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ABSTRACT

TITLE OF THESIS: The One That Got Away: East Timor and Insurgency in Indonesia

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This thesis examines stability of the Republic of Indonesia and attempts to answer the following research question: Can the secession of East Timor be used to predict future instability and fragmentation of Indonesia? The secession of East Timor in 1999 led many experts to propose that Indonesia could fragment in a similar manner as Yugoslavia did in the 1990s. However, eight years later, the Republic of Indonesia remains intact and an important U.S. partner in the Global War on Terror. A comparison of the success of East Timor with ongoing nationalist separatist insurgencies in Indonesia identifies key factors that were unique to the East Timor situation. This leads to the conclusion that there is no threat to the stability of Indonesia from separatist movements attempting similar strategies. The research also shows that other key factors critical to the success of insurgencies in other parts of the world are also lacking in Indonesia.

The research supporting this thesis involved the analysis of current unconventional warfare doctrine, insurgency theory, and a broad selection of insurgency case studies. Key factors related to nationalist separatist insurgent success were developed and applied to the East Timor case study to determine why it was successful.

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Further analysis of insurgencies in Indonesia and the East Timor case were compared using the same key factors. The analysis and comparisons were then used to draw conclusions about the potential fate of the stability of Indonesia.

Sources for this thesis research included books documenting personal experiences of insurgents, interviews with regional experts, UN documents associated with peace negotiations and war crimes investigations, books written by regional and political science experts, and many different newspapers and periodicals.

Implications for the United States derived from these findings are that the Republic of Indonesia is currently a stable partner in the Global War on Terror and nationalist separatist insurgency will not threaten its territorial integrity. However, the U.S. needs to be aware of the great changes in the government of Indonesia due to the collapse of the New Order Government and recent emergence as the world's third largest democracy. Traditional power struggles within the ruling elite have greater potential to affect international relations and policy towards the U.S. than internal ethnic unrest.

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**THE ONE THAT GOT AWAY:
EAST TIMOR AND INSURGENCY IN INDONESIA**

by

(b)(6)

PGIP Class 2007

This thesis has been accepted by the faculty and administration of the National Intelligence University to satisfy a requirement for a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence or Master of Science and Technology Intelligence degree. The student is responsible for its content. The views expressed do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or the U.S. Government. Acceptance of the thesis as meeting an academic requirement does not reflect an endorsement of the opinions, ideas, or information put forth. The thesis is not finished intelligence or finished policy. The validity, reliability, and relevance of the information contained have not been reviewed through intelligence or policy procedures and processes. The thesis has been classified in accordance with community standards. The thesis, in whole or in part, is not cleared for public release

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

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CHAPTER 1

THE INDONESIAN QUESTION

The changing international milieu combined with imperatives created as a result of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), have increased the importance of the Republic of Indonesia to the United States and many other U.S. rivals and competitors. Geographically Indonesia's stability is important to the largest economies in the world because of its proximity to and control of sea lanes that constrict large amounts of trade and energy supplies. Political stability of Indonesia is equally important to U.S. national security policy in the GWOT because it is the fourth most populous state and the largest Muslim nation in the world. Therefore, any loss of control or stability in this region would leave an opening for Islamist groups to create greater instability or establish sanctuaries. Emergence of strong Islamist organizations in this region could force the U.S. to expand its military efforts at a time when it is decisively engaged in other parts of the world.

Also important is that Indonesia has recently become a true democratic Muslim nation and has reaffirmed its friendship with the United States. Part of this affirmation of friendship was the U.S. President's reiteration of support for Indonesia's National Unity, territorial integrity, and opposition to secessionist movements in any part of Indonesia.¹ This renewed partnership with Indonesia will require greater understanding by policy

¹"Joint Statement Between the United States and the Republic of Indonesia," *U.S. State Department*, 20 November 2006, URL:<<http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/prs/76323.htm>>, accessed 7 May 2007.

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makers and the Intelligence Community of a unique combination of ethnic, political, and military relations and agendas. A clear understanding of internal Indonesian biases, goals, and factional influences is especially important because of their past willingness to manipulate situations and perceptions to deceive international media and U.S. leaders.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The 2006 U.S. support for Indonesian territorial integrity and opposition to secessionist groups demonstrated a change in policy from 1999 when the U.S., along with Australia, was instrumental in forcing Indonesia to relinquish its territorial claims over East Timor. East Timorese independence groups were successful in turning world sympathy into enough political support to force Indonesia to relinquish a region it had occupied and developed for over 30 years. This occurred during a period of economic and political crisis in Indonesia and resulted in a resurgence of ethnic violence and secessionist activity. Many observers speculated that the fate of Indonesia could be similar to Yugoslavia resulting in years of civil war and disintegration into multiple independent states. However, eight years after international intervention into East Timor and four changes of Indonesian leadership, no other nationalist group in Indonesia has been able to achieve similar results.

Therefore, in order to better appreciate the current situation in Indonesia and understand why these predictions have not come true, this thesis will attempt to prove the hypothesis that: The conditions that led to the successful independence of East Timor

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from Indonesia were unique to East Timor at the time of secession and can not be used to predict future instability.

Key Questions

What conditions existed in East Timor that led to success?

What similar conditions exist in other regions of Indonesia undergoing nationalist separatist insurgency?

How did the government and army of Indonesia affect the conditions in East Timor and how are they affecting conditions in the current insurgencies?

Did the independence of East Timor affect the strategies and activities of other insurgent groups and the government of Indonesia?

Scope

This thesis will focus on nationalist separatist movements in three regions of Indonesia. While the national politics and influence of international Islamic terrorist groups does affect many of the current events in Indonesia they will only briefly be discussed when necessary and the emphasis will remain on comparison and contrast of regional factors.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The research on this topic will be separated into three sections; Insurgency, East Timor, and Indonesian Insurgency. There is a large amount of information written about

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insurgency from philosophical and theoretical points of view to multitudes of regional case studies. The difficult task is selection and review of relevant writing within the time constraints provided by NDIC. Therefore the primary sources used for the topic of insurgency are U.S. Army doctrine and books and journals used by the author during an assignment as an instructor at the Unconventional Warfare Training Center of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School.

There are many good sources for the study of East Timor. Several authors and institutes have had time to gather information and place the events in historical perspective. Ongoing crisis in the country continues to generate studies from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) nation building efforts that contain a retrospective on the conflict. Between the deployments of peacekeepers and the ongoing murder of foreigners, East Timor remains in the international media and creates additional information that allows a before and after examination of the population and culture. Finally the efforts to bring human rights violators to justice provides additional insight into the actions of the militias and Indonesian military that were important in the evolution of the struggle.

Indonesia is also a topic that is well covered by many books and journals with diverging opinions and predictions. Most of the books sighted in the bibliography were written during the reformation period that covered the period of three presidents following the downfall of General Suharto's government. These sources provide good historical and cultural data and analysis of the conflicts that are useful in understanding the setting of the conflicts. However, the recent change in government and new policies of President Yudhoyono has made significant changes to the situation. Therefore current

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events will be covered by including analysis from reputable international news sources such as the BBC, Asian Times, and The Economist.

METHODOLOGY

The Comparison with Historical Situations method will be used for the analysis of the research question.² The recent independence of East Timor will be the historical situation that will be examined for comparison. A conceptual model of insurgency based on U.S. Army Doctrine and current literature will be applied to the historical events that led to the violent uprising and eventual independence of East Timor. Key factors will be identified and defined. The key factors will then be compared to two regions of Indonesia experiencing separatist insurgencies. A second part of the historical comparison will focus on the progression of the insurgencies and examine insurgent and government strategies. Conclusions about the potential for success of nationalist separatist insurgent movements in Indonesia will be made based on the similarities of the historical model and analysis of current events.

OVERVIEW

Chapter 2 will review and define key aspects of nationalist separatist insurgency. The U.S. Army doctrine and supporting literature used by the U.S. Army Special Warfare

²Richards J. Heuer, *The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Pittsburg, PA: Government Printing Office, 2003), 38.

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School will be used as primary sources for specifying a set of key factors that will be used to analyze the Indonesian question.

Chapter 3 will review the successful secession of East Timor in 1999 and focus on the key factors of nationalist separatist insurgency identified in the previous chapter and analyze how they affected the progression of the insurgency. This chapter will also examine the government responses and policies that enhanced or reduced the impact of the key factors on the final outcome.

Chapter 4 will assess unrest in Indonesia and analyze Nationalist Separatist movements in West Papua and Aceh. These movements will be examined and compared using the key factors of insurgency. The results of the analysis of the factors affecting these insurgencies will be compared to the East Timor case study.

Chapter 5 will develop conclusions based on the comparison of the East Timor Case study with the separatist movements in West Papua and Aceh. These conclusions will explain within the context of the key insurgency factors why neither West Papua nor Aceh has been able to achieve the same level of success as East Timor. These conclusions will also be used to suggest implications for the United States Intelligence Community and Policy Makers.

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CHAPTER 2

NATIONAL SEPARATIST INSURGENCY

Insurgency has been one of history's most common forms of conflict and continues to present significant threats to regional stability and economic and social progress in the 21st Century. Insurgency arises from discontent among a population and can take several forms depending on the unique situation of the problems and the people. Insurgency was not taken seriously in ancient times because it was often brutally repressed and exterminated.³ Extermination is not as easy as it used to be because the invention of modern weapons gives the insurgent greater power to resist the government. Insurgents also exploit the pressures and sanctions placed on oppressive regimes by the international community and more even handed measures must be taken to control them. This modern technological and political environment creates an opportunity for many well organized groups to succeed where they may have had little chance 500 years ago. These opportunities create instability in traditionally volatile regions and are of great concern to the United States. The lack of strong central governments hinders economic and democratic development and provides sanctuaries for criminal and terrorist groups.

There are many forms of insurgencies and they share the same fundamental goal of achieving social and political change through force. Communist insurgencies can be described as egalitarian, traditional insurgencies strive to return their country to a

³Edgar O'Ballance, *The Indo China War (1945-1954)* (Bristol, UK: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1964), 13.

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perceived better time, internal insurgencies strike from within and replace the regime leadership, and many more can be defined by their subtle differences.

This study will break all insurgencies down into two broad categories, mass based and separatist. The definition of mass based used here will describe an insurgency intended to overthrow the ruling party or to make significant political change while maintaining the territorial integrity of the nation. The separatist insurgency is defined as attempting to achieve independence or autonomy for a specific population and geographic region and therefore separate from the country. A separatist movement may not be seeking independence but rather could be attempting to leave one state to join with another as in the case of the Serbian populations of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The separatist insurgency is one of the most common conflicts seen in the world today. During the 1990s it was calculated that 10% of the world's minority populations that made up at least 1% of a nation's population were involved in some type of violent insurgency.⁴ One of the great themes of human history is man's formation of groups and competition of these groups over resources. As populations grow and national borders are recognized and take on special significance in the eyes of the great powers of the world, these age old conflicts will continue to fester. In some countries a successful balancing act is performed to keep most competing groups satisfied or one group successfully oppresses and controls the less powerful groups. When discontent among one or more groups reaches an unacceptable level some members of the population will try to make change by leaving the system they feel is not in their best interests. These

⁴James D. Fearon, *Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order*, 21 May 2004, URL:<<http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/partitfinal.pdf>>, accessed 3 March 2007.

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groups are unified by a common history and culture that defines their nation and the separatist ideals.

Most successful insurgencies of the 20th century share several common factors that will be grouped into four categories for examination here, Population, Leadership and Organization, Environment and Space, and External Support. There are the rare insurgencies that succeed with little or none of one of these elements such as the Cuban revolution's lack of external support and sanctuary. However, the extremely weak government and incompetent military make Cuba a poor example. In general, insurgencies fighting against strong governments with their own outside assistance and base of popular support will need certain aspects of all of these areas if they are going to survive.

POPULATION

The most important factor and an absolute requirement for any form of insurgency is popular support or consent. This popular support does not need to be a majority of the population and even a small percentage of a local region would be enough to maintain a growing insurgency. For example the Sendero Luminoso group nearly toppled the government of Peru while only having a small regional support base.

Armed groups of men ravaging the country side without the support of the population are simply bandits or criminal gangs that are forced to steal to support their existence. Eventually bandit groups will be hunted down and destroyed by the government security forces with the help of the local population they are terrorizing.

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However, when an armed group is fighting for social change with the support of a significant number of the population, they will be labeled as insurgents and their motivations will determine how they are further categorized.

In order for any support to exist for an insurgent organization that is going to threaten a government, there usually must be a certain level of discontent and dissatisfaction with the current regime. The level of discontent required for action depends largely on the consequences from the government and alternative solutions for the population. Most dissatisfied populations will prefer to pursue less extreme solutions whenever possible and this is why successful insurgencies in societies with some level of democracy are rare. The hope for peaceful resolution through an electoral process provides an outlet for dissatisfaction and hope for change that does not risk life and standard of living.⁵ When there appears to be no end to the misery and suffering of a people and there is no other option, large sections of a population may begin to support the most extreme solution for change and risk their lives in the hope for a better life and future. This popular support for an insurgent movement can be divided into two forms; active and passive.

Active supporters support the insurgency by providing supplies, labor, intelligence, safe refuge, propaganda, recruiting, and may be actively engaged in combat. This is the most important form of support because these are the people who are willing to assume risk to their lives and property by providing critical resources required for the basic operation of the insurgency. The amount of active support required for success varies depending on factors such as environment, government strength, and external

⁵Ernesto Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, URL:<<http://www.freepeoplesmovement.org/guwar.pdf>>, accessed 18 January 2007.

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support. The Cuban revolution is an example of an insurgency that was successful with only a few thousand active supporters. However they were minimally challenged by a weak central government with almost nonexistent popular support and frozen external aid.⁶ In contrast the success of the Chinese Communist revolution required millions of active supporters struggling for years against a strong central government with a large support base and external military aid.⁷

While passive support provides none of the aid to the movement that the active support provides it is still critical to any mass based movement that expects to have success in the guerrilla warfare phase of the insurgency. Passive supporters are neutral players in the struggle, actively supporting neither the guerrilla nor the government. Whether the passive supporter secretly sympathizes with the insurgent or just wants to be left alone, the key fact is that he is not providing the support needed by counterinsurgency forces; information about the rebels.⁸

The amount of popular support required for success varies on the situation and execution. A mass based protracted people's war requires the majority of the population to be actively involved or passively consent to change. However, insurgencies pursuing nationalist separatist agendas or practicing a military focused approach need less popular support as long as they maintain support bases in their operational areas.

⁶Larry James Bockman, "The Spirit Of Moncada: Fidel Castro's Rise To Power, 1953 - 1959," *Global Security*, 1 April 1984, URL:<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/BLJ.htm>>, accessed 4 March 2007.

⁷John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 20-21.

⁸U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counter Insurgency* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, December 2006), 3-1. Cited hereafter as U.S. Army FM 3-24.

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In times and places where severe oppression and genocide have been practical counter insurgency strategies, the severe consequences to the population have often made civil disobedience an unappealing option. One of the best recent examples of the success of harsh counter insurgency tactics totally crushing an emerging insurgency was in Hama, Syria in 1984. Over 38,000 people were killed in response to violent attacks against government institutions and an attempt on the president's life by the Muslim Brotherhood. After the town of Hama was cleansed of the resistance a very clear message was sent to the population and there have been few insurgent problems in Syria.⁹ This does not mean that the problem has been solved. On the contrary the anger and dissatisfaction at the government has probably increased but the population will not be likely to take action until the government is weakened by a future crisis.

