A MYTH PREVAILED THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE INVINCIBLE. SINCE WHEN, HE ASKED, CAN CUBAN SOLDIERS MARCH FROM SOUTH TO NORTH IN AFRICA AND EXPECT THE WORLD TO APPLAUD

THEM. THE FORMER SECRETARY TOLD VIDELA HE GAVE HIS FULL SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON HIS AFRICAN POLICY.

6. HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE MANY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA WAS A SOFT DRINK. HE SAID THIS INDICATED THAT AMERICANS ARE NOT AWARE OF ARGENTINE HISTORY NOR OF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TERRORISM WAS NOT SOLELY OF ARGENTINE ORIGIN BUT INSTEAD IT HAD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT. KISSINGER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN COMBATING TERRORISM BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED IN DEFEATING TERRORISTS HAD NO PLACE IN ARGENTINA TODAY.

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEEMED RELAXED AND FRIENDLY. HE TENSED UP ONLY WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT USG.

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## Department of State TELEGRAM

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8. EARLY THURSDAY MORNING DR. KISSINGER MET WITH DR. JORGE LUIS BORGES, NOTED ARGENTINE POET AND WRITER. THIS PROMPTED MUCH NEWS COVERAGE. LATER IN DAY KISSINGER AND FAMILY DEPARTED WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ TO OVERNIGHT AT AN ESTANCIA FARM. THIS WAS MOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT.

9. ON HIS RETURN FROM THE FARM, KISSINGER SPOKE TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL. HE GAVE A PEP TALKS TO AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL AS WELL AS LOCALS. HE NARRATED SOME OF HIS EXPERIENCES WHILE IN USG SERVICE. HIS HUMOROUS APPROACH WAS WELL RECEIVED BY ALL.

10. ON FRIDAY EVENING A RECEPTION WAS GIVEN AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE HONORING KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WERE WELL REPRESENTED.

11. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTENDED A DINNER GIVEN BY MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ. THIS GROUP WAS COMPOSED OF BANKERS, ECONOMISTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS. THE MAIN DISCUSSION CONCERNED MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER INVESTMENT TO ARGENTINA. THE LONG TERM LACK OF POLITICAL STABILITY AND INFLATION SEEMED TO BE THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE GROUP. LITTLE ELSE DEVELOPED FROM THE DINNER.

12. ON JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTICIPATED IN AN OFF THE RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE AND WAS MADE AN HONORARY MEMBER OF ARGENTINE COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS GROUP IS COMPRISED OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO HOLD THEMSELVES UP TO THE PUBLIC AS THE "ELITE GROUP" ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. DR. KISSINGER GAVE AN OFF THE CUFF TALK. HE STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION BUT THAT AMERICANS LACKED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ARGENTINA'S HISTORY. ESPECIALLY, AMERICANS LACKED FAMILIARITY WITH ARGENTINA'S EXPERIENCE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM. HE EXPLAINED IN HIS OPINION GOA HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN WIPING OUT TERRORIST FORCES, BUT ALSO CAUTIONED THAT METHODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISM MUST NOT BE PERPETUATED. HE EXPLAINED A MOVEMENT TOWARDS NORMALCY MUST TAKE PLACE IF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS ARE TO PREVAIL.

13. DR. KISSINGER ALSO APPEARED IN A QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD WITH ONE OF ARGENTINA'S POPULAR NEWS COMMENTERS. DURING THE INTERVIEW KISSINGER STATED TERRORISTS WERE ONE OF THE GREATEST VIOLATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT IN SOME INSTANCES HUMAN RIGHTS WAS BEING USED AS A WEAPON AGAINST ITS FRIENDS.

COMMENT: THE KISSINGER FAMILY ATTENDED A FOOTBALL GAME IN ROSARIO, WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PUBLIC. INDICATIONS ARE HE WAS WELL RECEIVED BY THE AUDIENCE. HE ALSO ATTENDED TWO OTHER GAMES IN BUENOS AIRES AS A GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA. THE ARGENTINE MEDIA GAVE FAVORABLE AND HEAVY COVERAGE TO THE KISSINGER VISIT.

COMMENT: DR. KISSINGER TOLD THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SO LONG AS HE WAS OVERSEAS. HE SPOKE HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY TO THE AMBASSADOR, BUT FELT HE WOULD SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE

~~CONCEPT OF ATTEMPTING TO IMPLEMENT HUMAN RIGHTS IN L.A. HE SAID HE WOULD WAIT ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS RETURN TO US BEFORE SPEAKING OUT. KISSINGER WORKED CLOSELY WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL. THEY WERE GOOD GUESTS AND MADE EVERY EFFORT TO GIVE APPEARANCE THEY WERE NOT ENVISSARIES OF OPPOSITION TO CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION.~~

MY ONLY CONCERN IS THAT KISSINGER'S REPEATED HIGH PRAISE FOR ARGENTINA'S ACTION IN WIPING OUT TERRORISM AND HIS STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA MAY HAVE GONE TO SOME CONSIDERABLE EXTENT TO HIS HOSTS' HEADS. DESPITE HIS DISCLAIMERS THAT THE METHODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISM MUST NOT BE PERPETUATED, THERE IS SOME DANGER THAT ARGENTINES MAY USE KISSINGER'S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR HARDENING THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE.  
CASTRO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

11

CONFIDENTIAL (Entire text)

BILATERAL PAPER

ARGENTINA

Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Pastor

I. PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Ambassador Vaky

Carlos Washington Pastor  
(Phonetic: pahSTOR)

II. INTRODUCTION

Argentina was helpful in the OAS vote on the Nicaraguan resolution. The GOA wants a high-level bilateral exchange with us during the course of the Ecuadorean inauguration. We want to encourage Argentina to continue its efforts to end human rights abuses. The Foreign Minister will note that progress has been made. Pastor may suggest that we should take some public action to bolster President Videla's and General Viola's prestige and authority.

III. ISSUES

A. Human Rights. There has been some progress on human rights in Argentina. Disappearances have declined from the 55 per month average in 1978. There have been 13 unaccounted-for disappearances since February 1, the last occurring May 13. The GOA continues to release prisoners held under Executive Power. The ICRC reports that prison conditions have improved. There is, however, still little information on the fate of disappeared persons. Legal efforts to force the Government to show cause for holding alleged subversives have not been successful.

Points to be Made

-- We are pleased with moves to curb disappearances, and urge the government to continue to investigate recent cases and definitively end the practice.

-- We hope families of the disappeared will receive information that they request.

-- We are pleased with the release of prisoners held under Executive Power, and hope that all

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prisoners will be given fair trials or be freed.

-- We remain deeply concerned over the continued detention of Jacobo Timerman, and hope that he will be released without delay.

-- We hope to see greater numbers of prisoners released under the Right of Option Program.

B. Nicaragua and Central America. The GOA was most helpful in supporting the United States and the Andean countries in the OAS vote and has already moved to recognize the new Government. However, the GOA supplied arms to the Somoza regime. It cannot be expected to have much influence with Nicaragua.

Point to be Made

-- We appreciate the GOA's support on the Nicaragua Resolution in the OAS and hope that the GOA will support the Andean countries in their efforts to assist Nicaragua.

C. Beagle Channel. The Papal mediation of the Beagle Channel dispute is still in progress.

Point to be Made

-- We are pleased that Argentina and Chile agreed to mediation of the Beagle dispute and hope that both will continue to work with the Vatican.

D. Nuclear Technology. We are discussing with potential suppliers (Canada, the FRG and Switzerland) safeguards and other conditions they will require for the sale of a heavy water plant. (We would have preferred that Argentine deferral of reprocessing be a condition, but Canada is unwilling to require deferral and the FRG will follow Canada's lead.) We are also discussing with the GOA the additional U.S. safeguards requirements, effective in March 1980, needed for us to continue nuclear cooperation. We do not wish to take the initiative on this.

Point to be Made (If raised)

-- We want to cooperate with Argentina in the transfer of nuclear power equipment and technology. Our cooperation must be consistent with the nuclear export law and policy.

August 1979

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Argentina 4D

MEETING

President Carter with President Jorge Rafael Videla  
of Argentina

September 9, 1977 - 9:00 a.m.  
Cabinet Room - White House

Checklist and Follow-up Items

1. Videla said that as soon as political conditions permit -- perhaps before the end of the year, Argentina would ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
2. President Carter told Videla the USG would talk to the Cubans about signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked whether Argentina would send representatives to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference on October 19 - 21, 1977.
3. President Carter said he would provide the Department of State for onward transmission to the Government of Argentina, a list prepared by a Washington human rights group containing the names of 3,000 individuals being detained in Argentina.
4. Videla said he hoped that the problem of detainees might be resolved by Christmas 1977.
5. In response to President Carter's inquiry whether it might be possible to send representatives of the OAS or UN to confirm human rights progress in Argentina sometime after Christmas, Videla referred to recent visits by USG officials and said such visits are the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed of its record. Videla said he was not troubled by visits by international human rights commissions which testify to the facts in Argentina.
6. The President and Secretary Vance accepted Videla's invitation for the Secretary to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete bilateral consultations.

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NARA EF Date 7/9/16

MEMORANDUM

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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September 8, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: The Last Five Bilaterals: Argentina,  
Uruguay, Grenada, Bahamas and Costa Rica

ArgentinaNonproliferation

We would very much like to have Argentina attend the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference, October 19-21 in Washington. Since both Chile and Brazil said they would implement Tlatelolco Argentina did, Argentina is obviously key. If you could coax Videla into saying, "We will do it, if they do it," then you might want to suggest a simultaneous decision at the Washington conference in October.

Human Rights

Unlike Stroessner or Pinochet, Videla is said to be aware of the way the world views the present human rights situation in Argentina, and more importantly, the validity of that view. He is said to be a moderate struggling to improve Argentina's human rights performance against unyielding hard-liners in the junta. If this is true, and our intelligence reports confirm this interpretation, then, paradoxically, the best way to approach Videla would be with a very firm statement on our human rights policy. His opponents criticize him for being too deferential to the U.S., and thus, the best way to strengthen his hand would be to reiterate your strong commitment. Specifically, there are a number of recent arrests and detentions of Jews (like Jacobo Timerman, a prominent newspaper publisher, and the Deutsch family, who have influential relatives in Los Angeles) which suggest the resurgence of anti-semitism. More generally, we want to continue to urge an end to the state of siege and to urge the government to publish a list of all prisoners, showing their place of detention and the charges against them.

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You may also want to mention that the Argentine Committee on Human Rights, a non-profit organization with an office in Washington has compiled a partial list of some 3,000 names of people who have disappeared or are detained. The State Department has a copy of this list, and any information which the Argentins government can provide on the whereabouts of the people, whose names are on the list would be appreciated.

One other point: Pat Derian, as well as Assistant Secretary Todman both visited Argentina recently.

### Uruguay

#### Human Rights

We understand that President Mendez will take advantage of his meeting with you to announce Uruguay's first major moves on human rights. These may include the release of some prisoners, the disclosure of names and charges on all political prisoners, and the announcement of disciplinary actions taken against military and police officials involved in human rights abuses. Because this represents the first step taken by a government that had previously refused to acknowledge that it had political prisoners, it is significant.

We should reinforce this decision, while letting Mendez know that the international community will judge Uruguay's performance not by words but by deeds. You may also want to encourage Mendez to follow this action by an invitation to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit Uruguay to see the positive steps first-hand.

We understand that Mendez may want to make these announcements to the press after your meeting.

#### Countervailing Duties

President Mendez will raise the issue of countervailing duties. He is concerned about Treasury investigations into Uruguayan subsidies on leather handbags and leather apparel, both important exports. A third investigation on leather shoes was announced on September 7. Together, these products account for 60% of Uruguay's exports to the US. Imposition of countervailing duties would thus have a significant impact on Uruguay's export earnings.

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Officials close to Mendez tell us he believes the US should do something to reciprocate for his support of the Panama Canal Treaty and the actions he is taking on human rights. He wants to be able to show that he can "get" as well as "give" in his dealings with the United States.

Uruguayan officials know that there is a waiver provision in our countervailing duty law, but are not adequately familiar with how it works. They have inquired about "an advance waiver" which is impossible. However, Mendez can probably get all the political mileage he requires out of being able to announce upon his return that he discussed the countervailing duty issue in Washington and that agreement was reached to have high level officials on both sides consult at an early date about how the imposition of such duties might be avoided. You will want to point out, however, that the law is strict, and that a waiver is possible only if the Uruguayan government takes steps to reduce or alter the subsidies.

Grenada

As "comic relief" we have scheduled your meeting with Eric Gairy in the middle of your five bilaterals. Gairy has informed our Ambassador that he wishes to discuss seven issues with you. Among them, are the following:

UN Resolution on UFO's: Gairy wants your support for his UN resolution favoring scientific research on Unidentified Flying Objects and the psyche. Gairy is eager to talk about your experience with a UFO.

US Military Base: He seeks establishment in Grenada of a US base of any service.

Tax Exemption on Foreign Convention. He shares the position of the Bahamas on this.

Anti-Communist Fund: He would like to see a United States fund established to help democratic governments fight communism.

God. Gairy is interested in your personal concept of God and would like your support in calling a meeting of world religious leaders to define "God".

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Bahamas

We have just learned that Prime Minister Pindling may raise several issues not covered in your briefing book:

US Taxation of Foreign Conventions

Section 602 of the 1976 Tax Reform Act placed severe limitations on deductions from the federal income tax of expenditures associated with attending foreign conventions. The Bahamian Government has claimed that these restrictions have had an adverse effect on its tourist industry and, by extension, the economy. We have responded that we would be pleased to study any facts which it would care to make available supporting this claim, and, if its case seemed justified, to support an appeal of Section 602.

Duty Free Exemptions for Returning US Tourists

Congress is considering legislation that would increase the amount of goods an American tourist can bring home with him duty-free. The Bahamian Government is extremely interested in this legislation and the Prime Minister may urge you to lend it your support. The Bahamian economy is heavily weighted toward tourism (which generates about 77% of its GNP) and a more liberal duty free exemption would serve as an additional stimulus to the local economy. State believes this needs further study.

Air Route New York-Nassau

The Prime Minister may raise concerns on this. Adequate air services between New York and Nassau are highly desirable, but the technical nature of the subject argues that it should best be referred to the civil aviation experts of the two countries.

Costa Rica

Meat

Oduber seeks an increase in Costa Rica's meat quota to the US. You will recall that you decided not to make a decision on this until around November when USDA estimates are available.

