MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Correction to INV-2013-0064 Case-Referral Memorandum

The file for case number INV-2013-0064 contains an incorrectly dated case-referral memorandum. This Memorandum For The Record corrects the issue date of that document from 9 February 2014 to 9 February 2015.

No further action is required.

[Redacted]

Assistant Inspector General, Investigations

24 May 2016

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UNCLASSIFIED

000190
MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED], ODNI OHR

FROM: [REDACTED], AIGI, IC IG

SUBJECT: Referral - IC IG Inquiry 2013-0064

(U//FOUO) The IC IG conducted an inquiry that determined there were time and attendance (T&A) discrepancies associated with [REDACTED] an ODNI/DDNI-II/NIC/S&T employee. The IC IG is referring this matter to you for management consideration.

(U//FOUO) The IC IG conducted this inquiry due to an anonymous complaint that [REDACTED] did not work her scheduled hours. An analysis of time and attendance practices for the period 1 August 2011 through 9 August 2013 revealed that [REDACTED] possibly claimed 412 hours of unearned compensation.

(U//FOUO) If you would like further information, please contact IC IG Investigator [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] (secure).

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

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MEMO FOR: AIGI

FROM: INV

SUBJECT: 2014-0008

On 3 November 2014, the IC IG opened an investigation on [REDACTED], due to an initial 334.76 discrepant hours in badge record data over the course of 10 months.

After reviewing [REDACTED], this office determined that [REDACTED] was performing her duties while present at other authorized locations. She was also given permission to perform work on specialized software that she had at her home.

Also reasonably relied on direction from her employer that she could perform duties at alternative work sites.

I recommend that this case be closed with a management referral to IARPA regarding the ODNI place of performance guidelines and without further action regarding [REDACTED] by this office.
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE NUMBER: 2014-0011

SUBJECTS: (U//FOUO)

ALLEGATION: (U//FOUO)-Nepotism

I. (U//FOUO) SUMMARY

(U//FOUO) The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) initiated this investigation in response to a referral from IC IG Inspections. The referral alleged that [redacted], a former ODNI employee and mother of [redacted] took actions regarding the hiring of [redacted] in May of 2008 which constituted violations of either 5 USC §§ 2302(b)(6)-(7) or 5 USC § 3110. A careful review of available records regarding the process and procedures surrounding [redacted] selection and hiring failed to reveal any evidence to substantiate this allegation.

II. (U//FOUO) BACKGROUND

(U//FOUO) During an inspection of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) in the summer of 2014, the IC IG Inspections Division (INS) received a complaint regarding potential nepotism.
that occurred in the spring of 2008. It was alleged used her position and influence to have her son, hired into her division as an Executive Assistant.

(U//FOUO) A similar allegation was lodged regarding nepotism in December 2008 and Senior Associate General Counsel, conducted a review of the matter. interviewed (supervisor and hiring manager), a Human Resources Officer, and (ONCIX Chief of Staff). concluded in a memo dated 22 January 2009:

While there is some confusion over the specific facts in this case, it does not appear that there has been a violation of law. the hiring official, indicated that did not lobby or encourage him in any way to either interview for the Executive Assistant position or to ultimately select him. indicates that he acted independently throughout the process.

III. (U) SCOPE AND AUTHORITY

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV conducted this investigation pursuant to 50 USC § 3033, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, effective 7 October 2010; ODNI Instruction 10.34, Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, dated 22 Sept 2013; and, Quality Standards for Investigations, dated 15 November 2011, set forth by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

IV. (U//FOUO) POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS

a. 5 USC § 2302 – Prohibited Personnel Practices. Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority grant any preference or advantage not authorized by law, rule, or regulation to any employee or applicant for employment (including defining the scope or manner of competition or the requirements for any position) for the purpose of improving or injuring the prospects of any particular person for employment. An employee may not appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a civilian position any individual who is a relative (as defined by 5 USC § 3110) of such
employee if such position is in the agency in which such employee is serving as a public official over which the employee exercises jurisdiction or control as such an official.

b. 5 USC § 3110 – Employment of Relatives; Restrictions. A public official is defined as an employee or any other individual authorized by law, rule or regulations, or to whom the authority has been delegated, to appoint, employ, promote, or advance individuals, or to recommend individuals for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement in connection with employment in an agency. A public official may not appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a civilian position in the agency in which he is serving or over which he exercises jurisdiction or control of any individual who is a relative of the public official. Any individual appointed, employed, promoted, or advanced in violation of this section is not entitled to pay, and money may not be paid from the Treasury as pay.

