Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Examination of the Adjudicative Guidelines

Appendix B Part 2
Adjudicative Guidelines Literature Review: the "National Conflict" Cluster

Leading Intelligence Integration

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose

A review of current social science research was undertaken to provide evidence about the meaning and effectiveness of the Adjudicative Guidelines for making security clearance decisions. This White Paper reviews that evidence for four Guidelines, A. Allegiance to the US, B. Foreign Influence, C. Foreign Preference and L. Outside Activities. These four Guidelines focus on different types of evidence of foreign relationships that may create divided loyalties and opportunities for inducement or coercion.

Approach

The literature review covered a wide range of social science literature including counterproductive work behavior, workplace safety behavior, workplace aggression, police corruption, white collar crime, organizational citizenship behavior, organizational commitment, national allegiance, immigrant assimilation, group identity, social identity, academic cheating, traffic violations, and case studies of espionage. Given the almost complete lack of research on national security behavior itself, the primary strategy of this review was to review research in other work behavior domains similar to security behavior to draw inferences about the Guidelines as measures of antecedents of security behavior.

Key Findings

- Evidence supports the general approach of the national conflict Guidelines to evaluate security risk based on potential conflicts between US and Foreign attachments.
- Identity-based forms of attachment are likely to be most predictive of security violation behavior.
- Dual citizenship is associated with lower levels of US national identity.
- People can manage multiple identity attachments by shifting from one identity to another based on the situation without experiencing the conflict assumed in the Guidelines’ approach.
- The Guidelines’ evidence that focuses on indicators of risk for security violations does not capture, with some exceptions, the personal attributes leading to positive security behavior.
Key Recommendations

- Adjudicators may improve risk assessment by focusing on identity-based indicators of strength of attachment and on evidence about the manner by which individuals managed multiple identity attachments in situations of conflict.

- Mitigators currently focus on evidence that discounts risky attachments. Additional mitigators should focus on the ability to manage non-discounted attachments without creating additional security risk.

- A structured Risk Assessment Scale may improve adjudicators’ ability to aggregate relevant evidence across multiple Guidelines.

- A new Guideline representing policy-driven “basic qualifications” for clearance may improve the efficiency of the overall clearance process.

- Guidelines B and L may be combined with no loss of effectiveness and possible gains in adjudicator efficiency.
THE NATIONAL CONFLICT CLUSTER

A. Allegiance to the US
B. Foreign Influence
C. Foreign Preference
L. Outside Activities

Introduction

This paper evaluates the social science research literature relevant to the effectiveness of the four national conflict Adjudicative Guidelines. This evaluation describes the extent to which research evidence provides rationales supporting or questioning the current meaning and use of these Guidelines. In addition, potential modifications and alternatives are described where the research evidence points to such adjustments.

The social science evidence evaluated here focuses on understanding, explaining and predicting individual human behavior relating to US national interests and, more specifically, the protection of classified information. The purpose of this project is to evaluate social science-based evidence about the meaning and use of the Guidelines. The questions being answered by this project are (a) “Does current social science evidence support the meaning and use of the Adjudicative Guidelines?” and (b) “What changes does the evidence suggest to improve the meaning and use of the Guidelines?”

This project is not intended to evaluate support for the Guidelines based on policy considerations. This is an especially important point for the national conflict Guidelines because strong arguments supporting many facets of these particular four Guidelines can be made on a policy basis alone. For example, much like the rules of evidence in the US legal system, evidence that an individual has acted illegally directly against US national interests might, itself, be a sufficient basis for disqualification. The policy-based justification of such a Guideline may have no need for social science evidence about the predictive value of previous illegal actions against US interests for future security violations. Nevertheless, this White Paper will take note where apparent rationales for the Guidelines are grounded in policy considerations and where social science evidence is also relevant.
The National Conflict Guidelines

The four Guidelines clustered in this white paper are referred to as the national conflict cluster for the purposes of this project. This label stems from the commonality among these four Guidelines that all address evidence about individuals’ potential conflicts with US national interests. These conflicts may take several forms as differentiated by the four Guidelines. These include conflicting attitudes or beliefs manifested in direct action against US national interests as referenced in Guideline A. Guidelines B, C, and L all address potentially conflicting attachments to foreign countries and other personal interests such as financial, business, or professional interests that may be sources of conflict with US interests. Social science evidence is directly relevant to the weight given to such evidence of conflicts because, except for Guideline A, the personal history evidence covered by these Guidelines is not typically a direct manifestation of conflict with or action against US national interests. Rather, this personal history evidence is better viewed as signs of underlying beliefs, motives, attitudes, preferences, social identities, etc. that may be predictive of future security violation behavior if the individual is granted or retains access to protected information. Relevant social science evidence provides the best information about the prediction value such evidence has for future security risk.

In an effort to capture the extent to which social science evidence is relevant to each of these national conflict Guidelines, a table is presented below for each national conflict Guideline. Each table lists the conditions (evidence) within that Guideline that could raise security concerns. The conditions are taken from the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (2005). For each condition, the table also indicates whether the presumed supporting rationale for that condition rests primarily on social science evidence or primarily on an apparent underlying policy position or both. The judgment about the supporting rationale was made by the author based on a review of the social science evidence and the nature of the condition. These judgments were not made by national security clearance officials or experts.
Table 1. Supporting Rationales for Guideline A. Allegiance to the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition triggering security concern</th>
<th>Important Supporting Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Involvement in, support of, …any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the US</td>
<td>Evidence-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, (a) above</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten,… or use any illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. overthrow or influence the government of the US</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. prevent Federal, state or local government personnel from performing their duties</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by Federal, state or local governments</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the US or of any state</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each of these tables, a policy-based supporting rationale is judged to be important where the personal history event constitutes an illegal act or support of an illegal act directed against US national interests, or where the action is comparable in intent and severity to security violation behavior. Other events such as deception or noncompliance in the clearance process may be policy-based reasons for disqualification. Such conditions carry great weight by virtue of their direct comparability to security violation behavior regardless of social science evidence that such acts predict future security violations.

In contrast, many conditions imply risk for security violation behavior on the assumption that the psychological and/or situational factors that gave rise to the condition will also increase the likelihood of security violations. The weight given to such conditions should depend to a great extent on the social science evidence supporting the assumed relationships between psychological and situations factors and security violation behavior. These conditions are the primary focus of this project.

It should also be noted that policy and evidence-based rationales are not mutually exclusive. The weight given to some conditions may be influenced by both the policy rationale as well as the social science evidence rationale.

Table 1 shows that all the potentially disqualifying conditions associated with Guideline A. Allegiance to the US, may be supported by a policy rationale. However, conditions (b) and (c) also depend on an important social science rationale. In these conditions, the investigative evidence is that the individual supported or sympathized with the actors, but did not take the action himself. In this case, the presence of social science showing that such support or sympathy is predictive of later security violation behavior, or similar behavior, should increase the weight given to conditions (b) and (c).
Table 2. Important Supporting Rationales for Guideline B. Foreign Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition triggering security concern</th>
<th>Important Supporting Rationale</th>
<th>Evidence-based</th>
<th>Policy-based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) contact with a foreign family member, …, or other person who is a citizen or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, …, or coercion</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) connections to a foreign person,… or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,…, or country by providing that information</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) counterintelligence information…indicates that the individual’s access to protected information may involve unacceptable risk to national security</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Sharing living quarters with a person(s), regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) a substantial business, financial or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) failure to report, when required, association with a foreign national</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence service</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to future exploitation…</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) conduct…which may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows that 6 of the 9 conditions of concern for Guideline B. Foreign Influence, depend on assumed psychological/situational factors that require social science evidence to be confirmed. For example, condition (e) refers to personal monetary interests in foreign entities which could increase risk of foreign influence. The foreign monetary interests are typically not illegal nor are they typically directed against US national interests. The degree to which such indicators predict future security violations depends on certain personal attributes and situational factors, whether the gathered evidence accurately represents these factors, and the predictive link between these factors and subsequent security violation behavior or similar behavior. Social science evidence is important for this condition to judge its relevance and weight for each individual.

Table 3 shows that 6 of the 10 distinct conditions for Guideline C. Foreign Preference should be informed by social science evidence. The core, underlying consideration common to all Foreign Preference conditions is strength of the individual’s allegiance to a foreign country relative to his US allegiance. On their face, conditions (a) 2, (a) 6, (c) and (d) show direct evidence of a dominant allegiance to the foreign country and are fully supported by a policy that clearances are not awarded to or retained by individuals whose allegiance to the US is or becomes subordinate to that of any other country, regardless of country. The six conditions for which the indication of dominant allegiance is unclear should be informed by the social science
of dual citizenship, patriotism and nationalism to assist the investigators and adjudicators with placing appropriate weight on the evidence.

Table 3. Important supporting Rationales for Guideline C. Foreign Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition triggering security concern</th>
<th>Important Supporting Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a US citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This includes but is not limited to:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. possession of a current passport</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. accepting educational, ..., social welfare, or other such benefits from a foreign country</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. seeking or holding political office in a foreign country</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. voting in a foreign election</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of a foreign person, ..., or government in conflict with the (US) national security interest</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than the US; for example, declaration of intent to renounce US citizenship; renunciation of US citizenship</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 shows that 3 of the 5 concerning conditions for Guideline L. Outside Activities are of the sort that should be informed by social science evidence. Condition (a) 1 and condition (b) are sufficient, on their face, to be given great weight as a matter of policy alone. Condition (a) 1 is an unambiguous indication of dominant allegiance to a foreign country. For purposes of this project, we regard deliberate deception on the individual’s part with respect to potential conflicts of interest, such as condition (b), to be sufficient grounds for disqualification as a matter of policy.
Table 4. Important Supporting Rationales for Guideline L. Outside Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition triggering security concern</th>
<th>Important Supporting Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer, with:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. the government of a foreign country</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. any foreign national, organization, or other entity</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. a representative of any foreign interest</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when this is required</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The supporting rationales are reviewed in detail to identify the specific rationales that will be informed by this evaluation of the relevant social science evidence.
Positive and Negative Security Behavior

Although the national conflict Guidelines focus attention almost exclusively on negative indicators of potentially disqualifying conditions, the “whole person concept” applies to these four Guidelines in the same way it applies to all other Guidelines. Adjudicators are expected to use all available evidence to evaluate not only the degree of risk for future violations but also the degree to which each individual satisfies the whole person standard of being reliable, trustworthy, and able to protect classified information. The social science evidence evaluated for this project will be examined for its implications for the adjudicator’s positive imperative to affirm reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information as well as the negative imperative to avoid unacceptable risk.

The national conflict Guidelines are designed and used to discover and interpret personal history evidence that an individual may have conflicts with US interests. These may be conflicts of attitude and beliefs manifested in harmful behavior (Guideline A), conflicts grounded in competing national attachments (Guidelines B and C), and/or conflicts based on business or personal interests that compete with US national interests (Guideline L). ADR (2005), although not a policy document, provides adjudicators a basic reference resource to help them determine whether the evidence is persuasive that such conflicts exist. Where evidence is persuasive that such conflicts exist, these four Guidelines weigh against granting or retaining a clearance.

The ADR relies on assumptions about the strength of the conflicts, the individual’s allegiance to the US, and the manner in which the individual, when cleared, would resolve any possible conflicts. We review research from a variety of different social science research domains relevant to these assumptions including social identity, national attachment, dual citizenship/loyalty, ethnic/cultural differences, social norms, and risky behavior such as academic cheating, drinking and traffic violations, among others.

Each of these possible types of explanatory variables is reviewed here because it is potentially relevant to the social psychological mechanisms that explain how people would behave in the presence of potential conflict relating to US national interests. We will use the Theory of Planned Behavior to organize and clarify the way in which these attributes may influence security behavior. This theory is a general theory of behavior grounded in social cognition which is designed to explain how attitudes, self-identities, social norms, beliefs, dispositions and past behavior combine to cause future behavior. This theory is not specific to any one behavior domain. But by considering personal attributes that are specifically relevant to the domain of national security behavior, we will be able to apply this theory to the types of behavior considered by the clearance adjudication. By fitting the many attributes relevant to security into this general theoretical framework, we will be able to derive conclusions and recommendations about the Guidelines’ meaning and use. Ultimately, the primary purpose for introducing this framework is not to advance a theoretical understanding of security behavior but to clarify the way in which the reviewed research literatures lead to the conclusions and recommendations we offer about the meaning and use of the Guidelines.

Theory of Planned Behavior

Since Ajzen (1991) proposed the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and presented supporting evidence, scores of studies have demonstrated TPB’s ability to predict a wide range of human behavior especially including risky, counter-normative behaviors such as academic cheating, speeding, marijuana use, and heavy episodic drinking. Although these risky behaviors are not close analogs to security behavior because they lack the organizational context of security behavior, they do share important features of security violation behavior such as being risky,
stimulating, illegal/counter-normative, and potentially harmful to self and others. A particularly valuable aspect of TPB is that it provides an explanation for the link between past behavior and future behavior, which is at the center of Guideline A. A close examination of the relevance of TPB to Guideline A can provide insight about the manner in which the investigation and adjudication of Guideline A are supported and might be optimized. Similarly, TPB provides a framework for capturing the effects of various facets of foreign attachment, which are central to Guidelines B, C and, partly, L.

TPB is grounded in social cognition and offers an explanation for intentional behavior. It describes behavior as a direct function of the intention to behave and the actor’s perception of his ability to perform the behavior. In addition, the actor’s attitudes toward the behavior and the actor’s perception of the social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior have a direct influence on the intention to act. This theory is schematically represented in Exhibit 1.

In Ajzen’s TPB, each component has a specific meaning relating to the target behavior. The behavior itself can either be a specific behavior in a specific context or a more generalized behavior aggregated across times and contexts. This latter, broader behavior type is likely more typical of the behaviors targeted by the Allegiance Guideline. Intention is considered to be the immediate antecedent of the behavior and is defined as the actor’s readiness to perform the behavior. Perceived behavioral control represents the actor’s perception of his ability to perform the target behavior. In most cases, this perceived control is the aggregation of the actor’s perceptions about multiple factors that may inhibit or facilitate performance of the behavior. In those cases where perceived control is an accurate perception of actual control, perceived control can have a direct influence on the target behavior. Subjective norm is the perceived social pressure to engage or not engage in the target behavior. It is not simply the imperative associated with the actor’s social or moral identity. Rather, it is a combination of the actor’s beliefs about normative expectations held by people important to the actor with regard to the actor’s behavior and the actor’s own motivation to comply with that perceived social norm. Social/moral identities influence the actor’s motivation to adhere to the expectation. Attitude toward the behavior represents the aggregated positive or negative value the actor attaches to the behavior.

**Exhibit 1. A Schematic Representation of the Theory of Planned Behavior**
In summary, TPB hypothesizes two key sets of predictions. First, behavior is predicted directly from intentions and perceived control, if the perception of control is accurate. Second, the influence of attitudes and subjective norms on behavior is by way of their direct influence on intentions. They do not directly affect behavior.

Of particular interest in TPB is the role of past behavior. In general, TPB does not represent past behavior as a predictor of future behavior except in two conditions. First, where past behavior has become a behavior of habit and occurs relatively automatically then past behavior is likely to be a direct predictor of future behavior. Second, if the internal and external circumstances are unchanged from the past occasion to the future occasion, then past behavior is likely to be a predictor of future behavior. This form of prediction is generally viewed merely as the stability of behavior and is uninteresting from an explanatory perspective. In effect, TPB asserts that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior only when nothing has changed. If internal perceptions, beliefs, motives or external conditions have changed then intention, not past behavior, is the best predictor of future behavior.
Grouping the Guidelines for Purposes of Literature Review and Evaluation

The literature review itself will be organized around two subgroups of national conflict Guidelines, where Guideline A comprises one subgroup and Guidelines B, C, and L comprise the second subgroup. These subgroups are based on two considerations, (1) what distinguishes Guideline A from the others, and (2) what Guidelines B, C, and L have in common. Both considerations are important because they relate to the research literatures reviewed and evaluated here. Guideline A is different from the other three in that it focuses on evidence of behavior, or support/sympathy for such behavior, explicitly directed against US national interests. Guideline A evidence is about behavior antagonistic toward the US. In contrast, the different types of evidence gathered for Guidelines B, C and L all focus on behavior that, for the most part, is not itself antagonistic toward the US but may reflect attachments or interests in foreign countries, persons or entities that may result in conflicts with US interests that could lead to security violation behavior. Research evidence about factors that influence the strength of national attachments is relevant to Guidelines B, C and L in similar ways.
Evidence for Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States

Guideline A includes evidence of behavior/support/sympathy for harm directed at US national interests. Such behaviors/support/sympathy represent evidence of behavior that is precisely the same as or very similar to the harmful behavior the security clearance process is designed to minimize. In effect, Guideline A appears based on the assumption that the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior. By looking for historical evidence that the individual has engaged in or supported/sympathized with action directed against US national interests, adjudication based on Guideline A seeks to disqualify all those who would be likely to repeat similar behavior once given access to protected information. As might be expected, very few important issues are found, at least in the 1084 SSBI investigations summarized in the Foundations Paper, Table 4. Indeed no significant Guideline A issues were reported for that sample.

As Table 1 describes, a policy-based rationale supports the Guideline’s reliance on all potentially disqualifying conditions. The close similarity between the evidence of national harm gathered in Guideline A and the targeted security violations justifies the implied policy to disqualify individuals who have provided support to or sympathized with others who have acted to harm US national interests. This policy-based rationale is especially persuasive for Condition (a) which refers to direct personal involvement in or support of actions against the US.

The remaining conditions are more removed from the targeted behavior than Condition (a). Conditions (b) and (c) (1-4) all refer to associations or sympathy with other persons who intend through illegal means to harm US national interests. Because Conditions (b) and (c) (1-4) are not about the individual’s own behavior directed at harming US interests, the persuasiveness of the policy-based rationale for these conditions could be strengthened by social science evidence. Such evidence would demonstrate that association or sympathy with others who intend harm is predictive of the individual’s own likelihood of violating US security standards.

The Levels 1, 2 and 3 evidence described in the Foundations Paper will be reviewed to examine whether any social science evidence currently is available that strengthens the policy-based support for Guideline A.
Level 1 Evidence

Level 1 evidence can be empirical or conceptual and provides information about the predictive relationship between the types of behaviors gathered in the Guideline A investigation process and the security behavior targeted by the Allegiance consideration. This is the form or research evidence that is most directly relevant to security behavior context. The only true Level 1 evidence for Guideline A is the various analyses of espionage case studies. These studies constitute Level 1 evidence because they include behavior of the type gathered by clearance investigations for Guideline A and they include national espionage, which is a focus of Guideline A.