Insurgencies that fail to develop or maintain popular support are doomed to eventual failure. Often these insurgencies are able to survive with large amounts of external support as puppets of a rival state and are able to create some regional instability but have very little chance of effecting social change. The best example of the failure of an insurgency due to lack of popular support is Ernesto "Che" Guevara's attempts to conduct a military focused (Foco) insurgency in Bolivia. The Bolivian insurgents had external support from Cuba, ideal terrain, and organization provided by an experienced revolutionary cadre and local communist party. However Bolivia's large indigenous

⁹Thomas Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990), 76-83.

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population, which was the target of Guevara's efforts, had no interest in a revolution led by non-indigenous foreigners espousing a Western political system.¹⁰

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

An effective insurgency requires leadership and organization. There may be very angry groups that are resisting and striking out against government institutions but without organization and direction it degenerates into mob violence that can be controlled by well organized police forces. Organization of an insurgent movement begins with an idea that becomes the ideology of the group. This idea could be, "we can be more prosperous with our own government," or "communism would be better for our people," and many other possibilities. When a large number of people share these similar ideas they are loosely organized and ready for a strong leader to harness the feelings and desires for social change.

Unity of effort as a principal of war is even more critical to an insurgent organization than the conventional forces it is fighting. In a well disciplined technological modern military the rank structure and organization are taken for granted but this may not be the case with an insurgent force. It is not uncommon to see rivalries between resistance leaders and groups flare up during the course of an insurgency and cause serious damage and delay. An insurgency made up of many independent groups can be isolated and destroyed in detail or turned against itself by clever concessions and political maneuvering.

¹⁰Donald R. Selvage, "Che Guevara in Bolivia," *Marine Corps Command and Staff College*, 1 April 1985, URL:<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/SDR.htm>>, accessed 24 February 2007.

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The Sudanese government's counterinsurgency strategy is an excellent example of how a state took advantage of factional loyalties to negotiate separate settlements with rebel groups. By pursuing separate peace negotiations with the fragmented resistance groups in Southern Sudan and Darfur the government was able to turn these groups against each other or offer concessions that allowed the government to concentrate its efforts on a smaller group that was the greater threat.¹¹

A unified insurgent military effort will not allow a government to successfully practice economy of force measures. Economy of Force is defined as the reciprocal of mass, the acceptance of risk in selected areas to achieve superiority in decisive operations.¹² Coordinated operations will dilute the government's combat power in securing lines of communications and rear areas and make it difficult to generate the combat power needed to destroy the guerrilla main forces and base camps.

The political organization and unity of the insurgent movement is also required to ensure success against a strong government counterinsurgency program's counter information campaigns. By exposing acts or messages of extremist groups or radical sects a government can attack the legitimacy of the entire movement possibly splitting supporters into moderate and extremist sections or getting all supporters labeled as terrorists. Therefore political organization and unity is important for a victory over a strong government because this battle for legitimacy is critical in the battle for the support of the undecided population and external observers.

¹¹Stephanie McCrummen, "Sudan in Mud Brick and Marble," *The Washington Post*, 26 February 2007, URL:<: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/25/AR2007022501341_pf.html>, accessed 26 February 2007.

¹²U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, June 2001), 4-13.

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The organization of an insurgency must continue to develop or the movement will risk losing legitimacy and popular support. This insurgent organization must continually exploit the dissatisfaction of the population and demonstrate they represent a better option. When local populations support an insurgency and they are able to exercise some form of control over regions they must act on the promises they have made. If an insurgency is able to expel a government that has been providing security and food to a population the insurgency needs to be able to offer similar services through parallel systems or they risk losing legitimacy and support.

Strong leadership is a critical aspect for a successful insurgent movement. Without strong leaders to unify the organization and motivate the people there is little chance for challenging an established government. History's greatest and most successful revolutions are all identified with a powerful figure that was the driving force for the organization and generated the support of the population. Strong leaders motivate dissatisfied populations into action and give them hope for social change. Names like George Washington, Vladimir Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, and Ho Chi Minh are only a few of recent history's great revolutionaries. They were synonymous with a movement and became a focal point for the internal and external support necessary for a struggle against the established governments. Insurgencies without strong leadership often suffer from internal conflict and it is common to see insurgencies flounder until one group eliminates the competition and enforces unity of effort.

A good example of this evolution of resistance leadership can be seen in the nationalist separatist insurgency in Sri Lanka. Today the "Tamil Tigers" and their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran are synonymous with the violent insurgency that has existed for

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over 30 years. However, in the beginning of the fight for independence there were 25 other Tamil nationalist groups. In 1985, when the government forces retreated after violent uprising throughout the ethnic Tamil region, the Tigers quickly betrayed and attacked the other groups and eliminated the military and political leadership who did not share their beliefs. The Tigers continue to eliminate rival leaders and moderates to maintain their control over the insurgency.¹³

SPACE AND ENVIRONMENT

The insurgent environment consists of the physical terrain and the cultural disposition of the population. This environment creates both opportunities and constraints and plays a significant role in the success or failure of an insurgency. The strategies of the insurgents and the government will be defined by the environment. The methods employed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other urban based resistance groups are significantly different than the methods employed by rural insurgencies such as the “Shining Path” in Peru.¹⁴

The most important aspect of the physical environment is a question of whether the insurgent forces have the space required to organize and survive government counter insurgency campaigns. This space includes the area needed for sanctuaries and base camps. This sanctuary can come in the form of restricted terrain that the government is unwilling to be drawn into or area in an adjacent country that is sympathetic to the

¹³Edgar O’Ballance, *The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88* (McLean, VA: Brassy’s Inc., 1989), 31.

¹⁴Edgar O’Ballance, *Terror In Ireland* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), 226.

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guerrillas. This space used for sanctuaries, base camps, and maneuver is essential to any successful protracted insurgency. Greece in 1948 is a good example of counter insurgency campaigns where the government denied the guerrillas the space to maneuver and effectively destroyed the insurgency by isolating it in the mountains and destroying it through direct attack or starvation.¹⁵ The Chinese experience on the Long March in 1937 is the opposite of the Greek Communists and demonstrates how a motivated and well organized guerrilla army with the space to move was able to survive well coordinated and aggressive counter insurgency campaigns by retreating over 6,000 miles.¹⁶

The physical environment of desert versus triple canopy jungle is predominantly a tactical factor that will have an important effect on the military decisions relating to force composition, locations of base camps and tactics used to strike government forces.¹⁷ However the cultural terrain is also important because it will determine whether there is enough population in region to support an insurgency and influence factors that have greater impact on the insurgencies operational and strategic decisions.

For nationalist separatist movements the cultural environment is of greater importance than the physical terrain because ethnic identity and grievances are usually important elements that separate the dissatisfied portion of the population from the government. Good examples of this are the Kurdish independence groups in the mountains of Kurdistan that are far removed from the Turks, Arabs, and Iranians who

¹⁵Edgar O'Ballance, *The Greek Civil War* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), 207.

¹⁶Dick Wilson, *The Long March* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 314.

¹⁷U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, April 2003), 1-6. Cited hereafter as U.S. Army FM 3-05.201.

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attempt to maintain control from far away capitals. This separation of populations creates an important demographic barrier that facilitates the formation of the nationalist separatist insurgency and makes it easier for these groups to succeed. It becomes exceptionally difficult for security forces to gather intelligence in a region where they are disliked and do not speak the language. Without this connection to the population their existence in the region to enforce the government's will creates opportunities for the insurgency to exploit. However, this exclusion from the majority of the population also allows the government to take action for which there may be little repercussions. For example, the Russians have been able to practice extremely brutal counter insurgency tactics against the nationalist separatist movement in Chechnya with very little domestic political repercussions because of little sympathy between the two cultures.¹⁸

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

There are few examples of insurgencies that have succeeded without external support. Those that have, like the Cuba revolution, succeeded only because of confronting an extremely weak and corrupt government or as the case in China where there was an abundance of experienced soldiers and military hardware left behind from the struggle against the Japanese occupation. Most successful insurgencies received large amounts of external aid in different forms from state sponsors and non state actors. In some cases external support may not be a decisive factor but a certain type or quantity may change the timing or nature of the end state. For example, the Afghani Mujahideen

¹⁸Dodge Billingsley, producer and researcher for documentaries on Chechnya. Interview by author on 21 February 2007.

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would likely have been able to continue their war against Soviet occupation and cause the political leaders to withdrawal without advanced weapons from the United States.

However, the aid contributed to the speed of disengagement and the subsequent situation in Afghanistan.¹⁹

External aid comes in four forms: moral support, political support, sanctuary, and resources.²⁰ During the cold war all of these types of aid were usually available to insurgent organizations as the two major super-powers, the United States and Soviet Union, fought their wars for influence through puppet governments and insurgent movements. Many of the cold war era proxy states could also not have survived against their own insurgencies without the same types of external support that insurgents needed. This support was not limited to the generosity of the nuclear powers. In Africa it was and still is common practice to support a neighbor's dissidents to weaken a rival government. For instance, South Africa supported insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique while both of those countries supported insurgent groups in South Africa.²¹

Since the end of the cold war external support is seen more commonly in smaller packages from neighbors seeking to effect local politics or nongovernmental groups furthering a cause. Political and financial aid from expatriate groups has become one of the most recent forms of support that is assisting nationalist separatist insurgent groups because of improvements in international banking and migration. This aid, in the form of cash, recruits, and non lethal assistance, is largely motivated by ethnic affinity rather than

¹⁹Michael A. Maggiano, *Afghanistan -The Policy, Decisions, and Reasons Behind the Soviet Withdrawal: Perception is only 50 Percent of the Truth* (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003), 57.

²⁰U.S. Army, FM 3-05.201, 1-6.

²¹Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism*, 2nd ed. (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2005), 140.

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geopolitics.²² This type of aid can be especially important when state sponsorship is tied to another political goal and support for an insurgency is used as a negotiating tool. Aid from expatriate groups is less likely to constrain an insurgent group than that from a state sponsor with additional political agendas.

The most basic form of support has been moral support. Moral support involves public and private statements of encouragement for the insurgent goals. Moral support is often the minimum amount given to an insurgency without entangling the supporter. Moral support provides encouragement and a moral boost for the insurgency and its followers as well as providing a degree of legitimacy for the ideals being promoted by the insurgents.

Political support differs from moral support in that it takes on active measures and is most often given with moral support. However, it is possible to give moral support without political support. For instance, many nations support one or both sides in the Israel-Palestine issue, giving moral support and acknowledging the rights to the existence of Palestine or Israel, but then condemning the methods used by the PLO or the Israeli government and refusing to provide additional political support.

Active political support measures involve promoting the insurgent cause in political and diplomatic forums and may include economic sanctions. Governments are less generous with political support than moral support because it invites retaliatory political measures. Any form of active support for an insurgency that threatens the territorial integrity of a nation can be expected to elicit some type of response or it begs for additional support for other sympathetic parties. Therefore nations may be hesitant to

²²Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannon, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1405-OTI, 2001), 15. Cited hereafter as Rand Study on Outside Support.

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provide this political support for a morally just cause if it does not further their national interests.

During the cold war political support had limited effects on internal conflicts supported by the super powers. However, recent trends have demonstrated that political support and threats of sanctions or intervention have had greater impact on the outcomes of insurgencies by forcing governments to negotiate settlements or accept arbitration. The international involvements in the Balkan conflicts during the 1990s are good examples of governments being coerced or forced into settlements with violent nationalist separatist groups.²³

The next level of escalation in support is the provision of resources. Resources can be tangible items provided in lethal and non lethal aid packages and intangible items like military training and political education. While military and political assistance and training is important early in the insurgency, once the movement has survived and built upon itself it will develop the skills and expertise to continue the fight as long as it has the material support to do so.

While there are many dissatisfied populations that can be encouraged or financed into a weak insurgency by a rival state, a movement that will be a serious threat to the survival of a strong government requires much more support. History has showed the amount of material aid needed by a successful insurgency is directly proportional to the will and resources of the government and its external supporters. For example, hundreds of millions of dollars were provided to the Mujahideen to fight the Russian Army in

²³Chaim Kaufman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, Vol 20, Spring 1996 URL:<http://bdm.wustl.edu/classes06/israel_papers/kaufmann.pdf>, accessed 3 March 2007. Cited hereafter as Kaufman, *International Security*.

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Afghanistan but only a fraction of that support was needed to support the Contras fighting the Nicaraguan Army.²⁴

The final level of support and the most dangerous to the donor is the provision of sanctuary. This becomes dangerous because the existence of enemy combatants in a neighboring country preparing for operations invites cross border military action, encourages support to rival insurgencies, and may start an international conflict. The country of Zaire is a good example of all of these counter actions taking place. Zaire has supported insurgencies in Rwanda and Uganda in response to these countries attempts to destabilize the Zairian government. As fighting between several insurgent organizations escalated, Zimbabwean troops were moved in to prevent the capture of the Zairian capital by Rwandan soldiers supporting Tutsi rebels.²⁵

There are many other levels of sanctuary that exist depending on the type of support supplied. Sanctuary for governments in exile and political activists is the simplest and is often associated with political support. These sanctuaries invite limited retaliation and may involve assassinations such as the killing of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Ivanov Markov who was given sanctuary in London.²⁶

The next type of sanctuary and one of the most critical for success is the provision of basing and staging areas. This is extremely important in the early stages of guerrilla warfare because it provides the space and protection required to prevent extermination during an insurgency's most vulnerable period. This is also one of the most common

²⁴Rand Study on Outside Support, 17.

²⁵Rand Study on Outside Support, 21.

²⁶Jack Hamilton and Tom Walker, "Dane Named As Umbrella Killer," *Times Online*, 5 June 2005, URL:< <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article530164.ece>>, accessed 20 February 2007.

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types of sanctuaries provided in nationalist separatist movements because often an adjacent country shares religious, ethnic and cultural ties to the group seeking independence. This type of sanctuary often invites cross border incursions to interrupt the activities of guerrillas and destroy their base camps. Good examples of these activities are the base camps provided by Mozambique to the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) rebels fighting against the Rhodesian Government. The cultural and ethnic backgrounds of the Africans facilitated support for the insurgents. The Rhodesian response involved large scale special operations to destroy the base camps and logistic areas but never involved a full scale invasion to seize terrain.²⁷

TIMING

Most insurgencies, successful or unsuccessful follow a three phase pattern of development. The three phases were originally defined by Mao Tse Tung and have been adapted by many insurgency authorities to include the U.S. Army.²⁸ There is no expected amount of time for each phase and insurgency may meet set backs and be forced back in phasing. It is also common for an insurgency to be in different phases in different regions of the conflict. As insurgencies pass through the three phases the size, level of organization, logistical requirements and intensity of violence all increase to address the escalating government counter insurgency efforts. See Figure 1. Phasing of Insurgency.

²⁷Barbara Cole, *The Elite* (South Africa: Three Knights Publishing, 1984), 242.

²⁸U.S. Army, FM 3-05.201, 1-7.

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


Figure 1. Phasing of Insurgency

Source: Author, compilation of case studies.