V. (U//FOUO) CHRONOLOGY

(U//FOUO) [redacted] responded to a 16 January 2008 vacancy announcement for Executive Assistant position 17066JX (GS-13). He was selected by hiring manager [redacted] on 13 March 2008, and entered on duty (EOD) on 27 May 2008. Within three months of EOD, he was sent on an 18-month non-reimbursable detail to the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). Upon his return, he worked for six weeks and was sent on a second non-reimbursable detail to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) for 26 months. When he returned from DEA, his title was changed from “Executive Assistant” to “IC Requirements Management Officer” and later, “Threat Management Analyst.”

VI. (U//FOUO) FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

(U//FOUO) A review of available records indicates [redacted] advocated for her son by communicating with HR to track the vacancy announcement; sought and acquired the interview questions for Executive Assistants (presumably prior to [redacted] interview); completed the Request to Hire form by entering [redacted] information and providing it to [redacted] and pressing [redacted] to expedite the process.
ROI - INV 2014-0011

(U//FOUO) Further analysis or findings are hampered due to the fact records no longer exist regarding the selection panel participants, other candidates for the position, interview dates, or what process was followed to select [redacted].

(U//FOUO) In addition, [redacted] retired 10 October 2009, and is no longer subject to our jurisdiction.

VII. (U//FOUO) CONCLUSION / RECOMMENDATION

(U//FOUO) A thorough review of available records regarding [redacted] selection and hiring failed to substantiate the allegation of nepotism on the part of his mother, [redacted]. Although [redacted] tracked both the vacancy and selection of [redacted] administratively, she did not have agency-designated authority to make recommendations on his selection or the final decision to employ him.

(U//FOUO) Recommendation: Close the investigation as unsubstantiated.

PREPARED BY:

Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

APPROVED BY:

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

DATE:

August 7, 2015

DATE:

07/06/15
(U//FOUO) Memo for: AIG
(U//FOUO) From: INV
(U//FOUO) Subject: 2014-0014 Contract Labor Mischarging

(U//FOUO) On 3 November 2014, the IC IG opened an investigation on [redacted] IBM Employee on subcontract to LEIDOS under ODNI contract [redacted] due to preliminary information that [redacted] was misusing government resources, claiming labor costs while obtaining a college degree online, and absent from the workplace during periods for which he claimed labor costs.

(U//FOUO) After reviewing available information [redacted] the investigation determined that [redacted] was not using government resources for personal gain while billing labor charges against the contract. There is a preliminary finding that [redacted] overbilled the contract for 82.5 hours.

(U//FOUO) I recommend that this information referred to LEIDOS for resolution and that the case be closed without further action by this office.

Investigator

Dissemination is prohibited unless authorized pursuant to 50 USC 403-3h
Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Investigations Division
Washington, DC 20511

26 January 2015

(U//FOUO) MEMO FOR: AIGI

(U//FOUO) FROM: INV

(U//FOUO) SUBJECT: 2014-0016

(U//FOUO) On 3 December 2014, the IC IG opened an investigation on [redacted] due to potential false reporting of timekeeping and misuse of government IT Systems over the course of 10 months.

(U//FOUO) After [redacted] this office determined that no further investigation was necessary.

(U//FOUO) I recommend that this case be closed.

INVESTIGATOR

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE NUMBER: 2014-0017

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) [Redacted]

ALLEGATION: (U//FOUO) Contractor Employee Labor Mischarging

BACKGROUND:

(U//FOUO) The Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) Investigations Division (INV) identified [Redacted] during [Redacted] at Maryland Square 2 (MS2). At the time of the review, [Redacted] was an employee of Booze Allen Hamilton (BAH) on ODNI contract [Redacted]. The [Redacted] indicated that [Redacted] was not likely present at his assigned worksite for the full period in which he billed the contract. [Redacted] from 31 October 2013 to 29 September 2014, showed that [Redacted] billed the government for 191 hours during which he was not present at his worksite.