Individual Case Studies of Espionage

In the past two decades, several systematic case study analyses have been reported about known cases of national espionage (e.g., Wood & Wiskoff, 1992; Herbig & Wiskoff, 2001; Herbig, 2008). The analyses cited here have been conducted using scientific methods unlike the myriad of news reports and non-scientific case analyses that are available in the popular media. The scientific methods include tabulating demographic information using standard categories, structured interviews and comparisons of results across time periods.

Nevertheless, these analyses provide little persuasive evidence that Allegiance evidence predicts later security violation behavior. While there would seem to be little doubt that Allegiance evidence predicts later security violation behavior given their virtually identical meaning, the espionage case studies provide more information about profiles of spies and espionage behavior than information about the predictive relationship between Allegiance evidence and later espionage. Consider one example of the type of evidence reported in these analyses. In the most recent update of case studies of US spies caught since 1947, Herbig (2008) reports in Table 11 (p. 40) that the percentage of spies who have exhibited Allegiance issues regarding a “separate country or cause” has increased from 21% prior to 1990 to 46% from 1990 – 2007. While this information is extremely helpful for understanding the behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of spies, it does not provide information about the extent to which Allegiance evidence helps to distinguish those applicants who will not spy from those who will. The short reason for this lack of prediction information is that no comparable information about Allegiance conditions is provided for a control group of demographically comparable people in similar roles who have not spied. (The only known example of a research study comparing caught spies to matched non-spies is Thompson (2003). In this dissertation Thompson investigated differences between spies and non-spies on issues associated with illegal drug use, financial responsibility, criminal activity, alcohol use and emotional issues as well as selected other psychological conditions. Spies were not compared to non-spies on factors related to the national conflict Guidelines.)

Although these reports provide little information about the effectiveness of Guideline A, it is nevertheless quite plausible that the rate of Allegiance conditions among spies is higher than
it is among demographically comparable non-spies. After all, espionage itself would certainly constitute Condition (a) behavior in an Allegiance investigation. Herbig’s (2008) evidence that 46% of the 37 spies caught from 1990-2007 displayed allegiance to a country or cause different from the US is in stark contrast to analyses of recent SSBI issues reported in the Foundations Paper. Not one of the 1,084 screened applicants yielded a significant condition on Guideline A. Such a large discrepancy between spies and applicants suggests but does not demonstrate that spies have higher rates of Allegiance conditions than do comparable non-spies. From a research standpoint, a critical issue is what the rate of Allegiance issues was for spies at the time they were adjudicated for their clearance. This rate is not known from any of the analyses of espionage cases. It is unclear from Herbig’s (2008) analysis whether the Allegiance conditions reported for spies were conditions known at the time of the spies’ clearance investigations or came to be known later. In sum, for all the value such analyses of espionage case studies have, they do not provide discriminating evidence of the effectiveness of Guideline A.

One closely related implication of the espionage case studies is important. Overall, Herbig reports that spies have relatively high rates of Allegiance issues, among other Cluster 1 issues. The clear implication is that Allegiance investigations applied in re-evaluations of clearances could have resulted in the removal of clearances from as many as 46% of these spies. This measure is certainly one index of the potential effectiveness of Guideline A. It is a measure of the “true positive” rate with which an Allegiance investigation could identify ongoing espionage behavior. But this index is only a partial measure of the value of Guideline A for withdrawal of existing clearances. It would also be important to estimate the “false positive” rate that would simultaneously result from Allegiance-based re-evaluations. The “false positive” rate is a percentage of people who are not engaged in espionage but reveal serious Allegiance issues. A high “false positive” rate could reduce the assessment of Guideline A’s overall effectiveness in re-evaluation processes. It is important to note that this application of Guideline A to re-evaluations of clearances does not rely on prediction evidence. Rather, it is in effect a verdict as to whether the person has directed action against the US national interests.

**Empirical Analyses of the Relationship Between Allegiance Evidence and Security Behavior**

No research evidence has been found that reports empirical analyses showing the extent to which Allegiance evidence predicts later security violation behavior. It should be noted that the converse is also true. No empirical evidence has been reported showing the extent to which the absence of Allegiance issues predicts security citizenship behavior.
Level 2 Evidence

Level 2 evidence can be empirical or conceptual and provides information about the predictive relationship between the types of behaviors gathered in the Guideline A investigation process and psychological attributes underlying the security behavior targeted by the Allegiance consideration. It is assumed that the Allegiance Guideline targets anti-US security violations occurring in the context of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition. Examples of psychological attributes underlying security violations in these hostile anti-US contexts include anti-US nationalism/patriotism, intolerance, extremism and revenge. No research was found describing the influence of actions harmful to US security or use of force or violence against citizen rights on such underlying variables of involvement in, or support/sympathy for those who are involved in, illegal hostile acts directed against US national interests. A likely reason is the lack of access to people displaying Guideline A conditions who would be the participants in research producing Level 2 evidence.

This lack of Level 2 evidence about underlying explanatory variables may not call into question the rationale for Guideline A. Guideline A appears to rely, in effect, on the principle that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Adjudicators have relatively few assumptions to make about the operation of underlying attributes and circumstances. When Allegiance issues are in evidence, the primary goal of the adjudicator is to confirm through mitigator evidence that the individual intended the behavior and that the past behavior is still indicative of the individual’s intent (ADR, 2005). If the past behavior was intended and is still indicative of current intent, the adjudicator is likely to make the straightforward inference that the individual is a significant risk to repeat such behavior when given access to protected information. The adjudicator is not required to develop hypotheses about the underlying explanations for the individual’s intended, relevant past behavior. Because it is highly similar to, if not the same as, the undesired security violation behavior, the adjudicator draws the conclusion that the individual’s past behavior creates a substantial risk of similar future behavior.

Considerable research has been done, however, on a general theory of intentional behavior that provides a social psychological rationale generally supportive of the manner in which Guideline A is adjudicated and its likely effectiveness. This theory and supporting evidence is best described as Level 3 evidence.
Level 3 Evidence

Ajzen (1991) described the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and presented evidence in support of its key propositions about intentional human behavior. Since then scores of studies have demonstrated TPB’s ability to predict a wide range of human behavior especially including risky, counter-normative behaviors such as academic cheating, speeding, marijuana use, and heavy episodic drinking. Although these risky behaviors are not considered close analogs to security behavior because they lack the organizational context of security behavior, they do share important features of security violation behavior such as risky, stimulating, illegal/counter-normative, and potentially harmful to self and others. A particularly valuable aspect of TPB is that it provides an explanation for the link between past behavior and future behavior that hinges on intention, which is at the center of Guideline A. A close examination of the relevance of TPB to Guideline A can provide insight about the manner in which the investigation and adjudication of Guideline A are supported and might be optimized.

Consider an example of a behavior representing a Guideline A-oriented security violation such as the transfer of US nuclear weaponry plans to a foreign intelligence agent. The behavior in question is a clear and consequential act directed against US national interests. In TPB terms, the intention leading to this behavior is the readiness to deliver the material, which is the culmination of some number of planning steps. Assuming the target behavior is not so frequent and routine as to be habitual and that it is unique to the current local circumstances, TPB views past behavior as having little explanatory value. Exhibit 2 populates the TPB schematic model with examples of attitudes, norms and perceptions that might be expected to lead to such an act of espionage.
Exhibit 2. Speculative TPB Model of a Security Violation Behavior

Other Variables, e.g.,

Self-Ideentities
- I’m important
- I’m capable, effective
- I’m loyal to XYZ country first
- I’m right to help XYZ country
- I’m smarter than the rest

Beliefs
- XYZ country needs help I can provide
- The US is heading in the wrong direction

Motives
- I want to be recognized
- I need money
- I want to get even with those who have hurt my career
- I want to help XYZ country
- I’m angry
- I must protect my family

External Context
- The opportunity is now
- I have the connections needed

Attitude Toward Hand Over
- I will be rewarded for this
- This is important
- This is thrilling
- This will help the receiving country gain international leverage

Others’ View of This Action
- I don’t care that the US would condemn this
- The foreign agent will learn to trust me
- I don’t care what the Agency thinks; they had their chance to reward me

Intention
- Agree to the time and place
- Plan the travel route
- Confirm start

Behavior
- Drive to the site
- Contact the agent
- Hand over the contents
- Return

Perceived Control
- I can do this without being caught
- I’ve considered every detail
- I’ve done this before
- I don’t see any obstacle I can’t overcome

This speculative example demonstrates the role of various personal attributes relating to national security. For example, attachment and loyalty to the US and other countries operate to influence the actor’s attitudes toward the behavior that is good or bad. Motivations such as revenge, money and power influence the actor’s motive to comply with perceived social norms regarding the behavior. The actor’s skills, experience, self-efficacy, etc. combine to create the perceived control over performing the behavior successfully.

To be sure, TPB is not intended to apply to all behavior. Unintended behavior such as inadvertent security violations are not modeled by TPB. This limitation is not critical to this evaluation because, for the purposes of this project, the security behavior domain of interest to the clearance process only consists of intentional behavior. Potentially more important, TPB does not apply to emotionally reactive behavior triggered by some critical event or experience. As noted above, TPB is a model of behavior grounded in social cognition. The question for future research about security violation behavior is whether important types of such behavior are best explained as emotionally reactive behavior. For example, in the domain of workplace aggression Geen (1991) and Berkowitz (1998) distinguish between proactive, instrumental, “cold”
aggression and reactive, hostile, “hot” aggression. To the extent that the latter form of aggression is short-lived, directed at a person to do harm and automatic, it would not be well explained by TPB. However, even reactive aggression can have more significant cognitive components to the extent it is planful, deliberate, and not automatic or spontaneous. Such planful reactive aggression may be well captured by TPB. The question for security behavior is whether important security violations have taken the form of spontaneously reactive, automatic, emotional attempts to harm. If such types of security behavior are important, a different theoretical framework from TPB will be needed. While we do not propose a single, coherent theory of such spontaneously reactive behavior, such a theory would presumably emphasize automatic, emotional, non-cognitive components of behavior associated with deeper psychological dynamics associated with anger, aggression, fear and harm-avoidance.

Evidence Linking TPB to Guideline A

In the section above, a conceptual rationale was provided for using the TPB theoretical framework to support the use of Guideline A. In addition, considerable empirical evidence has accumulated showing that TPB successfully predicts a variety of risky, counter-normative and potentially harmful behaviors as well as preventative behaviors in the health domain. While none of these behaviors are analogs to security behavior because they don’t take place in an organizational context, this evidence demonstrates the effectiveness of TPB in predicting counter-normative, risky behaviors that bear some relationship to security behaviors.

Academic Cheating

Among the behavior domains in which TPB has been empirically tested, academic cheating is perhaps the domain most directly related to security behavior. Three studies (Beck & Ajzen, 1991), Whitely (1998) and Harding, Mayhew, Finelli & Carpenter (2007)) provide the most direct test of TPB as a predictor of academic cheating. Beck & Ajzen (1991) tested whether TPB predictions account for academic cheating, academic lying (to get out of exams/papers) and shoplifting. They found that both intention and perceived control predicted dishonest behavior, r = .52 and .44, respectively, although perceived control did not add predictive value above intention. Further, they reported that attitude toward the dishonest behavior, subjective norms about such dishonesty and perceived control all predicted intention to behave dishonestly as hypothesized by TPB. Interestingly, subjective norms were correlated with both attitudes and perceived control such that the independent contribution of subjective norms was near zero.

Whitely (1998) meta-analyzed data from 107 studies of academic cheating to test key TPB hypotheses about the relationship between cheating behavior and (a) attitudes about cheating, (b) subjective norms about cheating, and (c) perceived control over cheating behavior. Consistent with TPB, all three predictors were positively related to cheating behavior. Students were more likely to cheat who had favorable attitudes toward cheating, perceived that social norms permitted cheating, and saw themselves as more effective cheaters. Because the 107
studies were not designed specifically to test TPB, Whitely was not able to test TPB’s predictions about intention mediating the effects of attitudes, subjective norms and perceived control on cheating behavior.

Like Beck & Ajzen, Harding et al. (2007) conducted a study of academic cheating specifically to test the relationships hypothesized by TPB. Their results were similar to Beck & Ajzen. Intention to cheat was significantly related to cheating behavior but perceived control was not. Similarly, attitudes toward cheating and subjective norms about cheating were significantly related to intention to cheat but, unlike Beck & Ajzen, perceived control was not related to intention to cheat. Overall, Harding et al. found perceived control over cheating to be unrelated either to intent or behavior.

Of special relevance to Guideline A, both Beck & Ajzen and Harding et al. also tested the influence of moral identity (moral obligation to avoid cheating) on cheating above and beyond the predictions of TPB. Both found that students who expressed a moral obligation to avoid cheating were less likely to intend to cheat above and beyond the effects of attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived control. Bennett, Aquino, Reed & Thau (2005) argue for the importance of moral identity as a self-regulating mechanism that influences people’s organizational behavior, including workplace deviance. The TPB research on academic cheating supports their assertion by showing an influence of moral identity on cheating intentions. Given that Guideline A addresses harmful, counter-normative (deviant) behavior almost exclusively, it is likely that the relationship between Guideline A investigative issues and subsequent security violations depends in some part on the role of moral identity in addition to the influences of national attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived efficacy in carrying out the violation behavior.

**Heavy Drinking**

Schlegel et al. (1990) tested a theory of reasoned action, which was a precursor to TPB absent the perceived control variable. However, Schlegel et al. included a measure of perceived control, which allowed them to test the core predictions of TPB. Their results provided support for all key components of TPB by showing that heavy drinking intentions predicted heavy drinking behavior and that attitude, subjective norms and perceived control with respect to heavy drinking each added uniquely to the prediction of intention to drink.

Collins & Carey (2007) specifically tested TPB as a model of heavy episodic drinking. Attitudes and perceived control predicted intention to drink but, unlike most other TPB studies, subjective norms did not predict intention. Intention to drink also predicted future heavy drinking.

**Traffic Violations**

Two studies in the UK tested TPB as a predictor of traffic violation behavior (Parker et al. (1992) and Elliott, Armitage & Baughan (2003)). Between the two studies, 5 behavior domains were used to test TPB. Elliott, Armitage & Baughan examined speeding and Parker et
al. examined speeding, drinking and driving, close following, and passing in risky circumstances. Empirical evidence from all five domains provided consistent support for TPB. All domains showed that intention toward risky driving influenced driving behavior and that attitudes toward risky driving, subjective norms and perceived control all influenced intention. Parker et al. found the atypical result that subjective norms had a larger influence on intention than is typically found in TPB studies where subjective norms tend to have the smallest effect on intention. Parker et al. explain this result by noting that risky driving behavior clearly has consequences for others so the actor’s assessment of others’ normative expectations carries more weight than if the behavior had relatively little consequence for others.

The Role of Past Behavior as a Predictor of Future Behavior

The influence of past behavior on future behavior is central to the assumed rationale supporting Guideline A. TPB provides a theoretical framework in which this relationship may be assessed. However, as noted in the Level 1 section, no studies in the security domain have been found that examine the predictive influence of past security behavior on future security behavior, whether using the TPB framework or not. At this point, then, the best evidence-based opportunity to evaluate the role of past behavior is to examine the TPB research that has analyzed the link between past and future behavior. After several initial TPB studies had accumulated, Ajzen (1991) summarized the role of past behavior as a predictor of future behavior. The basic question of interest is whether the TPB model predicts future behavior better where past behavior is one of the predictors. Ajzen summarized the findings as indicating the inclusion of past behavior usually improved the prediction of future behavior. However, this increase in prediction was of modest magnitude that was probably explained by shared method variance. (Past behavior and future behavior are often measured in the same way - by asking study participants to report their past behavior and current behavior.) But studies continue to reach different conclusions about the role of past behavior. For example, Elliott, Armitage & Baugan (2003) reported that past behavior modestly improved the prediction of future speeding behavior and Harding et al. reported the same result for academic cheating behavior. Both of these results were consistent with the modest magnitude Ajzen previously noted. In contrast, Collins & Carey (2007) reported that past behavior harmed the prediction of future drinking behavior. In a study of healthy eating behavior, Conner, Norman & Bell (2002) reported that as intentions became more stable over time, past behavior became a weaker predictor of future behavior.

It is likely that the different results across different studies are not merely the effects of sampling error or other random effects. Past behavior is likely to improve intention’s prediction of future behavior to the extent (a) internal and external conditions have not changed between occasions, (b) the behavior in question is habitual, automatic, repetitive or frequent, and (c) intention is relatively unstable over time in the target behavior domain.
TPB’s Support for Guideline A

Is TPB Relevant to Guideline A?

A basic question for this evaluation is “Does the accumulated evidence for TPB in non-security domains provide support for the meaning and use of Guideline A?” Guideline A is, in effect, an atheoretical process of gathering information about an individual’s anti-US behaviors, confirming that those past behaviors still represent the individual, then making a decision on the assumption that future behavior will be like past behavior. But this assumption that future behavior is predicted by past behavior is the critical link between Guideline A evidence and its role in adjudications decisions. TPB is a theoretical framework that, through empirical research, provides an explanation for the relationship between past behavior and future behavior. This explanation identifies factors that can be used to understand when future behavior is best predicted by past behavior or by other underlying personal attributes. This is TPB’s relevance to Guideline A. It provides a theoretical framework for not only testing the assumed rationale for Guideline A but also for identifying what information is likely to be most predictive of future behavior.

Does TPB Evidence Support Guideline A’s Assumed Rationale?

Although TPB has not been tested in the domain of security behavior, sufficiently consistent results have been obtained in a variety of other domains of risky, counter-normative behavior to conclude that an individuals’ past behavior is an effective predictor of future behavior but in many cases not likely to be as effective a predictor of future security violation behavior as either (a) intentions with regard to anti-US behavior or, less likely, (b) perceptions about the individual’s control over the anti-US behavior in question. TPB supports Guideline A’s reliance on past behavior but suggests that additional information about intent and relevant self-efficacy are likely to improve prediction of future security behavior.
Guideline A and Positive Security Behavior

The “whole person” concept establishes as standard for clearance adjudications that persons with clearances should be reliable, trustworthy, loyal and possessing good judgment. The Foundations paper in this series of White Papers proposes a model of security behavior that includes the full range of positive and negative behavior. In developing the proposed model of security behavior, research in other similar domains of behavior such as counterproductive work behavior and workplace citizenship behavior was considered.