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May 23, 1977

Mrs. Carter's Trip:  
The Western Hemisphere in Creative Flux

Mrs. Carter's trip comes at a propitious time. President Carter has reasserted American leadership, and this has had a creative impact on international politics in the Western Hemisphere. By explaining the new directions in U.S. policy and by underscoring our determination to pursue these goals, Mrs. Carter will be providing the momentum for solidifying cooperative relationships with selected governments on important issues like human rights, arms control, and the North-South dialogue.

\* \* \* \*

Low Profile

From around 1965 to January 20, 1977, the United States, in effect though not in rhetoric, retreated from Latin America. A disastrous war in Southeast Asia diverted scarce resources in the late 1960s. And the Republic Administration which took power in 1969 defined U.S. interests in the region so narrowly that it either ignored or resisted the forces of change and reform in the nations of the hemisphere. As significant, the U.S. was reluctant to involve itself in the politics among the hemisphere states.

The great irony was that Latin America prospered during those years economically (manufacturing exports in this period expanded by 25 percent annually), institutionally, and internationally. Regional institutions and bilateral relations with the U.S., however, deteriorated. Debate in the OAS became bi-polar with the U.S. trying to resist unanimous Latin American resolutions, which were in fact nothing more than reactions by the Latins to a U.S. policy, decision, or inaction. A "low profile" by the U.S. encouraged sterile debate in the OAS. Latin American leaders took their economic issues to global fora, like UNCTAD and later CIEC, for negotiating. The possibilities for constructive exchange went unexplored.

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### New Leadership in the United States

President Carter's policies have been based on the premise that the U.S. should not be reluctant to lead or to bring the full weight of its influence on issues of morality and social reform when we feel we are right. I had thought that the human rights issue would unite Latin America against us as the investment issue had done for the last decade, but I was wrong. It has inspired the democracies, embarrassed the repressive governments, and moved transitional governments closer to us. Since the Carter Administration began, the military governments in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador have all pledged themselves to hand power over to the civilians in the next year or two.

Chile with some support from Uruguay and Brazil has tried to unite the Southern Cone countries against the new U.S. policy, but until now, Argentina and Paraguay have resisted their initiatives. (Recent reports have these countries planning a conference in Paraguay on June 3.)

Most importantly, U.S. leadership is welcomed once again in those countries like Venezuela, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Mexico with which we have a natural affinity.

### Changing Political Structures

As a result of the President's moral leadership and determination to take the North-South dialogue seriously, geopolitics in the hemisphere have also undergone a dramatic transformation in the last four months. In the sense that geopolitics in the Western Hemisphere currently permit free floating coalitions of States, the hemisphere resembles European politics before Napoleon; the difference is that the coalitions currently have the potential of being infused with genuine purpose, whereas international politics in pre-19th Century Europe had no more profound purpose than territorial aggrandizement or survival.

To take the most important example, Venezuela's probable motive in reaching out to President Carter and giving enthusiastic support for his nonproliferation and human rights policies is to contain Brazil, and to this aim, Perez is seeking better relations with Argentina. In this way, the pattern of traditional balance of power politics is replicated. The difference is that the U.S. really has no interest in this game, but it has a definite interest in the pursuit of certain policies, which because of their greater claim to international legitimacy, attract the interest and support of Venezuela.

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Venezuela's interests are not the same as ours, but they are closer to ours than that of any other regional power. President Perez pursues three sets of goals, only the first of which directly conflicts with our own: (1) high prices for petroleum and OPEC solidarity; (2) containment of Brazil; and (3) the milieu goals of hemispheric and global statesman.

I believe that we can flatter Perez with acknowledgement of his leadership, and infuse his leadership with our two central interests in the hemisphere -- human rights and nonproliferation. If we can make it appear as if we are supporting him rather than that he is carrying our water, then our leverage on OPEC pricing will be greater rather than less than before. (Indeed, I believe that his State visit at the end of June will provide us with an opportunity to persuade him of the necessity of keeping the petroleum price stable.)

Because Brazil has become so closely identified with the antithesis of our two current hemispheric concerns, necessity has required that we move away from the "special relationship" which Kissinger constructed with Brazil. But the long-term importance of Brazil also demands that we make special efforts to improve our overall relationship with Brazil.

Thus, while increasing our support for Venezuela's efforts on behalf of human rights, arms control, and nonproliferation, we should not permit ourselves to be identified with any Venezuelan-Argentine attempt to contain Brazil, and we should make clear that we would consider it inconsistent for Venezuela to let her new alliance with Argentina overcome her great concern for the human rights situation in Argentina. (There is some indication that Videla asked Perez to prevent the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from "interfering" with Argentina.)

Perez has a larger role to play. Unquestionably, if we need help in either the Canal or the Cuba negotiations, we ought to seek his advice. Our strategy for dealing with the Caribbean must include Venezuela. (Their Minister of Communications told me that Venezuelans now know how Americans feel because the Caribbean countries are referring to them as "imperialists.") Devising such a strategy in cooperation with Mexico and Venezuela, as well as the U.S. and Canada, as potential donors would be a model for similar projects in other developing countries.

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The increased production of Venezuelan (and Mexican) energy, the development of alternate energy resources and the curbing of a plutonium economy are all issues where U.S. and Venezuelan cooperation and leadership will be so important, and the U.S. should encourage Venezuela to take the lead.

But Venezuela's leadership does not necessarily imply Latin America's follower-ship, and we should be careful not to place all our eggs in their basket. Indeed, we should independently seek the cooperation and encourage the leadership of all the countries visited on appropriate issues. Our strategy should be to mold coalition around issues.

Human Rights. Our goals in the immediate future relate to the strengthening of the independence, the capability, and the credibility of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Specifically, this means:

1. Seeking cooperation to obtain the signing and ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights.
2. Seeking a larger budgetary allocation and administrative autonomy for the IACHR.
3. Seeking the support of all democratic and transitional governments for human rights issues to be discussed at the OAS General Assembly in Grenada, and particularly for an OAS Resolution which calls upon all governments to grant access to investigations by international human rights commissions.

Nonproliferation. Our purpose is to explain the President's commitment to nonproliferation, as demonstrated in his decision to sign Protocol I. Our goal is to seek hemispheric support for removing the remaining obstacles to full implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

North-South Dialogue. Instead of reacting to their concern about the future direction of North-South negotiations, we should volunteer comments about the President's commitment and desire that the Latin American nations play a constructive, active, and moderate role.

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Andean Stability. Mrs. Carter's trip to Peru and Ecuador and our interest in curbing the sub-regional arms race will contrast nicely with the view of the previous Administration that any U.S. initiative or even expression of support for arms control would be "the kiss of death," increasing rather than decreasing tension in the region. I believe that her visit to the region will, by her expressions of concern, demonstrate U.S. interest in the stability of the region.

Summary

Mrs. Carter's trip will provide an opportunity for modest progress toward these four goals -- human rights, nonproliferation, moderate but constructive progress in North-South negotiations, and arms control in the Andes. And the process of developing a close relationship with President Perez will be an important instrument in this design. Prime Minister Michael Manley could conceivably play a similar role in developing a coordinated response to dealing with the problems of the Caribbean.

\* \* \* \*

The shift by the new Administration from a low-profile, passive policy to an active, purposeful posture has had an interesting and unanticipated impact on international politics in the hemisphere. To take a single illustration, the possibility exists that Mrs. Carter's trip will prompt human rights demonstrations in Latin America. Who would have thought that Latin America would be so divided by a U.S. initiative, as it is on our human rights and nonproliferation policy. Five years ago, who would have contemplated the liberal-left in Latin America seeking the support and applauding the initiatives of the new U.S. Government?

These changes will be seen more clearly as a result of her trip.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

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DOS REVIEWED 07-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

TO: The Secretary *[Signature]*  
FROM: ARA - Terence A. Todman

Your Visit to Argentina November 20-22, 1977

I. Objectives

U.S.-Argentine relations are increasingly strained. Basic differences on human rights have led to a de facto US refusal to sell arms and to a "no" vote on an Argentine loan application in the Inter-American Development Bank. Meanwhile, Argentina's rush toward nuclear reprocessing raises the spectre of its becoming a member of the nuclear club.

President Videla offers the best hope on the nuclear issue, and the possibility, though by no means the certainty, of the progress on human rights improvements basic to other issues. But Videla's position is not secure, and there are indications that the Argentines expect to make some basic decisions on their relations with us after evaluating their talks with you.

In this context, our objectives are to:

- strengthen Videla's position vis-a-vis military elements who oppose him on human rights and nuclear issues (the "hardline" nationalist constituencies on these issues overlap);
- obtain Videla's agreement to ratify Tlatelolco, preferably at a date certain in the near future, and to set the stage for possible movement on the reprocessing issue;
- encourage Videla to follow through on his promise of significant improvements in the Argentine human rights situation through (a) release of detainees or affording them due process, and (b) ending "disappearances" and torture. *[Signature]*

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*Punishment of interests*

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Argentina's objectives are twofold:

-- the government wants a clarification of what Argentina may expect from us on issues on which they would like our cooperation, including military sales; and

— President Videla will try to make the talks appear cordial and substantive and hence to demonstrate to Argentine public opinion that his government has our ear and respect.

## II. Setting

Although Argentina is Latin America's most European country, chronic political instability and exaggerated economic nationalism have long impaired its otherwise significant achievements. At the time of the military takeover in March 1976 the civilian government had disintegrated: fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terrorists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly bankrupt, and inflation exceeded 600% per year.

The three-man Junta, of which President Videla is the Army member, came to power with two primary goals: elimination of terrorism and restoration of the economy.

Organized terrorist movements are now largely under control. The once powerful Peronist-inclined Montoneros have been reduced to some 700 combatants, and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) to only 120. Both groups have been forced to confine themselves to low risk, high visibility operations such as assassinations of military officers and businessmen, and bombings of public buildings.

The defeat of large-scale armed groups has not brought peace, however. Acts of violence are still relatively common, and respond to various motives, including personal vendettas, political radicalisms of all kinds, and even cynical maneuverings to weaken contending government factions, and may on occasion be designed to embarrass Videla himself.

Under these conditions, official and unofficial abuses are common. Armed Forces units hunt down suspected terrorists. Nonviolent citizens are sometimes imprisoned or killed under circumstances difficult to ascertain. Homes of detainees are often looted, and torture is fairly common during the first days of detention. We have been told repeatedly that excesses of the security personnel have been punished, but there is no public record of it.

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Economic performance has improved under the Junta. Foreign currency reserves now exceed \$3 billion, inflation has been reduced, a balanced budget may be possible in 1978, serious distortions in relative prices have been corrected and record level crops and exports were reached in 1976-77.

On the negative side, the government has not been able to force inflation below 150%, and wage restraints have reduced real income by 40%. As a result, consumption has decreased, and worker dissatisfaction is increasing. Strikes for higher salaries have rocked the country in recent weeks and more unrest is likely.

Problems or not, Argentina's international economic position is improving steadily. Exports should reach \$4.5 billion this year, compared to imports of about \$4 billion, including more than \$700 million from the US. Interestingly, while the Argentine-US trade balance will be some \$400 million in our favor this year, Argentina's balance with the Communist countries in 1976 was almost as much in its favor, and may lead to some pressure to increase Argentine purchases from the Soviet Union.

Recent improvements in Argentina's economic situation have led to considerable new interest and some new activity by foreign investors. US investment now stands at \$1.4 billion and loans by US banks to Argentina exceed \$3 billion.

The military dominate the Argentine political scene: Armed Forces officers act as governors, mayors and managers of nationalized companies. With the exception of Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, civilians are excluded from major decision-making positions.

Internal military rivalries are endemic. President Videla mediates pragmatically among military factions, but cannot impose his will. Several "hard-line" Army generals remain in key command positions even though their retirement would relieve right wing pressures on the President. The politically adroit but unscrupulous Navy Junta member, Admiral Massera, who is associated with the Navy's hard-line human rights practices, takes advantage of every opportunity to embarrass Videla and boost his own chances for the Presidency.

The Junta has not committed itself to restoring civilian rule, but consultations between prominent citizens and military leaders are taking place. Meanwhile, political party activities are suspended, and the

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powerful labor unions are largely under the control of military interventors.

Argentina's international activity has been limited by concentration on its own chaotic internal politics and by a general disinclination to identify closely with the problems of the Third World. However, Argentina does have an exceptionally able diplomatic service which could help build better understanding between the DCs and LDCs in international fora.

As noted above, the U.S. is the country which presents the most significant challenges for the Argentines. They are deeply disturbed by our conditioning of weapons sales and IFI loans on their human rights performance, and may be on the verge of making basic decisions to reduce their ties to us.

Argentina has Latin America's most advanced nuclear technology, and probably has the capacity to produce a nuclear explosion within the next two years. The Argentines are fully aware of our nuclear preoccupations and may hope that cooperation on that front might strengthen our relations and diminish tensions on other fronts, including human rights.

The historic rivalry with Brazil continues (e.g. the dispute over rights to Parana River water.) There is, however, no great tension now. An April U.K. international arbitration decision awarding ownership of Tierra del Fuego to Chile raised nationalist sentiments in Argentina, already resentful of the British presence in the Falkland Islands. The Argentine Navy has increased its patrols in the area, but the other elements in the GOA seem more inclined toward negotiation. The Navy apprehended nine Russian and Bulgarian fishing boats in October, but the seizures do not seem to have had a lasting impact on Argentine-Soviet relations.

### III. Key Issues

#### 1. Human Rights

U. S. Objective: To convince the Argentines that better relations are dependent upon their making human rights improvements, i.e., (a) releasing or affording due process to detainees, and (b) ending torture and "disappearances."

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Argentine Objective: To convince the US that the human rights violations which have taken place were a result of a bloody civil war, that official violations were an unfortunate but necessary part of the fight against terrorism, that such violations are being gradually brought under control, and that a full return to the rule of law will take time.

Essential Factors: U. S. reactions to Argentine human rights violations have severely strained our relations. The Argentines claim not to understand why we have limited arms sales and voted against Argentine IFI loans. They believe that we overemphasize official violations and underestimate the terrorist actions which triggered them.

Hundreds of members of the Armed Forces and innocent civilians have been killed by leftist terrorists. The military, aided by fanatical rightist civilians, have reacted brutally. Many terrorist activists and suspects have been summarily executed. Torture to produce confessions and obtain information is commonplace. Military authorities have frequently allowed off-duty security personnel to terrorize leftist sympathizers and human rights advocates not involved in the bloodletting.

Supreme Court writs of habeas corpus concerning the disappeared are often ignored by the government. A group of "Mothers of the Plaza" assemble weekly in downtown Buenos Aires to petition for information about disappeared family members. We have received a letter signed by 178 of them asking for your intercession with the Argentine government.