SCOPE:

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV conducted this investigation pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3033, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, effective 7 October 2010; ODNI Instruction 10.34, Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, dated 22 September 2013; and, Quality Standards for

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Investigations, dated 15 November 2011, set forth by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U//FOUO) APPLICABLE LAW:


ISSUE PRESENTED: Whether engaged in labor mischarging in violation of law.

(U//FOUO) ANALYSIS:

(U//FOUO) of all contract employees in ODNI facilities. These steps led to a preliminary finding of approximately 191 discrepant claimed hours and formal investigation into time and attendance. A reduced the preliminary discrepancy to 123 hours.

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV interviewed on 23 March 2015, during which his discrepant hours were discussed. During the interview stated that he took smoke breaks and worked from home with the authorization of his BAH team lead. further stated that if he finished his work for the day he would leave early but bill an additional 15-30 minutes of time to round out his hours for the day. would occasionally work from a BAH facility, time for which he was credited in the analysis.

(U//FOUO) In the course of a related investigation, IC IG INV interviewed several ODNI and BAH employees who all stated that the RIM task on which was assigned had to be completed at MS2 or at BAH, and all were unaware of any arrangement or directive to work from home, unless the government was closed.

(U//FOUO) Based on the information gathered during this investigation, allegations that mischarged labor costs for 123.5 hours are substantiated.
CONCLUSION:

(U//FOUO) [Redacted] falsely charged approximately 123.5 hours from 31 October 2013 to 30 September 2014. He had a billing rate of $87.04 per hour. The total amount of mischarging is approximately $10,706.

Prepared By:  
Approved By:  

Investigator  
Assistant Inspector General for Investigations  

[Redacted]

May 2015
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE NUMBER: (U//FOUO) 2014-0018

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED] (AIN: [REDACTED])

ALLEGATION: (U//FOUO) Contractor Employee Time and Attendance Fraud

BACKGROUND:

(U//FOUO) The Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) Investigations Division (INV) identified time-keeping discrepancies for during

During the period examined by IC IG INV, [REDACTED] was an employee of KPMG working on ODNI contract [REDACTED].

(U//FOUO) The data analyzed indicated that [REDACTED] was not likely present at his assigned worksite for the full period billed to the contract. showed that from 31 October 2013 to 6 February 2015, [REDACTED] billed the government 516.25 labor hours for which he was not present.

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(U//FOUO) From 31 October 2013 to 31 March 2014 [redacted] had a billing rate of $173.88 per hour and 166.25 discrepant hours for a sub-total of $28,907.55; from 1 April 2014 to 6 February 2015 he had a billing rate of $173.19 per hour and 350 discrepant hours for a sub-total of $60,616.50. The total amount mischarged is estimated at $89,524.05.

AUTHORITY:

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV conducted this investigation pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3033, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, effective 7 October 2010; ODNI Instruction 10.34, Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, dated 22 September 2013; and, Quality Standards for Investigations, dated 15 November 2011, set forth by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

APPLICABLE LAW:


ANALYSIS:

(S//NF) IC IG identified [redacted] time and attendance discrepancy through [redacted] his time and attendance led to a formal investigation of his activities during the discrepant hours. These steps confirmed the preliminary finding of approximately 516.25 discrepant claimed hours.

(S//NF) Direct evidence from [redacted] verified his absences as not work related and confirmed that he mischarged his labor costs from 31 October 2013 to 6 February 2015 in violation of law.

(S//NF) Testimonial evidence from an interview [redacted] on 4 March 2015 also confirmed that he mischarged his labor costs from 31 October 2013 to 6 February 2015 in violation of law. [redacted] was shown a daily accounting of his discrepant hours, as well as the total figure of 516.25 hours.
The time and attendance analysis process was thoroughly explained and he acknowledged that he understood. In response, he stated that he did not realize his mischarging was that bad; "I guess I didn't do a good job tracking my hours". He was presented data that supported a discrepancy of 516.25 hours and was provided an explanation which identified a pattern of arriving late, taking long lunches, and leaving. He responded, "Obviously, it's true. Yeah. That's what's written down and that's what's...it's hard to argue against." He also acknowledged that he was responsible for the input of his hours worked which were determined to be falsely billed. He apologized and asked how he can rectify the situation.