A major conclusion from that research is that positive and negative security behaviors are not likely to be functions of the same underlying personal and a situational attributes. For example, Dalal (2005) and Miles, Borman, Spector & Fox (2002) showed that counterproductive work behavior (an analog to security violation behavior) and organization citizenship behavior (an analog to positive security behavior) have somewhat different relationships to antecedents and that situational factors such as workload and interpersonal conflicts in the workplace may have different effects on negative and positive workplace behavior. Similarly, Lee & Allen (2002) showed that workplace deviance and organizational citizenship behavior are different functions of affect and cognition. Sackett (2002) and Viswesvaran & Ones, (2000) suggest that counterproductive (negative) work behaviors and citizenship behaviors (positive) represent separate sets of behavior with somewhat different antecedents and contextual factors; they do not appear to be merely opposite ends of a single spectrum. In effect, the same people can predictably demonstrate positive and negative behaviors depending on personal attributes and local circumstances.

This conclusion has direct implications for Guideline A’s likely effectiveness in clearing reliable, trustworthy, loyal people who have good judgment. When considering Guideline A, the adjudicator focuses virtually exclusively on evidence of behavior antagonistic toward US interests. Did such behavior take place? Did the individual show support or sympathy for others engaged in such behavior? When did it take place? Did it end? And so on. Guideline A influences the clearance decision by evaluating the overall weight that should be attached to evidence of anti-US behavior or sympathies. Guideline A does not weigh evidence of pro-US behavior such as voting and volunteering for civic service work. Such evidence of pro-US behavior is not referenced in either the conditions or mitigator guidance. In effect, the absence of negative evidence relating to anti-US behavior, a “not guilty” verdict if you will, is supportive of a decision to grant a clearance. However, the research has shown that the absence of negative work behavior does not strongly imply the presence of positive work behavior. In effect, there is no evidence that individuals will be any more likely to be reliable, trustworthy, loyal and of good judgment merely because they have not been antagonistic toward the US.

The type of evidence most relevant to reliability, trustworthiness and good judgment is likely to be more closely associated with other Guidelines relating to general personal attributes underlying psychological conditions, addictive behavior or other risky behavior. The narrow
context of Guideline A is unlikely to provide strong evidence about the positive side of the “whole person” with the exception of loyalty.
The aggregate of Level 1 and 3 evidence about Guideline A leads to the following conclusions.

1. **Policy v. Empirical Rationale.** Empirical evidence confirming the assumed rationale supporting Guideline A is largely absent. The implication is that the policy rationale supporting Guideline A is stronger than any empirically supported rationale.

2. **Empirically Supported Theoretical Rationale.** The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) provides an empirically supported, general framework for identifying those characteristics relating to intended harm that are likely to be most predictive of subsequent security violations. Previous tests of this framework provide strong evidence that attitudes toward harmful behavior, subjective norms about harmful behavior, and an accurate perception of self-efficacy with regard to harmful behavior are likely to provide the strongest prediction of later harmful behavior directed toward US interests.
   a. **Contextual Information About Individual’s Past Behavior.** TPB suggests that information about an individual’s past harmful behavior or support for same should be supplemented with information about the individual’s context in which that behavior/support took place. This contextual information would include information about intent, planning and attitudes toward the US, as well as information about the individual’s normative reference group at that time.

3. **Re-Evaluation Effectiveness.** Empirical evidence about caught spies strongly suggests that many spies have foreign allegiances. To the extent that these allegiances are manifested in actions directed against the US or, more likely, sympathy or support for others engaged in such actions, the implication is that Guideline A should be effective in re-evaluations at detecting cleared individuals who are engaged in or intending actions against US interests.

4. **“Whole Person” and Guideline A.** Guidelines A’s current use does not support the “Whole Person” concept because individuals who are judged to be low/no risk under Guideline A standards cannot be assumed, therefore, to demonstrate positive reliability, trustworthiness, loyalty or good judgment. Evidence indicates that reliability, trustworthiness, and good judgment are likely to be separate categories from security violation behavior, not just opposite ends of the same spectrum. Even loyalty may not be merely the opposite end of the same spectrum from security violation behavior.

5. **Additional Consideration of the Individual’s Norm Groups and Planning.** Evidence from the Theory of Planned Behavior provides indirect support that additional mitigator considerations focused on current social norm groups and
planfulness around US behavior would have value in judging the weight of past behavior.
Guidelines B, C and L share a focus on attachments to foreign entities that may conflict with US national interests. Each Guideline emphasizes a specific domain within the range of foreign attachments. Guideline B focuses on one’s degree of engagement with individuals, groups, or organizations affiliated with a foreign country, while Guideline C focuses on an individual’s involvement with roles, benefits and obligations associated with citizenship in a foreign country. Guideline L focuses more narrowly on employment and service relationships with foreign entities. (Separately, in condition (a) (4) Guideline L also focuses on personal/professional interests in the business of national security information, which may be a source of conflict whether or not there is a foreign entity involved.) The underlying assumption common to these three Guidelines is that the potential for conflict with US national interests increases as the strength of attachment to foreign entities increases. Each of these three Guidelines examines somewhat different domains of evidence about the strength of attachment to foreign entities.

Level 1 evidence addresses research demonstrating a linkage between the evidence gathered for any of these three Guidelines and security violation behavior. Level 2 evidence addresses research demonstrating a link between evidence gathered for the Guidelines and personal attributes such as strength of foreign attachment assumed to be antecedents to security violation behavior. Finally, Level 3 evidence addresses research about personal attributes such as assimilation and social identity that provide explanations for the relationship between Guidelines evidence and security violation behavior. For these Guidelines we also review research that does not satisfy the definition of Level 3 evidence, but does provide relevant information about relationships among variables associated with national attachment.

As noted above and in the Foundations Paper, the scope of this project includes positive security behavior as well as negative security behavior. However, in the review of the three levels of evidence the focus will be on negative behavior of security violations because that is the primary focus of the adjudicator’s decision making process. Within each Guideline, the specified “conditions” are about evidence leading to disqualification and mitigators are factors that may increase or decrease the weight attached to conditions. So, in the review of research relating to the Guidelines’ meaning and use, it is clearer to retain the same focus as in the Guidelines. The implications of the reviewed research for the prediction of security citizenship behavior will be summarized separately following the three sections on levels of evidence. The Theory of Planned Behavior will provide the common framework for explaining the prediction of positive and negative security behavior.
Level 1 Evidence

Level 1 evidence can be empirical or conceptual and provides information about the predictive relationship between the types of behaviors gathered in the investigation processes for Guidelines B, C and L. and the security behavior targeted by these three Guidelines. This is the form or research evidence that is most directly relevant to security behavior context. The only true Level 1 evidence for Guidelines B and C is the various analyses of espionage case studies (Herbig, 2008). Herbig’s analysis does not address Guideline L, however. The primary link between Guideline L and espionage cases is the Samuel Morison case in which Morison disclosed secret information to a prospective employer whose favor he was seeking.

Individual Case Studies of Espionage

In the past two decades, several systematic cases study analyses have been reported about known cases of national espionage (e.g., Wood & Wiskoff, 1992; Herbig & Wiskoff, 2001; Herbig, 2008). The analyses cited here have been conducted using scientific methods unlike the myriad of news reports and non-scientific case analyses that are available in the popular media. The scientific methods include tabulating demographic information using standard categories, structured interviews and comparisons of results across time periods. However, even these structured approaches do not rise to the level of experimental or even quasi-experimental evidence from which one might conclude that conflicting attachments lead to security violations.

The case study data reported by Herbig (2008) make a compelling case that conflicting national attachments play a role in a significant proportion of espionage cases. Herbig reported that among the 37 caught spies from 1990-2007, 51% had foreign connections (business or professional), 49% had foreign cultural ties and 58% had foreign attachments (relatives or close friends.) (Note, Herbig reported the 58% result for foreign attachments in Table 2 (p. 40) but in Table 11 reported the percentage of foreign attachments in the same sample to be 41%). All these percentages represent a substantial increase over the previous decade. More importantly, from a research perspective, these three percentages are substantially higher than the percentages of individuals who yield important issues for Guidelines B and C. In the SSBI sample of individuals analyzed and reported in the Foundations Paper, only 7.6% of individuals showed important issues on B. Foreign Influence and only 16.9% showed any issues on B. Foreign Influence. Fewer than 2% of the individuals showed any issues on C. Foreign Preference. The rate of foreign relationships among caught spies is substantially larger than the rates of Foreign Influence issues or Foreign Preference issues among persons under consideration for a clearance.

These results could be discounted if one assumes that the work context these spies were in created foreign relationships that were not present at the time these individuals were adjudicated for their clearances. (Herbig’s 2008 analyses do not clearly indicate whether these foreign relationships existed prior to the clearance or accumulated following the clearance.) But even if these results should be discounted, 22% (N=8) of these 37 spies reported “divided loyalties” as their sole motive. An additional 57% (N=21) reported divided loyalties as one of
multiple motives for their espionage. In total, 78% (N=29) reported that divided loyalties was a factor in their motivation to commit espionage. Although even these results cannot be used to draw the causal conclusions that foreign attachments lead to espionage, it is quite clear that foreign attachments played a role in decisions to betray the US trust, where such decisions were made. However, the complication is that a vastly larger number of individuals with foreign attachments appear not to be engaged in espionage. Herbig (2008) estimated the number of spies from 1950 – 2007 to be less than 50 in any one year. Yet we speculate that in any one year the number of individuals with clearances who have foreign attachments is likely to number in the many thousands. If this plausible speculation is even approximately true, espionage is a rare event even among individuals who have foreign attachments.

Since 1990, 35% of spies were foreign-born, up from approximately 20% prior to then. Of the 1/3 who engaged in espionage after being recruited, only 1 was recruited by a family member. Eight were recruited by a foreign intelligence service, and four by acquaintances. Family members do not appear to be a primary source of recruitment.

**Empirical Analyses of the Relationship Between Guidelines B, C or L Behavior and Security Violations**

As with Guideline A, no research evidence has been found regarding the extent to which an individual’s manifestation of foreign relationships is predictive of later security violations.
Level 2 Evidence

The social science evidence reported here addresses the links between the personal histories relating to foreign attachments and strength of foreign and US allegiance. The core question for Guidelines B, C and L in the security clearance process is, “What patterns of foreign attachments lead to a strength of foreign allegiance that may outweigh US national interests when the person is faced with a conflict between the two?” The short answer is no clearly describable patterns have emerged that reliably predict dominant allegiance to a foreign country. Considerable evidence has accumulated about the types of behaviors and activities that are associated with the strength of one’s foreign attachment (e.g., Berry, et al. 2006; Phinney, & Ong, 2007) and the various types of foreign attachment. But the emerging picture is that multiple and diverse attachments may be both strong and simultaneous.

The only Level 2 research relating Guidelines evidence to strength of national attachment is about dual citizenship. All other research relevant to Guidelines B, C, and L is Level 3. Broadly speaking, dual citizenship is one manifestation of the duality of interests and attachments that are at the core of these Guidelines. The fundamental assumption is that dual attachments where one set of attachments is US-centric may represent conflict between US interests and the interests in the other entity. The assumption built into the adjudication guidance is that conflict involving US interests increases the risk of security violations.

Before describing and summarizing the literature on dual citizenship, we will describe research findings about the meaning and measurement of national attachment. This concept of national attachment is fundamental to the meaning of all Guidelines and fundamental to the practical decisions embedded in the Guidelines about what evidence to investigate and what mitigators to consider. So, even though the research on the meaning and measurement of national attachment is not, itself, Level 2 evidence, it is important to the understanding of the Level 2 and Level 3 research.

The Meaning and Measurement of National Attachment

This report uses “national attachment” as the broad, general term referring to a variety of labels used to describe one’s affective, identity and instrumental connections to a nation. These terms include national identity, national pride, nationalism, patriotism, constructive patriotism, and symbolic patriotism, among others.

Perhaps no concept is more central to the national conflict Guidelines than national attachment. The investigative processes gather evidence about indicators of national attachment to foreign countries and the US. Potential conflicts between US attachment and other national attachments are at the heart of the adjudicator’s decision making process. These decisions make assumptions about the influence of national attachment – both positive and negative – in resolving future conflicts relating to US national interests. Similarly, it is important to understand how specific types of evidence including dual citizenship are reflections of one or another of the various facets of national attachment. For these reasons, it is important to describe the meanings
of the various facets of national attachment and any available evidence about their likely impact on future behavior relating to national security.

The distinction between nationalism and patriotism was perhaps the first to arise in the effort to parse national attachment into its parts (Kosterman & Feshback 1989). Patriotism is generally regarded as a deep affective attachment to the nation. Nationalism includes not only an affective attachment but the additional element that one believes in the superiority and dominance of their own country over other countries (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin & Pratto, 1997). As methods of measuring nationalism and patriotism were developed, concerns were raised that measures of patriotism in particular were grounded in ideological differences roughly along the conservative – liberal spectrum (Schatz & Staub, 1997). The concern was that a measure of patriotism that emphasized conservative beliefs such as, “I believe US policies are almost always the morally correct ones,” would tend to blur the distinction between patriotism and political ideology.

The effort that followed to define measures of patriotism less dependent on an ideological perspective and that measured distinct facets of patriotism has led to more precisely defined forms of patriotism. Huddy & Khatib (2007) provided the most comprehensive analysis of the differences in meaning between several measures of patriotism that had accumulated in the preceding 20 years. Including nationalism, they investigated the four major facets of national attachment that had emerged – nationalism (or blind/uncritical patriotism), national identity, constructive patriotism, and symbolic patriotism (or national pride) as defined below.

**Nationalism**

Nationalism is described as belief in the idealized rightness and superiority of the nation and its dominance over other nations. Expressions such as “my country, right or wrong” and an unwillingness to criticize one’s country or accept criticism of it are characteristic of nationalism. Many consider nationalism to be synonymous with uncritical or blind patriotism.

**National Identity**

National identity is a subjective (internalized) sense of belonging or attachment to the nation. This feeling of belonging involves conformance to prescriptive country norms (“All good Americans should vote.”) rather than descriptive norms (“Many Americans don’t vote.”). National identity is grounded in social identity theory rather than any ideology about national attachment.

**Constructive Patriotism**

Constructive patriotism is a love of country characterized by a desire for positive change and improvement through constructive criticism and loyalty.
Symbolic Patriotism (National Pride)

Symbolic patriotism is pride in one’s country and its symbols such as the flag and the anthem.

Huddy & Khatib (2007) used survey data from student samples and a national sample to evaluate whether these four facets of national attachment measure distinctly different components and what the relationships are among them. The items used in the surveys to measure these attributes are shown in Exhibit 3 below to provide a more explicit understanding of the meaning associated with each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facet of National Attachment</th>
<th>Survey Items Measuring the Facet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>• I support my country’s leaders even if I disagree with their actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• People who do not wholeheartedly support America should live elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• For the most part, people who protest and demonstrate against US policy are good, understanding and intelligent people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The United States is virtually always right.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• I support US policies for the very reason that they are the policies of my country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There is too much criticism of the US in the world, and we as citizens should not criticize it (US).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• I believe US policies are almost always the morally correct ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• America is a better country than most others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The world would be better if more people from other countries were like Americans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td>• How important is being American to you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To what extent do you see yourself as a typical American?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How well does the term American describe you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• When talking about Americans how often do you say “we” instead of “they”?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regarding your neighborhood, town, city or county, how close do you feel to America?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How important is it to you to feel American?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructive Patriotism</td>
<td>• People should work hard to move this country in a positive direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• If I criticize the United States, I do so out of love of country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• I oppose some US policies because I care about my country and want to improve it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• I express my attachments to America by supporting efforts of positive change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Patriotism</td>
<td>• How good does it make you feel when you see the American flag flying?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How good does it feel when you hear the national anthem?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are you proud of the way democracy works here?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are you proud of economic achievements here?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are you proud of your country’s science and technology achievements?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are you proud of your country’s history?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are you proud of your country’s fair and equitable treatment of all groups in society?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are you proud of your country’s achievements in art and literature?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are you proud of your country’s social security system?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Their results showed that each of these four facets had distinctly different meanings and that these differences in meaning led to different relationships with other measures of interest to the national conflict Guidelines. Of particular interest, national identity was unrelated to ideology whereas nationalism and symbolic patriotism were related to conservatism. Conversely national
identity was positively related to voting and political participation while nationalism was negatively related to both. In general, national identity was the only facet of national attachment that positively predicted political and civic involvement. Presumably this is a function of the prescriptive normative element of national identity.

Earlier, Schatz, Staub & Levine (1999) demonstrated a very similar result that blind patriotism (nationalism) was associated with political disengagement.

These findings regarding political and civic engagement are significant for the evidence about dual citizenship reported below. The dual citizenship research reports that, compared to sole naturalized US citizenship, dual citizenship is associated with lower national identity and less political and civic engagement. If one assumes that national identity and political engagement are indicating of stronger attachment to the US, the implication is that dual citizenship represents greater risk than sole citizenship for future behavior that is not in US national interests.

**Dual Citizenship/Nationality**

A central question relating to multiple attachments and identities, especially for Guideline C, is whether dual citizenship, or dual nationality, is an indicator of multiple non-dominant national attachments or of one dominant and one subordinate national attachment. Political philosophers distinguish between traditional, transnational, and postnational models of citizenship (e.g., Brubaker, 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller, & Szanton Blanc, 1994; Geyer, 1996; Huntington, 2004; Renshon, 2000; Schuck, 1998).

Brubaker (1992) describes the traditionalist view that citizenship is, among other things, national, unique and socially consequential. The traditionalist view is that nations exert sovereignty within their geographic borders and that immigrants’ assimilation culminates in citizenship. The traditionalist expectation is that citizenship in a new country implies loss of attachment to the origin country. This view predicts less dual citizenship and more assimilation into single, naturalized citizenship in the new country. The traditionalist view is an “either/or” model. In contrast, the transnational view is a cross-border view of citizenship (Basch, et al. 1994). Citizens retain original ethnic attachments and are able to sustain dual national identities. This functional dualism is maintained without any necessity for gradual evolution to a single national identity. Transnationalism predicts growth in dual citizenship for the instrumental and social advantages it provides and a reduction in the marginalization of outgroups. Postnationalism proposes that the traditional state legitimacy grounded in sovereignty and national self-determination gives way, especially in Europe and North America to international human rights. A national citizen’s human rights are not a function of nationhood but of cross-national consensus. Postnationalism predicts the irrelevance of national citizenship and so, expects initial levels of dual citizenship to be followed by decreasing levels.

As a practical matter, the domain of national security is located squarely within the traditionalist context. National security is, after all, about the protection of national assets where interests of other countries compete or conflict with US national interests. Empirical evidence
that dual citizenship is taking on different meaning associated with transnationalism or postnationalism would reduce the current implication of traditional dual citizenship that it is an indicator of the individual’s competing interests and/or identities that may increase the risk of choices and actions against US national interests.