The State of Siege provisions of the Constitution enable the government to detain prisoners without charges or set trial dates. President Videla pledged to President Carter to try to resolve the cases of the 4,000 prisoners held under these provisions by Christmas, but there has been little progress. A recently reinstated "right of option", which would allow political prisoners to choose exile instead of jail, has resulted in the release of only a few prisoners.

There is considerable U. S. public and Congressional interest in the fate of Argentine political prisoners and the disappeared: five members of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs wrote you asking your inter-

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vention on behalf of jailed newspaper editor, Jacobo Timerman, and some 25 Congressmen have expressed interest in the Deutsch family. (These cases are covered in the Background Paper on Human Rights.) Congressman Harkin has asked that you inquire about the application of the right of option. A U.S. human rights group has just given us an unverified list containing the names of 7,500 people they claim have disappeared or have been detained in Argentina.

Points to be Made

-- Incidences of prolonged detention, disappearances and torture strain our relations with Argentina. We do not wish to tell Argentines how to run their country, but we feel compelled to express our concern.

-- President Carter was heartened by President Videla's desire to resolve the status of political detainees by Christmas; we know that it is difficult to process 4,000 individual cases, but we hope that they will soon be decided.

-- We were encouraged by the decision to restore the "right of option." We hope that its provisions will allow many detainees to be freed from prison.

-- We are especially concerned about the fate of Jacobo Timerman and the Deutsch family. Both cases have aroused great interest in the U.S., as did the detention of the AP reporter Serrat.

-- The government should clarify what has happened to individuals who have disappeared without explanation. We know some may be victims of terrorists, but the security forces appear to have been involved in many instances.

-- A public accounting of all prisoners held by the government would help resolve questions about disappearances and would considerably improve Argentina's world image.

-- We still frequently hear reports of torture, especially during the first days of detention. We understand that the fight against terrorism has been brutal, but torture of prisoners is not acceptable under any circumstances. Torture should be forbidden and future cases tried in the courts.

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## 2. Terrorism

U. S. Objective: To remind the Argentines that we, too, abhor terrorism but that we cannot condone counterterrorist measures that violate human rights.

Argentine Objective: To focus U. S. thinking on terrorism as a prime violator of human rights, and as the origin of what most Argentines privately consider "shameful" conditions of internal disorder.

Essential Factors: The Argentines contend that U.S. concentration on human rights violations by government authorities has forced attention away from terrorism, which they say also violates human rights and is the real threat to Western civilization. They have forcefully pressed a campaign in international organizations to combat terrorism. This was the principal theme in Foreign Minister Montes' speech to the UNGA in October and a major concern of Deputy Foreign Minister Allara during his calls at the Department in early November. The Foreign Minister will have especially strong feelings about terrorism; his predecessor, Admiral Guzzetti, was almost killed by an assassin in May.

A recent upsurge in terrorism in Argentina heightens their concern; two Armed Forces officers were assassinated, three businessmen were killed, and the office of the Labor Minister and the home of a Chrysler executive have been bombed in the last month.

### Points to be Made

-- Terrorist attacks against government officials and innocent civilians are deplorable. We wish to express our sympathy to these men and their families.

-- We are as deeply troubled as the Argentines by the actions of the international terrorists. We cannot, however, condone counterterrorist actions that violate human rights and due legal process.

## 3. Ratification of Treaty of Tlatelolco

U. S. Objectives: To have Argentina ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, bring its nuclear program under fullscope safeguards, defer reprocessing and forego nuclear explosions.

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Argentine Objectives: To complete its nuclear fuel cycle in order to have greater energy independence, to become a nuclear technology exporter and to maintain cooperative ties with the U.S.

Essential Factors: Argentina is now proceeding apace to construct a reprocessing plant which in two years could produce plutonium in sufficient quantities to support a nuclear explosive capability. Argentina, which is by far Latin America's leading nuclear state, views nuclear technology as a source of both energy and international status. It was the first to have a research reactor (1958), the first and so far only state to operate a power plant (1974), and is a major exporter of technicians under IAEA programs.

If Argentina were to defer its reprocessing plans, accept fullscope safeguards and forego nuclear explosions, we would consider the transfer of sensitive heavy water technologies. Failure to defer reprocessing could scuttle the chances of establishing a Latin American nuclear-free zone and lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our own hemisphere. The President has approved a long-range nuclear strategy involving both Argentina and Brazil which is outlined in the background papers, but a key immediate objective of our foreign policy and your trip is to get Argentina to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco now.

Points to be Made

-- The United States is determined to do all it can to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

-- Ambassador Smith is available to brief your officials on our efforts to achieve a new SALT agreement and a Comprehensive Test Ban.

-- It is not our policy to dissuade Argentina or any nation from acquiring nuclear technology. On the contrary, if steps can be taken to ensure the safe uses of such technology, we have indicated to your government a readiness to assist you in the sensitive field of heavy water.

-- Any cooperation on heavy water would, of course, involve your deferral of reprocessing plans while an urgent world study is conducted on how to reprocess in a safer manner.

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-- We accept and support Argentina's expectation that its Latin American neighbors should also make sacrifices on behalf of safe nuclear technologies.

-- What we ask now, therefore, is that Argentina take a bold step on behalf of continental security and move now to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

-- We were heartened by President Videla's conversation with President Carter, and President Videla's commitment to consider Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

-- Ratification and entry into force of the Treaty would give dramatic impetus to Latin America's efforts to create a nuclear free zone, and would demonstrate Argentina's dedication to peace.

#### 4. U. S.-Argentine Military Relations

U. S. Objectives: To assure the Argentines that we want a good military relationship, but to get them to understand that this depends on their human rights performance.

Argentine Objective: To inform us that it values its military ties to the U. S., but that without a clarification of U.S. arms policies, particularly on spare parts, Argentina will be forced to reorient its military procurements and relationships.

Essential Factors: U. S.-Argentine military relations have deteriorated sharply as a result of U. S. actions taken to disassociate the U. S. from the GOA's human rights violations. As a result of our strictures, Argentina has refused all military sales financing for fiscal year 1978. We will not request funds from the Congress for fiscal year 1979. In addition, Congress has prospectively banned military training and arms sales as of October 1, 1978 unless human rights conditions improve. Already, the Department has been refusing almost all Argentine military requests.

While our policy has little real military significance for Argentina, our actions have damaged relations with the armed forces who run the country. Argentina dropped out of UNITAS fleet exercises this year. Until substantial progress is made on human rights considerations-- release or the affording of due process to detainees, and the ending of torture and disappearances -- Argentina can expect our military relations to remain paralyzed.

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Points to be Made

-- The United States values its military relations with Argentina and regrets the circumstances which have led to the current situation regarding military sales and training.

-- Our willingness to provide equipment is directly related to internal security policies. Given the present situation in Argentina, it is virtually impossible for the Administration to justify military sales to Argentina.

-- We hope earnestly that the restoration of due process in Argentina will permit us to develop more normal military relationships.

-- This would permit us to advise the Congress of a changed situation and to recommend abrogation of the law which will prohibit military transfers to Argentina after October 1, 1978.

5. Argentina and the International Financial Institutions

U.S. Objectives: To explain to the Argentines that we cannot support their loan requests, except those which meet basic human needs, until they demonstrate substantial human rights improvements.

Argentine Objective: To persuade the U.S. to vote "yes" or abstain on Argentine loan requests in the IFIs.

Essential Factors: In June we abstained instead of voting "no" on one loan and told the Argentines that this was due to improvements in their human rights situation. We added, however, that it would be difficult for us to support their loan requests in the IFIs. They held back loans until October when they submitted a \$36 million gas pipeline project to the IDB. We voted "no", and informed the Argentines that without human rights improvements we would vote "no" on future loans not clearly meeting basic human needs. (We have since voted "yes" on a potable water loan in the IDB that met our basic human needs criteria, but decisions on two more Argentine loan requests in the IDB, \$60 million for science and technology development and \$50 million for electrical transmission lines, have been delayed until after your visit.)

The Argentines claim, somewhat disingenuously, to be confused by our voting record in the IFIs. They ask how we could abstain on a loan in June and now,

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after significant improvements in human rights have taken place, vote "no".

Points to be Made

-- We do not seek to intervene in the internal affairs of other societies; but we believe that no member of the United Nations can claim that violations of internationally sanctioned human rights are solely its own affair.

-- We will continue to use our vote in the IFIs to promote human rights and hope that conditions in Argentina will permit us to take a more positive stance in the World Bank and IDB when future loans come up.

-- (If raised) Eximbank is encouraged by Argentine progress on economic questions and this is revelent to the Bank's decisions. However, Exim is required by law to consider human rights factors in passing on all loans.

6. North-South Issuss

U.S. Objectives: To encourage Argentina to use its influence within the G-77 on issues where our interests overlap.

Argentine Objective: To encourage the U. S. to cooperate with Argentina on economic issues affecting middle-income developing countries.

Essential Factors: Although outwardly supportive of Third World positions on North-South issues, Argentina has been quietly but energetically arguing against many G-77 proposals. Along with other large Latin American countries, Argentina is concerned about important aspects of the New International Economic Order, and increasingly sees itself as a potential "swing" country between DC's and LDC's.

Argentina believes that the UNCTAD Integrated Program for Commodities favors Africa and Asia. It is not a major exporter of any of the 18 core commodities. Last September, it opposed the African countries' demand for an immediate LDC pledge of financial support for the rapid creation of the Common Fund to finance the Program. Argentina feels that any generalized debt moratorium for all LDC's would jeopardize the Latin American region's vitally important credit standing with private lenders.

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As a middle-income country, however, Argentina has strongly criticized our "basic human needs strategy" as a no growth ploy designed to divide the LDCs.

Points to be Made:

-- The United States appreciates the constructive, moderate position Argentina has taken on many economic questions in the international fora. We hope they will continue to use these fora to speak out constructively on issues of importance to the world community as a whole.

-- Argentina is a country with strong ties to both the G-77 and the developed countries; we look forward to working with the Argentines in seeking practical solutions to North/South issues.

-- We look forward to cooperating closely with the Argentines in the MTN negotiations, and would be interested in exchanging views on ways in which developing countries can become more involved in international economic decisions generally.

-- Our support for the basic human needs approach is not designed to supplant programs to develop infrastructure and productivity, which are obviously essential to meet basic human needs in all developing countries

7. U. S. - Argentine Mixed Commission

U. S. Objective: To be receptive to Argentine requests for closer economic consultations.

Argentine Objective. To reactivate the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Commission on Economic Relations.

Essential Factors: A U.S-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission was established in 1966, but is moribund. The Argentines proposed its reactivation when Assistant Secretary Todman visited Buenos Aires in August and we have since agreed to meet with the Argentines in Washington at an unspecified date, possibly in January.

We consider a consultative group useful, but would prefer to organize it at a relatively low level, e.g., Deputy Assistant Secretary, to avoid the appearance of too close a relationship to Argentina at this time.

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The Argentines may wish to use a reactivated Commission to consider ways to improve their negative trade balance with the U.S. -- some \$400 million in 1977. Our restrictions on beef imports and countervailing duty cases against Argentine leather and clothing exporters may also be raised by the Argentines in the Commission. (Although the incidence of hoof and mouth disease in Argentina limits raw beef trade, we did import some \$100 million worth of cooked-frozen and canned beef in 1976). On our side, the Commission could be used to raise investment disputes: Deltec International (a major meat producer) has a claim pending in the Argentine courts.

Points to be Made:

-- The U. S. views the Economic Commission as a useful instrument to achieve shared economic interests.

-- Our health restrictions against Argentine beef are not a device to deny access to U. S. markets. We welcome discussions with Argentina regarding health and sanitation matters.

-- The Treasury Department appreciates the cooperation of the GOA in providing information relevant to pending countervailing duty cases and is taking that information into consideration in making its decision.

8. Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition (If raised)

U. S. Objective: To consider Argentine proposals for cooperation.

Argentine Objective: To discuss the establishment of a U.S.-Argentine Commission on Malnutrition.

Essential Factors: The Argentines first suggested this Commission during the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister's visit earlier this month. They seemed undecided about what they want the group to do and gave the impression that they may have included it on the agenda to divert attention from the harder issues of human rights and nuclear non-proliferation.

Points to be Made:

-- The U. S. will listen with interest to Argentine proposals on a Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition.

-- We would like to cooperate with Argentina to alleviate malnutrition in the hemisphere.

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## 9. Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries

U. S. Objectives: To encourage greater technology development in LDCs, but to restrain discrimination against U. S. suppliers of technology. To insure that IFI and USAID money is used to finance the best technology available, regardless of origin.

Argentine Objective: To foster greater utilization of Argentine technology by other LDCs through multilateral agreements.

Essential Factors: A United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries will be held at Buenos Aires from August 30 to September 12, 1978. The GOA has long been the prime proponent of such a conference, which it hopes will help promote greater use of technology developed in advanced LDCs like Argentina.

### Points to be Made:

-- We will attend the Buenos Aires Conference with the goal of cooperating with LDC's to enhance use of technology available in their countries.

-- We hope to work with Argentina to direct the Conference toward that goal.

-- We would not favor a Conference attempt to justify use of LDC technology for its own sake at the expense of superior technology available elsewhere.

## 10. Malvinas/Falkland Islands

U. S. Objective: To urge negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement and avoidance of incidents, while staying out of the middle of this Argentine-U. K. question.

Argentine Objective: To solicit U. S. support for the return of the U. K. held Malvinas Islands to Argentina. (The Argentines would prefer you use the name Malvinas.)

Essential Factors: The Malvinas have been governed by the U. K. since 1833. Argentine-UK conversations will take place in New York in December, but there is basic disagreement on a date. The Argentines want them now but the U. K. is thinking of an end-of-century turnover. The negotiations are complicated by the 2,000 inhabitants'

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unwillingness to be ruled by Argentina and the possibility that large oil deposits may exist in the area.

We have consistently urged both parties to seek a solution through negotiation. The Argentines, however, may be thinking of other tactics: Deputy Foreign Minister Allara told Assistant Secretary Todman in early November that an "incident" was possible so long as the matter remained unsettled. The Argentines urged that we pressure the British to return the Malvinas to Argentina. The British have asked that we urge restraint on the Argentines to permit an evolutionary approach.

Points to be Made:

(In view of Argentine interest and the UK request, we believe you could profitably take the lead in raising this issue.)

-- The U. S. hopes that the U. K. and Argentina can work out a suitable agreement on the Malvinas.

-- Argentina should show restraint: any "incident" would only make the future of the islands more difficult to resolve.

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ACTION ARA-14

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4937

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OYIP  
SUBJECT: HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO ARGENTINA

SUMMARY: FROM ARRIVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS FAMILY WERE WELL RECEIVED BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA LAID OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. DR. KISSINGER SPOKE TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS--FROM BANKERS TO GAUCHOS. IN MOST INSTANCES, HE COMPLIMENTED GOA FOR DEFEATING TERRORISTS BUT HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEM THEN ARE NOT JUSTIFIABLE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS.