(U//FOUO) [Redacted] attempted to mitigate the discrepant hours by advising IC IG INV that he was used to only working on Fixed Price Contracts and that he had the habit of recording eight hours a day. IC IG INV then informed [Redacted] that the review covered 259 days, and out of those 259 days he overbilled the government on all but six days. He did not provide a rebuttal to this evidence.

(U//FOUO) During the interview it appeared that [Redacted] was very forthcoming in answering the questions and did not try to deceive the government with his responses. He agreed with the summary of discrepant hours and the reasoning and the pattern that was presented to him.

CONCLUSION:

(U//FOUO) [Redacted] falsely charged 516.25 hours from 31 October 2013 to 6 February 2015. The evidence gathered during this investigation substantiated the preliminary finding of 516.25 discrepant hours and allegation that [Redacted] mischarged labor costs in violation of law.

PREPARED BY: Investigator

APPROVED BY: Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
(U//FOUO) MEMO FOR: AIGI
(U//FOUO) FROM: INV
(U//FOUO) SUBJECT: 2014-0019

(U//FOUO) On 15 DEC 14, the IC IG opened an investigation regarding a Boeing Company employee following a preliminary inquiry which found 364.25 possible discrepant hours from 7 OCT 13 through 30 SEP 14. The Boeing Company provided a document to the IC IG purporting to be Mr. [redacted] direct billing to the NCTC RLSI contract. Detailed review of [redacted] revealed that Mr. [redacted] direct billing to the RLSI program were well below the full-time hours originally presented by Boeing.

(U//FOUO) After further review of the data associated with this investigation, I recommend that this case be closed without further action.

INVESTIGATOR

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(U/FOUO) On 3 December 2014, the IC IG opened an investigation on [REDACTED] due to potential false reporting of timekeeping.

(U/FOUO) It was determined that the observable billing discrepancies occurred while [REDACTED] was employed as a CIA contractor. On 30 April 2014 CIA OIG received information from BAE that [REDACTED] had engaged in time and attendance fraud on a contract with CIA. BAE determined [REDACTED] had fraudulently misrepresented $16,550 of billable hours on a CIA contract. DOJ declined prosecution, and BAE fired [REDACTED] on 29 April 2014. No reason was provided by BAE for the termination at his debrief, so no action was taken at that time with regards to his security clearance.

(U/FOUO) 15 days after being fired by BAE, [REDACTED] began working for Six3 Intelligence Solutions, Inc. supporting DNI/NCTC/DITI [14 May 2014]. With no negative notation in his file, his clearance crossed over that day.

(U/FOUO) On 6 October 2014, the CIA OIG informed Clearance Division that they wanted a "Do Not Crossover" action placed on his electronic security file due to their investigation that substantiated his earlier labor mischarging. That action was completed but [REDACTED] was already working at the DNI.

(U/FOUO) CIA Community Programs has opened an event-driven RIP (reinvestigation) to review this matter, and will advise our office of the outcome.

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(U//FOUO) After reviewing [REDACTED] billing patterns on his new contract, it appears that he is properly accounting for his time and no further investigation is necessary.

(U//FOUO) I recommend closing this case and notifying ODNI security of [REDACTED] investigation.
18 March 15

(U//FOUO) MEMO FOR: AIGI

(U//FOUO) FROM: INV

(U//FOUO) SUBJECT: 2014-0021 AIN:

(U//FOUO) On 3 December 2014, the IC IG opened a preliminary inquiry into alleged labor mischarging by [REDACTED]. A review of the Statement of Work (SOW) and base contract documents determined the primary place performance was MITRE. Additionally, work performed under this contract was also permitted at ODNI facilities, other Government agencies, and other contractor facilities.