The first phase of an insurgency is known as the Latent and Incipient phase. This is when a disgruntled population begins to develop feelings of anger and despair with their current situation and is vulnerable to the exhortations of the agitators and organizers of an insurgency. In this phase, Intellectuals and insurgency leaders begin to spread the ideas and ideals of the insurgency and attempt to politically awaken and unify the target audience. These new ideas exploit the discontent and dissatisfaction of the population with the current government and focus on the political rather than military solutions. Resistance organizations will use many subversive techniques to prepare the population such as propaganda, demonstrations, and boycotts. These activities are designed to create awareness among the population and cause the government to take actions that will further turn the people against it.

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While the population is being prepared, the leaders and cadres of the resistance are creating the basic infrastructure to escalate the insurgency. These cadres will be gathering intelligence, establishing networks, infiltrating the government and civilian organizations, training, and gathering supplies. Establishing well trained and organized resistance cells is critical to the progression of the insurgency because the members of these cells will become the leaders as the organization grows.

This early phase also usually sees the initial battles between the founders and great thinkers of the insurgency for dominance and eventual leadership. For example, both of the leaders of the great mass based insurgencies in China and Viet Nam were mid level members of the early resistance structure and took several years to reach dominance in their organizations. The emergence of the strong leader to take control and drive the insurgency forward is a key indicator that the movement is ready to move forward into the next phase.²⁹ Once the key leaders have emerged it is not uncommon for a government in exile to be formed at the end of this phase or early in the next to create greater legitimacy for violence and resistance. These external bodies that take on some semblance of an official organization are also key to drawing external support and awareness to the cause.

Secrecy is crucial during this early phase because this is a point where the resistance movement is susceptible to decapitation by an effective security service. Sudden mass arrests and disappearances of dissidents are a common theme in states with a disgruntled population being controlled by political elites. For example, in the 1970s the Argentinean military controlled government was notorious for quickly eliminating

²⁹O'Ballance, *Indo China War*, 258.

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people with the slightest hints of association with anti regime groups and was able to effectively suppress dissidents and maintain power for seven years through harsh police state tactics.³⁰

The second phase, Guerrilla Warfare, begins with overt guerrilla warfare. This is usually not a general offensive across the entire country but rather a slowly emerging series of violent attacks against the government in and around the most well established insurgent zones. Often the beginning of this phase is not planned for a certain date but is forced upon the guerrillas by a sudden discovery by government security forces or a perceived weakness causes a premature strike. The intent of initial guerrilla attacks is not to destroy or defeat government forces but to attack the legitimacy of the government and attempt to cause a reaction that will create even more anger and generate propaganda to further promote the cause

The early guerrilla warfare phase is predominately about survival and recognition. This is where the resistance movement comes out into the open and begins to attract new recruits and expands the fight to promote its agenda. Guerrillas do not normally engage the government in open battle, will not attempt to hold ground, and will only strike at times and places of their choosing. It is during this early stage where the resistance is most vulnerable because they are suddenly exposed to a government that may not have had a good picture of what was forming but now has the mandate to take aggressive action.

As the guerrilla warfare phase progresses, the insurgents will begin to establish areas where they can temporarily or permanently exercise control. Development of

³⁰Martin Anderson, *Dossier Secreto: Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the "Dirty War"* (Jackson, TN: Westview Press, 1993), 33.

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insurgent administered regions are an important final step of the guerrilla warfare phase because these regions provide new sanctuaries and resource bases and also provide and increased level of legitimacy. By controlling regions and providing services and security the guerrillas take on the role of the government they have expelled. By effectively replacing the government the insurgents demonstrate that they are capable of providing a new alternative to the government they are fighting and establish greater legitimacy. This increased legitimacy is an import step in increasing popular support in regions under government control and also increasing external support and awareness. If insurgents fail to replace the government services and provide hope for improvement they will quickly loose legitimacy and support from the local population and external supporters may question their aid. A good example of this is the Taliban government in Southern Afghanistan. They expelled corrupt local warlords and provided a short period of stability. However, their development plans were flawed or nonexistent causing a decline in quality of life. When U.S. supported Northern Alliances forces counterattacked the people quickly turned on the Taliban.

The length of the guerrilla phase of an insurgency is dependant upon two variables, the will of the opponent populations to fight and the ability of one group to totally defeat the other. This will to fight and willingness to accept losses is an especially important quality to insurgents fighting a strong government that may be supported by foreign soldiers. Sustained violence and hardship may not threaten the government but it may convince it to make concessions or abandon a cause. Vietnam is a good example of the value of will to fight versus operational success; the Vietnamese were willing to

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accept much greater losses over a much longer period to achieve their goals than the Americans and were successful while never defeating the U.S. military in a major battle.

The second factor determining length of the guerrilla warfare phase is the ability of one combatant to defeat the other. Successful counter insurgency efforts will destroy guerrilla units, kill their leaders, capture their materials, and separate them from the population. While this will not destroy the movement, it will force it back into the latent incipient phase where it will rebuild and reorganize. On the other extreme, successful guerrilla operations will deny access to terrain, increase the size of units and operations, and will eventually be capable of challenging large conventional units. Without decisive military success on either side the guerrilla warfare phase can continue indefinitely. The conflict in Sri Lanka is a good example of the extreme case of this situation. The populations on both sides of the conflict have shown a strong will to continue the fight with little thought of compromise. While the government has been able to control the majority of the country they have not been able to achieve decisive military victory and eliminate the guerrilla controlled regions. This advanced level of guerrilla warfare has lasted for over 20 years with no signs of progress.³¹

The final phase of the three phase model is described as mobile warfare or war of movement. This is when the insurgency has developed a main force and the logistics capable of fighting the conventional forces of the government. The insurgent's main forces will abandon guerrilla tactics and pursue a military strategy that will cause the collapse of the government or withdrawal of its forces from the separatist region. If insurgent units are able to seize and hold terrain and begin to control portions of the

³¹"Sri Lanka Talks Failure," *BBC News*, Online ed., 30 October 2006, URL< http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6099514.stm>, accessed 21 February 2007.

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country, then the fate of the government or separatist region is in serious jeopardy. With control of large portions of the country the insurgency begins to take on the legitimacy of a rival government as well as responsibility for the population under its control.

Prolonged conflict in this stage of the insurgency begins to take on the characteristics of a civil war. A good but rare example of this level of insurgency is the nationalist separatists of Croatia in 1995. Croatian police and military units supported the separatist government and represented the main force of the movement. Local militias practiced guerrilla warfare in support of the nationalist separatist agenda. Battles between the Croats and Serbian dominated Yugoslavia Army for control of Croatia were executed with modern Soviet weaponry and division sized units. The Croatian separatists were able to establish legitimacy quickly because they only replaced the top level of the government and retained the basic services that had existed when it was part of Yugoslavia. As the Croats demonstrated they were the masters of the majority of the region they developed legitimacy in the international political arena and were soon recognized as an independent state.

This final step of the unconventional warfare process is rare and typically insurgencies are either crushed or abandoned in the early phases of guerrilla warfare, continue in a perpetual state of violent insurgency, or reach some sort of political solution. There are many more examples of insurgencies that were unable to reach the final phase of the model but were willing to reach compromises while maintaining the threat of perpetual violence.

Since the end of the bi-polar Cold War, political and military intervention by third parties has become a more common occurrence. Incipient insurgencies have used this

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strategy of encouraging third party intervention especially when they realize they have no real chance of military victory. Kosovo is a recent example of the success of a nationalist separatist movement developing international intervention to achieve their goals.

International anger over the atrocities committed by the Serbians and revealed through the world media drew international pressure and political and military support for the insurgents. This support achieved results that the Albanian guerrillas never could have hoped for against the Serbian Army.³² Other groups have taken notice and information campaigns directed at international audiences are a standard component of well supported insurgencies.

CONCLUSION

Instability caused by nationalist separatist insurgencies will continue to be a problem throughout the world because many competing ethnic and tribal groups are required to share finite resources among ever growing populations. By examining and understanding the fundamental elements of these insurgencies, the U.S. intelligence community can assist policy makers in developing appropriate policy that seeks to apply diplomatic, economic and information solutions to some of the problem areas before they escalate to the point of requiring massive military intervention.

³²Kaufman, *International Security*.

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CHAPTER 3

EAST TIMOR

The first serious sign of trouble in post Suharto Indonesia was the secession of East Timor. Different levels of guerrilla violence were regular in the province since the colonial period and continued into the Indonesia occupation. However, the sudden collapse of the authoritarian government that had ruled the country for over 30 years presented an opportunity for the independence movement. Following the success of East Timor, similar movements in other parts of Indonesia were encouraged and invigorated in their attempts for independence. Four presidents with varying policies designed to enforce sovereignty and inspire unity have had different levels of success and failure. There had been much speculation in the wake of East Timor's secession about the fate of the sovereignty of Indonesia. However, after eight years of continuing ethnic conflict and unrest there has not been another successful insurgency. The question now is not whether the state of Indonesia will fragment like the state of Yugoslavia but what conditions or policies have changed that has allowed the new government to maintain national unity. In order to understand these changes a closer look at the factors and progress of the guerrilla war in East Timor needs to be examined for comparison to current events.

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SETTING

East Timor, also called Timor Leste, was a colony of Portugal since the 1600s when traders established a post because of the island's strategic location. There was very little attempt by the traders to assert control over the interior and the only contact and development was from Catholic missionaries. As the Portuguese establishment grew and local governors, traders, and soldiers established a permanent presence, a perpetual state of conflict developed that ebbed and flowed between the many different tribal groups, the Portuguese and their surrogates. The conflicts were usually caused by disagreements over land sharing or taxation laws and sometimes resulted in destructive rebellions.³³

The people of East Timor continued their culture of resistance after the Japanese occupied the Island in 1942. British and Australian forces led a successful guerrilla campaign that forced the Japanese to deploy 20,000 soldiers in defense of its ports and airfields. In response the Japanese conducted a harsh counter insurgency campaign that was responsible for an estimated 60,000 East Timorese deaths and destruction of what little infrastructure existed prior to the war.³⁴

After World War Two and the return of Portuguese administration the problems of East Timorese resistance did not diminish. In 1959 the Viqueque rebellion erupted in response to dissatisfaction with colonial administration and interethnic conflicts. Even though the uprising lasted only a few weeks, hundreds of people were killed. The

³³Flo Lamoureux, "East Timor: The World's Newest Country," *Center for South East Asian Studies, University of Hawaii*, March 2004, URL:<<http://www.hawaii.edu/cseas/pubs/timor.pdf>>, accessed 4 April 2007.

³⁴"History of East Timor," *Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University*, URL:<<http://www.asia.msu.edu/seasia/East%20Timor/history.html>>, accessed 4 April 2007.

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uprising demonstrated that the people of East Timor were still motivated to fight the colonial forces.³⁵ Most of the conflict on the island continued to come from disorganized ethnic groups fighting each other or rising up against local issues. It was not until the Portuguese started to divest themselves of their African colonies that the small groups of East Timorese nationalists began to unify for what appeared to be impending decolonization.

In 1974 the Carnation Revolution in Portugal resulted in the new government's rapid divestment of its colonies. The cost of the colonial war in resources and political support had been a huge drain on Portugal for the previous 15 years and was one of the primary causes for the revolution led by leftist learning military officers against the authoritarian government. Therefore the decolonization process was not one of gradual exit and transition to a newly elected government but rather a hasty retreat with the authorities ceding control to the local independence organizations.

On 28 November 1975 the newly formed government of East Timor declared its independence and was subsequently invaded 9 days later by the armed forces of Indonesia (TNI). This invasion was tolerated by the western powers because the government of Indonesia claimed it was fighting against communist aggression in South East Asia, a common goal of the western powers at that time. The occupation of the next 25 years was excessively brutal and resulted in the deaths of approximately 180,000 East Timorese.³⁶ Eventually, the excessively violent and oppressive counter insurgency

³⁵Lamoureux, "East Timor: The World's newest Country," March 2004.

³⁶Colum Lynch and Ellen Nakashima, "East Timor Atrocities Revealed," *The Washington Post*, 21 January 2006, URL:< <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/20/AR2006012001811.html>>, accessed 27 May 2007.

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tactics resulted in enough international pressure to cause the Indonesian government to allow the East Timorese an opportunity for independence.

POPULAR SUPPORT

The motivations for the people of East Timor to confront colonial and Indonesian occupation are the same as most other dissatisfied and oppressed groups. The people had a high level of discontent with the government and reached a point where they were willing to take action to seek change. The people of East Timor have been incredibly poor since the Portuguese colonial period and to this day are still considered one of the poorest people in the world.³⁷ Even within East Timor, most of the wealth has been held by westerners, Chinese businessmen, and a few Timorese elite families. The remainder of the population survived through subsistence agriculture and exploitation of the island's Sandalwood. There is very little industry on the island and limited development because of the low level of education; approximately 93% of the population under the occupation was illiterate.³⁸ Throughout the Portuguese occupation there was very little progress made to develop the economy and infrastructure and because of this what efforts the Indonesians made had very little impact.³⁹

The invasion by Indonesia set the conditions for a partisan struggle in an environment that was ready for revolution. The Indonesians were not seen as liberators

³⁷"East Timor," *U.S. AID Budget Report*, 14 June 2005, URL:<<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ane/tp.html>>, accessed 4 April 2007.

³⁸David Armstrong, "The Next Yugoslavia? The Fragmentation of Indonesia," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15 no 4, (2004): 786.

³⁹Lamoureux, "East Timor: The World's Newest Country," March 2004.

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or fellow South East Asian brothers. They share very little cultural history, they do not share a common language, and 90% of the East Timorese are Catholic while Indonesia is predominantly Muslim. The brutality of the occupation by the Indonesian invaders created even greater divisions between the cultures and unified the people of East Timor against a common enemy.

The harsh counter insurgency operations conducted by the Indonesian army alienated the population and created an environment full of passive supporters with a small number of active combatants. During the final years of the struggle the Front for the Liberation of East Timor (FRETILIN) was reported to only have 800 full time fighters with 1,500 reserves.⁴⁰ This small number of fighters is an indication of the Indonesian military's effectiveness in crushing the guerrilla forces rather than an indication of a lack of popular support. The extensive underground organization and large amounts of civil disobedience that were critical to the struggle's political victories gives a better picture of the popular support generated by the resistance movement.

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

The origins of the East Timorese resistance movement come from a period shortly before the Portuguese divestment of its colonies. As it became apparent that the Portuguese would be leaving and decolonization was happening in other parts of the world, small groups of Timorese nationalists began to organize themselves in two groups. One group, the Unio Democratic Timorese (UDT), formed under the concept of gradual

⁴⁰Constancio Pinto and Mathew Jardine, *East Timor's Unfinished Struggle* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1997), 246.

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decolonization from Portugal with a process of development and democratization that would happen over many years. The other group, FRETILIN, was formed by people with socialist influence and argued for immediate independence. When it became apparent that decolonization was coming sooner than they originally expected, these groups formed an uneasy peace and began to take control of institutions abandoned by the Portuguese.⁴¹

The uneasy peace was suddenly shattered on 11 August 1975 when the UDT attempted a coup. This act was in response to a deception by Indonesia intelligence agents who convinced the UDT leaders that FRETILIN was planning a communist take over with material aid from China and Vietnam.⁴² These same stories were published in other Asian newspapers and would later provide support for Indonesia's claims to be preventing a communist take over that could threaten the region.

Unfortunately for the UDT, they over estimated the FRETILIN strength and were soon defeated. Subsequently the people of East Timor turned to FRETILIN to carry out the functions of government because there were no other established options. Soon the invasion of East Timor created an environment where FRETILIN was the only organized military and political force for people to support or seek for aid.