DO NOT REVIEW 03-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN BA EARLY WEDNESDAY MORNING (JUNE 21). HE WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY A FONOFF REP WHO DOGGED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT A SPOKESMAN FOR USG.

2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY WAS TO LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, COL. MALLEA GIL (INTERPRETER) AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDELA PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL. IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL AT 1300 LUNCH WAS SERVED.

3. KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT DURING PRIVATE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. ALLEGEDLY VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTIONS FROM DR. KISSINGER AS TO HOW TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USG. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED WHETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS.

4. AT LUNCH, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VIEWS ON LATIN AMERICA. FORMER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT NOW MORE THAN EVER WAS TIME TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE. HE ADDED UNITY OF ACTION AMONG THE LA COUNTRIES IS REQUIRED IF ALL AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE TO SURVIVE. HE STRESSED THAT DURING HIS TENURE AS SECRETARY OF STATE, LATIN AMERICA WAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE NOW. KISSINGER POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A REFLECTION ON ANY ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK OF ATTENTION TOWARDS LA WAS NOT A DELIBERATE ACT ON ANYBODY'S PART. IT WAS JUST A FACT THAT WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD EXPLODING, NEGLECT ENSUED.

5. KISSINGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AMERICAN MAY BE NEXT ON RUSIA AND CUBA'S SCHEDULE. HE ADDED IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN AFRICA IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICA. HE APPLAUDED PRESIDENT CARTER FOR HIS AYNAPOLIS SPEECH. KISSINGER STRESSED HIS SUPPORT OF MOST OF CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND SALES OF AIRCRAFT TO MID-EASTERN COUNTRIES. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS ABOMINABLE THAT A MYTH PREVAILED THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS WERE INVINCIBLE. SINCE WHEN, HE ASKED, CAN CUBAN SOLDIERS MARCH FROM SOUTH TO NORTH IN AFRICA AND EXPECT THE WORLD TO APPLAUD

THEM. THE FORMER SECRETARY TOLD VIDELA HE GAVE HIS FULL SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON HIS AFRICAN POLICY.

6. HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT WAS UNFORTUNATE MANY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA WAS A SOFT DRINK. HE SAID THIS INDICATED THAT AMERICANS ARE NOT AWARE OF ARGENTINE HISTORY NOR OF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TERRORISM WAS NOT SOLELY OF ARGENTINE ORIGIN BUT INSTEAD IT HAD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT. KISSINGER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN COMBATTING TERRORISM BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED IN DEFEATING TERRORISTS HAD NO PLACE IN ARGENTINA TODAY.

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEEMED RELAXED AND FRIENDLY. HE TENSED UP ONLY WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT USG.

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BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS: ARGENTINA

Political violence has wracked Argentina since the late Sixties. The violence was partially responsible for the economic and political breakdown precipitating the March 1976 coup, and has subsequently been used by the junta as a rationale for a no-holds-barred approach to counter-terrorism. This has resulted in egregious violations of human rights, despite public recognition by the government that the terrorists have been largely defeated, although businessmen and military officers continue to be murdered.

Security personnel and prison officials use torture although it is prohibited by law and publicly condemned by government officials. The victims are usually suspected terrorists, but leftists, priests and foreign political exiles have been maltreated as well. The government is aware of such activities but generally has not acted effectively to limit them.

The Argentine armed forces have committed themselves to the elimination of terrorist "combatants." This policy has led to the summary execution of prisoners who reportedly had "blood on their hands." These executions are sometimes disguised as shootouts with the security forces or prison escapes. It should be noted that leftist terrorists rarely allow themselves to be taken alive, in order to avoid interrogation.

State of siege arrests are authorized by the Argentine Constitution during periods of internal disorder. The President of Argentina may detain and relocate people under the state of siege provisions but, according to law, he may not convict or apply punishment upon his own authority. The state of siege powers, which were invoked in 1974, have been used to hold a wide variety of persons, many of whom have been held for long periods without formal charges. Many arrests and abductions under the state of siege have taken place in the middle of the night, sometimes in the form of mysterious abductions. Some people are freed after short periods of interrogation. Others are held incommunicado without charges or formal acknowledgement of their detention. They join a group known as the "disappeared" whose number is estimated to range between 2,000 and 20,000.

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Recently the Government of Argentina has reinsti-  
tuted a limited "right of option" for political prisoners  
who are being held under executive detention--i.e., not  
charged and remanded to civil or military courts--to  
request exile. Only a few detainees to date have been  
granted exile.

Action Taken on Human Rights

-- On October 27 the U.S. voted no on a gas pipeline  
loan in the IDB. The Argentines have been informed that  
if they allow three other loans to come forward we will  
have to vote against them as well on human rights grounds.  
We supported an IDB loan for potable water on the grounds  
that it meets basic human needs, on November 3.

-- President Carter discussed human rights problems  
with President Videla when the latter was in Washington  
for the Panama Canal signing ceremony. Ambassador Todman  
and Assistant Secretary Derian have also discussed these  
problems directly with Videla.

-- Argentina rejected FMS credits for FY '78 after  
the Administration reduced the proposed budget request  
for human rights grounds. The Administration declined to  
sign the FY '77 FMS Agreement and did not request FMS  
credits for Argentina for FY '79. All arms transfers (FMS  
sales and commercial sales of items on the munitions list)  
are being reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with only very  
few selected new items with no apparent relationship to  
human rights approved. In addition, explosive items such  
as shells, cartridges, etc. are being denied. Policy  
guidance is being sought on whether spare parts will be  
sold or not.

-- We have submitted over 3,000 names of individuals  
who are either detained or have disappeared to the  
Argentine government and have requested that they furnish  
information on these individuals.

Drafted: ARA/ECA:FRondon/HA:MBova

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ARGENTINA

<u>Loan</u>	<u>Institution</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Science & Technology	IDB	1978	\$60 million (FSO)
Transmission Lines	IDB	1978	61.3 million

The Issue      DOS REVIEWED 02-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

There are serious human rights violations in Argentina. Practices there include detention without charge; torture; and summary execution of prisoners. It also has an advanced nuclear program and is moving toward a reprocessing capacity, and is potentially a major source of oil. Its economic weight makes it a leader in Hispanic America and one of the most active Latin American governments in global economic fora.

We have supported one IDB loan (for potable water) on basic human needs grounds, have voted against an IDB gas pipeline loan, and have told the GOA that we will vote against three other IDB loans if the GOA brings them forward. Argentina rejected FMS credits for FY 78 after we reduced the proposed budget request on human rights grounds. All arms transfers are being carefully reviewed on a case-by-case basis. President Carter discussed the human rights situation personally with President Videla when the latter was in Washington for the Panama Canal Treaties' signing.

We have no bilateral aid program in Argentina. The Working Group is not aware of further loans pending in International Financial Institutions beyond the above two loans and those already considered by the Inter-Agency Group.

The Working Group recommends that consideration of the Science and Technology loan on this agenda be delayed, since it is not expected to come to a vote in the IDB for some time.

It felt more information was needed as to whether the loan on this agenda for Transmission Lines would serve basic human needs. Since then the Embassy has reported that the project would expand electricity supplies to the urban centers of Rosario, Coroba, and Buenos Aires. Industrial, commercial, and residential consumers would benefit equally. The project would not supply electricity to presently unserved groups.

There was question within the Working Group as to whether we should support loans to Argentina, even if they do meet basic human needs.

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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DOS REVIEWED 02-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
SUBJECT: Your Remark That Argentine Improvements  
in Human Rights Should be Acknowledged

The State Department has prepared a short report (Tab A) assessing the significance of Argentine President Videla's recent steps (on June 14) to improve the country's human rights image. Our mission in Argentina and the Department suggest that these steps -- the release of 342 persons, the processing of 1,000 cases, the reexamination of the right of exile -- should be "viewed cautiously." Nonetheless, the Department has sent a cable which instructs our Embassy to acknowledge and express our continued interest and encouragement for these and other steps which improve the human rights picture in Argentina. The State Department also requested further information on whether the announced steps have been taken.

A recent cable summarizing President Videla's trip to Uruguay appears to reinforce the conclusion that we should be more cautious about accepting announcements of reforms by the Latin American military governments at face value. At his press conference at the conclusion of his visit, Videla backed away from recent statements on democracy and instead said that his government has no fixed timetable for the installation of a democratic form of government.

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NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-54-6-7-2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

April 18, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVID AARON

FROM: LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor)

SUBJECT: Evening Report

Mexico. Attended a meeting chaired by Jules Katz with the industry and consumer representatives interested in the gas negotiations. We briefed them in a very general way and asked as well as solicited some questions. It went well. We are sending the proposal down to the Mexicans tonite with talking points for Lucey to use if the Mexicans initial response is very negative. Two new problems on the horizon on U.S./Mexican relations are: tomatoes and mixed credits -- the French have arranged an agreement on mixed credits with the Mexicans which upsets Treasury and they want to make a demarche to the French. I think that will be as effective as our demarche to Bonn in January 1977 on the Brazil nuclear agreement. I will try to turn Treasury off. (C)

Argentina. Lunched with Ambassador Raul Castro, who informed me of the recent improvement in the human rights situation and said he expects further improvement as Videla gets stronger. The Argentines promised him for the umpteenth time that they would ratify Tlatelolco at the end of this month; we spoke about the possibility of his returning to Argentina with a letter from Vance to Videla repeating our great concern. Labor problems will be more troublesome this year but he thinks the Argentine government will be able to manage it, although they will have to dismiss their Finance Minister. (C)

Nicaragua. Two important leaders of Nicaragua's business sector met with me and informed me of recent developments which have strengthened the middle. They urged us to appoint a good new ambassador soon and I assured them we will. They said that such an ambassador will help the middle in Nicaragua and we should look for additional symbolic ways to strengthen the middle; they suggested a meeting with the Vice President. (At the right time I think this is a good idea.) They also suggested that we should take some steps to counter Somoza propoganda that Solaun's resignation represents a Somoza triumph. I will suggest that State draft a Presidential letter to Solaun thanking him for his excellent service. (C)

Science and Technology. Briefed a group of people from different agencies on the Vice President's conversations with Figueiredo and Herrera on S & T, suggested some ideas for ways to package an over-all approach on S & T to Latin America for Frank Press' trip. (C)

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Review on April 18, 1985

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Tuesday, June 28, 1974

Daily Activities

(Pastor)

Prepared for and attended discussions between President Carter and President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela. Also working on memorandum of conversation of that meeting. Prepared press guidance and attended press briefing with Jerry Schecter and Rex Granum. Also met with two Venezuelan journalists to discuss the background of the OPEC exclusionary amendment to the GSP. And met with you and Foreign Minister Escovar of Venezuela to discuss the Carter Administration's world vision and where Venezuela fits in that.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Significant Information/Intelligence

(Trachtenberg)

Venezuela/Panama. A Panamanian National Information Release which first appeared the evening of June 27 reports that President Perez will meet at Blair House with the Panamanian Canal Treaty negotiating team after his meeting with President Carter.

In Caracas, the morning headlines of June 28 indicate that General Torrijos personally informed President Perez last Sunday that a Canal solution is imminent.

Peru. UPI and the Latin News Agency report that the United States has sold five A-37 fighter planes to Peru.

Cuba. Premier Castro reportedly has sent a personal note to Zambian President Kaunda asking him to reconsider his opposition to the stationing of Cuban troops in Zambia.

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Argentina recently announced a number of moves apparently designed to counteract adverse publicity on human rights. Although the measures appear more cosmetic than substantive, they indicate that President Videla's administration is growing increasingly sensitive to the U.S. position on human rights, and particularly to U.S. voting in international financial institutions.

Chile. Upon returning from the OASGA, Foreign Minister Carvajol said that the Carter Administration should send high level emissaries to the Southern Cone countries not visited in the pre-OASGA period. His statement indicates that the Government of Chile seems to be keeping alive the idea of visits designed to minimize concern about human rights practices in Chile.

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Argentina - Background Paper

The August 1 shift from government by a three-man Junta of Service Chiefs to a President-Junta arrangement had long been anticipated. Appointment of a retired officer as president was apparently provided for in the planning that preceded the March 1976 coup. Implementation had been delayed, however, in the face of what military leaders considered the emergency conditions of the post-coup period.

Jorge Videla's choice to serve as president (until March 1981) was not in serious doubt. Less clear, however, was how power would be distributed between Videla and the Junta. As matters now stand:

- the Junta will remain the supreme governing body, setting policy guidelines and reviewing presidential actions and appointments in light of those guidelines; and
- the president will be responsible for daily government operations, enjoying considerable powers of appointment (often with Junta advice and/or consent).

Many commentators have noted that Videla's personal power is less substantial than before August 1. This may be true, but Videla's personal, independent power is less consequential than his ability to sustain the backing of the army, the dominant service. As long as he maintains a close working relationship with General Roberto Viola, his successor as Army Commander and Junta member, and as long as Viola can keep the Army reasonably united, Videla and the Junta are not likely to come into serious conflict.

Terrorism continues to subside in the face of the military's counterinsurgency efforts. The human rights abuses that have accompanied the battle have probably also declined in frequency, but they have not been halted. Disappearances continue to occur, along with allegations of torture and summary executions. It is probable that human rights abuses will continue to decrease in frequency, especially if the military moderates supporting the Videla-Viola team can consolidate their power. The process is liable to be gradual, however, economically, 1978 has been a disappointing year for Argentina to date. Stabilization measures (reducing the fiscal deficit, decelerating the expansion of monetary aggregates, controlling wages, etc) have not prevented continuing high inflation and a drop in economic growth. Argentina is a victim of severe

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stagflation.

Inflation during the first half of the year surpassed that in the comparable 1977 period and is expected to exceed 120 per cent for the 1978 calendar year. The fiscal deficit will be at least double the 1 percent of GDP target, and the growth rate will probably show about a 2 percent loss. With blue collar wages continuing to decline, the government has a serious economic problem that is generating significant domestic discontent.

The external economic sector provides a very different picture. Performance has exceeded expectations, and there are no balance of payments, debt or foreign exchange problems except insofar as the influx of exchange has helped fuel domestic inflation.

Bilateral relations with the U.S. have remained strained because of the human rights issue. By legislative mandate, all U.S. security assistance to Argentina was terminated on September 30, 1978. Despite rhetorical flareups over specific incidents, however, bilateral contacts have been maintained as is evidenced by the bilateral economic and nuclear consultations that are scheduled to take place in October.

Denied certain forms of U.S. economic and military assistance, the Argentines have been successfully concentrating on efforts to diversify their sources of markets, financial and investment opportunities, and military equipment and training.