Bloemraad (2004) and Staton, Jackson & Canache (2007) independently examined data about dual citizens in Canada and the US, respectively, to determine whether characteristics of dual citizens fit with a traditional model of citizenship or fit better with either emerging model. In general, evidence supporting the traditional model would support the current Guidelines approach to regard dual citizenship as a serious potential disqualifier. These two large-sample studies found virtually the same pattern of results showing more support for the traditionalist model.

In general, both studies showed that frequent indicators of national identity are negatively associated with dual citizenship. Using national census data on over two million Canadian residents over a 25-year period, Bloemraad showed that Canadian dual citizens are more likely not to speak English/French in the home. They are more likely not to be married, and are more likely to be internationally mobile. Also, her data showed that the longer foreign nationals had been in Canada, the less likely they were to seek dual citizenship. Except for education, which was positively associated with dual citizenship, most socio-economic and demographic factors were unrelated to foreign nationals’ decision to seek dual citizenship. These results may be interpreted to mean that dual citizenship is not a sign of stronger national attachment to the host country.

Staton, Jackson & Canache (2007) used results from two national surveys in 1999 (N=4,614) and 2002 (N=4,213) of first-generation Latinos’ who were naturalized US citizens. The analyses compared two groups – those who were sole US citizens and those who were dual citizens. The survey focused on behavior and attitudes toward US participation and citizenship. They focused on US national attachment differences between sole US citizens and dual US citizens. Like Bloemraad (2004), they evaluated these differences to test whether the characteristics of dual citizens reflected a more traditionalist model of national citizenship or a transnational model of multinational citizenship. Staton, et al. did not evaluate a postnational model.

The results were clear. Compared to single nationals, dual nationals were:

- Less likely to have high English proficiency;
- Less likely to self-identify as Americans;
- Less likely to consider the US as their homeland;
- Less likely to express high levels of civic duty; and
- Less likely to have registered to vote or to have voted.

Similar to Bloemraad’s Canadian sample, dual citizen Latino’s in the US were less assimilated – as indicated by English proficiency and American and Homeland self-identity.
Similarly, they were less engaged in US political processes. A reasonable overall conclusion from these separate studies is that foreign-born dual citizens show less strong attachment to the host country than those who are single citizens of the host country. The implication of both studies for the national conflict Guidelines is that dual citizenship is an indicator of weaker affective or identity-based attachment to the host country, unless mitigated by direct evidence of strong national identity.

Both studies investigated the magnitude of the differences between dual and sole citizens. In general, Bloemraad’s census-based study across all groups showed smaller differences between dual and sole citizens than Staton et al’s survey-based study of 1st generation Latinos. The largest differences in Bloemraad’s study were based on country of origin, home language, education, international mobility and length of Canadian residence. The probability of being a dual citizen was .28 among those who did not speak English / French in the home compared to .19 among those who did speak English / French in the home. Similarly, college degree people were nearly 50% more likely to be dual citizens than high-school only people, .30 and .19, respectively. People who lived abroad during the prior year were nearly 1/3 more likely to be dual citizens than people who lived only in Canada in the prior year, .28 and .21, respectively. Ten-year residents were near 20% more likely to be dual citizens than were 20-year residents, .25 and .21, respectively. The probability of being a dual citizen based on country of origin ranged from a high of .37 among French and .27 among Lebanese to a low of .13, .15 and .15 among Trinidadians, Guyanans and Jamaicans, respectively. Other differences due to age, sex, and employment status were negligible.

Within the narrower range of the Staton et al. Latino sample, differences between dual and sole citizens tended to be more consistently large. Sole citizens were more likely than dual citizens to: (a) have high English proficiency, .62 to .44; (b) self-identify as Americans, .73 to .60; (c) demonstrate high civic duty, .76 to .62; (d) be registered to vote, .88 to .80; and (e) to have actually voted, .86 to .73.

Both studies of dual citizenship concluded that the pattern of citizenship relationships continues to reflect a largely traditional view of country citizenship with some indications of increasing transnational relationships. There is little indication that citizens are adopting postnational views of their relationships with their home or host countries.
Level 3 Evidence

Guidelines B, C, and L focus on the potential for social influences (other nations or foreign employers) to result in security violations. As described in the Guidelines, these social influences may either be internal or external to the individual. Internally, a person can be at risk for violating security behavior because their cognitions, feelings or resources are linked to a foreign entity and thus they feel motivated or obligated to voluntarily act on behalf of that foreign entity.

In contrast to these internal motivations, coercion represents a social influence that is external to the person. In other words, it is not that one’s attachments intrinsically motivate one’s actions on behalf of foreign entities, but rather an external force extrinsically motivates (coerces) a person to engage in security violation behavior by exploiting their connections or attachments to foreign entities. Unlike above, the coerced person is not voluntarily engaging in security violation behavior based on personal attachments to foreign entities so much as those are being used against them to compel such behavior. The focus of this review of Level 3 evidence for Guidelines B, C, and L is on the psychological construct underlying intrinsic motivations to act on behalf of a particular foreign entity: psychological attachment. Although these psychological attachments may be one factor that influences the degree to which a person is susceptible to coercion (e.g., one’s emotional investment in a foreign country may be exploited by a foreign agent), the focus of this review is on the Level 3 evidence supporting the role of psychological attachments in predicting voluntary behavior.

Psychological Attachments

Broadly speaking, Guidelines B, C, and L are related to a psychological attachment to a foreign entity with conflicting interests to the United States. Each of these Guidelines relates the individual to social influences that are driven by cognitive, affective or instrumental attachments to foreign interests. Adjudicators are instructed to pursue evidence related to all three types of attachments: evidence that shows that a foreign influence serves to define who I am (cognitive attachment), how important that influence is to me and what I value (affective attachment), and what I get in exchange for that attachment (instrumental). The implicit assumption of these Guidelines is that foreign attachments (1) exist and motivate behavior toward those entities to which an individual is attached and (2) create potential conflicts of attachment which the individual may resolve through security violation behavior.

Social Identity Attachments

At a fundamental level, individuals’ connections to social groups are meant to satisfy important needs and values, including self-esteem, security and belongingness (Pratt, 1998; Tajfel, 1978; Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Being a part of a social group helps to define one’s self-concept as it relates to his/her social environment. More specifically, the literature on social
identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) posits that individuals derive part of their self-concept from their membership in a particular social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership (p. 255). In other words, one’s social identity describes two types of attachment to a social group: a cognitive attachment (I categorize/define myself as a member of group X) and an affective attachment (being a member of group X is important to me and what I value). This second element represents the degree or strength of identification, and is particularly relevant to personal motivation and, by extension, individual and behavior.

The SIT literature suggests consequences of social identity which are relevant to loyalty behavior. Namely, individuals tend to choose activities congruent with salient aspects of their identities, and they also support the values and institutions embodying those identities (e.g., Stryker & Serpe, 1982; Mael, 1988). Group identification is associated with loyalty to, and pride in, the in-group as well as value congruence and attitude similarity within its membership. In the organizational loyalty literature, for example, identification with an organization enhances support for and commitment to that organization (Riketta & Van Dick, 2005). In sum, social identification serves as a motivator for behavior, namely behavior in favor of the in-group. Social identity as a motivator of behavior is relevant to Guidelines B, C, and L because it serves as a distal predictor of loyalty.

Social identity research provides insights into loyalty behavior through the concept of in-group favoritism. A large body of literature on in-group favoritism (for review see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002) consistently illustrates that individuals think and behave in accordance with the interests of their own group (and often contrary to the interests of out-groups). Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of applying social identity to the adjudication of the Guidelines is the fact that the strength of social identification influences the likelihood that one will act in the interest of their own identity in-group (e.g., Hogg & Williams, 2000). Group membership, especially when it is very important to a person’s self-concept (i.e., strong identification), motivates behaviors that benefit the in-group or are in line with the values of the group.

The question of concern in personnel security is not as much about a specific identity category, but rather the presence of an identity other than an “American” identity. That identity (and the psychological attachments it represents) is concerning to the degree that the identity in-group represents interests which seem incompatible with those of the United States. Generally speaking, the Guidelines instruct adjudicators to pursue evidence indicating (1) a potential conflict of identity in individuals and (2) that individuals would act in favor of another in-group (against the US) when confronted with this conflict.

First we will describe a specific identity which has been implicated by the Guidelines as being a potential source of conflict with national loyalty, namely, ethnic identity. In describing that conflict, we will relate ethnic identity to national identity, and use the acculturation literature to present social science evidence with regard to the ethnic identity-national identity conflict. Then, we will introduce organizational identity as a viable analog to foreign attachment, drawing links between its underlying cognitive and affective attachments and loyalty. In the context of
this organizational identity analog, we will then present evidence linking its underlying *instrumental* or exchange-based attachment to loyalty as exemplified by Guideline L. Outside Activities (and, to a lesser extent, Guideline B. Foreign Influence). Finally, we will describe how individuals’ identity conflicts are managed or resolved drawing examples from both the ethnic and organizational identity literatures.

**Ethnic Identity**

Clearly, there are as many possible social identities as there are potential groups or categories of human beings. However, we chose ethnicity-based social identity as a particularly relevant identity categorization because the foreign influence and preference Guidelines seem to imply that ethnic identity is form of psychological attachment that is especially relevant to the potential for security violation behavior. One’s attachment to his/her ethnic identity may, therefore, be thought of as a psychological analog to attachment to the nation. Moreover, ethnic identity may pose a risk to national loyalty to the extent that it conflicts with one’s national identity.

First, it will be useful to define what is meant by ethnic identity. Unfortunately, there is substantial inconsistency and debate surrounding this particular term (in both research and colloquial language). Ethnicity is sometimes confused with nationality, race and/or religion, but for the purposes of this paper, ethnicity is defined as one’s “objective group membership as determined by ancestral ethnic heritage” (Phinney, 1992, p.158). Like any social identity category (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986), ethnic identity involves both a self-categorization as a member of an ethnic group and a strength or personal importance of that identification to one’s sense of self. In other words, checking a box on a survey in response to the “what is your ethnicity?” only indicates self-identification and does not capture the entirety of this construct. The strength of identification or the degree of personal relevance of a certain group membership is the more important aspect of this construct as it relates to motivation and behavior (Ashmore et al., 2004; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Phinney, & Ong, 2007; Roberts, et al., 1999). An identity must be personally consequential in order to be relevant to motivation and behavior. The potential security risk posed by ethnic identification may be enhanced or diluted by identity strength, depending on the personal importance one places upon in-group membership.

With respect to the adjudication of the Guidelines, this begs the question, how can an outside observer infer one’s (1) ethnic self-categorization and/or (2) strength of ethnic identity? Aside from simply asking people to self-report these two facets of ethnic identity, the acculturation literature suggests that outside observers might infer ethnic identification through “ethnic behaviors.” These types of behaviors represent two dimensions: (1) involvement in social activities with one’s group and (2) participation in cultural traditions (Phinney, 1990). It is not clear in the literature whether a tally or summation of these behaviors would indicate strength of identification, although it has been suggested that certain behavioral indicators may be stronger or more important indicators than others (i.e., language use/preference; Phinney & Ong, 2007). It should be noted, that while ethnic behaviors are generally correlated with other aspects of ethnic
identity, ethnic identity is an internal structure that can exist without behavior. Below is a collection of “ethnic behaviors” that have been used in prior research to indicate one’s ethnic identification:

- Ethnic language proficiency.
- Ethnic language use.
- Endogamy (marrying within one’s own ethnic group).
- Social Network Structure (number of ethnic peer contacts; centrality of ethnic contacts in social networks, frequency of contact with ethnic in-group members).
- Religious affiliation and practice (church membership, attendance of religious ceremonies, and enrollment in parochial education).
- Participation in structured ethnic social groups (ethnic clubs, societies, or organizations).
- Political activity (involvement in political activities on behalf of one's ethnic group).
- Area of residence (geographical region or number/proportion of in-group members in one's neighborhood).
- Miscellaneous ethnic/cultural indicators: ethnic music, songs, dances, and dress; newspapers, periodicals, books, and literature; food or cooking; entertainment (movies, radio, TV plays, sports, etc.); traditional celebrations; visits to and continued interest in the homeland; knowledge about ethnic culture or history.

Since it is not clear how (or if) these behaviors can be used to capture (or compare) strength of ethnic identity, the centrality of an ethnic identity to one’s self-concept is typically measured in the psychological literature using self-report survey measures. Such measures ask respondents to report the degree to which they agree with various statements relating to their ethnic identity (strongly agree to strongly disagree). A total ethnic identity score is then computed taking the average of those responses. In addition to an open ended question on ethnic identity self-categorization (“what is your ethnicity?”), ethnic identity measures typically capture the following components in order to infer strength of attachment.

- **Exploration** (seeking information and experiences relevant to one’s ethnicity).
- **Commitment** (perceived sense of belonging; or affective commitment to one’s ethnic group).
- **Positive attitudes** toward the ethnic in-group.
- **Values/beliefs** (agreement with values/beliefs specific to a particular group; e.g., Felix-Ortiz et al., 1994).

With respect to the application of ethnic identity research to the adjudication of the Guidelines, it is important to note that research has indicated that there are intergroup differences
in both behavioral expressions of ethnic identity as well as strength of ethnic identification. For instance, differences in language preference (use) behaviors do not necessarily indicate ethnic identification to the same degree for all ethnic groups. In fact, language preference is not a relevant marker of ethnic identity for groups whose official or “unofficial” native language is English (e.g., Canadian immigrants, Swiss immigrants). Also, there appears to be differential rates of intermarriage among nonwhite racial groups with significantly higher rates of intermarriage among Asians and Latinos (Lee & Bean, 2004). This suggests, again, that racial/ethnic identity behaviors differ across groups.

Likewise, strength of identification may be manifested at different levels for different ethnic groups. Research illustrates that some ethnic groups consistently exhibit higher or lower levels of ethnic identity than other groups. For instance, ethnic minority individuals report higher levels of ethnic identity than White Americans (Phinney, Cantu, & Kurtz, 1997; St. Louis & Liem, 2005). More specific studies have found African American subjects score higher on measures of ethnic identity than do Whites (Phinney & Alipuria, 1990; Phinney & Tarver, 1988). These results imply that ethnicity may be differentially important to entire groups, not just individuals. As such, the motivational and behavioral outcomes associated with ethnic identity may not generalize across groups. With respect to the adjudication of Guidelines B and C, it may be that not all ethnic identification or foreign attachments are equal, and one must take into account the potential for this unequal influence. To use a concrete yet hypothetical example, it may be that Israelis are more affected (motivated) by their attachment to their ethnic group than are Indians, although both may score comparably on a given measure of ethnic identity (e.g., Phinney, 1992 Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure).

National Identity

The relationship between ethnic identity and Foreign Influence and Foreign Preference Guidelines hinges upon the assumption that these Guidelines are, at their core, intended to capture a conflict between foreign attachments and national attachments (and thus foreign loyalty and national loyalty). Through the lens of social identity theory, it is clear that the Guidelines assume that one’s foreign (ethnic) identity would constitute a threat to one’s national identity, and therefore, one’s attachment and loyalty to the US. However, the Guidelines focus namely on evidence for competing or conflicting identities without explicitly addressing the strength of one’s national identity as a predictor of loyalty behavior. If social identity motivates behavior, then a strong national identify should mean that one is more likely to be loyal to the US.

Measures of national identity are often confused with other indicators of national attachment like patriotism and nationalism. From a social identity standpoint, however, national identity also involves both self-categorization (as an American) and the personal importance of that group membership to an individual. National identity has been assessed with measures of national affirmation and the importance of one’s national identity, similar to the ethnic identity measurement strategy proposed by Phinney (1992). National identification ostensibly indicates that one is cognitively and affectively attached to the nation, motivated to behave in the interests
of the nation, and less likely to engage in security violation behavior. When national identity conflicts with ethnic identity, it poses an increased security risk.

**Ethnic vs. National Identity**

With respect to the adjudication of the Guidelines, social science evidence does not necessarily indicate that there is an inherent conflict between ethnic and national identity as the Guidelines imply. In fact, there is no empirical research suggesting that the absence of a substantial conflict between foreign attachments (ethnic identities) is necessary (or sufficient) for predicting national loyalty.

The relationship between ethnic and American (or more generally, national) identity has been debated for decades (see Berry, 2003, for a review). For instance some acculturation literature argues that identification with a national culture often comes at the cost of the customs and values related to one’s ethnic identity suggesting a negative relationship between national and ethnic identity (e.g., Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Other studies illustrate that the relationship between ethnic identity and national identity is not necessarily negative, but it depends on which ethnic group is being referenced. More specifically, ethnic groups that have been traditionally oppressed or that frequently experience ethnicity-based discrimination tend to report weaker national identification.

For example, there is evidence for a negative relationship between black ethnic identity and national identity, suggesting that they conflict. Research on social dominance offers an explanation for this apparent moderating effect of ethnicity in the ethnic identity-national identity relationship. The literature on social dominance (Sidainus, 1993) suggests that members of traditionally oppressed or disadvantaged minority groups in a given society are less likely to report positive attachments to the social system (i.e., the nation) within which they are imbedded (and subjugated). Social dominance research has found that the level of national attachment and the relationship between ethnic attachment and national attachment is asymmetrical across ethnic groups. For instance members of dominant groups (e.g., Caucasians) identify more strongly with the nation than members of subordinate groups (e.g., African Americans) (Peña & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius, Feshback, Levin & Pratto, 1997) and social dominance theory suggests that this is because the social system serves the former groups’ interest more than the latter groups’.

Related research on the relationship between experiences of ethnicity-based discrimination and national attachment shows a similar pattern. For instance, the experience of ethnic/cultural discrimination has been shown to cause 2nd generation immigrants to reactively identify more strongly with their parents’ ethnic or national origins (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). In more local circumstances, Huo & Molina, (2006) showed that African American and Latina immigrants in the US demonstrated more loyalty toward the US when they believed their own race/ethnic group was perceived more positively by others. Taken together, this evidence suggests that the negative correlation between ethnic identity and national identity assumed by the Guidelines does appear to hold true for some ethnic groups. Other recent studies, however, have found that ethnic and national identity may be unrelated or even positively related with
each other. A large international study of over 5,000 immigrant adolescents (ages 13–18 years) from 26 cultural backgrounds in 13 immigrant-receiving countries (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 8 countries in Europe, and Israel) independently assessed ethnic identity and national identity (Berry et al., 2006). The results showed that, across the countries of settlement, correlations between the two identities ranged widely (from .32 to -.28) with many near 0. The results showed that (a) strong ethnic identity does not necessarily imply a weak national identity and vice versa and (b) ethnic and national identity interact, implying that the effects of ethnic identity on behavior may vary depending on individuals’ identification with their country of residence. Other research has shown that the relationship between ethnic and national identities also differs across ethnic groups. Some research has shown that members of different ethnic groups exhibit varying degrees of national attachment. For instance for African Americans ethnic identity is negatively correlated with national attachment but the same is not true for Latinos (Sidanius, Feshback, Levin, & Pratto, 1997). In fact, a study on Mexican Americans and showed that Latino ethnic identity predicted higher levels of national attachment (De la Garza, Falcon & Garcia, 1996).