Throughout the 25 years of resistance there were personal power struggles and purges within FRETILIN that caused a split in the leadership and resulted in a reformation under the name of National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM). However, the unifying nature of the Indonesian invasion and oppression limited internal

⁴¹International Crisis Group, *Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis*, Asia Report 120, 10 October 2006. Cited hereafter as ICC, *Resolving Timor-Leste*.

⁴²Joseph Nevins, *A Not So Distant Horror* (London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 50.

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politics and allowed competing factions to cooperate for independence. The difficulties for the movement were not in the structure of its leadership or ideals but rather the nature of the counter insurgency campaign that limited the resistance's ability to conduct large scale organization and guerrilla operations. The population control measures combined with the minimal external support presented few options for military organization and led to the main effort being placed on small political groups. The eventual awarding of Nobel Peace Prizes to the leaders, increased support from Indonesian NGOs, aid from the UN, and many well coordinated civil demonstrations is a better indication of an organized resistance movement operating under extremely difficult conditions.

The desire of the people of East Timor to be rid of the Indonesian army and its oppressive daily tactics and population control measures was the single unifying idea of the resistance. It was under this idea that many smaller organizations formed and eventually were integrated into the CNRM structure. The power of this single idea to unify the people in the struggle is apparent now that the country has achieved its independence. Within a few years of independence the unity of the resistance had crumbled. Inter ethnic violence and political conflict that had been put aside during the occupation resulted in new rioting and widespread gang violence that required additional international peacekeeping forces to return order to the country.⁴³

⁴³Jonathan Head, "No Happy Ending for East Timor," *BBC News*, 3 June 2006, URL:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/5041052.stm>, accessed 3 April 2007.

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SPACE AND ENVIRONMENT

East Timor does not provide ideal terrain for a guerrilla war beyond tactical operations. The surface area is 15,000 square kilometers, a space that is approximately the size of Connecticut.⁴⁴ All sides of the country are bordered by water or Indonesia. This compact region provides limited options for the creation of guerrilla sanctuaries. However the undeveloped and mountainous interior region did provide enough room for the guerrillas to hide and is well suited for small tactical operations. See Figure 1. East Timor Geography.



Figure 1. East Timor Geography

Source: “Tourismo de Timor Leste,” *Official Website of Tourism for Timor Leste*, 22 September 2004, URL:< <http://www.turismotimorleste.com/dl/Timor-Leste.jpg>>, accessed 3 May 2007.

⁴⁴Central Intelligence Agency, “East Timor: Geography,” *World Fact Book*, 15 May 2007, URL:< <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html>>, accessed 17 May 2006.

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The physical terrain in the interior portions of East Timor is very rugged. The central mountain range rapidly climbs from sea level to 6,000 ft and has large areas of rain forest.⁴⁵ The average height of the central range is approximately 2,500 feet and provides terrain that can be used by small groups of insurgents to avoid contact with army patrols. While this allowed guerrilla forces to survive during counter insurgency operations it did not facilitate large scale operations that would have been required to oppose the Indonesians. By controlling the low lands and population centers and conducting regular operations against guerrillas in the interior, the Indonesians were able to place enough pressure on guerrilla units that they could do little more than survive and conduct harassment.

Approximately 80 percent of the population lived in agricultural villages prior to the invasion and this resulted in a dispersed population that was difficult to completely control.⁴⁶ During the initial years of occupation the Indonesians tried to relocate large numbers of the farmers into military controlled villages to prevent support for rural guerrillas. However the population was so well dispersed across the countryside that this program was difficult to implement and it took three years for the Indonesian Army to fully take control of the countryside from the guerrilla fighters. The dispersed nature of the population would have been a benefit to a resistance movement conducting a Maoist mass based rural insurgency if they had other factors such as sanctuary and material support. However, without these aids, the most effective acts of the insurgency were conducted closer to and within the large population centers.

⁴⁵*Google Earth*, URL:< <http://earth.google.com/>>, accessed 2 April 2007.

⁴⁶Pinto and Jardine, 12.

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Even though the terrain and other factors did not allow for an effective guerrilla war it did help the insurgency to survive. The fundamental act of survival and continued violent resistance fueled the anti Indonesian ideology and propaganda that would eventually lead to international intervention

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Until the last years of the occupation the East Timorese suffered from a lack of moral and political support because their struggle was not well known and was in competition with Indonesian interests. The isolation of the country from outside visitors and the tacit approval of the destruction of another communist insurgency by western allies combined to create limited awareness by the outside world of the degree of human suffering in East Timor.

Throughout their struggle East Timor received moral and political support from many other sympathetic third world nations who had suffered under colonialism and were generally enemies of the western capitalist nations. While these nations could provide little political leverage they did supply legitimacy and awareness to the cause through actions within the UN and human rights organizations.

International awareness increased as reporters gained greater access to East Timor and were able to document the level of oppression being imposed on the people. This greater awareness led to the awarding of Nobel Peace Prizes to the leaders of the resistance and was a major victory for the East Timorese and a great embarrassment to

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Indonesia and its supporters.⁴⁷ Underground cells of the resistance were also able to increase visibility through demonstrations during public visits by the Pope and other international delegations. The deaths and serious injury to several western reporters and distribution of videos and first person accounts of Indonesian atrocities had a shock effect that brought increased attention to the region. All of these efforts gradually increased the level of moral and political support for the East Timorese people.

In order to maintain support from its major western allies Indonesia conducted a deception campaign aimed at convincing them that the trouble in East Timor was inter ethnic conflict and the Indonesian Military was a source of stability rather than oppression. During the 1975 invasion these deceptions was successful and allowed the Indonesians to side step nonaggression clauses in treaties with the U.S. The Indonesians were able use their American weapons under the pretense of restoring order and did not risk U.S. protest or sanctions. As international awareness increased, the Indonesians repeated the deception plan and sent Special Forces groups to East Timor to organize and act as pro-integration militias. These militias acted to create greater fear in the local populations and gave the impression to some outside observers that it was machete wielding militias composed of local inhabitants that was responsible for the disturbances and the Indonesian military was needed for security. Initially this plan to reduce support was successful; leading figures in the U.S. State Department believed the story and even attempted to facilitate negotiations in an effort to aid the situation.⁴⁸

Eventually the cooperation of the Indonesia military with the pro-integration militias could not be denied and western leaders came under pressure from their

⁴⁷Nevins, 67.

⁴⁸Nevins, 115.

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electorates to take action. Human rights support quickly became moral support for self-determination that resulted in political support in the form of sanctions by the U.S., Australia, the U.K. and the World Bank. The rapid overwhelming application of political support combined with threats of serious economic damage to a country that was still feeling the effects of the Asian financial crisis caused the Indonesian government to accept a referendum for independence and UN monitoring of the crisis.

The Timorese guerrillas were totally dependant on battlefield recovery and aid from the people for material support. They had limited ability to purchase weapons and supplies through the black market; however, this was not in large enough quantities to be helpful. Guerrilla training stressed the need to conserve ammunition and very few were able to conduct live fire training prior to combat.⁴⁹ Therefore guerrilla units carried only small arms, and even the lightest of machineguns and mortars were almost nonexistent.

In contrast, the Indonesian military was a relatively modern and competent force trained and supported by the U.S. and other western allies. They had an abundance of ammunition that allowed the Indonesians to suppress even the hint of a guerrilla attack with large volumes of fire. Large amounts of indirect fires were utilized in the harassment and interdiction role during the first years of the invasion when the Indonesians did not control the rural areas. The great expenditure of ordinance resulted in a demoralized population and an excess of civilian and livestock casualties. As the counter insurgency campaign developed, the Indonesians brought in more weapons and techniques that had been successful for the U.S. against the Viet Cong such as spotting

⁴⁹Pinto and Jardine, 50.

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aircraft and napalm.⁵⁰ In addition to the effectiveness of the modern weapons, ancient scorched earth tactics resulting in starvation and disease were also utilized and were responsible for approximately 90 % of the East Timorese deaths during the conflict.⁵¹ This tactic also caused the guerrillas to spend large amounts of their time just trying to survive and gather supplies instead of organizing operations.

Without a large amount of external aid, the resistance effort was at best a war of attrition and at worst was the young Timorese dieing in a fight that they had no hope of winning. Without significant aid there was little chance that the East Timorese resistance would ever have defeated the Indonesians in anything greater than a street battle. However, the continued military struggle and resulting oppression provided the political ammunition need by the leaders in exile and international groups sympathetic to their cause and would be critical to that final victory.

The Timorese island provides little opportunity for the adjacent political sanctuary that has often been crucial for the success of other insurgencies. Because of the colonial history of Portugal the East Timorese resistance did find friends in the other former colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Both of these countries had recently been successful in their own insurgencies against Portuguese colonialism and offered training and sanctuary for the resistance leadership. However, these nations were too far away and poor to offer much more than shelter. The only sanctuary available to the resistance was provided by the rugged terrain made inaccessible by mountains, jungle, and undeveloped infrastructure. However this sanctuary was often lost when the Indonesians

⁵⁰Lynch and Nakashima, "East Timor Atrocities," 21 January 2006.

⁵¹Sian Powell, "UN Verdict on East Timor," *The Australian*, 19 January 2006, URL:<http://www.yale.edu/gsp/east_timor/unverdict.html>, accessed 27 May 2007.

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mounted aggressive counter insurgency campaigns and the end result was that the guerrilla forces were severely hampered by a lack of a secure refuge to train, organize and rest before and after operations.

TIMING

Throughout its modern history East Timor had a highly advanced level of latent incipient discontent and anger that occasionally exploded into violent resistance. The political parties that emerged during Portuguese decolonization were able to take advantage of the many groups of unhappy people willing to organize to try and make their lives better.

When the Indonesians invaded in 1975 they immediately met with resistance from the new government soldiers. These forces were quickly destroyed and dispersed to become the nucleus of the resistance. Therefore the Indonesian invasion caused the East Timorese resistance to immediately transition into the second phase of insurgency, guerrilla warfare. Across the island the population fled and resisted the invaders, but there was very little the people could do because of a lack of military equipment and experience. The fledgling guerrilla forces resisted as best they could but were quickly forced into the interior of the country. For the next five years the Indonesian military continued to advance and take control of the rural areas reducing approximately 15,000 FRETILIN fighters to a force of only 700.⁵²

At the time of the Indonesian Invasion, the leaders of FRETILIN were outside of East Timor seeking international aid. Without a country to return to, they sought

⁵²ICC, *Resolving Timor-Leste*, 3.

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sanctuary in the sympathetic former Portuguese colony of Mozambique. There they established a government in exile, sought political support through the UN, NGOs and direct contact with any other world leaders that would listen.

The Indonesian military destroyed the majority of the Timorese resistance and pushed the insurgency back from the second phase of guerrilla warfare into the Latent Incipient phase in most areas of the country. For the next 20 years there was always resistance to the Indonesian occupation but the draconian counter insurgency efforts were effective in minimizing guerrilla activity. It was a new generation of young Timorese who grew up under the occupation that revitalized the resistance in the 1990s. This resurgence of resistance to the Indonesian occupation in a world of emerging globalization, telecommunications and 24-hour news television played a key part in the victory. Student protests and demonstrations created new incidents and human rights violations that were recorded by reporters and created a greater level of international awareness. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prizes, the increasing international awareness of human rights abuses and a series of misfortunate events in Indonesia set the conditions for East Timorese independence rather than the traditional escalation from Guerrilla Warfare moving into War of Movement.

The Indonesians and Mr. Suharto would still likely be in control today if it were not for a series of misfortunes to befall Indonesia in the late 1990s. The first major problem was the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1999 that resulted in a significant lowering of the Indonesian standard of living, a 16.5% drop in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and rapidly rising inflation.⁵³

⁵³Tim Huxley, *Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 14.

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In addition to the internal economic problems, the world price of oil during this period dropped to 10-12 dollars per barrel. This added to the already poor state of the Indonesian economy because at this time Indonesia was a major international oil exporter and profits from oil dropped from 7.2% of the GDP in 1996 to 2.8% of the GDP in 1999.⁵⁴

The Indonesian government of Suharto had always been confronted with problems of social unrest due to political oppression, ethnic conflict, and corruption. The combination of these factors with the sudden decline of the entire population's economic well being resulted in large student riots throughout the country. These riots threatened the stability of the nation and resulted in the third event, the resignation of President Suharto and assumption of the presidency by Vice President Habibie.

The fourth event was the crash of a military helicopter containing all of the senior military officers who were responsible for the control and military administration of East Timor. The combination of the loss of all these senior military experts with president Habibie's relative lack of experience with the East Timor issue caused a serious lack understanding and resolve in the Indonesian administration.⁵⁵

While the Indonesian Army was able to prevent the insurgency from transitioning into phase three, the war of movement, the insurgents did not need this progression because of the awaking of international awareness of human rights abuses. The increased counter insurgency activities that resulted from the new wave of civil disobedience were

⁵⁴Southeast Asia Studies Center, "Indonesian Fact Sheet," *University California, Berkley*, 31 January 2003, URL:< <http://ias.berkeley.edu/africa/Events/OilHR/Indonesia%20Factsheet.pdf>>, accessed 6 January 2007.

⁵⁵Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Savior* (Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2004), 33-46.

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transmitted to the news media outlets of the western democracies. The actions and legitimacy of Indonesia in East Timor became a serious issue for many of the Australian, European, and U.S. voters and government representatives. The sudden wave of support created tremendous pressure on the Australian and U.S. leaders to take action against Indonesia.

In response to early pressures the Indonesian Special Forces were sent in to East Timor to organize and pose as anti Independence militias.⁵⁶ This resulted in a dramatic increase in violence and destruction of private property that was displayed by domestic and international news organizations. The intent to make the world leaders think that there was greater support from pro integration groups and that without Indonesians to maintain peace and order, the country would disintegrate into civil war. It was thought that once the world saw the Indonesian army as a source of stability in the middle of a civil war the western leaders would alter their political and financial threats.⁵⁷

The increase in violence had the opposite effect and increased the pressure from Australia, the U.S. and the World Bank who began to cancel funding of Indonesian economic programs. These threats had the desired effects because Indonesia was still recovering from its financial crisis and could not afford to be stripped of U.S. aid. In the same way that international intervention had allowed marginally effective resistance groups achieve goals that would have otherwise been impossible in Bosnia and Kosovo, the resistance movement of East Timor had been able to gain international recognition of their plight and defeat the Indonesian government. With very little besides popular and

⁵⁶Julian Duplain, "Indonesia's Special Forces," *BBC Online*, 29 September 1999, URL<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/460702.stm>>, accessed 24 April 2007.

⁵⁷Nevins, 86.

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political support, the people of East Timor were able to achieve what many other nationalist separatist movements with many more advantages have failed to do.

SUMMARY

When compared to one of the most successful insurgencies of the Post colonial period, the Viet Minh, it becomes apparent that the reasons for the East Timorese success were very different. See Table 1. Comparison of Post Colonial and Post Cold War Insurgency. The insurgencies of the cold war and post colonial period were the first steps in the evolution of industrialized warfare into modern asymmetrical warfare. In the conflicts against French and Americans in Vietnam the insurgents were practicing asymmetrical strategies but were largely attempting to win victories on the battlefields through traditional forms of combat. Recent victories in East Timor and other parts of the world demonstrate that under certain conditions little real combat involving modern weapons and tactics is needed to be successful.