Drafted:ARA/ECA:JNBumpus:SMyles  
INR/RAR:JBuchanan  
10/12/1978 x 29166 (Tape #14)

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Argentina

10A

MEETING

President Carter with President Jorge Rafael Videla  
of Argentina

September 9, 1977 - 9:00 a.m.

Cabinet Room - White House

Checklist and Follow-up Items

1. Videla said that as soon as political conditions permit -- perhaps before the end of the year, Argentina would ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
2. President Carter told Videla the USG would talk to the Cubans about signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked whether Argentina would send representatives to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference on October 19 - 21, 1977.
3. President Carter said he would provide the Department of State for onward transmission to the Government of Argentina, a list prepared by a Washington human rights group containing the names of 3,000 individuals being detained in Argentina.
4. Videla said he hoped that the problem of detainees might be resolved by Christmas 1977.
5. In response to President Carter's inquiry whether it might be possible to send representatives of the OAS or UN to confirm human rights progress in Argentina sometime after Christmas, Videla referred to recent visits by USG officials and said such visits are the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed of its record. Videla said he was not troubled by visits by international human rights commissions which testify to the facts in Argentina.
6. The President and Secretary Vance accepted Videla's invitation for the Secretary to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete bilateral consultations.

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*Signifying*

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Argentina

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DOS REVIEWED 19-May-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

DATE: September 9, 1977  
TIME: 9:00 am  
PLACE: White House

SUBJECT: President Carter/President Videla Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS:

ARGENTINA

US

Lt. General Jorge Rafael Videla  
President of Argentina  
Oscar A. Montes, Minister of  
Foreign Affairs and Worship  
Jorge A. Aja Espil, Ambassador  
to the United States  
Julio Cesar Carasales,  
Ambassador to OAS  
Enrique Quintana,  
Chief of Protocol  
Cdr. Eduardo Alberto Traid,  
Aide-de-camp

President Carter  
Vice President Mondale  
Secretary Vance  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Assistant Secretary Todman  
Robert Pastor, NSC  
Charge Maxwell Chaplin

President Carter opened the conversation by expressing his pleasure at the attendance of the Argentine President and emphasizing its significance as a demonstration of hope for the Panama Canal Treaty. He was also pleased that it provided an opportunity for the hemispheric leaders to have conversations about issues of common concern.

President Videla expressed his satisfaction over the opportunity to witness an event of such major importance as the Canal Treaty Signing, as well as the opportunity to have a face-to-face discussion with the President. He observed that the signature of the treaty not only denotes the end of one era but opens a new one in which the United States has demonstrated its sincerity and goodwill toward Latin America. He added that the Argentine presence was his government's effort to establish its goodwill in response. He observed that while US-Argentine relations have had their ups and downs throughout history, the temporary circumstances which impeded close relations have always been overcome by the basic identity of interests of the two nations.

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As a parenthetical comment, President Carter observed to Videla that his Spanish was the clearest and easiest to understand he had ever heard - the President either chose simple words or had an unusually clear manner of expressing himself. He found this typical of Argentina which he and his wife had visited some years previously. President Carter also added his thanks for the hospitality that President Videla had shown to Assistant Secretary Todman during the latter's recent visit to Argentina.

President Carter said he hoped to have a frank discussion of two major issues with the objective of improving relations between the two nations.

#### Non-Proliferation

President Carter considered the threat of nuclear explosives the greatest problem facing the hemisphere. Because Argentina leads the Latin American nations in nuclear technology - which is a great credit to Argentina - he hoped that Argentina could also lead in the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the area and the prevention of introduction to nuclear explosives. He observed that all hemispheric countries but Cuba and Argentina had signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Chile and Brazil had conditioned their approval of that treaty upon Argentina's ratification and acceptance of it. He expressed the hope that Argentina would ratify this treaty which would provide unrestricted use of nuclear energy for power but no introduction of nuclear explosives.

President Carter said that the United States, the European Community, Canada and Australia were now evolving a study of fuel cycle from ore to reactor wastes and safeguards. On October 19 there will be a three-day meeting on this subject, and it would be helpful if the GOA could be represented at this meeting. He envisaged establishing common policies with regard to the export of nuclear technology heavy water and enriched uranium. He said this policy envisages restriction of sale of these items to countries which do not cooperate in the non-proliferation effort. President Carter said he understood that Argentina was cooperating with Canada with respect to limited safeguards but stressed the importance the United States places on the Tlatelolco and the NPT. This is very serious to the United States, and it would remain of constant concern.

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President Videla responded by observing that the two countries' coincidence of interest was mirrored by the fact that the two Presidents' agendas were the same. He did not perceive these issues as problems but as opportunities for progress. He reviewed Argentina's 25 years' work in developing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, noting that one power reactor is currently in use, a second under construction and a third in the planning phase. He understood President Carter's concern over the misuse of nuclear energy and said Argentina had offered to establish safeguards beyond those which were really needed. However, he understood that even this may not be sufficient reassurance for Latin America and the world.

President Videla said the GOA had considered ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco but stressed that President Carter must be aware of the great need for proper political timing of such an action. Argentina was only 18 months away from its gravest national crisis, so the government must be particularly careful not to disturb the progress toward normalcy. He stated that as soon as political conditions permit - perhaps before the end of the year - he would give proof of the GOA goodwill with regard to non-proliferation by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked if this reassured President Carter.

President Carter said it did, and stated that if the GOA decided to send a delegation to the fuel cycle conference it would be particularly exciting if it would be possible to announce intended ratification of the treaty at that time, but he would defer to President Videla on the best political timing. With Argentine ratification, the treaty would be in effect for all countries but Cuba, and the United States would be raising this issue with the Cubans. The President added that Argentine ratification would also remove our concerns about technology and heavy water supply to Argentina from the United States and other suppliers. The President had discussed this very issue the previous day with Prime Minister Trudeau in the interest of establishing a common export policy.

#### Human Rights

The political changes in Argentina have been given careful study by the American government, and recent developments there said President Carter, have impressed me as much as the natural beauty of the country. He stated his admiration for the achievements of President Videla's

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government in dealing with the problem of terrorism and the reconstruction of the Argentine economy. He said the study of the achievements of President Videla's government led to the conclusion that the GOA had achieved great strength, stability and influence. He hoped that the security and the strength of the government would lead to the alleviation of concerns expressed by many about the observation of human rights in Argentina. The President stated he did not have a way to assess the many charges of human rights violations and noted the particularly high press interest in this subject in the United States. Certain cases drew particularly intense interest here, such as that of editor Jacobo Timerman and the Deutsch family, who have many relatives in the California area. He said that a Washington group concerned with the subject of human rights had provided a list of 3,000 people being detained in Argentina without public notice of their arrest or charges against them. The President acknowledged that some of these allegations may be false or exaggerated, but he felt that in the privacy of the room he could express our concerns about the state of human rights in Argentina. He would make the list available so the State Department could provide it to President Videla's government for its use. President Carter felt that the friendly bilateral relations, of over a hundred years were of great value, and he was concerned that this issue could come between the two countries. He felt that more progress in this area would be welcome. In summary, he said he had great admiration and appreciation for what President Videla has been able to do for his country, and asked what additional steps could be taken to alleviate the concern in the United States (which, indeed, may have been exaggerated) about the state of human rights in Argentina.

President Videla recounted the situation in which Argentina found itself in March 1976, with an economic, political and social crisis aggravated by terrorism, which led the armed forces as an institution reluctantly to take over to fill the power vacuum and protect those enduring values and human rights of which President Carter spoke. Those who recognized that man was created in God's image must recognize his dignity as an individual. Terrorists wanted to change that view of man, and Argentina had faced what amounted to a war over the issue. All wars have their undesirable consequences, and President Carter as a military man would know of this. Argentina has suffered all of these misfortunes of war.

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President Videla said that the war, while virtually over in a military sense, continued in the political arena, both domestically and internationally. The terrorists wish to isolate the GOA from a civilized world, but their charges were not true; the people of Argentina opposed terrorism and the system it advocated. They were dedicated to democracy. Argentina faced the intentionally exaggerated publicity abroad of admittedly unfortunate incidents. President Videla said there were incidents for which the government was responsible, and he accepted that responsibility for them and stressed his efforts to control abuses of power. He said, however, that he could not accept the image of a brutal and uncivilized Argentina and the attempt to isolate his country from those other nations which shared its basic values. He stressed that he would do his utmost to reestablish order and control, and meanwhile he needed the understanding of Argentina's friends, especially natural friends such as the United States.

With the war almost over, President Videla felt that the need for repressive action was less. He felt that within a short period the negative consequences of the repression would be eliminated.

He agreed to accept the list of names of those who were reportedly detained in Argentina and welcomed the opportunity to comment on the Timerman case. He assured President Carter that Timerman was detained under due process, charged with dealing with subversive elements. He was not detained because of his name - there was definitely no anti-Semitic connection to this detention. The same was the case of the detention of the Deutsch family: they were detained for investigation of possible connection with subversion, not for racial reasons.

President Videla stated that 1,990 persons had been detained under the national executive power in the first year of his government and 2,020 in the subsequent six months. Since March 1976, 300 of these cases had been tried in the civilian courts with 73 found guilty, and 370 in the military courts with 187 found guilty. In the last two months, 300 persons detained on suspicion of terrorist activities have been liberated. President Videla was most reluctant to give a date, but he hoped and wished the problems of the detainees might be resolved by Christmas 1977. He would make a major effort to achieve this and meanwhile hoped for US understanding.

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President Carter ventured a question about the Argentine judicial system, noting that one of the great concerns expressed in the United States is the fact that there are no announcements of the arrest of Argentines or the charges on which they were being held. He asked if this is customary. President Videla responded that the Argentine courts are independent institutions and operated beyond the control of the executive. In cases dealing with subversives and their detention as a preliminary security measure, no announcements of the detentions were made. As soon as the case was investigated it was turned over to the military or civilian courts or the individual was released. While for security reasons it is not convenient to provide public information on detentions at the initial stage, the GOA has an office charged with providing information to relatives about the possible detention and charges against family members. President Carter expressed his desire to help restore world appreciation of Argentina and what its government stands for. He hoped that President Videla would give the United States the opportunity to do so. As President, he said he knew how much opportunity he had to preserve the liberties of the US citizens. He asked if, at sometime in the future after Christmas, it might be possible for representatives of the OAS or the UN to visit Argentina, not to check on you but to certify the progress made by the GOA.

President Videla said he was pleased to respond with the same frankness shown by President Carter and observed that facts were infinitely more important than words. The visits of Mr. Todman, Mrs. Derian, the Congressmen and the Senators are the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed of its record. He thanked President Carter for sending these groups and for providing lists of detainees. He admitted that there were disappearances in Argentina for four reasons: first, when an individual joins the subversive underground; second, when a terrorist is killed by his associates who may suspect betrayal; third, terrorists were killed in battle; and fourth, people were killed by excesses committed by forces of repression. He said this fourth case is under our control, and it is his responsibility to eliminate it. He said he was not troubled by visits or lists or any future visit made in goodwill which can testify to the facts in Argentina.

President Videla regretted that it was necessary to devote the short time available to discussion of the two fundamental issues raised. Since there were a number of important remaining bilateral issues, which should be covered, he wished to invite Secretary Vance to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete the consultations.

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President Carter and Secretary Vance both accepted the invitation for Secretary Vance to visit Argentina. President Carter said he regretted that the two items had dominated this discussion, which would have to be ended because the President of Uruguay was arriving shortly. Should President Videla wish, he said that Vice President Mondale could meet with him now, or the conversations could be continued during the Secretary's visit. President Carter expressed his hope he could return to Argentina before long and presented President Videla with his book and a collection of satellite photographs of the world. The meeting terminated with expressions of mutual goodwill.

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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June 24, 1978

IS REVIEWED 06 Nov-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
SUBJECT: Information Items

Information

Weizman's Visit to West Bank: Our Jerusalem Consulate General reported that Weizman, during his June 20 visit to Nablus, Hebron, and nearby Israeli settlements exhibited unprecedented Israeli flexibility.

-- In Nablus, he approved the purchase of new generators to expand the municipal electrical plant, reversing Israel's longstanding policy. He also gave the go-ahead for the drilling of new water wells, and promised to curb the overzealous security searches conducted by IDF troops in the area.

-- In Hebron, he approved the return of two prominent deportees, local hospital improvements, and increases in electrical power.

Regarding the Jewish settlements, he gave his general support, but affirmed the Israeli government's respect for private Arab property. West Bank mayors were very pleased with Weizman's pronouncements, but the West Bank press took pains to disassociate municipal cooperation with Weizman from collaboration with Begin's autonomy scheme.

Trends in Human Rights in Argentina: According to a State analysis, Argentina's human rights record in 1978 displays some improvement over the 1976-77 period, but conditions have changed little in the last six months. Serious abuses still occur, despite reports of efforts by military officials to curb renegade counterterrorist activities. There is a reasonable prospect for gradual but significant improvement over the next year or so, however. In the meantime, the Argentines will probably pursue a damage-limiting strategy in their relations with the U.S.

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In recent weeks, President Videla's government has taken several noteworthy steps that are designed primarily to defuse human rights criticism during the OAS General Assembly.

-- On June 20, the IAHRIC was invited to pay a "special visit" to investigate "legal-judicial conditions."

-- President Videla is said to have informed an archbishop on June 19 that 14 labor leaders would be released and the cases of others reviewed.

-- Alfredo Bravo, a well-known labor leader and rights activist, returned home on conditional liberty on June 16 after 10 months in jail.

-- Two restrictions on press freedom were rescinded on June 5.

State notes that implementation of well-timed human rights "concessions" has been a consistent Argentine tactic over the past two years. The prospects for gradual improvement over the coming months will be enhanced by the continued diminution of the terrorist threat and the likelihood that Videla and his fellow moderates in the armed forces will consolidate their control over the security forces.

Your OAS Speech: Latin American media headlined and commented on your address to the OAS meeting, emphasizing your comments on human rights.

-- Gazeta Mercantil of Sao Paulo considered the speech "one of the most important, if not the most important, you have ever delivered before a Latin American audience." The article said you made one of your strongest defenses of human rights, not only reaffirming your human rights principles, but pronouncing them with even greater energy.

-- Headlines in Buenos Aires read: "Carter's Stern Warning -- Governments Violating Human Rights Will be Punished". "Carter Reaffirms Human Rights Policy".

-- Leftist-nationalist Excelsior of Mexico City approved of the proposal "to create a technical committee" to help raise living standards, but noted that to do this it would be necessary "to overcome the very powerful interests of those who uphold exploitation, frequently by U.S. companies."