Voluntariness of immigration is one additional consideration regarding the relationship between ethnic and national identities. Some groups have entered into the acculturation process voluntarily while others experience acculturation without having necessarily sought it out (e.g. refugees, indigenous peoples). Reasons for migrating have long been studied using the concepts of push-pull motivations and expectations. For instance, Richmond (1993) has proposed that a reactive-proactive continuum of migration motivation in which push motives (including involuntary or forced migration, and negative expectations) characterize the reactive end of the dimension, while pull motives (including voluntary migration and positive expectations) cluster at the proactive end. Such a single dimension allows for more concise conceptualization and ease of empirical analysis. This research proposes that those who are motivated to migrate by “pull” or proactive motivations acculturate more successfully and adapt better psychologically than those who are pushed or forced to migrate. Interestingly, Kim (1988) found that both those with high “push” motivation had psychological adaptation problems (those with high “push” motivations had more problems but those with high “pull” motivations had almost as great a number of problems). Kim (1988) found that reactive immigrants (those who are pushed) are more at risk for poor acculturation/adaptation in their host country, but so too are those who are highly proactive. Kim proposed that these latter migrants may have had extremely intense or excessively high (even unrealistic) expectations about their life in the new society, which were not met, leading to greater stress and poorer psychological adjustment. Unfortunately, this line of research confounds motivation and expectations. For instance, one might feel “forced” to immigrate but still have positive expectations the United States (as might be the case, for example, with a Kurdish Iraqi immigrant).

Experiences of discrimination have been repeatedly shown to increase identification with one’s ethnic group (e.g., Berr et al 2006), and decrease identification with the nation or society within which one is subjugated (e.g. Ward, 2008). Individuals such as Kurdish Iraqis who are
discriminated against or persecuted in their home nation probably have much lower level attachments to Iraq as compared to members of the majority/dominant ethnic group. However, the lack of identification with a home nation does not necessarily indicate the presence of an attachment to one’s host nation. In addition, experiencing discrimination in the host nation is likely to be detrimental to Kurdish Iraqis’ identification with the host nation and to enhance the strength of their identification with their own ethnic group. Social identity theory predicts that identification with a particular social group motivates people to act in the interests of that group and support causes and institutions whose goals align with the goals of the ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It seems likely, then, that Kurdish Iraqis would be more likely to positively identify with the United States if the US was supporting the goals of their ingroup.

In conclusion, it seems that some ethnic groups (especially those that have been traditionally disadvantaged or discriminated against) attribute less personal importance to their national identity than their ethnic identity. However, this research does not prove that minorities must relinquish their ethnic identity to feel positively toward the state. In further support of these findings, a recent study by Elkins and Sides, (2007) across 51 multi-ethnic states, showed that strength of ethnic/cultural identity was not significantly related to state attachment (pride or identification). Taken together, empirical evidence illustrates that, contrary to the assumptions in the Guidelines, individuals can seemingly maintain their ancestral culture without inducing an ostensible conflict between foreign and national attachments. A full discussion of how individuals manage multiple identities and how such identity management applies to national loyalty will be provided below in the Identity Management section (p. 41.)

Organizational Commitment

There is a significant body of research that parallels the ethnic/national identity research in the Industrial and Organizational Psychology literature on organizational identity. In this vein, we will first introduce the criterion construct of organizational commitment as a relevant analog to the construct of national loyalty. Then, we will describe how research on organizational identity provides evidence linking psychological attachments to commitment and loyalty. It is through this link that the literature on organizational commitment provides relevant insights into motivations and behaviors related to national loyalty.

Generally speaking, loyalty and allegiance can be defined as an attachment to a country, leader, cause, group, or organization that causes people to behave in a manner consistent with their commitments, obligations and desire to help ensure the well being of that entity. Several authors have illustrated that the construct of organizational commitment (also referred to as organizational loyalty; cf. Hirschman, 1970; Morrow & McElroy, 1993) is a relevant analog to the national commitment and loyalty that the security clearance Guidelines are intended to predict (Krause, 2002; Gonzalez & Timm, 2007). More specifically, there is a large body of literature which illustrates that organizational commitment is positively related to behaviors intended to help the organization and its interests (organizational citizenship behaviors) but is
negatively related to behaviors intended to harm the organization or its interests (counterproductive workplace behavior) (see Dalal, 2005).

Insights into the factors that influence organizational commitment and subsequent behaviors should also provide analogous insights into the factors that influence commitment to the nation (and subsequent loyalty behaviors). Like ethnic identification, the factors underlying loyalty or commitment to a given entity rest in three forms of attachment: cognitive, affective, and instrumental attachments. The organizational commitment literature adds to our understanding of cognitive and affective attachment via its link to the social identity literature (i.e., organizational identity). It also adds to our understanding of the instrumental or exchange-based attachments underlying Guideline L and to a lesser extent, Guideline B. In fact, this literature is especially relevant since Guideline L is distinguishable from the social influences underlying Guidelines B and C through its focus on the organizational context and employment attachments. This is not to say that organizational commitment does not involve cognitive or affective attachments, but rather that it is especially applicable to this Outside Activities Guideline due to the inclusion of instrumental attachments explored in organizational employment and service contexts. In the paragraphs below we will present evidence on psychological attachments from the perspective of the organizational commitment literature and discuss the implications for the Adjudicative Guidelines and national loyalty.

**Cognitive & Affective Attachment**

Early research on organizational commitment generally suggested that having a social identity based in the organization was a precursor to becoming committed (as reviewed in Meyer, Becker, & Van Dick, 2006). Incidentally, the early literature on immigration made a similar suggestion that an affective attachment to the nation was a precursor to national loyalty (e.g., Gordon, 1964), although that position is now debated. Regardless, both literatures converge on the idea that identification yields positive affective commitment due to the emotional bond created through one’s experiences and feelings of belongingness (e.g., Ashforth & Mael, 1989; DeLamater, Katz, & Kelman, 1969; Druckman, 1994).

The application of social identity theory to organizational commitment research, however, suggests that it is not just affective attachment, but also the incorporation of the in-group into one’s self-concept (cognitive attachment) which promotes loyalty in a group (Becker, 1992; Johnson & Chang, 2006). In other words the affective and cognitive attachments embodied by social identity can act as social glue that promotes loyalty and keeps a group together (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). Along these lines, the organizational literature defines the construct of “organizational identity” as the extent to which organizational membership is central to one’s identity (e.g., Hogg & Terry, 2000; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, Monden, & de Lima, 2002).

Similar to social identification ethnic groups, this definition suggests that the attachments represented by identification with an organization are grounded in (1) self-categorization as a group member and (2) the personal importance of group membership with the latter being the
more critical component. Implicit in this definition is the critical role of strength of identification in identity’s effects on motivational tendencies, and ultimately behavior. Accumulated evidence in the organizational identity literature shows that the degree of personal importance accorded to one’s identity as an employee at an organization is related to positive motivations and behaviors directed toward the organization and its members. For instance, stronger organizational identification reduces employees’ intentions to quit their jobs (Abrams et al, 1998; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Likewise, loyalty toward one’s organization promotes positive and constructive workplace behavior (e.g., Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). Through the lens of social identity theory, these findings suggest that cognitive and affective attachment to one’s organization make employees more likely to behave in ways that favor the organizational in-group. Such findings support the idea presented above (see pp. 32-33 and 41) that national identification is likely to make citizens more likely to behave in the interests of the nation.

**Instrumental Attachment**

In addition to cognitive and affective attachments to one’s organization, the organizational commitment literature incorporates the idea of instrumental or exchange-based attachment whereby individuals form commitments to their organizations based on shared expectations of what each party (the organization and the individual) will receive as a benefit of this loyal relationship (Gellatly, Meyer, & Luchak, 2006; Meyer, Becker, & Van Dick, 2006). Like affective and cognitive attachments, instrumental attachments are significant influences on behavior. In contrast to identity-based attachments, though, instrumental attachments are based on exchange-type relationships (rather than emotions or preferences) whereby one party is motivated by the prospect of receiving something in return (e.g., money, power, prestige).

In Guidelines B and L, adjudicators are instructed to pursue information indicating the potential for conflicting instrumental attachments which undermine national loyalty. Guideline L focuses on professional relationships (employment/service relationships with foreign organizations) which create instrumental value for individuals and raise the possibility of a “conflict of interest,” whereas Guideline B includes questions about foreign business connections or financial investments which may do the same. Both Guidelines seek to predict whether conflicting instrumental attachments exist, although they do not appear to be concerned with the strength of such attachments.

The “strength” so to speak of exchange-based attachments may be measured by the degree of importance or the value that one places on the outcome he/she wishes to receive from behavior. In other words, an instrumental attachment’s motivational effect on behavior varies according to what one expects to get in return. Research on the motivational effects of the subjective value of a behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991) or a desired outcome (e.g., Vroom, 1964) supports this contention. Since this valence or value of an outcome is subjective (varies between and even within individuals) it is typically only directly measured by self-report (e.g., asking people how important something is to them). But, as has been suggested in the previous section on Guideline A, the Theory of Planned Behavior (TBP) suggests that the importance of a given
outcome may be best predicted by an individual’s past behavior directed toward achieving that outcome (Ajzen, 1991). Applied to the Adjudicative Guidelines, indications of instrumental attachments may be best captured by prior behaviors which reflect the value placed on outcomes of such instrumental attachments.

It should be noted that the organizational commitment literature also posits that there may be inherent differences in strength across types of attachments. In fact, Meyer et al. (2006) suggest that exchange-based commitments (instrumental attachments) may indicate more transitory, context-dependent commitments whereas more stable, meaningful attachments (commitments) are grounded in cognitions and affect (i.e., organizational identities). Therefore, it may be that social identification with a foreign entity is a more powerful/relevant predictor of security violation behavior than is instrumental or an exchange-based relationship. In fact, research comparing the motivations of past spies seems to support this contention. In past espionage cases, spies (especially in the more recent cases) were more likely to have been motivated by ideology than money (Herbig, 2008). The application of this idea to the Adjudicative Guidelines will be expounded upon in later sections (see p. 63 for Risk Assessment Framework).

Identity Management

In our discussion above, we have outlined the ways in which psychological attachments impact behavior, specifically behavior favoring groups to which one is cognitively, affectively or instrumentally attached. In our illustration of the relationship between ethnic and national identities we have provided the reader an initial look at the relationships, and ostensible conflicts, between multiple identities. In the section that follows, we will draw on the acculturation (e.g., Berry, 1997) and social identity complexity (e.g., Roccas & Brewer, 2002) literatures in order to answer the following two questions, (1) How do individuals construct their social identities in relation to non-convergent in-group membership? (2) How do people behave in response to this identity construction? It is these two questions that are at the core of the adjudication of Guideline B. Foreign Influence, Guideline C. Foreign Preference, and Guideline L. Outside Activities. The Guidelines imply that foreign influences, preferences, and outside activities are problematic to the extent that they (1) do not overlap with US interests representing a “conflict of interest” and (2) result in behavioral manifestations (security violations) which resolve that conflict in an undesired direction (in favor of foreign attachments).

An important characteristic of social identification (and psychological attachments more broadly) is that it is a relatively dynamic process that can change with the choice of a referent group. Evidence from the psychological literature shows that individuals appear capable of simultaneously, and even holistically, defining themselves in terms of multiple identities (Postmes & Jetten, 2006). Studies of US immigrants, for example, show that people can and do sustain multiple identities that, from an external point of view, appear to conflict (Deaux, 2008; Wiley & Deaux, 2008). The social identities people hold fall under 5 general categories (personal relationship identities, vocational/advocational identities, political affiliation, stigmatized groups,
and ethnic or religious group identities) and all social identities are not the same across individuals (Deaux, et al. 1995). Moreover, people vary widely in how they mentally construct multiple social identities (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2004) and social science research illustrates that there are many ways in which individuals can cope with or manage potentially conflicting identities (e.g., Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Breakwell, 1986; Kreiner, Hollensbe, et al., 2006; Pratt & Doucet, 2000; cf. Collinson, 2003; Kondo, 1990; Kunda, 1992). In line with what seems to be the basis for Guidelines B and C, the psychological literature has, in fact, suggested that immigrants from foreign countries often experience conflict between the demands of home and host cultures. For instance, they often feel torn between the influence of American culture and that of their home culture. This conflict not only creates negative psychological and social consequences (Marsella & Perdersen, 2004; Pierce, 2007), but it is assumed in the Guidelines to be a potential threat to one’s national allegiance or loyalty. Of particular relevance to the discussion of social identity with respect to the Guidelines is the question of how a member of an immigrant group or ethnic enclave deals with the potential demands of competing identities (country of residence vs. ethnic-national group membership). Brewer and colleagues (Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Brewer & Pierce, 2005) have proposed (and illustrated empirically), that there are four alternative strategies for managing multiple identities: intersection, dominance, compartmentalization, and merger. In the following paragraphs, we will delineate these management strategies, linking them where appropriate to the literature on acculturation (e.g., the four forms of acculturation proposed by Berry, 1997: assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization), and illustrating the implications for loyalty behavior.

**Intersection of Identities**

The first way that an individual can manage conflicting social identities is by defining the in-group as an intersection of multiple group members. This strategy results in a blended form of bicultural identity, exemplified by a hyphenated identification (e.g., African-American, Korean-American). Intersection is similar to a form of differentiation or dissonance described in the cognitive psychology literature where the compatible elements of two cognitions are separated out from the inconsistent ones. From the actor’s internal point of view this intersection or blending may be used to take “some of this and some of that” to create a functional hybrid that incorporates two identities while minimizing conflict (Wiley & Deaux, 2008). The behavioral implications of this type of identity management strategy are not clear, but some research shows that this configuration is associated with heightened ethnic consciousness (Sellers, et al., 1998), and a tendency to favor those who share this particular hyphenated identity (e.g., other Korean-Americans). Since this blended category simply appears to represent a more restricted (i.e., less inclusive) social identity, there are no discernable implications of this identity management configuration for security clearance decisions over and above those already discussed for social/ethnic identity.
Many researchers have tried to identify ways in which we can assess or quantify the relations between two cultures within one individual (Noels, 1992, 2004; Phinney, 1990, 2007; Hong, 2000, 2007; Benet-Martínez, 2002, 2005, Ward, 2008 submitted). For instance Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee and Morris (2002) put forward the idea that shifting between the two cultures is moderated by the perceived compatibility or opposition between the two cultural perspectives. To our knowledge, Benet-Martínez and Haritatos (2005) developed the only published instrument assessing bicultural identity (bicultural identity integration or BII). According to their model, BII is composed of two separate dimensions: perceptions of distance (perceiving the two cultures as separate and dissociated versus overlapping) and perceptions of conflict (feeling torn between the two cultural identities versus a feeling of harmony between the two cultures). Empirical studies using the BII scale illustrate that, in accordance with the Benet-Martínez’s proposed model, the distance scale is predicted by variables such as age, years spent in country of origin/host country, proficiency in language of origin, bicultural competence, and openness. It should be noted, however that the validity of the conflict scale seems to be somewhat questionable; in the 2005 study the conflict items only correlated with indicators of stress (e.g. intercultural relation, discrimination and isolation) and in the 2006 study the conflict scale was dropped from the analysis of results due to unacceptably low reliability ($\alpha = .45$).

Other researchers have also created scales assessing the notion of conflict between the two ethnic identities, but to date, their scales have not yet been published. For instance, Ward (2008) suggests that ethno-cultural identity conflict is a function of the cultural distance between the two ethnic groups, meaning that people who originate from a country whose language, culture and ethnic composition are significantly different from the host group will experience more conflict. Ward (2008) developed and validated the Ethno-cultural Identity Conflict (EIC) scale and illustrated that individuals who are integrated (according to Berry’s 1997 model) will experience less conflict, as opposed to assimilated, marginalized and separated ones. The scale also correlated significantly with measures of depression, and social difficulty, indicating its predictive value for the well-being of bicultural individuals. Recently, integrating prior theoretical propositions and building on these previous research findings Comănaru (2009) identified five interrelated dimensions of experiences of biculturalism and developed and validated a new instrument to measure these experiences, the Bicultural Identity Orientation Scale. The five dimensions of this unpublished BIO scale are: conflict (a perceived discord between the two cultures), monocultural orientation (the desire to be part of only one of the two cultures), flexibility (the alternation of behaviors and attitudes depending on the context), compatibility (perceived congruence between the two cultures) and hybridity (the blend of the two cultures to create one). The development of such scales assessing bicultural identity (conflict) offer a clear indication that individuals have a wide range of experiences due to their belonging to two (or more) cultural groups. Although two of the three scales described above are still unpublished, such attempts at quantifying the extent to which intraindividual identities are compatible point to not only the existence of dual identities but also illustrate the potential for
cognitive, affective and behavioral reactions resulting from perceptions of conflict or incompatibility between identities.

**Dominance of Identities**

The dominance mode of identity management is indicated when individuals adopt one primary group identification to which all other potential group identities are subordinated. This approach to managing multiple identities is exemplified by the traditional view of nationalism. Conceptually, ethnic/cultural identities may come into conflict with national identities. In this view, homogeneity in the core facets of the nation (commonly held language, beliefs, values, and political engagement skills) is more nation-supporting than heterogeneity which threatens the commonly held meaning of the nation (Renshon, 2005). Nationhood rests on the dominance of commonly held identities. This perspective harbors the view that simultaneously held multiple identities must be in some dominance order, and may also be thought of as “hierarchical ordering” of social identification (Brewer, Ho, Lee & Miller, 1987). In other words, the dominance mode predicts that a Chinese immigrant’s simultaneous identification with “Asian” and “American” cannot be sustained; one identity must dominate the other. Illustrations of this in the acculturation literature (e.g., Berry, 1997; Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006) point to two extremes: identification with the host culture at the expense of ethnic/cultural identity (i.e., assimilation) or exclusive investment in one’s ethnic/cultural identity and alienation from the host culture (i.e., separation). In terms of consequences for national loyalty behavior, it is clear that the former is much more desirable than the latter when it comes to security clearance decisions. The separation form of acculturation represents a rejection of another culture or a refusal to adapt and learn about a second culture (in this case, that of the United States). Persons seeking a security clearance who reject American culture are clearly not likely to be attached to the US or motivated to be loyal to its interests, and therefore, as a matter of policy will be denied a clearance. However, the implications of a domination of a “national” identity (over an “ethnic” identity) may be more complicated. We now turn to the literature on the “assimilation” form of acculturation which illustrates some of the behavioral manifestations the dominance strategy of “resolving” identity conflict.