The victories for the separatist movements in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor point to a change in potential insurgent strategies that will become increasingly effective as the world advances as an information society. Visibility and accountability to global partners will continue to play a role in politics and legitimacy will be a key factor in any group's ability to achieve its goals. Relatively weak and ineffective militias in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor achieved great results because of their ability to gain legitimacy for their cause in the eyes of influential outside powers.

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Green = Good for Insurgents, Red= Bad for Insurgents

Factor	Viet Minh vs. French	East Timor
Popular Support	Strong Nationalist and Anti Colonial feeling unifying people against French occupation	Strong Nationalist support unified by poor treatment of native people by Indonesian government and brutal population control measures by TNI
Space and Environment	Rugged terrain, large area, well dispersed population supports Maoist Insurgent Strategy.	Supports tactical guerrilla warfare, allows government to control population, limited space for maneuver
Leadership and Organization	Single leader, popular ideology, effective military organization	Charismatic Leaders, Government in Exile Marxist Vanguard
Support		
Moral	Communists, Chinese, anti-Colonialists, Socialists	Humanitarian NGO, United Nations, Former Portuguese Colonies, EU, Australia
Political	China, Russia, Communists	UN, U.S. Australia, UK, Portugal
Material	Massive material support from China	Internal logistical support and battlefield recovery of military material
Sanctuary	China, Thailand, Viet Minh base areas	Government in Exile in Africa and UN
Value and motivation of occupation forces	Natural Resources, history and development, Pride, Colonial integrity	Pride, monetary and human investment, National Integrity

Table 1. Comparison of Post Colonial and Post Cold War Insurgency**Source: Author derived from sources cited in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.**

Much more capable insurgencies in Chechnya, Sri Lanka and Kurdistan have been able to liberate large areas, gain considerable material aid, and develop significant levels of moral support but have failed to gain political support. Without legitimacy and political support exceeding the power of the occupation forces, their insurgencies have

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peaked at very advanced stages of Guerrilla Warfare or immature levels of Mobile Warfare and have stagnated for years to follow. The ability of the East Timorese to leverage international outrage and sympathy to achieve their goals is a reminder of how globalization has changed the nature of warfare and ethnic struggle since the end of the cold war.

The situation that existed in East Timor is not unique to the Republic of Indonesia. There are other ethnic groups who are seeking independence and have observed the events in East Timor. The continuing reports of ethnic violence begs the question of, are other insurgencies on the same path to independence, are the situations comparable, and has the government learned from its failure in East Timor and changed its strategy to prevent the loss of another region. The following chapters will attempt to answer that question by using the analysis of East Timor as a basis for comparison.

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CHAPTER 4

UNITY THROUGH DIVERSITY

Indonesia is composed of 17,508 islands controlling approximately two million square kilometers of Southeast Asia.⁵⁸ The population numbering 246 million people resides on approximately 6,000 of these islands.⁵⁹ See Figure 3. Indonesia.



Figure 3. Indonesia

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "Indonesia," *World Fact Book*, URL:<<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>>, accessed May 17 2007.

⁵⁸"Country Profile," *Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia Web Page*, URL:< <http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/Country.html>>, accessed 21 March 2007.

⁵⁹Central Intelligence Agency, "Indonesia," *World Fact Book*, URL:< <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>>, accessed 21 March 2007. Cited to hereafter as CIA, *Indonesia*.

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“Unity through diversity” is the national motto of the Republic of Indonesia and it paints an idealistic image of one of Indonesia’s greatest challenges. Cultural anthropologists offer the impressive figures of over 300 distinct cultural groups speaking 742 languages.⁶⁰ However, the population is dominated by the Javanese and Sudanese ethnic groups that represent 44% and 16% of the population respectively. Most other groups make up less than 3% of the population with some recognized cultural groups and languages being represented by only a few hundred people.⁶¹ Adding to the potential clashes created by the ethnic overlap is the fact that the population practices five major religions. Various forms of Islam combine to represent 88% of the population and factionalism in this religion create even greater diversity.⁶² It would not require an expert on world conflict to come to the conclusion that Indonesia’s high level of diversity presents problems for the central government and has required various strategies since independence in 1949 to maintain the level of unity seen today. As the effects of globalization continue to polarize ethnic and religious groups throughout the world and inspire many to take action for independence, Indonesia will continue to be challenged to maintain its national integrity.

⁶⁰Eka Merdekawady, “Bahasa Indonesia and Languages of Indonesia,” *University of Bozen Language Studies Department*, 6 July 2006, URL:< http://www.languagestudies.unibz.it/Bahasa%20Indonesia_Merdekawaty.pdf>, accessed 21 March 2007.

⁶¹Republic of Indonesia, *Indonesia 2000 Census*, The 2000 Census of Indonesia, 30 June 2000, URL:< http://www.kbri-bangkok.com/about_indonesia/land_and_people_02.html#languages_and_dialects>, accessed 21 March 2007.

⁶²CIA, *Indonesia*.

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EARLY UNIFICATION

Prior to 1942 Indonesia was unified under Dutch colonial administration. The Dutch successfully brought the majority of the territory and ethnic groups together under its control and negotiated treaties that established the basis for what is modern day Indonesia. Effective economic and colonial development programs enabled the Dutch to cultivate a period of growth and prosperity in the region that is largely responsible for the unification and development of a national Indonesian identity. The Dutch economic programs also resulted in some suffering for the peasant population of Indonesia and were partially responsible for early Indonesian nationalism based on hatred of the Dutch.

The emerging Indonesian identity coupled with anti-colonialism was an early unifying force for the people of Indonesia that did not end when the Dutch were expelled by the Japanese. The Japanese occupation and tolerance of limited self-government during World War Two strengthened the nationalist feelings and desire for independence. The resistance to the Dutch reoccupation after the war further strengthened the Indonesian nationalists who fought a guerrilla war for four years and were finally granted independence in 1949.⁶³

The vacuum of power left by the Dutch colonial administration created an environment where groups battled for dominance. This was not a battle between Javanese and Sudanese or Muslim and Buddhist. It was a battle for control of Indonesia between political ideologies championed by nationalist groups consisting of all ethnic

⁶³Department of Defense, "Indonesia," *Intellipedia*, URL:< <https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Indonesia>>, accessed 1 April 2007.

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backgrounds. Nationalist separatist causes existed but were not a dominant force in the early conflict for control of Indonesia.

The party led by the nationalist leader Sukarno was victorious in the struggle and effectively established the first Indonesian government. There was debate within the ruling coalition about the nature of the government and disagreement on the role of Islamic law in society. The debate over religion and national direction in the new government raged on in the parliament with little chance for compromise and resolution. The inability of the parliament to agree on how to govern the country was an early indication that diversity was a factor in developing the nation. Therefore, when the Sukarno government was secure, the parliament was dissolved and a secular constitution was imposed. This was the first act of the strong central government emerging as an authoritarian regime and the beginning of the policy known as Guided Democracy. The early consolidation of the country under the Sukarno government combined with the external factors of conflict with Malaysia and founding of the nonaligned nations movement reinforced the early feelings of nationalism that were instrumental in maintaining Indonesian unity. The main challenges to the Sukarno government were mostly a result of cold war politics. An emerging legal communist party in conflict with military nationalists and to a lesser extent Muslims began to threaten the stability of Indonesia. Additionally, this internal stress was enhanced by a neglected economy and food shortages caused by President Sukarno's non-alignment foreign policy and refusal of western aid.⁶⁴

⁶⁴Charles A. Gimon, "The Sukarno Years," Sejarah Indonesia, 2001, URL:< <http://www.gimonca.com/sejarah/sejarah09.shtml>>, accessed 22 May 2007.

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The increasing fragmentation of society caused by conflict between the steadily growing Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and the Nationalists resulted in what some people refer to as a civil war. However, civil war would be a romantic way to describe the counter coup led by General Suharto against a communist mutiny in the military that resulted in the deaths of six general officers and a few skirmishes in the vicinity of the capital. Indonesia's military nationalists were quick to consolidate control and institute martial law. The military and police under the direction of General Suharto and his supporters conducted a harsh anti-communist campaign that resulted in the deaths of at least 250,000 communists and has been described in a CIA report as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century.⁶⁵ Ironically, at this time the destruction of the communists did not threaten to tear the country apart but rather created a common enemy to form a greater sense of unity among the non-communist Indonesians. Following the coup and purge of the communists, President Sukarno's role as a figure head was no longer needed and he was retired to make way for a new and even more authoritarian regime.

The socialist authoritarian policies of President Sukarno's Guided Democracy were quickly replaced by the new policies of the Suharto Government known as the New Order. General Suharto understood the difficulties and dangers of the diversity of Indonesian society and initiated campaigns and programs to develop national unity. The military developed a parallel system of government that reached down to the village level

⁶⁵Department of Defense, "CIA in Indonesia," *Intellipedia*, URL:< https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Central_Intelligence_Agency#Indonesia>, accessed 1 April 2007.

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to ensure that unrest was detected early and controlled.⁶⁶ The authoritarian police state tactics that were used to maintain order and security were responsible for many internal protests and international criticisms but the end result was stability for over 30 years of the New Order Regime.

The New Order regime of President Suharto was certainly deserving of the criticism of human rights abuse and repression but it also created order and improved the quality of life for the majority of Indonesians. Over the 30-year span of the New Order regime, absolute poverty fell from 60% to 14%, the average life expectancy increased by 11 years, and infant mortality was cut in half.⁶⁷ These tangible improvements in life for the masses of Indonesia were important reasons for the longevity of the regime and the sudden end to this prosperity was one of the main factors in the government's demise.

RECENT UNREST

Within the last 10 years Indonesia has seen an increase in internal violence coinciding with a period that has encompassed the Asian Financial Crisis, the fall of the Suharto Government, four presidents with differing policy, and the Global War on Terrorism. Ethnic conflict is a regular part of human history and it should not be surprising that Indonesia experiences a proportionate level of ethnic violence resulting from ancient feuds, resource conflicts and native peoples' fear of loss of power due to transmigration. However, several regions of Indonesia have experienced unusually high

⁶⁶Kevin O'Rourke, *Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post Suharto Indonesia* (New South Wales, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2002), 9.

⁶⁷"Wake Up Call," *Asia Week*, 23 August 1996, URL:<<http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/96/0823/ed1.html>>, accessed 1 April 2007.

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levels of ethnic violence resulting in the loss of thousands of lives and tens of thousands of internally displaced persons.⁶⁸ See Figure 4 Principle Areas of Indonesian Unrest.

While the majority of the ethnic and religious conflicts identified by region and the activities of the Al-Qaeda associate group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are outside the scope of this thesis, the nationalist separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua can be examined using the model of success in East Timor. Although neither of these movements has been able to achieve the same level of success, similar factors do exist and a comparison of these will give some insight into the current situation and potential outcome in the near term.




Figure 4. Principal Areas of Indonesian Unrest

Source: Author, derived from, Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁶⁸Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.

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WEST PAPUA

The early years of Indonesian nationhood saw conflict caused by sovereignty issues over West Papua, also known as the province of Irian Jaya. The new government of Indonesia was adamant that all of the Netherlands East Indies territories be included in the Indonesian state. However, the Dutch insisted that West Papua be excluded during final negotiations. Negotiations stalled and the point remained an issue used by President Sukarno to mobilize popular support and unite the many divided factions in Indonesian politics. The Sukarno government threatened war with the Dutch and accepted aid and assistance from the Soviet Union to maneuver the western powers into supporting the Indonesian claim. Finally, in 1963 international pressure led to the Dutch exodus and occupation of West Papua by Indonesia.⁶⁹ The subsequent occupation and government programs for development and exploitation of natural resources led to one of the earliest organized resistance movements in West Papua known as the Free Papua Movement (OPM). Unlike Indonesia's previous internal conflicts, the agenda of the struggle was not to affect change in Indonesian government but was the expulsion of Indonesians and the formation of an independent state.⁷⁰

⁶⁹Edwin Aspinall and Mark T Berger, "The Break Up of Indonesia?" *Third World Quarterly* 22 no. 6 (2001): 1014.

⁷⁰Peter King, *West Papua & Indonesia Since Suharto* (Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press, 2004), 22.

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Population

The Melanesia people are a racially distinct group composed of many unique cultures that have inhabited West Papua for over 30,000 years. The difference in ethnic, cultural and religious heritage between Papuans and Javanese was a significant source of the arguments used by the Dutch to justify West Papua as an independent state and have become the basis for independence ideology.⁷¹ Native resistance to Indonesian administration developed among student groups and political elites before the Indonesian government officially took possession and this opposition spread through the country as its presence was felt.

The government policy supporting migration to West Papua and indoctrination in Indonesian culture increased the resistance of the native population to outsiders. The influx of Indonesian administrators, military personnel, immigrants and Chinese business people created a great cultural and economic separation within the society. The exploitation of timber and mineral wealth encroached upon the domain of many local communities increasing the animosity between Indonesians and Papuans. The majority of government and industrial jobs associated with the Indonesia occupation and development have gone to immigrants because of language and greater levels of education and this has also increased geographic and economic inequality between the populations. The Indonesian immigrants have created additional separation by treating the native people as second class or backwards people because of their traditional way of life. The province's population is currently estimated to be 34 to 40% non-Papuan and

⁷¹Bertrand, 147.

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this number is growing due to continued migration. This additional threat of becoming a minority resulting in greater cultural irrelevance has increased nationalist anger.⁷²

Sporadic guerrilla violence erupted shortly after occupation in 1962 and resulted in brutal suppression by the military and the deaths of 30,000 Papuans.⁷³ Oppressive population control measures have unified the native Papuans through hate and desire for self determination. Over 40 years of occupation, economic exclusion, labor and resource exploitation, and military oppression has resulted in an angry native population willing to support any organization offering change.

Leadership and Organization

The social structure of West Papua is not predisposed to the successful organization required to eject the Indonesian military or the formation of a cohesive independence movement. The people in the region represent over 250 different language groups and display many unique cultural practices. These fundamental differences have led to local conflict and the region has never been unified under a native government.

Although pro-independence sentiment is widespread throughout West Papua there is little organization of an independence movement similar to or even approaching those that can be considered successful models. Much of the pro-independence support is a result of poor government, corruption and discrimination and does not go beyond general hate for Indonesian intruders. Organizing this pro-independence sentiment is difficult

⁷²Blair A. King, *Peace in Papua: Widening a Window of Opportunity*, Council on Foreign Relations CSR no. 14, March 2006, 6.

⁷³Armstrong, 790.

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because of the historical ethnic divisions among the Papuan people and lack of a strong leader.⁷⁴

The OPM has attempted to organize resistance to the Indonesia occupation since 1964 and has a dedicated armed wing known as the National Liberation Army. Similar to the guerrilla fighters in East Timor, this group is poorly trained and equipped and represents no serious threat to the Indonesian Army. The guerrillas control no terrain and conduct small uncoordinated ambushes and attacks against police and small convoys. The guerrilla army is currently led by three independent commanders who control a few hundred fighters. The guerrilla fighters' importance to the resistance movement is as a symbol of resistance to help keep the idea alive and bring international attention.⁷⁵ Attempts to gain international attention have focused on attacking foreign tourists, researchers and industrial experts and have done more to hurt the movement than foster international sympathy.⁷⁶

Political organization is also hampered by ethnic divisions. While there are several groups of Papuan exiles who are working for international support and claim to be the official representatives of the people, much of their effort is spent criticizing and competing against each other. These groups have achieved a small level of success in neighboring Melanesian countries but they have failed to achieve recognition from any of the world's major powers. However, they have been successful at developing support among student groups, churches and a few parliamentarians in Australia, Sweden and

⁷⁴International Crisis Group, *Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions*, Asia Briefing 53, 5 September 2006, 4. Cited to hereafter as ICG, *Papua FAQ*.