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-- The English language daily Journal of Caracas stated:  
"Latin America is one part of the world where the push  
for human rights seems to be going well....even some  
of the worst violators of human rights in the hemisphere  
appear to be restraining themselves..."

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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DOS REVIEWED 02-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

May 30, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Cyrus Vance C.V.

Genscher. At breakfast today, I briefed Genscher on SALT and recent developments in the Middle East. We discussed MBFR and agreed that progress on a forthcoming response from the Soviets on our proposal is a necessary precondition to a meeting of Foreign Ministers. Neither of us had a clear picture of what the French are trying to do -- especially to MBFR -- with their new proposals for a European disarmament conference. We agreed the subject should be discussed at our next four power meetings with Owen and De Guiringaud in Paris and Bonn. We decided to raise the question of an appropriate forum for negotiation of grey area systems at the same time.

Genscher underlined the importance he attaches to your forthcoming visit to Germany. He urged that enough time be allowed in your schedule for "intensive political discussions," and expressed his hope that you will agree to meet separately with the leaders of the four political parties represented in the Bundestag.

Ecevit. An exclusive interview with the New York Times and an appearance on the Today Show unfortunately focused attention on Ecevit's visit to Moscow next month and his belief that detente has diminished the Soviet threat to Turkey. Ecevit did stress that Turkey is not seeking to obtain military equipment from the Soviet Union and he emphasized Turkey's continuing commitment to NATO. His opening address at the NATO Summit conveyed a much more helpful and balanced position, and will be helpful on the Hill.

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Ecevit's two-hour meeting last night with Karamanlis at Blair House resulted in an agreement that senior officials from the two Foreign Ministries will meet in Ankara July 4-5 to continue the Greek-Turkish dialogue. This is a favorable development, although we doubt that Cyprus was discussed at any length. Ecevit will meet with the HIRC on Thursday and address the National Press Club before going to New York to speak at the Disarmament Session and meet with Waldheim, bankers, and journalists. He will return to Washington next Monday for a session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before returning to Turkey.

Four Power Meeting. I met with my colleagues from the UK, France and Germany on Sunday evening to consider matters relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole. We noted that the Berlin situation was essentially calm and that the Soviets had shown relative restraint on Berlin over the past few months. Genscher reported that, while no progress was made on specific Berlin issues during Brezhnev's visit to West Germany earlier this month, the Soviets had discussed Berlin in a non-polemical way and had sought to avoid friction. Genscher thought it a positive sign that Brezhnev had resisted East German entreaties to stop in East Berlin on his way home and had sent Gromyko instead. Genscher expressed concern that East Germany is seeking a voice in the interpretation of the Quadripartite Agreement (US, UK, France, USSR) and urged the Allies to take every opportunity to rebuff their efforts.

Argentina. We have had our first indication that Under Secretary Newsom's trip to Argentina may be sparking needed action on human rights. Subsequent to Newsom's return, Ambassador Castro informed Videla that military training would be resumed when Argentina announced publicly that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was being invited. Videla was obviously pleased, and responded that in addition to the announcement, positive strides would be made in prisoner releases before September 30, and that by year end an impressive number of people would be released. Such action could enable us to resume some

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shipments to Argentina and hopefully ultimately create conditions which could allow us to recommend repeal of the Kennedy/Humphrey new arms embargo. Videla seems genuinely to want improved relations with the US, and the question is whether his political situation will give him room to take the necessary steps.

Icelandic Elections. Prime Minister Hallgrimsson's Independence Party, traditionally the cornerstone of pro-American, pro-NATO views as well as Iceland's largest political party, suffered heavy losses in Sunday's municipal elections. The big winner is the communist-dominated Peoples Alliance which polled 24.5%, up from its 17.1% in 1974, while the Independence Party dropped from 49% to 39.9% and the other coalition partner in the present government, the Progressive Party, fell 3.6% to 15.2%. The setback for the coalition partners could have an important psychological and political effect on the national elections scheduled for June 25 and is certain to alter the nature of the campaign now underway.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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DOS REVIEWED 02-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

May 26, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Cyrus Vance *CV*

Argentina. On Wednesday, Under Secretary Newsom met with President Videla in Buenos Aires concerning human rights conditions in Argentina and the effect they are having on our relations. Newsom reports that there is reason for some optimism that the human rights situation in Argentina will improve, but it is still unclear how fast the government will or can move. He made it clear to Videla that in the absence of genuine human rights improvements, we will not be in a position to approve pending arms transfer requests. Videla confided that at the OAS General Assembly next month Argentina will announce that it is inviting the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit Argentina. In view of this development and as a means of encouraging further human rights improvements, we are informing Videla that when the invitation is announced, and after we have consulted with Congress, we would expect to grant Argentina's pending application for the purchase of military training.

SALT. I testified on SALT before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today with Paul Warnke. Considerable bi-partisan support was expressed for your statements yesterday on the need to separate our interest in a new SALT agreement from condemnation of the Soviet role in Africa. In their questioning, Glenn, Percy and others stressed the importance of our being able to make a strong case that the agreement was verifiable. Percy and Javits emphasized the necessity to build public and Congressional support for SALT.

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Kenya. This week we briefed Kenyan Foreign Minister Waiyaki in Nairobi on our intention to send a military survey team to Somalia as a step toward possible US supply of defensive equipment. Waiyaki was told of the assurances we had received from Siad, and we emphasized Siad had been advised that Somalia's continuing material support for insurgents in the region would prevent our establishing an arms supply relationship with Somalia.

Waiyaki did not object to the step we are taking, but he cautioned that Kenya remained convinced that Somalia would never abandon irredentism. He cited Kenyan intelligence reports that Somalia was continuing its active support for the Ogaden insurgency and that Somalia was maintaining surreptitious contact with the Soviet Union. Waiyaki appeared to appreciate that, as we seek to limit Soviet influence in the Horn, we do not intend to sacrifice Kenya's interests.

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*Argentina*

NOBIS  
EYE ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR CASTRO  
E.O. 11652: GJ

TAGSI GVIP, PGOV, PDIP, AR

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT VIDELA

1. SUMMARY. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, SEPTEMBER 5, AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN ROME. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE A FOLLOW-UP INQUIRY TO PRESIDENT VIDELA OR DR. YORRF, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, THE VICE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT WE WANT GOOD RELATIONS BUT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE A CENTRAL CONCERN. WE WISHED TO WORK WITH ARGENTINA IN HAVING GOOD RELATIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT VIDELA RECEIVE THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IAHRC), ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMISSION. WE WOULD NOT LINK ARGENTINE ACTIONS WITH OUR OWN. PROGRESS ON CASES SUCH AS JACOBO TIMERMAN WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL.

3. PRESIDENT VIDELA STATED THAT HE FULLY CONCURS IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE WESTERN WORLD MUST BE UNITED AND THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAD THE

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENT \*\*\*\*\*

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WESTERN WORLD. ARGENTINA WAS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND NOT TROUBLED BY OBJECTIVE CRITICISM. HE WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, BY CRITICISM WHICH HAD THE APPEARANCE OF INTERVENTION IN ARGENTINE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. SUCH CRITICISM HAD COMPELLED HIM TO POSTPONE AN INVITATION TO THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. HIS CONCERN WAS THAT PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP AT THE GOVERNMENT PLANE HAD BEEN RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC OR POPULAR ISSUES.

4. THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT, TO PUT RELATIONS ON A MORE POSITIVE COURSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COME TO ARGENTINA TO MEET WITH VIDELA OR A PERSON OF HIS CHOICE FOR A REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONS. VIDELA ASKED WHETHER THE VAKY VISIT WOULD BE AFTER THE IAHRG OR BEFORE. THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT IT BE SCHEDULED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. PRESIDENT VIDELA REVIEWED STEPS TAKEN BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SINCE HIS LAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER (DURING THE PANAMA CANAL SIGNING), WHICH HE SAID SHOWED THAT THERE HAD BEEN EFFORTS BY HIS GOVERNMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. VIDELA CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE THE COMMISSION. HE SAID IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE OCTOBER 1, THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, BUT DID NOT THINK IT COULD BE DONE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 15. (AT AN EARLIER POINT, HE SAID THAT HE COULD PERHAPS ARRANGE A VISIT OF THE COMMISSION BY MID-OCTOBER.) ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COULD VISIT AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT. VIDELA SAID HE PREFERRED THAT VAKY VISIT ARGENTINA ONLY AND REQUESTED THAT THE USG LET HIM KNOW AHEAD OF TIME THE OBJECTIVES OF THE VAKY MISSION. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID WE WOULD COMMUNICATE THESE.

6. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE EX-IM RANK REACH A DECISION ON ALLIS-CHALMERS BY SEPTEMBER 15, THE DATE OF THE BIDS FOR THE YACYRETA POWER PROJECT. AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S VISIT BEFORE OCTOBER 1 MIGHT ENABLE US TO ACT ON A LETTER BY EX-IM IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIS-CHALMERS BID BEFORE SEPTEMBER 15.

7. ACTION REQUESTED. VIDELA REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE INTENDS TO RECEIVE THE COMMISSION. YOU ARE RE-

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QUESTED TO FOLLOW UP IN LOW KEY FASHION WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA HIMSELF, IF POSSIBLE, OR WITH YOFRE (WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING) MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS: (1) WE ARE DELIGHTED THAT THE MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT TOOK PLACE; (2) WE WANT TO REITERATE THE U.S. DESIRE TO BRING U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS BACK TO THE STATE WHICH SHOULD EXIST BETWEEN TWO FRIENDLY NATIONS; (3) YOU HAVE BEEN ASKED TO BE IN TOUCH IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON THE MONDALE-VIDELA CONVERSATIONS; (4) WE ARE NOW TAKING A LOOK AT WHERE WE STAND AS A PRELUDE TO THE TRIP TO ARGENTINA BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY WHICH WAS DISCUSSED IN ROME; AND (5) NOW THAT VIDELA IS BACK, DOES HE HAVE A CLEAR VIEW OF THE TIMETABLE WHICH MIGHT BE LIKELY FOR BOTH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISIT AND THE VAKY TRIP?

CHRISTOPHER  
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SUE:

PLEASE SEND THIS ALONG TO DENIS CLIFT AT CAMP DAVID  
FOR HIS CLEARANCE.

ALSO, WOULD YOU PLEASE VERIFY WITH DCLIFT -- DOES THE  
REFERENCE TO "VAKY VISITING ALONE" MEAN NO ACCOMPANYING  
PERSONNEL OR JUST A VISIT TO THE COUNTRY OF ARGENTINA?

THANKS.

LOUISE  
SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR VAKY

9/6  
5:55 P.M.

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NOTES

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR CASTRO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP, PGOV, PDIP, AR

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT VIDELA

1. SUMMARY. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, SEPTEMBER 5, AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN ROME. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE A FOLLOW-UP INQUIRY TO PRESIDENT VIDELA OR DR. YOFRE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, THE VICE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT WE WANT GOOD RELATIONS BUT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE A CENTRAL CONCERN. WE WISHED TO WORK WITH ARGENTINA IN HAVING GOOD RELATIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT VIDELA RECEIVE THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IAHRC), ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMISSION. WE WOULD NOT LINK ARGENTINE ACTIONS WITH OUR OWN. PROGRESS ON CASES SUCH AS JACOBO TIMERMAN WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL.

3. PRESIDENT VIDELA STATED THAT HE FULLY CONCURS IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE WESTERN WORLD MUST BE UNITED AND THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAD THE

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WESTERN WORLD. ARGENTINA WAS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND NOT TROUBLED BY OBJECTIVE CRITICISM. HE WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, BY CRITICISM WHICH HAD THE APPEARANCE OF INTERVENTION IN ARGENTINE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. SUCH CRITICISM HAD COMPELLED HIM TO POSTPONE AN INVITATION TO THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. HIS CONCERN WAS THAT PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP AT THE GOVERNMENT PLANE HAD BEEN RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC OR POPULAR ISSUES.

4. THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT, TO PUT RELATIONS ON A MORE POSITIVE COURSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COME TO ARGENTINA TO MEET WITH VIDELA OR A PERSON OF HIS CHOICE FOR A REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONS. VIDELA ASKED WHETHER THE VAKY VISIT WOULD BE AFTER THE IAHRG OR BEFORE. THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT IT BE SCHEDULED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. PRESIDENT VIDELA REVIEWED STEPS TAKEN BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SINCE HIS LAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER (DURING THE PANAMA CANAL SIGNING), WHICH HE SAID SHOWED THAT THERE HAD BEEN EFFORTS BY HIS GOVERNMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. VIDELA CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE THE COMMISSION. HE SAID IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE OCTOBER 1, THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, BUT DID NOT THINK IT COULD BE DONE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 15. (AT AN EARLIER POINT, HE SAID THAT HE COULD PERHAPS ARRANGE A VISIT OF THE COMMISSION BY MID-OCTOBER.) ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COULD VISIT AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT. VIDELA SAID HE PREFERRED THAT VAKY VISIT ALONE AND REQUESTED THAT THE USG LET HIM KNOW AHEAD OF TIME THE OBJECTIVES OF THE VAKY MISSION. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID WE WOULD COMMUNICATE THESE.

6. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE EX-IM BANK REACH A DECISION ON ALLIS-CHALMERS BY SEPTEMBER 15, THE DATE OF THE BIDS FOR THE YACYRETA POWER PROJECT. AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S VISIT BEFORE OCTOBER 1 MIGHT ENABLE US TO ACT ON A LETTER BY EX-IM IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIS-CHALMERS BID BEFORE SEPTEMBER 15.

7. ACTION REQUESTED. VIDELA REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE INTENDS TO RECEIVE THE COMMISSION. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP IN LOW KEY FASHION WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA HIMSELF, IF POSSIBLE, OR WITH YOFRE (WHO WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING) MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS: (1) WE ARE DELIGHTED THAT THE MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT TOOK PLACE; (2) WE WANT TO REITERATE THE U.S. DESIRE TO BRING

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U.S. ARGENTINE RELATIONS BACK TO THE STATE WHICH SHOULD EXIST BETWEEN TWO FRIENDLY NATIONS; (3) YOU HAVE BEEN AS TO BE IN TOUCH IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON THE MONDALE-VIDELA CONVERSATIONS; (4) WE ARE NOW TAKING A LOOK AT WHERE WE STAND AS A PRELUDE TO THE TRIP TO ARGENTINA BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY WHICH WAS DISCUSSED IN ROME; AND (5) NOW THAT VIDELA IS BACK, DOES HE HAVE A CLEAR VIEW OF THE TIMETABLE WHICH MIGHT BE LIKELY FOR BOTH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISIT AND THE VAKY TRIP?