**Assimilation Acculturation**

Assimilation involves own-culture shedding or the loss/replacement of behaviors (Berry, 1992) that allow the individual to better “fit” with the host society. The underlying assumption of assimilation models of acculturation is that a person cannot simultaneously maintain the culture of the home country and that of the new country. In other words, members of other cultures must lose or shed their original cultural identities as they acquire a new identity in a second culture (Ward, 2007). In the assimilation process, immigrants lose their ethnic distinctiveness, become ever more indistinguishable from the host society, and eventually adopt an American identity (Gordon, 1964). The foreign preference and influence Adjudicative Guidelines (C and B
respectively) assume that assimilated individuals (those who “lose” their old culture and adopt that of the US) obviously prefer the US over their country/culture of origin and therefore are less likely to commit security violations as a result of divided loyalties.

Some evidence supports this contention that as individuals abandon their ethnic attachment they will exhibit greater loyalty toward the United States. For instance Dowley and Silver (2000) found that strength of ethnic attachment is negatively related to feelings of national attachment (Dowley & Silver, 2000). Other empirical evidence, however, links assimilation models of acculturation to less positive attitudes toward the US as well as to more negative (risky or deviant) behavior. For instance, Wenzel (2006) observed that assimilation correlated with less positive attitudes toward the United States government. He explained these findings by suggesting that the process of assimilation erodes the idealized patriotism of recent immigrants and replaces it with cynicism. However, it is unclear in the literature as to whether this erosion of idealized patriotism represents a “normalizing” or “Americanizing” of immigrants’ patriotism or whether this erosion of patriotism is due to perception of unfulfilled promises or even betrayal by the nation. For instance, research on political attitudes of immigrants show that as immigrants become more attuned to American cultural traits and practices, there is a corresponding shift in their attitudes to mirror those of the dominant group Anglo-citizens (Binder, Polinard & Wrinkle, 1997; Branton, 2007; de la Garza et al. 1996). In contrast, research on psychological contract breach indicates that when newcomers’ expectations do not match their experiences, they feel betrayed and are less likely to be loyal and committed to the group (Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski & Bravo, 2007). Clearly the psychological contract breach explanation for the documented decline in patriotism has more threatening implications for national loyalty. Immigrants who feel like the United States has betrayed or abandoned them will pose greater risks to nation security than those who are simply adopting the cynical “American” attitude toward government. Only when the underlying cause of this phenomenon is determined will its relevance to national loyalty and security behavior be apparent.

It is clear, however, that assuming that identification (e.g., assimilation) progresses in a linear fashion (toward more American) may be flawed. In fact, ethnic self-identities can vary in a reactive fashion over time, indicating a return to and/or a valorization of ethnic identities (Rumbaut, 1997). In other words, it is not the case that ethnic attachments necessarily diminish over time.

Moreover, risky or deviant behavior of immigrant adolescents (e.g., violence, substance abuse) seems to increase as they become more assimilated in the US. For instance, Harris (1999) found that second generation immigrant adolescents are more prone to engage in risk behavior than foreign-born (and assumingly less assimilated) youth. This research illustrates that the assumption that assimilation leads to more stable, reliable or trustworthy behavior could be deficient. However, the results of this second study (Harris, 1999) should also be taken with a grain of salt, especially given that adolescents were its sample population. It may be that risky or deviant behavior is a “cultural norm” for American adolescents and the positive relationship between assimilation and risky behavior can be explained by the fact that assimilated adolescents
are just behaving like the Americans. In this case, an increased propensity for risky behavior would not reflect an increased security risk but rather a simple “normalizing” of behavior toward more Americanized. Taken together, research findings highlight the fact that our understanding of the effects of assimilation on the underlying causes of national attachment are limited, and it is precisely those undetermined causes which pose potential threats to national security.

Compartmentalization of Identities

Also referred to as “alternating biculturalism” or “frame switching,” this mode of identity management indicates switching between identities based on contextual cues. Social identity and self-categorization theories point to a context dependency whereby individuals’ social identification depends on the relevance and salience of an identity group in a particular context. This pattern is exemplified by children of immigrant parents who alternate between the ethnic language used at home and the national language used in the community (e.g., Harris, 1999; Hong, Morris, Chiu & Benet-Martinez, 2000). In frame switching, situational factors can activate a relevant identity which subsequently impacts values and attitudes depending on context. For example, Hong and colleagues (2000) showed that attributions made by Westernized Chinese students differ when in the context of Chinese culture than in the context of American culture. Similarly, Verkuyten & Pouliasi (2006) showed that bicultural Greek nationals living in the Netherlands reported different values associated with personal traits, family and friendships when the context shifted from Greek to Dutch. Extending these findings, it may be that the activation or switch from one identity to another not only “switches” attitudes and values, but also propensity for certain types of behaviors.

It is this identity management strategy that is the most potentially problematic for the adjudication of security clearance decisions. The compartmentalization strategy implies that different (incompatible) identities are experienced in a situation specific manner, making it difficult to capture attachments and loyalty tendencies which is the main purpose of these national conflict Guidelines (A, B, C and L). In other words, a threat to national security could arise when one “switches” attachments or loyalties (away from the US) based on certain contextual factors. In fact, research on espionage (Herbig, 2008) reports that in approximately 1/3 of the espionage cases some critical event, often a negative work event, appears to have triggered a transition toward espionage. Taken together, social identity and espionage research results imply that previously compliant (loyal, trustworthy) individuals may have reactively shifted facets of their moral and/or national identities in a manner that either changed their attitudes about espionage behavior or changed the importance they attached to different subjective norm groups. Since goal of the Adjudicative Guidelines is to gather evidence about individual characteristics which predict loyalty across situations, an inherent challenge arises when the dynamic nature of social identities is acknowledged. One of the reasons that espionage behavior is difficult to predict may be the reactive and dynamic nature of self-identities central to the decision to engage in espionage.
Research generally indicates that contextual factors which increase the salience or relevance of one social identity over another typically include cues that increase the perceptions of threat to that social identity (e.g., intergroup competition or conflict like diplomatic issues or ethnic tensions). Although context is clearly an important factor in the dynamics of social attachments, there is one relatively stable or chronic influence that may predict the variance in behavioral manifestations of compartmentalized attachments above and beyond contextual factors: strength of social identification.

An individual’s strength of identification with a particular identity may make “switching” between attachments or loyalties more or less likely. In the framework of security decisions this suggests that compartmentalized identities (i.e., dual loyalties) are sustainable during times of peace and cooperation between the U.S. and the homeland, but identity strength becomes important when the context primes a switch in identity. For example, the likelihood of maintaining national loyalty in the context of increasing hostilities and incompatible national agendas will be reduced among individuals who maintain strong attachments to their homeland.

In sum, the Guidelines seem to assume that social identity is a relatively stable individual characteristic, and by extension, attachments and loyalties are also relatively stable within individuals. Compartmentalization (and the social identity theory research that supports it) emphasizes the role of situational determinants of identification, and by extension, the contextual influences on attachment and loyalty. Although such instability of identification (and loyalties) indicated by the literature seems problematic when considering the relevance of the information gathered through the adjudication of the Guidelines, these challenges may be resolved by turning back to strength of attachments to particular entities.

In the face of changing contexts, the stability of social identity when a person utilizes the compartmentalization strategy may be best predicted by strength of identification for each of the compartments. Moreover, behavioral evidence that a person has consistently chosen to switch to or identify with one identity over another (e.g., American over Chinese) would serve as potential indicators of stability, attachment, and loyalty (see above tables of behaviors associated with ethnic p. 34, and national p. 35 identification). Unfortunately, social science evidence does not seem to offer any concrete recommendations for the possibility of comparing “strengths” across identities. In other words, it is unclear as to whether (1) behavioral indicators of strength of attachment should be measured in terms of quantity (additive frequency of behaviors) or quality (strong versus weak indicators) of association with a particular in-group; (2) measures of identity strength represent the same level psychological attachment(s) across different identity groups (e.g., does the same score on a Muslim and an American identity strength measure mean the same thing?); and (3) whether comparing “strength” of identification even makes sense theoretically or empirically. Insights into these questions would add value to the Guidelines to the extent that “strength of identification” is found to be quantifiable and comparable. Thus, information gathered by the adjudicators could be directed toward identifying a chronic switch or preference for one identity over another, which would indicate a propensity for loyalty toward the United States.
Merging of Identities

In the “merger” mode of identity management, one’s social identity is the sum of his/her combined group identifications, and is necessarily highly inclusive and diverse. This form acknowledges multiple cultural identities simultaneously, combining and integrating membership, values, and norms of both groups (Oyserman, Sakamoto & Lauffer, 1998), ultimately resulting in a global identity and making the individual a “citizen of the world” (p. 398). In the cognitive psychology literature, merger is analogous to “transcendence” or the introduction of some superordinate principle that makes the inconsistent cognitions compatible. By merging identities, individuals maintain and manage multiple, perhaps conflicting, attachments.

In terms of security clearance decisions, the “merger” mode of identity management raises questions as to whether evidence about cultural, ethnic and even national identities can be assumed to have fixed meaning and application. A possible implication for these Guidelines is that information about how the individual applies multiple identities or attachments in specific contexts relevant to national security may improve the accuracy of adjudicators’ inferences about the security risk posed by the individual. The “integration” form of acculturation (described below) provides some insights into this idea of “merged” identities, but the research on this superordinate form of identity is still emerging just as globalization is now emerging as a popular topic of inquiry in the social science literature.

The existing literature on integration acculturation supports this merger mode of identity management, indicating that people can simultaneously maintain their cultural heritage (they do not have to reject their home culture) while also participating in, and becoming attached to, their host country (the dominant cultural group) (e.g., Berry et al., 2006). Furthermore, it may be that those who subscribe to a global identity are not motivated by attachments to particular identities (nations or ethnic groups) but rather by a “humanist ideology” (Sellers, et al. 1998) and thus more global moral norms. As described above (in the Level 2 section for Guidelines B, C and L), the post-modern view of nationalism (post-nationalism) view supports this notion of fading national/identity boundaries and suggests that one effect of globalization is that global moral norms, rather than laws of the state, direct attitudes and behavior. Individuals whose identity structures are merged, therefore, will behave in the interests of the United States so long as they coincide with these global moral norms to which they subscribe. To the degree that these persons perceive US interests to be counter to global moral norms, however, they may present a greater risk to national security.

Integration Acculturation

According to Berry (Berry 1997; Berry, et al. 2006), integration results when individuals both maintain their original culture and participate in their new culture. The complex nature of social identities is especially well illustrated by the integration models of acculturation. In fact, integration seems to be the preferred strategy for identity management. Integration has been
consistently found to be the most frequently reported acculturation strategy for immigrants, refugees, and indigenous peoples (e.g., Berry, 1997; Berry et al. 2006; Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989), and is associated with the most adaptive outcomes, including intellectual adjustment (Peal & Lambert 1962, Portes & Hao 2002) as well as psychological and socio-cultural adaptation (e.g., Sam & Berry, 1995; Ward & Kennedy, 1994). Such results imply that individuals who integrate their former culture into their American cultural identity may be more reliable, trustworthy, and loyal than those who assimilate or “lose” their former culture in deference to “Americanizing.” However, more research is needed to explore the extent to which this integration strategy actually overlaps with the “global” identity proposed by Roccas and Brewer (2002). In conclusion, it seems that merging or integrating identities is the most adaptive, but our understanding of the nature of this identity management strategy is limited by a lack of empirical research. More research is needed to explore how, when, and why “merging” is possible without creating inherent internal conflict as social identity complexity and acculturation theories seem to suggest.

Managing Attachments in Organizations

In addition to the social psychology and acculturation literatures, the existing literature on organizational commitment may also provide additional clues as to the compatibility of multiple commitments. In organizational research literature, studies of individuals’ dual organizationally-relevant identities illustrate that such attachments can be relatively compatible or positively correlated. For example, several studies have indicated that dual attachments to organizations and other entities (e.g., union, profession/occupation, work-group, local subsidiary company, etc.) all show evidence of compatibility (c.f. Ashforth, Harrison & Corley, 2008; Pratt & Forman, 2000; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Read, 2001). However, other studies indicate the opposite.

In response to these conflicting findings, organizational researchers have investigated moderators of these dual attachments and found that the nature of the relationship between the two entities is a critical factor in the compatibility of attachment. For instance, competing identities in an organizational context may be more compatible to the degree that they are nested within each other (e.g., work-group identification is nested within the entire organization identity) (Pratt & Forman, 2000). Likewise, dual attachments are more compatible when the entities to which one is dually attached have a cooperative (as opposed to adversarial) relationship. Gordon and Ladd (1990) observed that cooperative union-management relations may be responsible for producing the apparent findings that dual commitments are sustainable, whereas Lee (2004) found that adversarial relations produced incompatible attachments to both.

In a meta-analytic investigation designed to test the moderating role of between group relations (union-organization), Reed, Young and McHugh (1994) confirmed that when intergroup relations were cooperative, individuals could maintain dual loyalties, but when these relationships were adversarial, people perceived these two loyalties to be incompatible, forcing them to “choose a side.” Likewise, other studies have shown that dual commitments to a
profession and an organization are not inherently incompatible, but that when conflict between these commitments are present, people’s job dissatisfaction and turnover intentions increase (Angle and Perry, 1986; Aranya and Ferris, 1983). Taken together, these findings imply that the relationship between two entities to which one is attached will impact the sustainability of dual commitments that intergroup conflict introduces. Adversarial relationships between two entities with which one simultaneously identifies introduces a perception of incompatibility where there may not have been done before, forcing people to choose between two loyalties. Applied to national loyalties, such findings imply that one must take into consideration the nature of the relationship between entities (e.g., nations) in order to understand the underlying threat to national security posed by dual (national) attachments.

The organizational identity literature (based in social identity theory) supports the general observation that conflicting identities (cognitive/affective attachments) can be psychologically maintained, although that maintenance becomes more problematic in the face of adversarial relationships between in-groups. Unfortunately, most of the organizational research provides no new insights into the psychological factors associated with one’s preference for or strength of commitment to a particular entities’ interest with respect to managing conflicting attachments. However, from the organizational loyalty literature, two things are clear with respect to the management of conflicting interests: (1) the propensity to behave in favor one entity over another is based on cognitive, affective and instrumental psychological attachments; and (2) more research is needed in order to elucidate relationship between certain behavioral outcomes of different identity or commitment management strategies with respect to those attachments.

Although the social identity management strategies presented from the social psychology/acculturation perspective may apply in organizations, the closest the organizational literature comes to furthering our understanding of behavioral outcomes of managing multiple identities comes from the role conflict literature. Findings regarding individuals’ experiences of role conflict within organizations suggest that competing demands at work may be resolved in a variety of ways. For instance, one may manage competing demands by (a) enacting behaviors sequentially so that an individual responds to the needs of the moment, (b) deferring to the role or attachment that is the most important or instrumentally valuable, or (c) compromising and fulfilling behavioral demands of each in a perfunctory manner (e.g., Ellemers & Rink, 2005). The implications of these organizational findings echo those of social identity management strategies for behavior, showing that people can sustain conflicting attachments. Moreover, multiple attachments can be managed by domination of one over the other (e.g., enacting behaviors sequentially, deferring to the more important role) or integrated (fulfilling the demands of attachments in a perfunctory manner). In the context of security decisions, the organizational literature again illustrates that it is the pattern of attachment management strategies which is the most relevant to predicting security risk, as opposed to the mere presence of conflicting attachments.

Unlike Guideline A, the identification and attachment variables underlying the psychology of Guidelines B, C and L are somewhat closer to the types of attributes thought to explain positive work behavior. The Foundations paper described organization citizenship behavior (OCB) as an analog to security citizenship behavior. We can compare the known antecedents of positive citizenship behavior to the variables assessed by Guidelines B, C and L evidence of affective, instrumental, cognitive, and identity-based connections to a country or ethnic group. OCB has been shown to be a function of job affect (e.g., liking), job cognitions (e.g., justice, pay satisfaction), and organizational loyalty/allegiance variables as well as other dispositional variables such as conscientiousness (Lee & Allen, 2002; Miles, et al., 2002; Dalal, 2005). In general, some of these OCB antecedents could be described as facets of job attachment with similar meanings to the instrumental, affective, identity and cognitive components of country/group/organization attachment used to explain security risk behavior. The implication is that OCB is explained, in part, by one’s attachment to the organization just as security violations are explained, in part, by one’s attachment to country, group and/or instrumental outcomes.

This overlap in explanatory variables, however, does not mean that security violation behavior and security citizenship behavior are at opposite ends of the same spectrum. Lee & Allen (2002), Miles, et al. (2002) and Dalal (2005) have all shown that these variables combine differently with situational factors to predict citizenship than to predict counterproductive or deviant behavior. This means that even though the Guidelines’ national attachment variables conceptually overlap to some degree with organization and job attachment variables, the Guidelines’ context of negative security behavior limits the effectiveness with which clearance decisions would predict positive security citizenship behavior.

The same question can be asked about the positive security behavior captured by the Whole Person concept. Do the nation-oriented attachment measures emerging from adjudication investigations of national conflict Guidelines overlap with the likely antecedents of reliability, trustworthiness, loyalty and good judgment? With the exception of loyalty, which is nation-oriented, the others’ attributes are general attributes of work behavior that are not necessarily specific to one’s national attachment. These qualities of work behavior are known to be predicted by general dispositions such as conscientiousness, agreeableness, and in some cases emotional stability. The Guidelines’ assessments of nation-oriented attachment are not measures of such general psychological dispositions. It is unlikely that clearance decisions are based on attributes that have predictive value for the Whole Person qualities.

However, even if the Guidelines’ assessment of nation-oriented attachment predicted positive security behavior such as security citizenship or reliability, trustworthiness and good judgment, the overall impact would be very small because only a small percentage of clearance decisions are negative. Virtually the full range of national attachment levels will be cleared. The very high clearance rate means that there will be very little benefit to positive behavior.
The overall conclusion is that in spite of the partial overlap in attributes considered by Guidelines B, C and L and attributes known to be relevant to citizenship behavior; the current use of these Guidelines is unlikely to have any notable effect on positive security behavior.
Relevance of the Theory of Planned Behavior

The Theory of Planned Behavior provides a theoretical framework for explaining the link between various social identities and security behavior. The role of subjective norms and attitudes toward the behavior in question are the primary vehicles by which TPB describes the psychological mechanism linking social identities to behavior. This is the theoretical expression of the assumption underlying Guidelines B, C and L that multiple attachments are predictive of later security behavior.