⁷⁵ICG, *Papua FAQ*, 5.

⁷⁶"Free Papua Movement," *Global Security*, 17 December 2006, URL:<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/papua.htm>>, accessed 26 May 2007.

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Ireland.⁷⁷ Similar support was the beginning of international pressure in East Timor and if more atrocities and human rights violations become public it is likely these groups will be able to use this to develop more support for their cause.

Recent turmoil in Indonesia and secession of East Timor encouraged Papuan political elites to seek a similar political solution and abandon violent struggle. Following the fall of the New Order regime and referendum in East Timor many intellectuals and local native leaders came together and formed the Papuan People's Council. This council declared independence after the resignation of President Suharto and demonstrated an unusual amount of unity. Declarations of independence were ignored by the Indonesian government but the group was able to engage President Habibie in discussions over the future of the region. This unity was short lived and competing political organizations have emerged in the new era of negotiation and limited autonomy.⁷⁸ The continuing inability to form a single cohesive resistance movement similar to that of East Timor has prevented the West Papuans from becoming a military and political challenge to the Government of Indonesia.

Space and Environment

The terrain of West Papua is extremely rugged and has provided protection for the guerrillas but has also made organization and operations extremely difficult. The center of the island is dominated by a mountain range that has glaciated peaks exceeding 14,000 feet and most of the slopes and valleys are covered with dense forest. There is very little

⁷⁷"UN Review," *West Papua Action Home Page*, 30 September 2005, URL:<<http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/unreview/index.htm>>, accessed 22 May 2007.

⁷⁸ICG, *Papua FAQ*, 7.

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development away from the low lands and population centers and most of the interior is not accessible by road.⁷⁹

The rugged terrain has also resulted in numerous isolated tribal groups and villages. Many of these are primitive people living in small groups practicing subsistence farming or are hunter gatherer societies that still practice cannibalism.⁸⁰ While these groups have little impact on the current political situation their mere existence demonstrates how isolated some parts of the island are and the extreme cultural differences that are the source of internal ethnic conflict.

The physical terrain and undeveloped interior make it difficult for the Indonesian army to find and destroy the small bands of guerrilla fighters but also impedes the guerrillas' ability to organize and conduct operations beyond the tactical level. The rugged terrain has caused the Indonesia Army to concentrate on population and natural resource centers while small bands of guerrilla fighters continue to conduct operations in their native regions.

External Support

The OPM and people of West Papua have received moral support from many of their neighbors, fellow Melanesians, NGOs, student activists and church groups.⁸¹ Australia has granted asylum to Papuan political refugees creating strained relations between the countries and resulting in the temporary withdrawal of the Indonesian

⁷⁹*Google Earth*, URL:< <http://earth.google.com/>>, accessed 5 May 2007.

⁸⁰“Papua (Indonesia) – Primitive Tribes – Today Cannibals,” *Papua Trekking*, 2006, URL:< http://www.papuatrekking.com/cannibals_papua.html>, accessed 7 May 2007.

⁸¹Peter King, 171.

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Ambassador.⁸² While the Australian government has reaffirmed its desire for good political relations, the support for human rights has caused it and other western nations to provide moral support and legitimacy to the independence movement.

There is plenty of evidence to support the claim that the Indonesians have had a negative impact on some people of West Papua and that there have been human rights abuses in the conduct of occupation and control of the region.⁸³ However, there is no strong evidence to support claims of genocide or mass crimes against humanity made by some NGOs that would be needed to rally international support and condemnation to their cause.⁸⁴

Efforts by Papuan exiles to develop political support revolve around what was called the Act of Free Choice. This was a referendum over the question of integration and was conducted by the Indonesian government with chosen tribal leaders as part of the UN sanctioned transfer of authority. Opponents claim the vote was illegal and manipulated and is invalid or should be done again now that the population could be more effectively polled.⁸⁵ However, the vote and integration of West Papua with Indonesia was supported by UN mandates, western political maneuvering to keep Indonesia away from the communists, and historical border traditions established over hundreds of years of colonialism. Once West Papua became integrated with Indonesia

⁸²“Indonesian Ambassador Recalled,” *ABC News Online*, 24 March 2006, URL:< <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200603/s1600241.htm>>, accessed 17 May 2007.

⁸³Amnesty International, *Indonesia*, Amnesty International Indonesia Report 2003, 6 June 2003, URL:< <http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/idn-summary-eng>>, accessed 7 May 2007.

⁸⁴ICG, *Papua FAQ*, 8.

⁸⁵Aspinall and Berger, 1014.

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the interests of the Republic of Indonesia superseded the rights of native peoples and continued occupation set political and legal precedents that have remained unchallenged.

International support for the integration of Irian Jaya into the Republic of Indonesia is unwavering. Only the governments of Vanuatu, Nauru, and Tuvalu officially support a reassessment of Indonesian control based on the unreliability of the Act of Free Choice. No other national government or international agency advocates self-determination for the people of West Papua.⁸⁶ Indonesia argues that historical precedent, international treaties, UN resolutions, and the Act of Free Choice all support the current status. Most international political pressure is focused on human rights violations and does not question the legitimacy of the Indonesian claim. Therefore, even though West Papua and East Timor share a similar history of a short period of independence and Indonesian occupation and oppression, the West Papuans do not share the political legitimacy that was critical to the independence movement of East Timor.

The OPM also lacks significant material support from an international ally. While a few sympathetic nations provide shelter to some of the Papuan exiles it is in the capacity of refugees rather than in support of a government in exile. There is no evidence of military material aid being given to the guerrillas and the fact that many attacks are conducted with spears and arrows would support the conclusion that external material support does not exist. The rebels do enjoy popular support and receive aid from the local villages but in such a poor part of the world this amounts to subsistence supplies rather than what is needed to support military operations.

Ethnic bonds and connections provided a small level of sanctuary in Papua New Guinea early in the conflict. However, Papua New Guinea is also a struggling country

⁸⁶ICG, *Papua FAQ*, 8.

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and has determined that good relations with Indonesia or avoiding retaliation were more important than supporting West Papuans.⁸⁷ Therefore what little support that can be credited to Papua New Guinea has more to do with traditional tribal and ethnic relations than a serious attempt to destabilize Indonesian control of West Papua.

Timing

The progress of the West Papuan independence movement is a good example of failed insurgency. The latent incipient phase was well developed because of the anger of a native population being threatened and disenfranchised by an occupying force. The occupation unified the natives with the idea of independence. Small parts of the population were willing to fight the occupying force while political elites argued the legitimacy of the independent state. Low levels of violence were perpetrated by a few dedicated fighters while a large percentage of the population participated in acts of civil disobedience. The premature escalation into the guerrilla warfare phase was brutally suppressed resulting into a return to the latent incipient phase in the majority of the province. The ebb and flow between high levels of latent incipient and guerrilla warfare have continued for 40 years but the insurgency has never progressed because of a lack of organization and external support.

There have been few notable cases of large-scale uprisings involving thousands of natives resulting in temporary occupation of terrain. While these were encouraged by OPM leaders, they were poorly organized regional events that were anomalies rather than indications of deliberate progression of a three phase insurgency. Under the New Order government these few uprisings were crushed with indiscriminate use of modern

⁸⁷Peter King, 172.

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weapons resulting in hundreds of casualties.⁸⁸ Some of the brutal counter insurgency methods did receive public attention and condemnation but the unorganized resistance was unable to use this to further their cause and there was no change in the official stance on independence.

The collapse of the New Order government and secession of East Timor invigorated the independence movement of West Papua but it also led most to openly support independence through dialog rather than violence. Successive Indonesian administrations have negotiated and offered autonomy and made promises to resolve the long-standing grievances of the Papuan people. However the native population has seen little improvement in their situation and the cycle of dissatisfaction and violence has continued. While this uncoordinated violence continues to demonstrate a high level of discontent in the native population the leadership remains fractured and inhibits and chance of military or political progression. Until the Papuan people and leadership become well organized they will never be more than one of the angry and violent minorities that have plagued Indonesia throughout its history and are easily controlled by a military heavily experienced in counter insurgency and population control measures.

ACEH

The region of Aceh has more in common with the majority population of Indonesia than it does with the other secessionist regions. The people speak many of the same languages and share cultural and historical experiences. The main differences and rallying points for the Acehnese nation are their Muslim history, a stronger attachment to

⁸⁸Bertrand, 149.

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fundamental Islamic principles, and longer period of independence and occasional dominance in the region over the last 500 years. This Muslim history also has created a greater adherence to Islam that has been one of the principle sources of internal conflict since Indonesian independence after World War Two.⁸⁹

Militant Acehese Muslim groups clashed with government forces during the formation of the Sukarno Government, the civil war period, and other small regional uprisings. Until the 1970s the goals of these groups were not focused on independence or autonomy. The conflicts were revolutionary and caused by disagreements over the role of Islam in government or policies that were offensive to the Acehese people.⁹⁰ In the mid 1970s the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was formed in response to feelings of exploitation of the people and natural resources of the region.⁹¹ The intent of this group was the formation of an independent Acehese state and it made no effort to reform the operation of the Indonesian government

Population

The people of Aceh share an Acehese identity that is founded on religion and recent shared experience. The Islam practiced in Aceh is much more traditional and devout than that practiced in other parts of Indonesia. There is broad support for religious leaders and the desire for Sharia law is strong within the population. This disparity of religion differentiates the Acehese from other Indonesians and creates part of their nationalist identity.

⁸⁹Bertrand, 161.

⁹⁰Armstrong, 794.

⁹¹Aspinall, 1017.

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The second half of the Acehese identity and nationalism is based on their modern history. Aceh was a regional power and maintained its independence from Dutch colonialism much longer than other regions. The Dutch finally gained control in 1903 but allowed a level of self administration. This colonial experience and resistance to Japanese occupation during World War Two unified the people and created the roots of modern Acehese nationalism.⁹²

The Acehese were strong supporters of an Indonesian state and fought for the creation of a republic after World War Two instead of seeking an independent Aceh. During the civil war the Acehese and many Muslim organizations were strong supporters of General Suharto because of his opponent's communist ties and secular policies. Following both of these periods the Acehese Muslims were expecting the government to officially adapt Muslim values into the Indonesia constitution as a reward for their support. However, in both cases and throughout the New Order period the government chose secularism and minimized the influence of Islam on Indonesian politics. These policies further segregated the Acehese and created greater support for Acehese nationalism and separation.⁹³

Similar to the grievances of the Papua people, in Aceh there are accusations of poor government, corruption, increasing poverty, poor health care and education systems and inhumane population control measures. The final affront and the catalyst for the creation of GAM was the realization that the region's oil wealth was being exploited for the benefit of people outside of Aceh. The region's oil wealth offered solutions to many of the region's problems and the demand for greater control of these revenues has been a

⁹²Armstrong, 793.

⁹³Bertrand, 163.

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pillar of the independence and autonomy advocates.⁹⁴ The hope that an independent Aceh would become an oil rich state and lead to an improved quality of life was a simple but strong reason for the majority of the population to support the goals of GAM.

Leadership and Organization

The nationalist separatist movement in Aceh is much better organized than the movement in West Papua. Estimated strength of the Guerrilla force is slightly over 5,000 with strong active and passive supporters throughout the province.⁹⁵ The military organization of the movement has taken on the appearance of a well organized command structure with units and chains of command going from regional down to the village level. However, the command structure relies on local commanders and units and cannot be considered a true military hierarchy because of parochial loyalties. Factional disputes among village and regional guerrilla units were a problem throughout the conflict and impeded the organizations ability to conduct large scale offensives and coordinated operations.⁹⁶ While the guerrillas did have many successes against the government forces and were able to control small sections of the province during portions of the struggle the lack of centralized control of combatants and charismatic leadership was part of the reason the movement never evolved into the advanced stages of guerrilla warfare or the war of movement.

⁹⁴Kristen E. Schulze, *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization* (Washington, DC: East West Center, 2004), 15.

⁹⁵“The Other Side to Aceh’s Rebels,” *Asia Times Online*, 22 July 2003, URL:<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EG22Ae05.html>, accessed 8 May 2007.

⁹⁶Schulze, 21.

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The political organization of GAM is much more successful than the West Papuan's and could be considered equal to that of the East Timorese resistance. Political elites established a government in exile in Sweden and developed a strategy of internationalization of their cause. In post Suharto Indonesia, the government in exile has been successful at gaining international assistance in brokering a peace process that has resulted in deals for autonomy in exchange for demilitarization of GAM.

The recent victory for GAM supported candidates in open elections held on 11 December 2006 demonstrates a surprising level of organization throughout the region. Infighting seen recently within GAM made many experts speculate that the organization was being destroyed by internal conflict and would fragment into separate factions in this election.⁹⁷ However, GAM and allied Acehnese political groups actively campaigned and organized the population during the period leading up to the elections. Although there were two main candidates supported by different factions of Acehnese nationalists the subsequent victory demonstrates a well coordinated political organization with supporters at all levels of society. While the democratic victory can be explained by general anti Indonesian sentiment, without the organization of the nationalist groups a significant victory would have been unlikely against the money and influence wielded by the Indonesian supported candidates.⁹⁸

⁹⁷International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh*, Asia Report 61, 22 March 2007, 2. Cited hereafter as ICG, *How GAM Won*.

⁹⁸ICG, *How GAM Won*, 6.

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Space and Environment

The terrain of Aceh is similar to East Timor and West Papua. The interior is mountainous with peaks reaching 5,000 feet and many valleys and alluvial plains covered with thick vegetation. This creates an environment that is difficult to coordinate operations and the lack of well developed infrastructure makes the movement and support of large forces outside of population centers complex. This physical terrain is ideal for small guerrilla groups to resist government forces with ambushes and surprise attacks on police outposts, minimizing the government's material advantages.

The distribution of population also favors the insurgent group. The large amount of substance agriculture throughout the region provides support and cover for GAM operations that is extremely difficult to control. Without being able to manage movement of the rural population or separate it from the insurgent fighters it is unlikely that the Indonesian military will be able to completely destroy the small guerrilla units that are responsible for the majority of GAM attacks.

While the terrain is advantageous to a rural mass based insurgency most of the advantages have been minimized by massive and brutal Indonesian counter insurgency methods. Martial law was imposed during the most violent years of the insurgency and as many as 45,000 Indonesian soldiers have been deployed to support local police.⁹⁹ These conventional forces have been able to control the key economic and population terrain and suppress large scale unrest and rioting. Specialized anti-guerrilla units were developed to pursue insurgents and Special Forces developed local militias to counter GAM's rural operations.

⁹⁹Armstrong, 800.

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External Support

The basis for moral support of the Free Aceh Movement is the colonial guilt that many other oppressed groups have used to justify western aid. The idea that the Acehnese people have been denied their rights to self determination because of colonial occupation is a major part of their argument for legitimacy.¹⁰⁰ The Acehnese demand for self determination has received moral support from the many non governmental groups that support the Wilsonian Doctrine of Self Determination. However, the UN and governments with the power to influence Indonesia support Indonesian's claim of sovereignty over the region. The moral support and associated legitimacy comes primarily from support for human rights in response to publication of atrocities. This support revolves around the idea that if Indonesia commits crimes against this population it has no right to govern them. However, most international response to the human rights strategy has been to pressure Indonesia to improve human rights rather than relinquish Aceh.