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NARA EE Date 7/9/16



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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

September 5, 1978

*file*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR GARDNER'S RESIDENCE,  
ROME, ITALY

September 4, 1968, 1:50 p.m.

ARGENTINE SIDE

U.S. SIDE

President Jorge Rafael Videla  
Col. Miguel A. Mallea Gil  
Dr. Ricardo Yofre

Vice President Walter F. Mondale  
A. Denis Clift  
Anthony J. Hervas, Interpreter

The Vice President opened saying he was pleased to have the pleasure of the meeting. He recalled the meeting with Videla in the White House at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty ceremony. He said we want good relations but there are strains now -- human rights are a central concern. He added that he would report to the President personally on Videla's views.

President Videla thanked the Vice President for the meeting -- an extremely important opportunity to discuss these matters because he feels our relations are deteriorating. He fully concurs with President Carter's position on human rights. Argentina has belief in the democratic process so that men can live with dignity and freedom. He said Argentina is with the United States and not troubled by criticism when it is objective. However, he is concerned by attitudes projecting intervention in domestic affairs. He spoke with President Carter about this at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty signing, but since that time he has had to delay announcement of an invitation to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights because of U.S. criticisms projecting intervention.

A second problem -- Argentine politicians were invited to visit the United States, but they, too, did not visit because of the U.S. statements intervening in our affairs. Mrs. Darien's statements are contributing to a deterioration in our relations.

The Vice President asked if these werè statements made in Argentina or in Washington.

President Videla said in Washington before Congress. He said the western world must be united, and the United States must lead the western world. At the same time, the people of Argentina cannot tolerate intervention. This is his concern.

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The Vice President said we want to work with you to have good relations. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment is coming into effect. We must soon take decisions on the Allis-Chalmers deal. We want to be helpful. It would be important if Videla could have the Inter-American Human Rights Commission received in Argentina on terms acceptable to the commission. We would not link Argentine actions with our own.

The Vice President added that the U.S. press covers developments in Argentina closely. There are certain human rights cases with the people known to the press -- people such as Jacobo Timerman. To the extent that Videla makes progress on these cases, it will help us to make progress.

Videla said he understood, and government-to-government relations are not easy. His concern is when a problem is raised to the level of a public or popular issue. This leads to situations where Argentine citizens adopt partisan positions against the United States, to situations where Argentine businessmen adopt partisan positions because they cannot conclude deals when Ex-Im does not grant a loan.

The Vice President repeated that it was important to put our relations on a more positive course. He suggested that it would be good if Assistant Secretary Vaky could come to Argentina to meet with Videla or with a person of his choice for a review of our relations. Videla asked if this would be after the Inter-American Commission or before. The Vice President said he thought it should be as soon as possible. Videla said perhaps he could arrange a visit by the Commission by mid-October. The Vice President asked if he could announce the visit earlier.

Videla then said he would like to point out that since the meeting at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of events showing the efforts on the part of the Argentine government:

- they have issued a list and names of all the detained;
- they have published a list of all of those who disappeared and then reappeared;
- last Christmas they released approximately 500;
- this last week, 65 individuals were freed;
- they have indicated that they are prepared to give a favorable response to the Commission on Human Rights;
- Timerman's situation has changed; he is now out of jail and under house arrest;

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-- Professor Bravo is now under house arrest and they expect the court to lessen the charges against him.

He said officials of the U.S. government are welcome in Argentina, but they cannot give the impression that they are coming to inspect Argentina.

The Vice President said Mr. Vaky was a man of experience and would exercise discretion. He said it will be important to have the announcement on a visit by the Human Rights Commission on the terms acceptable to the Commission.

Videla said he we could have done so last month, but Mrs. Darien's statement before the Congress forced him to suspend the announcement. In the course of a few days, he believed he could develop a satisfactory announcement.

Mr. Clift said that in considering the announcement, it is important to remember the timing in the United States. The Ex-Im Bank must take its decision by September 15. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment comes into effect on October 1. The Vice President said we would hope the announcement could be taken care of before then. He said this might enable us to move on the Ex-Im letter before the 15th deadline. Videla said this was his intention. He did not think it could be done, however, before September 15.

The Vice President said we are encouraged that you will receive the Commission. Will you authorize me to tell the President that this will be done. Videla said yes. The Vice President asked when Assistant Secretary Vaky may come. Videla said after his announcement on the commission. He said he would prefer to have Vaky to visit Argentina alone. The Vice President said he wouldn't give a yes on this, but he would recommend it. Videla asked if the U.S. will let him know ahead of time what Vaky's mission will be to permit him to prepare for it. The Vice President said we would communicate this.

President Videla observed that US-Argentine relations proceed in multiple channels -- economic, political, cultural. Now our relations are focused solely on human rights. He said he can understand this problem if it is addressed in the broader spectrum of our overall relations and is not the single focus.

The Vice President said that if we can get on the road to progress in human rights, this whole other vista will open. He said he thought we are now at a point where we can turn the right way.

Videla said "I think we can. Mr. Vice President, I know your time was limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my greetings and best wishes to President Carter."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

JOS REVIEWED 04-Jan-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL<sup>S/S</sup>

September 1, 1978

~~SECRET NODIS~~

TO : The Secretary  
THROUGH: P - David D. Newsom  
FROM : ARA - Viron P. Vaky  
SUBJECT: Vice President Mondale's Meeting with  
Argentine President Videla

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to sign the attached Briefing Memorandum from you to Vice President Mondale for the Vice President's meeting with Argentine President Videla, September 4, in Rome.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Vice President Mondale has agreed to meet with President Videla on September 4 in Rome to discuss the deterioration in U.S.-Argentine relations. Attached is a Briefing Memorandum with Talking Points and several supporting Background Papers.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached Briefing Memorandum.

Drafted: ARA/ECA: NBouton: mdk  
9/1/78

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E.O. 13526  
Authority NLC-133-22-30-6-D  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT  
From: Cyrus Vance  
Subject: Meeting with Argentine President Videla

You are scheduled to meet with Argentine President Videla September 4 in Rome to discuss U.S.-Argentine relations and ways to reverse a precipitous deterioration in our relations. The basic point you should make is that we seriously wish to improve relations as conditions permit and that a comprehensive and thorough review of our total relationship may be desirable. Assistant Secretary Vaky has been designated to undertake this task and is prepared to make arrangements with President Videla for this purpose.

SETTING

Faced with a once severe terrorist threat, the military government in Argentina has seriously abused basic human rights (Attachment 1). The United States has as a result restricted military sales (an embargo on the sale of Munitions List items will go into effect October 1. Attachment 2), held back approval of Argentine transactions in the Export-Import Bank, and voted against Argentine loan proposals in the International Financial Institutions (Attachment 3). We have sought to induce improvement by indicating that Argentine steps in this direction would result in relaxing these restrictions.

*The terrorist threat does not, at this point, appear to warrant the repressive actions taken in its name.*

Initially, the Argentine Government reacted to our pressure with some restraint and sought to convince us of the necessity of its actions. More recently, however, it has moved rapidly to diversify its international ties, reassess its relationship with us, and prepare to adopt an adversarial course.

In a major attempt to encourage progress in human rights and improve relations, Under Secretary Newsom visited Argentina last May and suggested that some

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relaxation of our restrictive actions would be possible if the Argentine government would take one or more of the following steps (Attachment 4):

- Agreement with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) on a visit to Argentina;
- Try, release, or allow exile for the prisoners held without charge;
- Establish a mechanism to inform families of the fate of the disappeared.

While Mr. Newsom was given a courteous and sympathetic reception, the Argentine authorities have not taken any significant steps forward since his visit. Reaction in Argentina to our pressure, on the other hand, has been severe. Contrary to our own view, many Argentines consider that the situation has measurably improved in the last two years. The recent ~~denial of an Ex-Im letter of interest to Allis-Chalmers for the sale of hydroelectric equipment, in particular, was seen as a deliberate escalation in our sanctions.~~

As the most powerful Spanish-speaking country of South America, Argentina could become a significant negative force in areas important to us such as nuclear proliferation (Attachment 5), regional security arrangements, conventional arms restraint, and Third World issues.

#### Videla's Approach

We do not know exactly what Videla will say. He may simply give the standard Argentine exposition -- that human rights violations are an unfortunate, if unavoidable and necessary, by-product of the effort to suppress a vicious terrorist campaign, which threatens Argentina with anarchy. On the other hand, there is also the possibility that he might bring some new concrete points, explain steps they are now prepared to take (particularly in regard to the Human Rights Commission), and suggestions on the future evolution of U.S.-Argentine relations.

#### Your Approach

Your approach should be sympathetic. You would wish to avoid commitments in response to specific suggestions, if any, but would note that you will carry Videla's

*advice to Ex-Im bank with regard to*

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message back to President Carter.

We recommend you say specifically:

- On our side, we seriously wish to improve relations;
- As a token of this, we have taken -- and are taking -- some modest steps, such as release of export licenses for ambulance aircraft as well as Army and helicopters, airport radar equipment, voice security communications equipment [and other items on our Munitions Export Control List.]
- While we understand the tragic history of Argentina's domestic political conflict, we remain concerned over the human rights situation, specifically the treatment of the human person.
- We wish to maintain normal relations in as many areas as possible, as is evidenced, for example, by the forthcoming bilateral economic consultations (Attachment 6), and are prepared to expand these relations as conditions permit.
- We believe a thorough and comprehensive review of the whole gamut of our relations would be desirable. The President and the Secretary of State have asked Assistant Secretary Vaky to undertake this.
- The place and format for such consultations would be for President Videla to decide. Assistant Secretary Vaky is willing to come to Buenos Aires, as previously proposed.

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-6-0

Drafted: ARA/ECA: CWR <sup>R</sup> / <sup>D</sup> / <sup>B</sup> / Newsom / JBurpus: deh  
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Clearance: P: Newsom

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-6-0

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 1, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Argentine  
President Videla

U.S.-Argentine relations have reached an extremely difficult stage. We have been withholding the sale of military and commercial equipment (those which require licenses) and deferring decisions on Export-Import Bank loans for human rights reasons for so long that they have accumulated to a point where they represent almost a trade embargo. Cy, Harold, and I believe that the time has come for us to make clear to the Argentines that we value good relations and that we are prepared to explore ways to move our relationship forward. In effect, what that means is that we will take a series of significant steps releasing some loans, commercial sales, military equipment, etc. if they can take a few steps forward in the human rights field, such as reaching agreement for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, charging and perhaps releasing political prisoners, punishing torturers, etc.

Your meeting with Videla presents the perfect opportunity to do that. We do not believe that it would be appropriate for you to get into the details of the steps we will take as well as those we expect. But we hope that your meeting will "clear the air" and permit Videla or his selected representative to be sufficiently confident to express interest in receiving Assistant Secretary of State Pete Vaky in Buenos Aires to discuss these details. Alternatively, we could receive Videla's representative in Washington.

In summary, let me suggest the following direction for your remarks:

-- The President and I enjoyed our meeting one year ago in Washington during the Canal signing ceremony, but we are very concerned that the relationship between our two governments has become strained in recent months.

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NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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-- Let me reaffirm the great importance we attach to good relations between our two countries, and our desire that we take steps to improve those relations. As a gesture on our part, we have recently granted licenses for the sale of Boeing Chinook helicopters.

-- We are prepared and indeed eager to move on a wide range of decisions as there is improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina and as agreement is reached for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

-- We were encouraged to hear you say that the "war on terrorism" is over in Argentina ~~and that your position is of the junta is strengthened.~~

-- We are deeply interested in developing in greater detail an approach which would permit us to put our relationship on a footing more appropriate to our two countries. If it could be helpful, the President would instruct Assistant Secretary of State Pete Vaky to go to Buenos Aires to meet with you or your representative to discuss this in greater detail.

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1978

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526

Authority NLC-133-22-26-6-5  
NARA EF Date 7/9/16

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR GARDNER'S RESIDENCE,  
ROME, ITALY

September 4, 1968, 1:50 p.m.

ARGENTINE SIDE

President Jorge Rafael Videla  
Col. Miguel A. Mallea Gil  
Dr. Ricardo Yofre

U.S. SIDE

Vice President Walter F. Mondale  
A. Denis Clift  
Anthony J. Hervas, Interpreter

The Vice President opened saying he was pleased to have the pleasure of the meeting. He recalled the meeting with Videla in the White House at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty ceremony. He said we want good relations but there are strains now -- human rights are a central concern. He added that he would report to the President personally on Videla's views.

President Videla thanked the Vice President for the meeting -- an extremely important opportunity to discuss these matters because he feels our relations are deteriorating. He fully concurs with President Carter's position on human rights. Argentina has belief in the democratic process so that men can live with dignity and freedom. He said Argentina is with the United States and not troubled by criticism when it is objective. However, he is concerned by attitudes projecting intervention in domestic affairs. He spoke with President Carter about this at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty signing, but since that time he has had to delay announcement of an invitation to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights because of U.S. criticisms projecting intervention.

A second problem -- Argentine politicians were invited to visit the United States, but they, too, did not visit because of the U.S. statements intervening in our affairs. Mrs. Darien's statements are contributing to a deterioration in our relations.

The Vice President asked if these were statements made in Argentina or in Washington.

President Videla said in Washington before Congress. He said the western world must be united, and the United States must lead the western world. At the same time, the people of Argentina cannot tolerate intervention. This is his concern.

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Videla then said he would like to point out that since the meeting at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of events showing the efforts on the part of the Argentine government:

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS/XGDS~~

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Videla said "I think we can. Mr. Vice President, I know your time was limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my greetings and best wishes to President Carter."