As exemplified in Exhibit 2, the subjective norms an individual relies on for moral or normative guidance derive from groups that are important to the individual. This is a critical requirement for group identity that the individual not only recognize group membership but also attach importance to adherence group norms. One implication of TPB is that the prediction of future security behavior requires an understanding of the group identity the individual will judge to be most relevant to the behavior in question.

Separately, other forms of attachment will reflect specific beliefs and attitudes that will form the individual’s attitudes toward the target behavior. Such formative attitudes and beliefs may be a function of instrumental attachments, identity attachments, emotional attachments as well as other experiences, education/training, and personal relationships.

As with Guideline A, TPB provides a theoretical framework to build an understanding of the link between foreign attachments and security behavior. The research reviewed above provides information about the specific attributes relevant to this context of national security behavior. TPB provides the explanatory shell which can be populated by these context-specific attributes such as national identity, identity management and instrumental attachment to organizations. Once populated with the right attributes, the TPB model can be used to test the Guidelines’ assumptions about the manner in which security behavior is most effectively predicted.
GUIDELINES B, C AND L

Guidelines B, C and L all rely on the same basic adjudicative strategy. Where evidence indicates potential conflict between some form of foreign attachment – personal relationships for Guideline B, citizenship for Guideline C, and employment/service relationships for Guideline L – and US national interests, the adjudicator uses mitigator evidence and informed judgment to assess the degree of risk posed by the evidence. The conflict may arise directly from the multiple attachments themselves or those attachments may be brought into conflict by persons, circumstances or events external to individual. The adjudicator’s assessment of risk is based largely on conclusions about the strength of attachment when all the evidence is considered. A core assumption is that stronger attachments will outweigh weaker attachments. A second assumption is that the attachments are relatively unchanged by the occasion of conflict.

The research evidence supports the importance of identity-based attachment and the concept of strength of attachment as a predictor of behavior. At the same time, the evidence also indicates that attachments are more dynamic, may be perceived as less conflicting by the actor than by observers, and may be relevant to the resolution of any conflict based not only on strength but also on appropriateness and other contextual factors. The conclusions below follow from this research evidence.

1. Attachment Evidence Supports the Guidelines. The overall conclusion from this review of evidence about attachments to nations, groups and organizations is that such attachments influence behavior directed at those entities. This supports Guidelines B, C and L’s overall focus on national and foreign attachment. While this evidence supports the Guideline’s focus on considerations of foreign attachments, it does not provide direct evidence that clearance determinations reduce negative security behavior. The research necessary for such direct conclusions has not been undertaken. Rather, the social science research reviewed here supports the indirect but plausible conclusion that adjudications decisions based on considerations of foreign attachment are useful for identifying individuals who are most likely to act against US national interests due, in part, to their stronger identification with some other entity.

a. The Distinctions Between Guidelines. No evidence directly addresses the question of whether the differences between the Guidelines are important for predicting violation behavior. However, the available evidence implies that the differences between forms of attachment captured by Guidelines B, C and L are not as important as the differences between identity-based attachment and other forms of attachment such as instrumental (exchange) or ideology-based attachment.
2. **Foreign Attachments Matter.** From the non-experimental espionage literature it is clear that spies’ foreign attachments and loyalty are factors in their decisions to spy.
   a. **National Attachment has Several Forms.** National attachment has several facets including national identity, national pride, nationalism and constructive patriotism. These different forms do not have the same meaning and lead to different outcomes.

3. **Dual Citizenship.** Dual citizenship is associated with weaker national identity, compared to naturalized sole US citizenship.

4. **National Identity May Be Most Consequential.** National identity has been shown to be less ideological and more predictive of civic participation than any other facet of national attachment. This suggests it may be a stronger predictor of eventual security behavior.

5. **Ethnic Identity v. National Identity.** Multiple identities that observers may see in conflict may not be experienced as conflicting or incompatible and may be managed by the individual to fit with the context as appropriate.
   a. **Relevant to Counter Intelligence Perspective.** The ability of individuals to adaptively manage multiple identities without experiencing them as conflicting suggests that the primary role of Guidelines B, C and L may be to assess a counter intelligence risk where a conflict is externally imposed on the individual rather than a loyalty risk that emerges from the individual’s experience of conflict. The presence of ostensibly conflicting identities does not necessarily imply a security concern in and of itself.

6. **Identity Management Strategies.** Multiple identity individuals may use a variety of management strategies to guide behavior in specific situations. Evidence about an individual’s history of identity management is likely to add to the predictive value of information about the identities themselves.

7. **Ethnic Identity.** The meaning and strength of ethnic identity are different for different groups as a function of ethnicity, group experience in the host country, and other factors.

8. **Organization Context.** The strength of instrumental attachment depends on the value of the outcome or reward. This may cause strength of instrumental attachment to be more context dependent and transitory compared to the strength of identity (affective + cognitive) attachment, which depends on the importance of group membership.

9. **Imposed Conflicts.** The conclusions described above are based on the social science relating primarily to types of national and ethnic attachments and the manner in which people manage these attachments across the circumstances of their own life experience. A question can be raised about applicability of these conclusions in specific circumstances. For example, do the conclusions about identity management apply when multiple identities are placed in conflict with one another by some the actions of some individual or set of events. One answer to this question is that the
social science research reviewed above collectively sampled individuals from across a wide range of life circumstances. So these conclusions are expected to have broad applicability across the ordinary range of life experiences. However, none of the studies reviewed here deliberately included individuals who were in a security work context requiring a clearance. Two limitations apply, then, to these conclusions. First, it may be that the circumstances of security work are unique in ways that change the manner in which people manage their multiple identities. For example, the work-based obligation to protect classified information that may have value for one’s country or origin may lead cleared individuals to adopt a dominance management strategy they would not have used otherwise. Second, it may be that the circumstances in which some cleared people work are extreme or compelling in ways that simply trump the ordinary range of attachment factors. To choose an extreme example, an individual whose life is at stake over the disclosure of classified technology may make decisions about information/technology security based on survival considerations that may easily trump attachment factors. Attachment considerations are not the only factors and in some cases may be far less important to the individual’s decisions than in other cases. In any case, the research has not been conducted to assess the extent to which attachment factors operate differently in the special circumstances of work requiring security clearances.

10. **Self-Selection.** Are people who choose to work in the special environments requiring security clearances different in systematic ways from others who do not? Do these conclusions apply to people who seek out work in national intelligence contexts? First, we have found no research that directly addresses these questions. Second, the research on ethnic and national attachments has not investigated the roles of individual differences such as personality, intelligence, and interests to offer empirically-based insight into these questions. Certainly, it seems reasonable to assume that relationships to one’s country are important to people who work in nation-oriented contexts in which they have obligations to protect the security of national information and technology. But importance alone does not appear to be a factor that would lead people to systematically manage their nation relationships differently than has been reported in the research on attachments. After all, this research is about the manner in which people managed the importance and roles of multiple attachments. Given the nature of the research findings about national and ethnic attachments, the most plausible operating assumption would be that the findings about the psychology of attachments applies to people who seek out nation-oriented work requiring clearances. But this is an assumption.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on two considerations, (a) the evidence reviewed above, and (b) the practical benefit for the adjudication process. A small number of major themes from the evidence influence several of these recommendations. These themes are:

1. Security behavior is likely to be influenced by the attachments themselves and also by the manner in which individuals manage multiple attachments in the face of conflict and in other situations.
2. Identity-based attachment is likely to be the most consequential form of attachment for security behavior.
3. The roles of multiple attachments can change with circumstances.

While the scope of this project did not include an assessment of investigative processes or the decision making processes used by adjudicators, certain key observations about the adjudicative process influenced some recommendations.

1. Historically, new security contexts have led to additional Guidelines, which increase the complexity of the adjudication process.
2. Some adjudicator decisions are largely fact-based. Most require judgment about the weight of multiple sources of evidence.
3. A primary demand on adjudicators is to combine multiple sources and multiple types of evidence into a single assessment of the risk of security violation.

The recommendations are organized into three groups: Across Guidelines, Individual Guidelines including mitigators, and Research.
A. Across Guideline Recommendations

Recommendation A1: Increase Focus on Identity-Based Attachment.

The adjudicative investigation and decision making processes should increase and sharpen their focus on evidence of identity-based attachments to the US, ethnic/social groups, foreign countries and other entities relevant to the particular Guideline. Investigators and interviewers should be taught to seek out attachment information that reflects identity attachment over other forms of attachment. Evidence reflecting identity attachment is described above and includes:

- Formal and informal group membership.
- Importance of group values and norms.
- Participation in group activities.
- Conformance to group rituals and rules.
- Group language use.
- In-group contacts.
- Group-specific civic/political/social participation.
- In-group marriage.
- Dominance of group identity in situations of conflict and stress.
- Circumstances/situations in which group identity is prominent.
- Managing multiple attachments such that group identity is sustained over time.

Adjudicators should be taught to give primary weight to the implications of identity attachment over other forms of attachment such as instrumental/exchange attachment, ideological attachment, and political attachment.

Recommendation A2. Explicitly Evaluate Strength of Attachment.

Adjudicators should be trained to evaluate, estimate and rely on “strength of attachment” for US attachment and other significant attachments. The evaluation of “strength of attachment” should take into consideration the number of indicators of attachment and the “strength-level” associated with each indicator. Strength level of an indicator may be an informed judgment based on scaled examples. For example, for ethnic group attachment a leadership role in regular group rituals is likely to be an indicator of stronger identity attachment than frequency of contact with family members. For national attachment, holding public office is likely to be a stronger indicator of national identity than registering to vote.

Some amount of research would be required to develop instructions and exemplars/anchors necessary to systematically evaluate “strength of attachment.”
 Recommendation A3: Where There is Evidence of Significant Multiple Attachments, Gather and Evaluate Indicators of Individual’s Strategy for Managing Potential Conflict.

Research shows people often successfully manage multiple attachments. Where multiple attachments are in evidence, adjudicators should assess the individual’s perceived success in managing the attachments in those occasions or events that pose potential conflicts, especially where those potential conflicts are nation-oriented. This assessment should focus on the manner in which the individual applies the multiple attachments to the particular circumstances of the occasion or event.

 Recommendation A4: Where There is Evidence of Change in an Attachment, Investigate and Evaluate the Factors Leading to the Change.

Investigators and adjudicators should gather and evaluate evidence describing the factors that led the individual to significantly increase or reduce, or alter or eliminate a previously significant attachment. The focus should be on the extent to which the change factors bear any relevance to security risk.


All national conflict Guidelines provide evidence relating to the individual’s risk for future security violations. A cognitively challenging task for the adjudicator is to aggregate all evidence from the four Guidelines into a single overall assessment of the risk posed by the individual. Adjudicators should use a structured overall Risk Assessment Scale as the mechanism by which they systematically aggregate diverse information about the individual’s risk for future violations.

A “working” Risk Assessment Scale and accompanying explanatory information are provided in Appendix A. The Scale itself is shown here.

**Overall Risk Assessment Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Dimensions</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity Source(s)</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Mixed with American Leaning</td>
<td>Mixed with Alternative Leaning</td>
<td>Mixed with American Leaning</td>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values-Based</td>
<td>American: Values-Based</td>
<td>American: Exchange-Based</td>
<td>American: Values-Based</td>
<td>American: Exchange-Based</td>
<td>American: Values-Based</td>
<td>Exchange-Based</td>
<td>Values-Based</td>
<td>Exchange-Based</td>
<td>Value-Based</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Relationship with US Government</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Congenial</td>
<td>Congenial</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td>Congenial</td>
<td>Congenial</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The design of this Risk Scale captures the operational implications of the literature review on the influence of national and foreign attachments of the individual’s likelihood of future security violations. The overall risk assessment is based on three considerations: (1) the sources of one’s important identities, (2) the strength of attachment associated with each attachment, and (3) an overall assessment of the individual’s relationships with the US government. Each of these three factors would be judged by the adjudicator based on attachment evidence from across the Guidelines. These three factor-level judgments would then be aggregated into an overall assessment of risk based on the standards expressed in the model. While this Risk Assessment Scale was designed to capture the implications of the relevant research, it may well be that additional planning, design and research would result in modifications to this approach.

It is worth noting that this proposed Risk Assessment Scale does not change the fundamental complexity of the adjudicator’s judgment task. Rather, it is an attempt to provide structure and an organizing framework to enable adjudicators to manage this complexity in more systematic, evidence-based manner. Arriving at an overall assessment of risk is a complex and somewhat ambiguous judgment task for the adjudicator. The adjudicator must collect information on a variety of indicators and combine these indicators in a meaningful way. The Risk Assessment Scale provides a way of managing this complexity based on the most important considerations to yield the most valid assessments possible. Further, this Risk Assessment Scale is intended to be illustrative of a structured method of supporting adjudicators’ risk judgments. Certainly, additional development work would be needed to optimize the structure of the scale components and provide a set of user instructions to support adjudicators’ use of the scale.

**Recommendation A6: Evaluate Whether Positive Security Behavior Should be Targeted by the Guidelines.**

At a high level, the Whole Person policy directs adjudicators to weigh evidence about the reliability, trustworthiness, loyalty and good judgment of each individual to help ensure that cleared individuals demonstrate those qualities in their security work. This policy was framed in the Foundations Paper by a thorough, research-based description of the likely characteristics of the full range of security behavior, including both negative violation behavior as well as positive citizenship behavior.

While the ADR (2005) points adjudicators to consider evidence of reliability, trustworthiness, loyalty and good judgment, it is our conclusion that the meaning and use of the national conflict Guidelines does not effectively accomplish this goal. There are three core reasons:

1. With a few exceptions, the evidence gathered for the national conflict Guidelines is not closely related to the antecedents of reliability, trustworthiness and good judgment. It is somewhat more related to antecedents of loyalty.
2. The extremely high clearance rate assures that the clearance process will have virtually no impact on the reliability, trustworthiness, loyalty and good judgment of cleared individuals. This is a statistical consequence of the fact that the extreme majority of individuals are cleared. Even if the Guidelines’ evidence directly assessed all antecedents of the Whole Person, the clearance process with its high “pass” rate would have no discernable impact on the characteristics of those cleared.

3. Reliability, trustworthiness, loyalty and good judgment are general attributes that have been demonstrated in several studies to predict positive work behavior including rule-compliance as well as extra-role citizenship behaviors such as promoting the goals of the organization. Clearly, the Whole Person attributes are closely aligned with the positive side of the proposed model of security behavior. Because these are general attributes not specific to any particular context, they lead to positive work behaviors across a wide range of types of work and contexts. In contrast, the evidence gathered for the national security Guidelines is highly specific to the context of national attachment. Even where an adjudicator concludes that an individual identifies strongly with and supports US national interests – a very positive attribute – this highly context specific characteristic is unlikely to predict positive work behaviors across the full range of security behavior. For example, conscientiousness predicts rule compliance. But to know that an individual strongly identifies with the US says little about his general disposition to be conscientious. The evidence gathered for the national conflict Guidelines is at a very different level of description and meaning than the evidence necessary to draw conclusions about the Whole Person bundle of attributes.

The implications of these conclusions about the meaning and use of Guidelines evidence is that substantial changes would be required to transform the clearance process into one that effectively implements the Whole Person policy. The process would need to gather evidence about more general characteristics of individuals under consideration and would need to disqualify at least 25%-35% of all clearance applicants in order for it to have any noticeable impact of the level of reliability, trustworthiness, loyalty and good judgment demonstrated by cleared employees.

This recommendation is made in order to ensure the maximum benefit of any of the other recommendations based on research about attachment. The collective impact of the several recommendations regarding the use of attachment information would be to sharpen the focus on individuals’ strength of attachment and the manner in which they manage multiple attachments. These recommended changes are unlikely to improve the effectiveness with which the clearance process implements the Whole Person policy. Indeed, adjudicators may find that the more
detailed requirements regarding their evaluation of attachment may increase the cognitive complexity of simultaneously considering the Whole Person imperative.
B. Recommendations for Individual Guidelines

Guideline A

None in addition to the cross-guideline recommendations.
See the recommendation about a new “Basic Qualifications” Guideline.

Mitigators

1. Revise Mitigator (d) to focus on two types of evidence:
   a. The individual has deliberately ended the involvement/association in question.
   b. Since ending the involvement/association, the individual has demonstrated increasing attachment to and support of US interests as manifest by changing social norms groups, changing beliefs about US interests, and changing plans with respect to US interests.

Guideline B

None in addition to the cross-guideline recommendations.
See the Guideline L recommendation.
See the recommendation about a new “Basic Qualifications” Guideline.

Mitigators

1. Add a mitigator addressing evidence that the individual has integrated foreign connections into a pattern of behavior supportive of US interests.
2. Add a mitigator addressing evidence that the individual has experienced conflicts in the past relating to dual attachments and has resolved them in a manner that does not imply security risk.
3. Add a mitigator addressing evidence that the individual has been increasing identity-based attachments to the US while maintaining / developing foreign expertise for US purposes and/or decreasing foreign identity-based attachments.
4. Modify mitigator (b) to emphasize the “depth” of foreign relationships (i.e., strength of attachment or personal importance accorded to that person, group, government or country) rather than how long the relationship has lasted.

Guideline C


Recommendation A1 directs attention to a sharper focus on evidence of identity-based attachment. The role of national identity information is especially relevant in cases of dual citizenship. Research shows that dual citizens tend to have lower US national identity and,
therefore, are likely to be somewhat more risky for security violations. In any particular individual’s case, evidence of strong US national identity or, conversely, strong foreign national identity, would be important for assessing the weight to attach to dual citizenship.

**Mitigators**

1. Add a mitigator addressing evidence that, for individuals holding dual citizenship, the individual has demonstrated a pattern of increasing attachment to the US in any of a variety of ways including English language usage, voting, civic/political participation, and knowledge of US values, history, governance, and social systems.

2. Add a mitigator(s) to reflect the nature of the relationship (adversarial or congenial) between the US and the country with which foreign attachment is indicated. Such a mitigator should also take into consideration the relatively chronic (or capricious) nature of the relationship between the given countries.

3. Mitigator (c) should be modified to also capture the extent to which the exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship is important to that person’s self-concept.

**Guideline L**

*Recommendation B2: Fold Guideline L into Guideline B.*

With the significant exception of condition (a) (4), Guideline L covers foreign relationships very similar to those covered in Guideline B. Employment and service relationships could be easily captured under the broad component of condition (b) regarding “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest...” The distinctive element of L is condition (a) (4) regarding relationships with others involving the communication of security relevant content. Because this condition does not rest on foreign relationships necessarily it is unique within the foreign conflict cluster of Guidelines.