Most political support seen for the Acehnese independence movement has not been in the form of support for independence but rather support for peaceful resolution of the conflict through negotiations with the government of Indonesia. This peace process was central to GAM's strategy of internationalization of the conflict by involving outsiders states in negotiations. Representatives of GAM lobbied the UN and prominent human rights groups for assistance in discussions with the Government of Indonesia to develop legitimacy. International supporters were lured into discussions with the belief that they were helping to restore peace when the leaders of GAM were actually seeking

¹⁰⁰Armstrong, 793.

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world attention and an East Timor like solution.¹⁰¹ This strategy has been very successful for GAM in advancing their cause because by receiving support from the UN, the EU, and the U.S. for the peace agreement they have achieved a level of legitimacy that has been used to invigorate the cause and rally unorganized resistance groups and ethnic factions.

The primary source of political support and organization for GAM has been the Swiss based Henry Dunant Center (HDC) also known as the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. Since 1999 this organization has been involved in a peace process that has included official and unofficial dignitaries from 16 nations and promises of support from the U.S., Japan, and the World Bank.¹⁰² GAM has been able to achieve legitimacy and advance many of its goals through this political process under the pretense of seeking peace rather and independence.

The Free Aceh Movement does not have a major external supporter for material aid. Several hundred fighters received training in the late 1980s from Libya but there have been no other reports of state sponsorship or material aid.¹⁰³ Most of GAM's funding comes from internal taxation, criminal activity, donations, and kidnappings. GAM supports its local operations through internal taxation and extortion of small business and international corporations with operations in Aceh. Donations come from Acehnese expatriates mostly living in Malaysia and there is no evidence of funding coming from state sponsors. Criminal activity in the form of kidnapping, extortion, and

¹⁰¹Schulze, 53.

¹⁰²"Aceh, Indonesia," *Centre for Humanitarian Dialog*, URL:< [http://www hdcentre.org/Aceh,%20Indonesia%20-%20Activities](http://www.hdcentre.org/Aceh,%20Indonesia%20-%20Activities)>, accessed 17 May 2007.

¹⁰³Tamara Renee Shie, *Indonesia's Aceh Conflict in Perspective*, Monograph, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1 February 2005), 4.

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drug trafficking also provides large amounts funding. It is estimated that 30% of all of South East Asia's marijuana comes from Aceh. Evidence shows that GAM is involved in the drug trafficking but it is uncertain what amount of the total industry it controls. It is clear that drug trafficking is a source of income and an important method used to acquire weapons and military supplies.¹⁰⁴ The political leadership in Sweden denies any involvement in criminal activity and this can be interpreted as either propaganda or inability to exert control over the local military commanders

Sanctuary in sympathetic countries has been limited to Sweden where the Acehese government in exile has operated for almost 30 years and many of the members have become naturalized citizens.¹⁰⁵ Malaysia has accepted a large expatriate population that has been able to unofficially support GAM members who have been forced to flee Aceh. The members of the government in exile have been able to travel freely to solicit support and participate in peace negotiations in many other countries but this freedom of movement can be viewed more as a toleration or lack of interest rather than sanctuary.

Adjacent sanctuary where guerrillas can organize and prepare for operations has not been available to GAM. Aceh is similar to East Timor in that its location is bordered by Indonesia or ocean. While some lodging has been provided by expatriates in Malaysia, this is not sanctioned by the government and is not sufficient to prepare for large scale military operations or provide logistical support.

¹⁰⁴Schulze, 24.

¹⁰⁵Lars Bevanger, "Aceh Rebels at Home in Stockholm," *BBC News*, 9 June 2003, URL:<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2976868.stm>>, accessed 26 May 2007.

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Timing

The latent incipient phase and general dissatisfaction with the government of Indonesia has been a regular part of Acehese society since the early years of President Suharto's New Order government. Very little has been done in rural areas to advance education, healthcare, or develop infrastructure. Authorities have been unresponsive to Acehese complaints and have resorted to brutal population control measures. Approximately 70% of the population is involved in agriculture while many better jobs associated with government or the exploitation of natural resources have been given to Indonesian immigrants or foreign contractors.¹⁰⁶

Dissatisfied Acehese intellectual elites began to organize under the name of the Aceh Sumatra Liberation front in 1976 and this quickly evolved into the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Initially this organization was limited to propaganda rallies and flag raisings and was quickly destroyed by the Indonesian military. During the 1980s GAM reorganized itself into an underground organization with considerable military and popular support. The active rebels numbered about 750, received training in Libya and in 1989 began attacking Indonesian security forces.¹⁰⁷

A low level insurgency with small scale guerrilla action persisted but was effectively suppressed with extremely harsh counter insurgency campaigns that involved many human rights abuses by the Indonesian army. In the short term these measures were very effective at destroying the active insurgents but in the long term these actions created greater discontent and an enlarged number of passive supporters.

¹⁰⁶Bertrand, 170.

¹⁰⁷Huxley, 35.

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The sudden collapse of President Suharto's New Order Government after over 25 years of oppression and neglect had an immediate effect on the stability of Aceh. The Acehnese people were not interested in reform and renegotiation of status, they sought justice and self determination. Large demonstrations and demands for removal of Indonesian army and police soon turned into renewed attacks executed by a motivated and well organized guerilla force. The Indonesian army's response to the sudden surge in violence was the usual over reaction that created much more civilian suffering and increased support for independence.

The next three presidents of Indonesia struggled with the desire for reform and democratization but were constrained by Indonesian nationalists and the military's political influence. President Habibie apologized to the Acehnese people and tried to reorganize the military in Aceh but these efforts did little to change to situation and end human rights abuses. The lack of progress and reform for Aceh resulted in the growth of political groups and the demand for a referendum on independence similar to the one that had recently been granted to East Timor. President Habibie rejected the demands for a referendum and recommendations to pursue justice in the cases of human rights abuses under President Suharto.¹⁰⁸ The result was the Indonesian government's credibility quickly evaporated and violent resistance and support for GAM increased. This led to more attacks on security forces and caused many more civilian casualties due to the Indonesian army's counter insurgency methods.

President Habibie's successor, President Wahid, attempted to negotiate a solution without success. Three peace settlements were agreed to by both sides but with no long term success. Similar to President Habibie, Wahid was constrained by a powerful

¹⁰⁸Bertrand, 175.

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military with interests in the economic control of Aceh and unity of Indonesia. Even though Wahid was able to exercise more control over the military than his predecessor, it was not enough to change course in Aceh and the cycle of insurgent violence escalated.¹⁰⁹ Additional units of heavily armed and specially trained counter insurgency units were deployed. These units had short-term effects while Special Forces units organized militias to terrorize local populations.¹¹⁰

The successful democratic election of President Yudhoyono in October of 2004 was the first sign that positive change toward Aceh could occur. Yudhoyono was the first democratically elected leader in the history of Indonesia and in his inauguration speech he stressed the need for reform.¹¹¹ His subsequent efforts to remove the military from politics, place it under civilian control, eliminate military run businesses in occupied territories, and develop western style professionalism have demonstrated a serious desire for change. His government negotiated with the GAM and on 15 August 2005 signed a peace treaty that promised regional autonomy in exchange for demilitarization of GAM.¹¹² Elections held in December 2006 that have been declared free and fair by EU observers resulted in the election of a GAM supported politician to the office of provincial governor.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹Bertrand, 180.

¹¹⁰Lesley McCulloch, "Militia Mayhem in Strife-Torn Aceh," *Asia Times Online*, 5 July 2002, URL:< http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/DG05Ae02.html>, accessed 9 May 2007.

¹¹¹"Presidents Inauguration Speech," *Jakarta Post*, 21 October 2004, URL:< http://www.thejakartapost.com/sby_speech.asp>, accessed 17 May 2007.

¹¹²"Aceh Rebels Sign Peace Agreement," *BBC News*, 15 August 2005, URL:< <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4151980.stm>>, accessed 16 May 2007.

¹¹³"Statement of Preliminary Findings," *European Union Election Observation Mission Aceh 2006/2007*, 6 March 2007, URL:< http://www.eueomaceh.org/Files/PS_2nd_round_ENG.pdf>, accessed 18 May 2007.

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While peace without independence may be acceptable to many people inside and outside of Aceh, to the dedicated nationalist it is only a chance to advance the cause and prepare for the next battle. Previous peace agreements in Aceh have only provided the rebels a chance to reorganize and rearm and the military leaders of Indonesia are not likely to be fooled. However, clever concessions and offers of autonomy will be likely to fragment the movement into its practical and fanatical supporters. Some observers may convince themselves that the conflict is over, but until Aceh is an independent state there will always be a group of nationalists waiting for a new crisis to renegotiate the influence of Indonesia.

COMPARISON OF KEY FACTORS

The comparison of key factors in Indonesia's recent various insurgencies shows some similarities but they are not identical and this can explain their levels of success. See Table 3. Comparison of Indonesia National Separatist Groups.

Popular support for all of these insurgencies is strong and unsurprising. Without it these struggles would not be under consideration for comparison here. While this seems obvious in the context of this study it should be noted that Indonesia has suffered from many other violent struggles that do not have the same level of popular support that has been seen in the regions discussed here. For example, the Islamic insurgent group Jemaah Islamiyah is notorious for the Bali bombings that killed over 200 people. However, this group is considered an extremist organization and does not enjoy popular support evidenced by the government's success against it.

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Factor	East Timor	Aceh	West Papua
Popular Support	Strong Nationalist support, People unified by poor treatment of natives, Brutal population control measures	Strong Nationalist support, People unified by poor treatment of natives, Brutal population control measures, and exploitation of natural resources	Strong Nationalist support, People unified by poor treatment of natives, Brutal population control measures, and exploitation of natural resources
Space and Environment	Supports tactical guerrilla warfare	Supports tactical guerrilla warfare and rural mass based insurgency	Supports tactical guerrilla warfare
Leadership and Organization	Charismatic Leaders, Government in Exile Marxist Vanguard	Government in Exile Religious ideology and organization Ethnic tribal hierarchy	250+ Ethnic groups Uncoordinated Guerrilla groups Multiple competing political parties
Support			
Moral	Humanitarian NGO, United Nations, Former Portuguese Colonies, Some EU, Australia	Humanitarian NGO, Student Christian, Islamic NGO	Australia, Melanesian Ethnic, NGO, Dutch
Political	UN, U.S. Australia, UK, Portugal	NGO, minor international support	Humanitarian NGO
Material	Internal logistical support and battlefield recovery of military material	Strong Internal Military Material Purchased through black market	Internal logistical support and battlefield recovery of military material
Sanctuary	Government in Exile in Africa and UN	Government in Exile in Sweden, expatriates in Malaysia	Expatriate groups in adjacent countries
Value and Motivation	Pride, monetary and human investment, National Integrity	Natural Gas, Strategic location National integrity	Gold, Copper, Timber, Natural gas, National integrity

Table 2. Comparison of Indonesian Nationalist Separatist Groups

Source: Author

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This study assesses that the rugged terrain and dispersal of an agrarian population makes these regions ideal for a rural mass based insurgency. The environment for all of these struggles would have proved ideal if supported by other factors. However, the lack of material aid and adjacent sanctuaries severely limited the insurgents' ability challenge the Indonesian military and conduct operations beyond the tactical level. The brutality and size of the Indonesian occupation forces also severely limited the advantage of terrain.

The comparison chart demonstrates the importance of organization against a strong government willing to become engaged in long term counter insurgency efforts to control a rebellious region. There is a direct relationship between success and insurgencies with well organized command structures and strong leaders. All of the struggles had stories of successful guerilla commanders who had localized successes in battles against security forces. However without unification and centralized direction their victories were isolated incidents that provided little to the progress of the insurgency. In contrast, insurgencies with well developed organizations directed by strong leaders and following a well defined strategy were able to achieve much greater strategic success even in the absence of significant guerrilla successes.

The table shows that the main factor that was critical to the East Timorese and is lacking in the other regions is the political support and legitimacy of the claim for independence. The UN mandates, history of forceful occupation, and Indonesia's oppression of the population led to broad acceptance that East Timor had a right to self determination. Indonesia has received condemnation for harsh population control

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measures but in no other case is there precedence for Independence based on UN resolutions or illegal occupation. Therefore the resulting support for other causes has been in the form of attempts to reform Indonesians human rights violations rather than support independence. Indonesia's current role in the GWOT has seen reaffirmation of its territorial rights by all of the powers that were instrumental in East Timor's case for independence. It is unlikely that this political support for the Republic of Indonesia will change in the near future and this will invalidate the East Timorese strategy for other insurgent groups.

Without political support from major powers or allies of the Government of Indonesia, the remaining options are compromise or military focused insurgency. The comparison table highlights the fact that sanctuaries and material aid needed to challenge the army of Indonesia are lacking. This leaves only one immediate option for Nationalist Separatists. The option of compromise and partial resolution of grievances has recently seen progress in Aceh. This will allow the Acehnese to organize and prepare for another attempt at forceful succession from Indonesia at a future time of crisis or weakness. The Papuans still lack the organization to be able to present a unified front for negotiations. The Indonesian government has made promises and conducted limited agreements with separate Papuan groups and has effectively divided the strength of the independence movement.

The final comparison involves the motivations of the Indonesian Government. While there are many parallels in the agendas, strategies, and situations of the insurgencies, the agenda and motivation of the Government of Indonesia has been different in each case. East Timor was forcefully acquired by an authoritarian regime and

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in retrospect its divestiture is not surprising. Aceh and West Papua have much stronger ties to Indonesian sovereignty and are much more important to the economy and identity of the Republic. Therefore, it can be expected that the Government of Indonesia would make greater efforts to maintain control of these regions and all of the identified factors for success would need to be stronger to achieve independence.

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CHAPTER 5

PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE

Eight years have past since the independence of East Timor and it appears that democratic reforms are successfully addressing the grievances of separatist organizations, making the possibility of the collapse of Indonesia unlikely. The increasing importance of Indonesia to the U.S. as an ally in the GWOT, as a point of leverage with other growing Asian economies, and as a guarantor of trade routes makes it even more unlikely that Indonesia will be allowed to collapse. However, few predicted the Asian financial crisis and a series of events that provided the opportunity for East Timor to succeed where others had failed. Indonesia's ethnic, physical, and economic environment makes it vulnerable to many unexpected events that could have surprising results. No one predicted the tsunami that struck the region in late 2004 and resulted in thousands of deaths but can also be credited with bringing attention and aid to the situation in Aceh. While some of these situations may be unpredictable and unique others can be examined based on historical case studies and analysts can develop logical conclusions regarding current events and make educated predictions.

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CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has examined the successful East Timorese nationalist separatist movement and compared it against two less successful insurgencies in Indonesia to assess the hypothesis of: The conditions that led to the successful independence of East Timor from Indonesia were unique to East Timor at the time of secession and can not be used to predict future instability. The following conclusions are derived from the comparison of the historical situations.

The successful insurgency and subsequent Independence in East Timor was the result of a combination circumstances and factors that is not present in other separatist regions. Therefore the secession of East Timor not does predict the progress and success of other Indonesian insurgencies.

The political legitimacy of East Timor's claim to independence was critical to its final success and no other insurgency has similar support. The human rights violations in East Timor were extreme, approximately 200,000 people died during the 30 years of Indonesian occupation out of a population of 600,000 at the time of the invasion.¹¹⁴ While other regions of Indonesia have experienced brutal counter insurgency programs, no other region has seen the same level of destruction that caused the final wave of support that led to international intervention. Current military reforms and offers of regional autonomy have also invalidated the East Timorese strategy of insurgency in Indonesia.