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1980

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1. Sadat Letter to the President on Military Supply: President Sadat has forwarded a letter to the President expressing his deep disappointment with the results of Mubarak's efforts in Washington to secure more modern military hardware for the Egyptian armed forces. Underscoring the importance of Egypt's position as the only power in the Middle East which, if properly helped, can oppose attempts to destabilize and impose communist domination in the region, Sadat appeals to the President to give his personal and urgent consideration to Egyptian demands for the acquisition of the F-15; an increase in the number of F-16s; and the spare parts for the F-4s. Mubarak, in passing the letter to Ambassador Atherton, frequently stressed that the issues raised by Sadat's letter are "vital and important." He expressed concern about the attitudes in the Egyptian military establishment toward the U.S.-Egyptian military supply relationship, saying U.S. responsiveness to Egypt's military assistance requirements was increasingly being compared unfavorably with the Soviets, particularly in the case of Libya. Mubarak was emphatic about the symbolic importance of the F-15, which Atherton readily admits becomes conspicuous when compared with what we make available to the Israelis and the Saudis on one hand and to Egypt on the other. Atherton's attempts to remonstrate with Mubarak made no visible dent. (Cairo 1813 NODIS, PSN 50462; Cairo 1814 NODIS Cherokee, PSN 50469) (S)
  
2. Weizman on Sadat Intent to Accelerate Normalization/Autonomy: Weizman confided to Ambassador Lewis on Saturday that Sadat is determined to wrap up a single, comprehensive normalization package by March with the professed objective of incurring the Arab world's wrath all at once rather than spreading the impact over a year or more. Weizman had met with Sadat, Hassan Ali, et al., earlier last week and, according to Lewis, was "just short of euphoric" about the results of his trip. The defense minister advised Lewis that he and Hassan Ali are to direct the overall effort, not the foreign ministries. Weizman will not personally enter the autonomy arena until the normalization package is first wrapped up; he hopes to improve the psychological climate in Tel Aviv enough to produce sufficient Israeli government flexibility

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 REVIEW ON JANUARY 28, 2000  
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 NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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for an autonomy agreement by May. Lewis comments that the psychological strategy both with regard to the Arab world and the Israeli political scene has a ring of realistic promise. Carrying out the concept of producing a total normalization package in a couple of months would, however, be a major bureaucratic and diplomatic undertaking. Weizman and Hassan Ali would also have to have very strong backing from Begin and Sadat to resolve impasses. (Tel Aviv 1613 NODIS Cherokee) (S)

3. Yamani Concern Over Justice Department Investigation: While agreeing to receive the Justice Department team investigating certain supply and pricing policies of the major international oil companies, Oil Minister Yamani's reiteration of strong legal, political and personal objections to surrendering any information which properly belongs to Saudi Arabia foreshadows the possibility of a serious confrontation with major implications for U.S.-Saudi relations. Yamani stated that his government could not allow "sensitive information about their most valuable material resource" to be scrutinized by anyone, including the U.S. He continued that if this became the case, the Saudi government would take steps to ensure such information would not be in the jurisdiction of the U.S. West indicates that Aramco sources have learned that sensitive information and files can no longer be sent to stockholders or Aramco officials in the U.S., which will eventually compromise the efficiency of Aramco's operations here. West stresses that the sensitivity of this issue cannot be overemphasized; given the growing pressure on the Saudis to reduce production and increase prices, a confrontation of this issue could "seriously impair our bilateral relationship and could easily lead to major reductions in the amount of oil production which would have serious price effects." (Jidda 0531, PSN 50319, 50321) (S)
4. Goodpastor's Discussion with Videla: President Videla affirmed to General Goodpastor Argentina's alignment with the West and relayed the Argentine position on the grain embargo, noting his decision not to exploit the issue for Argentina's own political and economic advantage. He warned, however, of the serious, negative domestic political reaction if it appeared that the U.S. had imposed its views. Videla indicated it was not in Argentina's interest to "deviate from normal pattern of trade" which would include some growth. Videla reiterated the Argentine position that it could not assure the ultimate destination of its exports and the understanding to limit direct exports to the Soviets must be

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held in "strict confidence." Videla indicated that this was only one of several issues in U.S.-Argentine relations and "did not wish that their participation in the grain boycott be the price to be paid for better relations." On human rights, Videla bemoaned the lack of understanding over the "dirty war" that had been forced upon Argentina but resolved that "this war had to be pursued by Argentina, with all its consequences." In a subsequent conversation with Economic Minister Martinez de Hoz, the minister clarified that a "normal export level" meant about three million tons, warned that the understanding could come apart because of the threat to the Argentine sorghum market in Japan due to U.S. underselling and reiterated the need to protect against a leak of the "agreement." (AMConsul Rio de Janeiro 0316, PSN 50651; AMCounsul Rio de Janerio 0317, PSN 50652, 50653) (NODIS) (S)

5. Meeting with Gromyko on U.S.-Soviet Relations: Ambassador Watson has been instructed to convey to Foreign Minister Gromyko our suggestion that the Soviets carefully study the President's State of the Union message and, while emphasizing our desire to keep SALT and other arms control processes alive, to also stress our determination to react strongly to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and any further moves which widen the conflict. Watson also will indicate in the strongest terms our displeasure with recent Soviet actions toward Andrey Sakharov and indicate this will have "severe effects" on relations between our countries' scientific communities. (State 4026, PSN 51832) (NODIS) (S)
  
6. Linowitz Meeting with Carrington and Callaghan: Carrington and Callaghan reiterated to Ambassador Linowitz their continued support of the Camp David accords adding, however, that they continue to be skeptical about any chances of success. Carrington, the more pessimistic of the two, stressed that the Arabs are increasingly impatient as they look to the U.S. to provide the impetus for the solution of the Palestinian problem. Carrington found Saudi Arabia particularly concerned over the Palestinian problem due to its domestic ramifications for them and critical of U.S. failure to move forcefully against Israeli intransigence on the matter. Former Prime Minister Callaghan was equally supportive of the Camp David accords and less skeptical of its chances for success. Callaghan was extremely concerned over the "air of defeatism" pervading Saudi Arabia and noted that the U.S. should work out some manner of defense arrangement with them since "if the Saudi regime goes...there will be

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a domino effect in the Gulf states." The former prime minister believes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will make the Arabs less likely to press us hard and, as a result, gives Washington time to move deliberately in the peace process. Linowitz comments that it is significant Carrington failed to broach the idea of a UNSC resolution on Palestinian rights supplementing or expanding on 242 although had he every opportunity to raise it. (London 1897, PSN 51158, 51161) (NODIS) (S)

ARGENTINA

*(Jim Kraft's Office)*

PARTICIPANTS

ARGENTINA

President Jorge Rafael Videla  
(HORhay RAFAEl VeeDEHleh)  
Vice Admiral Oscar Montes,  
Foreign Minister  
(OHScar MOHNtes)

US:

The President  
The Secretary  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Assistant Secretary Todman  
Charge! Maxwell Chaplin  
Mr. Robert Pastor

Checklist

- Courtesy Point - We want to thank President Videla for his warm reception of Assistant Secretary Todman on his recent trip to Argentina.
- Human Rights - We want to impress on the Argentines our concern over their continuing gross violations of basic human rights. We understand that they inherited a chaotic mess, but terrorism is now largely controlled. Human rights violations continue however. We think now is the time to move ahead. We are heartened to hear of releases of prisoners and the reinstatement of the "right of option".
- Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco - We want to impress on the Argentines the danger of nuclear arms proliferation; full safeguards are a necessity. We also want them to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco to indicate Argentine dedication to peaceful uses of atomic energy.
- Malvinas/Falkland Islands - We want to stay out of this Argentine--UK dispute. We are pleased that conversations are going on between the two governments to resolve the questions.
- Helicopter Sale - (If raised by President Videla) - We limited the equipment which will be supplied on the eight commercial Model 212 Bell helicopters because of present problems in the human rights field.
- Trade - Point out that current US health and custom regulations will not allow Argentine fresh meat to enter the US.

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Authority NSE waiver 4/7/13  
NARA EF Date: 7/9/14



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

SS 1/1/3 : 3 AUG 1978

MSC  
R. Poston  
A. [unclear]

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TO: The Secretary  
The Deputy Secretary

FROM: ARA - Viron P. Vaky  
HA - Patricia M. Derian

Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina

(U) The following is a summary of the human rights situation in Argentina. A more detailed review of current conditions is set forth in the attachment.

(C) Disappearances: Seventeen since February 1; three have turned up arrested by the GOA, one was released, and 13 remain unresolved. The last reported disappearance occurred May 13. In 1978, 55 persons disappeared per month; in 1977, 180; in 1976, 300.

(C) Accounting for the Disappeared: The GOA is preparing new legislation to shorten to six months the time period for declaring presumptive death. Army Commander and Junta Member Viola has spoken publicly for the first time of the disappeared as "those who will be absent forever" and told the Embassy he thinks, with rare exceptions, most of the disappeared are dead. The GOA has so far refused to provide individual accounting.

(C) PEN Prisoners: The GOA announced on June 29 it now holds 1,723 persons under PEN (executive detention). It is not clear how many former PEN detainees have been freed and how many have continued in prison after civil or military trials, but the Embassy and the ICRC estimate the total number of political prisoners at just under 3,000 in all of these categories. GOA officials plan to reduce the PEN category to 800-1,000 by late 1979; the latter will continue to be held for an unstated period. In early 1978, the GOA acknowledged that it held about 3,500 PEN prisoners.

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NARA EF Date 7/9/16

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(S) Clandestine Prisoners: The question of whether clandestine prisoners exist in significant numbers remains unresolved. If there are, they could number up to a few hundred as an outside limit; our Embassy considers it unlikely that the number would be that high; We have no firm evidence. Fragmentary data, however, suggest the existence of at least some unacknowledged prisoners and of some small scattered clandestine detention centers about to be closed.

(C) Right of Option: Moving at a slow pace, with only 13 GOA approvals so far for PEN prisoners seeking to come to the U.S. The GOA has approved approximately 170 applications since September 1977 for all countries.

(C) Prison Conditions: The GOA issued nation-wide uniform prison regulations in late April and consolidated PEN detainees in six facilities. In February, there were reports of two beatings (one fatal) and a disappearance in prisons and, in May, of a number of beatings and robberies among a group of prisoners in transit. The ICRC has told us that it believes prison conditions have improved over last year, when it criticized the GOA for poor prison conditions.

(C) The Judiciary: The NYC Bar Association mission noted that the Executive continues to be uncooperative in responding to habeas corpus petitions. The Judiciary has made some attempts to force greater cooperation, but its effective power remains limited.

(C) Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights Issue: Videla and Vicla appear to be trying to carry out commitments to us to end disappearances and reduce PEN detentions. Hardliners such as General Suarez Mason and General Menendez have recently stepped up calls for a new GOA offensive to root out "intellectual subversion." A political test of strength between these two points of view is shaping up for year's end.

(U) The NYC Bar Association mission noted that progress is possible but would come much faster if the Argentine legal profession would take a more active interest in return to rule of law.

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(U) The Church and some elements of the press have become more outspokenly critical in dealing with human rights.

Attachment:

Detailed Review of Current Conditions.

*pk* *imp: [unclear]*  
Drafted: HA/HR:PFlood:ARA/ECA:CHBrayshaw:mas  
8/1/79 X21966

Clearances: INR/RAR:JBuchanan *[unclear]*

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### Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina

(U) Following is a description of key human rights developments since the Task Force completed its assessment in early February:

#### Disappearances

(C) We have received reports of seventeen disappearances for the period since February 1. We immediately communicated these reports to high GOA authorities and asked for information on their whereabouts. The GOA has provided us with information that three of the persons were arrested and charged in the courts. One person was briefly detained and then released. The GOA has been unable to provide information on the thirteen other cases. In three cases, however, the disappeared persons have contacted relatives by letter or telephone call to advise that they were well and would eventually reappear. The last disappearance took place May 13. A list of unresolved disappearances, including those three, is attached.

(C) The victims of these abductions/disappearances have no confirmed connection with terrorist groups. Some, such as members of the Socialist Workers' Party, and the Argentine Communist Party-associated Relatives of Disappeared and Detained Persons are related to the nonviolent political left.

(C) This record since February compares to previous years when disappearances averaged about 55 per month in 1978, 180 per month in 1977, and 300 per month in 1976. In mid-May 1979 the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights published a list of 5,465 disappearances since 1975; in the month following publication, the Assembly received reports of an additional 105 previously unreported cases. An earlier Assembly report contained 80 1978 disappearances unknown to the Embassy and one from 1979.

#### Accounting for the Disappeared

(S) The GOA has not yet taken any public step to account for the disappeared. The Government has addressed the broad issue internally and is seeking solutions to specific aspects of the problem, such as

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shortening the period for legal presumption of death. There are also indications that it is seeking to establish what documentary evidence exists throughout the security apparatus.

(C) Foreign Minister Pastor briefed EC-9 ambassadors in Buenos Aires recently on the terms of new legislation and said that relatives will be able to petition the Government for assistance and information three months after the occurrence of a disappearance. The Government will have three months to establish the whereabouts of the missing person and, if no information is developed, relatives will be able to claim survivors' benefits and regularize their legal status. Although he did not supply details, Pastor said relatives will be able to claim indemnization.

(C) General Viola reiterated to Ambassador Castro on June 25 that the GOA does not have information on the fate of the disappeared and in view of the extended periods of disappearance he doubted any of these people were alive. He said a few of the disappeared may reappear, but these would be rare exceptions. In a public speech delivered on Army Day (May 29) Viola referred obliquely to the fate of the disappeared, calling them "those who will be absent forever." Argentine human rights groups have interpreted this tacit statement as an admission that many of the disappeared were killed by Argentine police and military forces.

(C) The Embassy concluded in a recent trends report (May 31) that "we are reasonably certain that the apparatus for disappearing people still exists although, even considering a small upsurge of disappearances in the past several weeks, it appears less used than in the past."

#### PEN Prisoners

(C) The GOA has continued to release detainees from PEN. The Embassy estimated in mid-June that the political prisoner population in this category is now at about 2,200. The GOA announced June 29 that there are now 1,723 PEN prisoners. At the end of 1978, this figure stood at about 2,900 and at the beginning of 1978 at about 3,500. It is not clear

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how many of those removed from PEN are at liberty and how many remain in custody under some form of charges in judicial processes, or after having been convicted by either military or civilian tribunals. The Embassy and ICRC estimate the total current prison population of persons confined because of the GOA's counter-subversion campaign at just under 3,000, including those held under PEN and persons who have been tried and convicted in civil or military courts. We have been told by a source on President Videla's staff that the GOA will continue to review the status of PEN detainees and plans to have the number down to 800 to 1,000 by the end of this year; these prisoners would continue to be held indefinitely under PEN since the "Campora amnesty" of 1973 makes it impossible to prosecute them. Other high-level Argentine officials have said that a certain number of persons will continue under PEN since the GOA considers them committed subversives although it lacks evidence that will stand up in court.

(C) Foreign Minister Pastor said the GOA has augmented its legal staff reviewing PEN detention from four to 30.

#### Clandestine Prisoners

(S) The Embassy has received fragmentary but credible data which suggest the GOA may continue to hold a number of prisoners that it has not publicly acknowledged. In a recent case a woman, who had disappeared in late 1978, was released by the authorities. It appears that most of the persons being held clandestinely are either the "disappeared" in process through the security apparatus or former terrorists who are cooperating with the authorities. As the number of new disappearances has dropped, there is little reason to think that there are still substantial numbers "in process." The Embassy believes that if clandestine prisoners exist, their number could not be more than a few hundred as an outside limit, and it considers it unlikely that the figure be that high. There are fragmentary data supporting, in the Embassy's view, that some small, scattered clandestine detention centers still exist, each holding no more than perhaps 25 persons. It is believed that such centers would be closed before the arrival of the IACHR in November.

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