The evidence-based rationale favoring moving L into B is that the foreign attachment issues associated with L are very highly related to those at the core of B. Both consider foreign attachment unrelated to citizenship (Guideline C) where dependencies or identification with foreign entities may create a risk of disloyalty or inducement or coercion. Employment and service relationships do not introduce a qualitatively different set of attachment considerations than the broader range of relationships captured in B.

Combining L into B would reduce the complexity in aggregating evidence across Guidelines.
Mitigators

1. Add a mitigator addressing evidence that individual has taken steps to eliminate potential conflicts with employment/service responsibilities.
2. Add a mitigator addressing evidence that the employment/service relationship is not unusual for naturalized US citizens with the individual’s skills, experience and country of origin.
3. Add a mitigator addressing evidence that the individual has complied with prescriptions and expectations regarding security protection practices.
4. Mitigator (a) should be modified to capture both the security risk of the activity itself as well as the nature of the relationship (adversarial or congenial) between the intended audience or beneficiary of such an activity and the United States government (and its interest).

New “Basic Qualifications” Guideline

*Recommendation B3. Establish a New Guideline to Evaluate Policy-Based Disqualifiers.*

Tables 1-4 show several risk conditions that appeared to depend far more on policy considerations than on social science considerations. An example from Guideline B is condition (g), “unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence service.” Another example from Guideline L is condition (b), “failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when this is required.” Other possible examples that are more speculative on our part include “active maintenance of a foreign passport,” “employment with a foreign government,” and “holding political office in a foreign country.”

The adjudicator’s task for these types of conditions is to confirm that the evidence is accurate. Once the facts are confirmed, these stand as potential single-issue disqualifiers. Once confirmed, mitigation evidence is unlikely to change the weight of the facts. Although the process of confirming the facts may be arduous, once confirmed, the decision process is relatively straightforward and is largely a matter of applying an implied policy.

In effect, these conditions represent the basic qualification requirements any individual must satisfy to be granted and retain a clearance.

Significant efficiency may be gained by establishing a Basic Qualifications Guideline for the purpose of identifying all such policy-based requirements. Such a Guideline could be treated as a Stage 1 review for individuals during which the facts are confirmed and decisions are made without the need to consider other substantive Guidelines in full depth.

A possible criticism of this strategy is that it may be interpreted as restricting the control of home organizations over the clearance decision. The core issue underlying this concern is whether there is consensus about any so-called “basic qualification” prescribed by policy. If no such consensus exists then this recommendation is mute.
C. Research Recommendations

A number of topics relevant to the effectiveness of the Guidelines are warranted given the considerable lack of evidence directly related to the prediction of security behavior.

C1. Compare Spies to Non-spies.

Given the considerable amount of stored data about caught spies, an investigation comparing characteristics of caught spies to demographically matched non-spies would be valuable. Such a study would be especially relevant to the question of Guideline usefulness if data about historical adjudication results were available for both groups. (Both groups would include only people who were cleared via the Adjudicative Guidelines process.) This would provide direct evidence of the predictive strength of adjudicator.

C2. Investigate the Dimensions and Categories of Security Behavior to be Targeted by the Adjudication Process.

No investigations have been done to describe the full domain of security behavior. Such an analysis would be valuable not only for a better understanding of the way in which the clearance process may be improved but also to better understand possible improvements to employment processes for jobs requiring clearances.

C3. Investigate Measures and Meaning of “Strength of Attachment.”

The above recommendations assume, with some support from the literature, that attachments vary in strength, and strength predicts dominance of attachments in situations where different attachments imply different actions. This assumption is central to the manner in which adjudicators make decisions about risk for violations. There is no evidence about this assumption in the security behavior domain and it is possible that the security contexts, with their extreme demands, are qualitatively different from other domains with fewer such demands. Investigations of strength of attachment should compare type of attachment (values-based (identity) v. exchange-based), source of attachment (ethnic groups v. nations), and owner demographics (e.g., race/ethnicity, age, experience with group membership).

C4. Investigate the Ways in Which Cleared Employees Manage Multiple Attachments.

Using existing cleared employees, investigate the manner in which they managed multiple attachments in contexts where the attachments imply different behavior. In the very strong security context people may have uniquely adapted the manner in which they manage multiple attachments.
C5. Develop Measures of Identity Attachment to be Applied in the Adjudication Process.

Recommendations above call for the assessment of identity attachments as part of the adjudication process. While such measure could be developed initially based on conceptual translations of identity measures in other domains, systematic work should be done in the investigations context of the adjudication process. The distinction between identity attachment and other forms of attachment appears to be significant for the prediction of other nation-oriented behavior but the measurement differences between these forms of attachment can be subtle. Good measurement is necessary for effective adjudication processes.


The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) is a general theory of intentional behavior, grounded in social cognition that enables tests of the key explanatory variables and relationships likely to underpin security violation behavior as well as security citizenship behavior. Key elements of TPB fit with the historical perspective about security behavior that it depends on normative attachment, attitudes and beliefs, and personal qualities related to expectations of success. By applying potential explanatory variables measured in the context of security work to the TPB framework, predictions made be made about relationships and outcomes. These predictions will enable a systematic program of research to be undertaken exploring the antecedents of security behavior.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A: GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF THE OVERALL RISK ASSESSMENT SCALE

In the following, a Risk Assessment Framework is described that serves as a recommendation and the basis for additional recommendations. As a recommendation in and of itself, the Risk Assessment Framework is intended to illustrate how to integrate major research findings from the social identity, commitment, and identity management literatures and how this can potentially refine and improve the assessment of risk of future security violation behavior based on Allegiance/Loyalty/Attachment issues. It is important to note that the Framework is not introduced with the goal of automating decisions. The intention is to provide structured guidance for aggregating identity-based evidence and making decisions that are consistent with theoretical and empirical evidence.

The Risk Assessment Framework also provides a basis for recommendations relevant to the improvement and/or modification of Guidelines A, B, C, and L. We turn to this issue subsequent to describing and explaining the proposed Framework.

The Risk Assessment Framework

The Risk Assessment Framework represents a continuum of risk for future security violations based on different combinations of three underlying dimensions: Identity Source(s), Strength of Attachment, and Nature of the Relationship with the United States. These dimensions are based on major findings from the social identity, commitment, and identity management literatures. Based on different combinations of these dimensions, 10 levels of risk are identified. In the following section, each dimension of the Risk Assessment Framework is described along with the theoretical/empirical rationale for its use. Also included is a discussion of how each dimension can be used to assess risk and improve the predictive accuracy of security clearance decisions.
Key Dimensions of the Framework

Dimension 1: Identity Source(s)

The Identity Source(s) dimension is intended to capture the group(s) with which an individual identifies. As discussed, the groups with which a person identifies can influence his or her attitudes, motivations, and behaviors, making this an important piece of information to capture. The risk assessment is based on three possible identity sources: American, Alternative and Mixed. The Alternative designation is meant to capture both international (e.g., France, Iraq) and domestic (e.g., Ku Klux Klan) groups with values, ideologies, customs, habits that are at some cultural/political distance from those characteristic of the American identity. The Mixed category represents a social identity based on some combination or multiplicity of American and Alternative influences.

With information relevant to this dimension in hand, three levels of risk can be distinguished: low, medium and high. These risk levels correspond to individuals with American, Mixed and Alternative identities, respectively. This dimension provides the most rudimentary assessment of risk. The literature suggests that reliance on this dimension alone would be too coarse and could contribute to a high level of prediction error, such as a high incidence of false positives, whereby people with acceptable risk are more likely to be classified as unacceptably risky and denied a clearance. A more sophisticated, and potentially more accurate, assessment of risk requires collecting information on at least two additional dimensions: Strength of Attachment and the Nature of the Alternative Group’s Relationship with the United States.

Dimension 2: Strength of Attachment

As discussed, the literature indicates that a group’s influence on an individual’s attitudes, motivations and behaviors is contingent on the strength of his or her attachment with that group. The stronger an individual is attached to a group, the more likely the group is to influence the individual’s attitudes, motivations and behaviors. Therefore, a “Strength of Attachment” dimension was deemed important and necessary. The organizational commitment literature provides additional insight on how to conceptualize this dimension, suggesting that there are at least two different types of attachment that vary in the strength of their influence on an individual’s attitudes, motivations and behaviors. These were referred to as value-based and exchange-based attachment and that the former type of attachment is more influential than the latter. Based on this research, value- and exchange-based attachments are used to define two levels on the “Strength of Attachment Dimension.” Value-based attachment represents a stronger form of attachment and exchange-based attachment represents a weaker form. The label “values-based” attachment used in the organizational commitment represents the same type of identity-based attachment as represented by national identity in the country allegiance research.

As shown in Table A1, the addition of this dimension expands the number of risk levels from 3 to 6, providing the adjudicator with a finer-grained representation of risk that may improve the accuracy of prediction. While the American, Mixed and Alternative identities still
correspond to low, medium and high levels of risk, respectively, there is now more room within these categories to draw finer distinctions regarding risk.

Table A1 shows how this works. At risk levels 1 and 2, an individual who identifies with the American identity is a greater or lesser risk based on the nature of her attachment to an American identity. A person with a values-based attachment to the American identity (risk level 1) can be considered less risky than a person with an exchange-based attachment (risk level 2). The assumption is that values-based attachment is not as deep or stable or general as affect-based (identity) attachment, and, therefore, they may be more vulnerable to inducements or incentives from external sources to engage in behavior that violates security rules and regulations.

At risk levels 7 and 8 the relationship between the strength of attachment and risk is reversed. A values-based attachment to an Alternative identity (risk level 8) is riskier than an exchange-based attachment (risk level 7). Since an individual with a values-based attachment is more strongly attached to the Alternative group, they are more likely to act in a manner favorable to that group. Under some circumstances, this may involve engaging in behavior that is in violation of security rules and regulations.

The previous example was based on a single identity, either American or and Alternative identity. When the adjudicator is evaluating an individual with only one identity to consider then risk is best assessed by conducting a comparison of attachment types (values v. exchange) within the identity. The nature of the comparison is different for those with Mixed identities, since both an American and Alternative identity are involved. Within this identity category, risk assessment is based on a comparison of attachment strength across groups. Such a comparison would require the adjudicator to determine the strength of the individual’s attachment to both American and Alternative identities. This is intended to answer the question, “Which identity is the individual most strongly attached to?” Individuals with a stronger/more dominant attachment to the Alternative identity would be a higher risk than those with a stronger/more dominant attachment to the American identity. As shown in Table A1, individuals at risk level 3 are less risky than those at risk level 4 because they have a stronger attachment to the American identity, which is value-based, than the Alternative identity, which is exchange-based.

**Dimension 3: Relationship with US Government**

Including the strength of an individual’s attachment to American and/or Alternative identity(ies) improves the predictive accuracy of risk assessment over and above reliance on the Identity Source(s) dimension. However, an even greater level of predictive accuracy may be achieved by considering a third dimension: the relationship of Alternative groups (and associated identities) with the United States. This dimension has two categories labeled Congenial and Adversarial, which are intended to provide a characterization of the relationship between the American and Alternative identities. Adversarial relationships refer to those in which political, economic and/or cultural conflict exists between the United States and the group, whether foreign or domestic, that the Alternative identity characterizes. A current example of a group with an adversarial relationship to the United States is North Korea. Congenial relationships, on
the other hand, refer to those that are positive in nature by way of shared political ideologies or alliances, economic interdependencies, and/or shared cultural values and beliefs. Great Britain is a good example of a foreign group that has a Congenial relationship with the United States. Of course, even “Congenial” nations may have an interest in clandestine access to US information. So, the distinction between “Congenial” and “Adversarial” fundamentally represents an assessment of the Alternative nation’s threat to engage in counter-intelligence against the US.

The basis for this dimension is empirical evidence that people can possess multiple identities. Apparently, our psychology does not require that we identify with one and only one group. This feature, however, appears to be contingent on contextual variables, such as the nature of the relationships between the groups with which one identifies. Under conditions of conflict, an individual may feel the need to resolve dissonant feelings by allowing one identity to gain dominance over another. When this occurs, the identity with which a person is most strongly attached is likely to take over. This has direct implications for the risk associated with individuals characterized as Mixed in Dimension 1. In Table A1, where the nature of the relationship between the United States and Alternative group is Adversarial, the person is deemed a higher risk than when this relationship is Congenial. This is the case regardless of the individual’s level of attachment to the American and Alternative identity. This is not to suggest that the second dimension is not useful. In fact, considering these dimensions together within the Mixed identity category results in four levels of risk that may aid in predictive accuracy beyond the two risk levels distinguished by the second dimension.

Table A1 shows that a person with a values-based attachment to the American identity and an exchange-based attachment to an Alternative identity where the nature of the relationship between the United States and Alternative groups is Congenial presents the lowest level of risk within this category. In this case, a person is most strongly attached to the American identity and, therefore, is most likely to act in the interests of the United States. Additionally, although the person is attached to an Alternative identity through an exchange-based attachment, the absence of conflict makes it less likely that a representative(s) of that group would use the attachment against them in the form of coercion. An individual that has a values-based attachment to an Alternative identity and an exchange-based attachment to the American identity when there is conflict between the Alternative group and the United States presents the highest level of risk in the Mixed category. In this case, conflict is likely to promote the dominance of the Alternative identity over the American identity, especially since the former is stronger than the latter. Consequently, the individual may be more likely to act on behalf of the Alternative group. In some instances, this may involve the violation of security rules and regulations on behalf on the Alternative group. In addition, this individual may be more likely to feel external pressure from a representative(s) of the Alternative group to engage in security violation behavior.

The applicability of this third dimension is not restricted to individuals falling into the Mixed identity category; it also applies to those with an Alternative identity(ies). Table A1 shows that the addition of this third dimension allows for the expansion of the Alternative category from two to four risk levels. As with the Mixed identity category, individuals attached
to identities characteristic of groups with an Adversarial relationship to the United States are judged to be more risky than those with identities characteristic of groups with a Congenial relationship with the United States, regardless of the level of attachment. Considering the second dimension in conjunction with the third for this category, however, results in a more fine-grained characterization of the level of risk. At the lowest level of risk within the Alternative category is an individual with an exchange-based attachment to an Alternative identity characteristic of a group with a Congenial relationship with the United States. At the highest level of risk is an individual with a values-based attachment to an Alternative identity characteristic of a group with an Adversarial relationship with the United States.
Putting It Together

Combining the different levels/categories of each dimension results in a 10-level continuum of risk. The inclusion of the second and third dimensions allows for a more fine-grained characterization of risk that may improve predictive accuracy/validity. The individual with the lowest level of risk is a person who has a strong attachment to the American identity based on a set of shared values. In contrast, the highest level of risk is posed by a person who strongly identifies with the values of an Alternative group that is threat for counter intelligence against the United States.

Can the Risk Assessment Dimensions be Evaluated from the Current Meaning and Use of Guidelines A, B, C and L?

Applying the Risk Assessment Framework to each of the Guidelines comprising Cluster 1 indicates that this Risk Assessment Framework is consistent with the Guidelines in certain ways and not in others. Consistency between the Framework and Cluster 1 Guidelines reinforces and validates some features of the Guidelines in their current form, while discrepancies emphasize how the Guidelines might be modified or improved to more accurately reflect social science research on identity and identification processes/dynamics, thus improving the validity of the Guidelines.

Though features common to and distinct to the Risk Assessment Framework and Cluster 1 Guidelines will be addressed, the goal of this section is not to provide an exhaustive analysis and/or set of recommendations; rather, the goal is to describe the most readily apparent consistencies, distinctions and implications for the validity of the Guidelines in their current form as well as potential steps needed to modify or improve their validity. To accomplish this, the extent to which dimensions 2 and 3 of the Risk Assessment Framework are evident in Cluster 1 Guidelines is discussed.

The “Nature of Relationship to the United States” Dimension in Cluster 1: Implications for Validity and Improvement

The third dimension of the Risk Assessment Framework – Nature of the Relationship to the US – is considered more or less explicitly in several of the Cluster 1 Guidelines. A potentially disqualifying condition in Guideline A is “association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing... (sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the United States of America).” This condition refers to an attachment with a group with adversarial relationship with the united states. as another example, a potentially disqualifying condition in guideline is C is “performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization or government in conflict with the national security interests.” As with the condition for Guideline A, this indicates that risk is heightened when an individual is attached to a group in an Adversarial relationship with the United States. Since the third dimension of the
risk assessment is consistent with social science research on identity, commitment and identity management processes, and this dimension is evident in several of the Cluster 1 Guidelines, there is some evidence for the validity of these Guidelines in their current form.

Typically the assessment of whether the US and Alternative groups are “Congenial” or “Adversarial” will be based on expert sources available to the adjudicator. “Congeniality” is not based on evidence from the individual. It is not the individual’s perception of the US – Alternative relationship. Rather, it is the most expert, available assessment of the threat the Alternative nation represents for intelligence gathering against the US.

The “Strength of Attachment” Dimension in Cluster 1: Implications for Validity and Improvement

The Adjudicator’s Desk Reference identifies several indicators that can be used to assess the risk associated with a particular individual. Several of these indicators refer to the attachments between an individual and a group. For example, a disqualifying condition of Guideline B is “unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence service,” and a disqualifying condition of Guideline L is “any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer, with: (1) the government of a foreign country.” What these examples illustrate is that although the indicators of person-group attachment are considered, the strength of attachment denoted by these attachments is not always clear, making it potentially more difficult to assess the true level of risk. This is not to say that there are not indicators more clearly denoting the strength of the attachment. For example, a disqualifying condition of Guideline A is “association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing…(sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the United States of America)” and a disqualifying condition of Guideline B is “a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.” The former condition seems indicative of a values-based or strong attachment, particularly considering use of the word “sympathy,” while the latter condition appears to be indicative of exchange-based or weak attachment.

This rationale is the primary basis for Recommendation A2 that strength of attachment should be explicitly evaluated.
Table A1. Overall Risk Assessment Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Dimensions</th>
<th>1 Lowest</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10 Highest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity Source(s)</strong></td>
<td>American</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Mixed with American Leaning</td>
<td>Mixed with American Leaning</td>
<td>Mixed with American Leaning</td>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>Alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strength of Attachment</strong></td>
<td>Values-Based</td>
<td>Exchange-Based</td>
<td>American: Values-Based</td>
<td>American: Exchange-Based</td>
<td>American: Values-Based</td>
<td>American: Exchange-Based</td>
<td>Exchange-Based</td>
<td>Values-Based</td>
<td>Exchange-Based</td>
<td>Value-Based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of Relationship with US Government</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Congenial</td>
<td>Congenial</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td>Congenial</td>
<td>Congenial</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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