¹¹⁴Asia, "Freedom at Midnight," *Economist*, 18 May 2002, 40-41.

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The referendum on East Timor happened at a moment of crisis within the government of Indonesia and it will take a similar state threatening crisis to create new opportunities for other secessionist movements.

President Habibie attempted to make reforms in response to internal and external pressures following the collapse of the Suharto government. The current government of Indonesia has made significant reforms and is continuing to evolve into a system that is much more acceptable to its western partners. These reforms are likely to limit external condemnation of its population control measures and will also likely appease sections of the discontented population and do much to weaken the support of nationalist separatist movements.

East Timor was a liability to Indonesia and was jettisoned because it had been a burden and showed no signs of improving. Aceh and West Papua are much more valuable to the Republic of Indonesia and will not see similar opportunities.

East Timor represented less than one percent of Indonesia's population and land mass. It produced little for the country and cost more each year in lives and resources of the Indonesian military. However, the region of West Papua represents 22 percent of Indonesia's land mass, contains over four percent of the population, and has two of the largest copper and gold mines in the world. Aceh also represents greater proportions of population and land mass and is even more important because of its natural gas reserves that have been estimated to be some of the largest fields in the world.¹¹⁵ These two regions not only pay for themselves and large parts of the Indonesian economy through the extraction of natural resources but they also represent much larger sections of the

¹¹⁵Energy Information Administration, *Indonesia Country Analysis Brief*, July 2004, URL:<<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/indonesia.html#gas>>, accessed 18 May 2007.

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country. Unlike East Timor, the secession of one of these regions would be a major blow to the integrity of the state. This disparity in value to the Republic of Indonesia supports the first conclusion that some parallels between the insurgencies can be found, however, conclusions about overall success should be avoided because of these differences in critical points.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

This thesis provides three additional points that may be applicable to future questions associated with insurgency and Indonesia. First, the insurgent strategy in East Timor is a variation of fourth generation warfare and may be seen in other similar special situations any where in the world. Second, greater understanding of the practices and mindsets of the Indonesian government observed in this case study may help in analysis of future Indonesia questions. Third, the government of Indonesian has conducted denial and deception against western powers in the past and these practices must be considered in future evaluation of situations involving policy towards Indonesia.

Insurgent Strategy

Although the strategy of the East Timorese Independence Movement is no longer valid within Indonesia it can be used to analyze similar movements seeking reform or independence in other oppressive authoritarian states. It can be seen from this and other examples cited in this thesis that there is a certain combination of factors that will make a state vulnerable to this less traditional strategy. These factors can be broadly summed up

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as: dissatisfied minority, excessive human rights violations, and a government vulnerable to external pressure.

The discontented population that is willing to take action for change and accept risk of prison or death is always a requirement for insurgency. However, in the East Timor model the insurgent is often faced with excessively brutal counter insurgency methods and therefore will require an unusually brave or desperate segment of the population to maintain the activity required to gain international intervention.

Fortunately for these groups, with modern media and communications equipment a few atrocities can be recorded and transmitted throughout the world. The most powerful and influential states are so well connected to the world media that sensational videos and stories spread quickly and are often played non-stop on the 24-hour news channels. East Timor demonstrated that small groups of active supporters are able to bait security forces into atrocities that can be recorded and transmitted to outside observers. The sudden outrage at learning of these acts is the first step in achieving the massive sympathy and support that is the foundation of this strategy.

Human rights violations that are a regular part of the occupation are a required element to this strategy. It is also important that these violations are viewed as a very bad government oppressing an innocent population. One of the key events in the East Timor insurgency was the video of Indonesian soldiers firing into a crowd of unarmed people attending a funeral. This attack was one of many that demonstrated an oppressive system and developed external support for action against a morally offensive situation. In contrast, the Chinese government's violent suppression of the students in Tiananmen Square generated a significant amount of shock and outrage from outside observers,

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however, it was viewed as a single act and created a limited amount of outrage that subsided when no additional acts occurred.

Insurgencies must be extremely careful about their own attacks against the government because if they take on the label of a terrorist group it can invalidate the feelings of outrage felt by outside observers. For example, there is very little public outrage in the U.S. over the ongoing battles in the Middle East when children are killed in the bombings of terrorist safe houses. It is tolerated because these are attacks against insurgents labeled as terrorists who are often shown beheading captives and killing hundreds in random attacks. The insurgent groups in Indonesia were able to avoid the designation of Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and this was very important to subsequent toleration and aid. However other groups have not been so clever and by conducting terrorist acts against international civilian targets have earned a place on the U.S. State Department FTO list.¹¹⁶ By doing this they have failed to follow the East Timor strategy and eliminated all chance of political support from anyone who does not want to be labeled a state sponsor of terror. Additionally, their international financing and propaganda systems are subject to attack from law enforcement in countries participating in the GWOT.

The third factor of being vulnerable to outside influences is very open to interpretation because every government is vulnerable to some level of influence from economic sanctions to total war. These vulnerabilities are what limit the East Timor strategy to success in only a few special circumstances. If East Timor had been a part of China or Russia it is doubtful if any amount of external influence would have allowed

¹¹⁶“Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs),” *U.S. State Department*, 11 October 2005, URL:<<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm>>, accessed 16 May 2007.

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their independence. Retaliation from Russia or China would also probably have prevented external powers from making the threats that they did. Indonesia's reliance on western financing and friendship put it in a position where it was vulnerable to external economic pressures. The situation in Darfur, Sudan is an example of similar external pressures failing because Sudan is not as vulnerable to the level of influence being used by the west. These influences are really questions of national interest and international politics and only loosely tied to separatist insurgency. The question for insurgents is how to convince the external powers to exert their influence in support of the separatist cause. Fundamentally, if external forces can be convinced to threaten national interests greater than the interests involved in retention of the separatist region they will likely cause the state to relinquish the territory or reform their occupation practices.

The East Timorese strategy is unlike the current insurgencies in Iraq and Chechnya and most other insurgencies for the last 50 years that are described as Fourth Generation Warfare. Fourth generation warfare is defined as, "an evolved form of insurgency that, uses of all available networks, political, economic, social, and military – to convince the enemies political decision makers that their strategic goals are unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit."¹¹⁷ In this reverse proxy strategy of insurgency practiced successfully by East Timor and Kosovo, efforts to affect the occupation government's decision makers had totally failed and new efforts were targeted at influential institutions outside of the conflict. Success was not achieved by breaking the will of the occupier but by instigating action from an even more powerful sympathizer.

¹¹⁷Thomas X. Hammes, Colonel USMC (Ret.), "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves," *Military Review*, May-June 2007, 14.

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While this new strategy is not common and is very situational dependant, it has given other insurgencies encouragement that their struggles may not be in vain. Both the Papuans and Acehnese modified their efforts after the independence of East Timor and other movements in the Balkans, Eurasia, and the Middle East have shown greater levels of propaganda and information warfare efforts aimed at the manipulation of external powers.¹¹⁸ Nationalist separatists have not been the only ones to observe the value of this strategy. Authoritarian regimes have taken notice of the fate of evil empires and human rights violators and have responded to the threats of intervention by western democracies. When observed as a group, these authoritarian states have shown greater polarization into enhanced authoritarian regimes or states embracing slight democratic reforms.

Indonesian Military Reform

There has been great change in Indonesia since the end of the New Order era and the last few years have seen much reform in the Indonesian military. This reform is important for analysts to understand because it was the military's population control measures in separatist regions that were responsible for much of the anger and discontent that led to the insurgencies. Even though President Yudhoyono has made many statements about the need to reform the military and there have been steps to accomplish this, analysts must remember that this is a president that was once a high ranking member of the army and numerous senior military officers are likely to remain in positions of authority after President Yudhoyono has left office.

¹¹⁸Timothy L. Thomas, *Cyber Silhouettes* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2005), 211.

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The greatest change to the Indonesian military that will likely have an impact on all future policy is the removal of the military from seats in the parliament. This will reduce the conflicting interests of military leaders influencing decisions for the sake of what is good for the military rather than what is good for the country. Parochialism is a normal part of politics but the military's involvement in Indonesia was unique because of its mechanisms for self financing. This caused it to take greater interest in regions from the perspective of exploitation rather than serving the good of the people. The budget of the Indonesian military is rather small on paper because approximately 75% of its funding comes from military operated businesses. These take on the forms of complex regional businesses and in some cases have greater similarities to organized crime syndicates. For example, the coffee industry in East Timor that represented over \$100 million in trade was controlled by the regional military commanders and therefore their desire to maintain control of the region has more to do with furthering personal interests rather than serving a nation.¹¹⁹ These military businesses are practiced in all parts of Indonesia and can explain why there was great resistance from military politicians toward relinquishing any level of control in separatist regions. In 2004, President Yudhoyono passed a law that required the military to withdraw from all economic activity within five years. This is one of the first steps in creating greater control and accountability over the military. However, there are many unofficial and criminal organizations that support the military and provide personal profit for its members. It is unlikely that these will be

¹¹⁹O'Rourke, 257

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willingly abandoned and will continue to create a conflict of interest in military-civilian relations.¹²⁰

By removing the military from politics and reducing its ability to generate its own funds, the Yudhoyono Government has taken steps to take control of the military establishment and make it dependant on the civilian government instead of the relationship as a business partner and sometimes overlord that existed for over 30 years of the New Order Government. While this officially removes military leaders from political power, these men certainly still have their business connections and traditional power relationships and will remain influential. These moves combined with anti corruption campaigns have reduced the power of groups that have controlled Indonesia for generations. The political control and economic activities that have been developed over the last 30 years are unlikely to be erased by a few years of reform, making it likely these power groups will attempt to regain their influence. While the recent reforms of the military appear to have created progress in the resolution of many of the nationalist separatist conflict the question remains of what the long term effects will be in these local issues and in the bigger picture of democratic reform.

Since the fall of the New Order Government the Indonesian military has made efforts to improve its professionalism. While the U.S. Congress has continued to place limitations on support to Indonesia because of the conduct of its military in separatist regions, the current bilateral agreements with the U.S. are designed to increase regional security and professionalize the military. The Indonesian military has a long history of U.S. material and training assistance and currently is receiving training under the

¹²⁰Lisa Misol, "Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic Activities," *Human Rights Watch*, 18 no 5, June 2006, 16.

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International Military Education Training (IMET) program. This system trains foreign military leaders on human rights, democratic values, and military professionalism. Indonesia also receives spare parts, funding for GWOT programs, and general economic support funds to improve its military and police.¹²¹

Although the Indonesians have had great success against the Islamists movements, its human rights record remains poor. Support from the U.S. to the New Order regime was controversial because there was little attempt from the Indonesians to change their undemocratic police state practices. Currently, U.S. aid is being used to further democracy and create stability in what is considered an important battlefield in the GWOT. After 30 years of strict military control it can be expected that there will be institutional inertia but there is evidence of true lessons learned and an attempt to change. For example, in the last few years of fighting in Aceh, the army reversed its practice of isolating the region from the media and emulated U.S. Military programs of imbedded media to counter enemy propaganda and provide transparency.¹²²

While transparency and accountability are an important part of the evolution of the Republic of Indonesia there are other areas that should be watched closely to gauge the military's removal from politics and commitment to human rights. Indonesians Special Forces have often been the source of political activity combined with human rights crimes. These Special Forces were not rouge elements out of control in far flung regions, instead they were the weapon of choice of the political leadership to manipulate

¹²¹Adam O'Brien, "U.S. Indonesian Military Relationships," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 3 October 2005, URL:< http://www.cfr.org/publication/8964/usindonesian_military_relationship.html>, accessed 21 May 2007.

¹²²Prangtip Daorueng, "Aceh: Echoes of East Timor," *Asian Times Online*, 12 June 2003, URL:<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EF12Ae02.html>, accessed 27 May 2007.

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internal and external perceptions of current events.¹²³ During the New Order period special operations personnel would recruit unemployed masses to conduct demonstrations and attack facilities and leaders of rival political parties.¹²⁴ In East Timor, Special Forces were used to organize militias and conduct acts of violence to make international observers believe that the Indonesian invasion and occupation was justified. Aceh also saw the recruitment and training of militias to create acts that could not be blamed on the government and incriminate the insurgents.

Military reform is one of the keys to resolving separatist conflicts in Indonesia and success will be a good indicator of future stability of the state. The election and reform programs of the new democratic government have been in place for less than three years and there is much progress to be made if the Indonesian army expects to be a true servant of the state rather than a giant syndicate furthering its own interests.

Denial and Deception

The government of Indonesia has practiced deception against western powers in the past and this should be considered in future analysis of evolving situations involving Indonesia. Denial was also a regular part of the authoritarian regimes strategy to prevent outside influence. Restrictions of journalists and dignitaries were a common practice to prevent opponents from acquiring information that could be used against the regime. The authoritarian government also controlled and manipulated domestic and international media to support deception. Recent government reforms appear to be providing new freedoms to journalists and creating greater transparency in military operations.

¹²³O'Rourke, 257.

¹²⁴O'Rourke, 13.

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However, it is unlikely that this will allow unrestricted access to potentially damaging political situations and the history of denial and selective exposure should be considered when evaluating open source information about current events.

Deception was practiced by the government of Indonesia with the intent to manipulate decisions by western policy makers. These deceptions involved secret military actions that resulted in the deaths of Indonesian citizens to alter perception of situations. The ruthless nature of these deceptions demonstrates the extreme measures the Indonesians were willing to take to achieve their goals. While there has been much reform in the government of Indonesia the leaders of the military remain in place. Therefore understanding of previous Indonesian deceptions will be important for future analysis. Current situations that could result in a change in international aid or policy favorable to the Republic of Indonesia should consider a competing hypothesis of deception. For example, increased piracy in the Straits of Malacca that would result in additional military aid to Indonesia should consider the possibility that some attacks are being perpetrated by Indonesian Special Forces.

IMPLICATIONS

The comparison of insurgency factors has demonstrated that there is little threat to the sovereignty of Indonesia from another East Timor like situation. The comparison has also demonstrated that any other separatist insurgency that lacks sanctuary and external support will be ineffective against the power and expertise of the Indonesian Army. Therefore U.S. policy makers can continue to rely on the Republic of Indonesia as a

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partner in the GWOT without fear of instability in the region or civil war that would require commitment of resources or a change in policy. The new democracy under President Yudhoyono has attempted to reform many of the practices of the authoritarian New Order Regime that were the cause for much of the separatist anger and ideology. The ambitious policies of this new democracy appear to be aligned with U.S. National Security Policy and strategies in the GWOT.

The greatest danger to U.S. foreign policy in Indonesia is the possibility that President Yudhoyono's reforms of the military and anti corruption campaigns may be destroying his traditional base of support. The corrupt military and political system that was a regular part of Indonesian society for over 30 years has been attacked by the new democratic regime. Outside observers should not be overly concerned with ethnic or separatist violence but should pay close attention to changing economic and political power struggles at the center Indonesian politics. The greatest threat to the stability of Indonesia and U.S. foreign policy is an internal insurgency aimed at the highest echelons of government. This could take the form of a military coup or peaceful transfer of power at the next election. Change in national leadership could upset many of the positive reforms being attempted by the Yudhoyono government and produce additional uncertainty and regional instability.

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