(U//FOUO) I recommend that this case be closed without further action by this office.

Investigator

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000208
(U//FOUO) On 4 December 2014, the IC IG opened a preliminary inquiry into alleged labor mischarging by [redacted]. A review of the Statement of Work (SOW) and contract documents determined that work performed under this contract supporting ILN courses was permitted at ODNI facilities, other Government agencies, and other contractor facilities. It was noted that her absences aligned with ILN course schedules, and [redacted].

(U//FOUO) I recommend that this case be closed without further action by this office.

Investigator
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Correction to INV-2014-0023 Report of Investigation

The file for case number INV-2014-0023 contains an incorrectly dated Report of Investigation. This Memorandum For The Record corrects the issue date of that document from 31 March 2015 to 6 April 2015.

No further action is required.

Date

Assistant Inspector General,
Investigations

(b)(3)
(b)(8)
(b)(7)(C)

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OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE NUMBER: 2014-0023

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

ALLEGATION: (U//FOUO) Contractor Employee Time & Attendance Fraud

BACKGROUND:

(U//FOUO) The Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) Investigations Division (INV) identified [REDACTED] during data analysis of ODNI contractor employee personnel [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. At the time of the review, [REDACTED] was an employee of LMN, under subcontract to Boeing, working on ODNI contract [REDACTED]. The data analysis indicated that [REDACTED] was not likely present at her assigned worksite for the full period for which she billed the contract. [REDACTED] from 4 November 2013 to 30 September 2014 suggested that [REDACTED] billed the government for 219 hours during for which she was not present at her worksite.

SCOPE:

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV conducted this investigation pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3033, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, effective 7 October 2010; ODNI Instruction 10.34, Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, dated 22 September 2013; and, Quality Standards for

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Investigations, dated 15 November 2011, set forth by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U//FOUO) APPLICABLE LAW:


ISSUE PRESENTED: Whether engaged in labor mischarging in violation of law.

(U//FOUO) ANALYSIS:

(U//FOUO) The initial analysis identifying of all contract employees in ODNI facilities led to a specific analysis of her location during the discrepant hours. These steps led to a preliminary finding of approximately 219 discrepant claimed hours and formal investigation into time and attendance. Additional information provided by Boeing resulted in a reduction of the discrepancy to 60 hours.

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV interviewed on 19 March 2015, during which her discrepant hours were discussed. did not dispute the analysis of discrepant hours and offered to make restitution for any discrepant hours. provided a written statement acknowledging that she did not dispute the data and offering to do whatever is necessary to resolve the discrepancy in her billing.

(U//FOUO) Based on the information gathered during this investigation, allegations that mischarged labor costs for 60 hours are substantiated.
CONCLUSION:

(U//FOUO) falsely charged approximately 60 hours from 4 November 2013 to 30 September 2014. She had a billing rate of $134.00 per hour. The total amount of mischarging is approximately $8,040.

PREPARED BY:  

APPROVED BY:  

Investigator  

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations  

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(C)
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Correction to INV-2014-0024 Report of Investigation

The file for case number INV-2014-0024 contains an undated Report of Investigation. This Memorandum For The Record establishes the Report of Investigation date as 11 February 2015.

No further action is required.

Date

Assistant Inspector General, Investigations

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

20 Mar 2014

UNCLASSIFIED

000214
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE NUMBER: 2014-0024
SUBJECT: [U//FOUO] Contractor Employee Time and Attendance Fraud

BACKGROUND:
[U//FOUO] The Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) Investigations Division (INV) identified during data analysis of ODNI contractor employee personnel at Reston 3. At the time of the review, an employee of Boeing, working on an ODNI contract, was an employee of Boeing, working on ODNI contract. The data analysis indicated that was not likely present at her assigned worksite for the full period in which she billed the contract. A from 2 October 2013 to 30 September 2014, showed that billed the government for 228 hours during which she was not present at her worksite.

SCOPE:
[U//FOUO] IC IG INV conducted this investigation pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3033, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, effective 7 October 2010; ODNI Instruction 10.34, Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, dated 22 September 2013; and, Quality Standards for

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Investigations, dated 15 November 2011, set forth by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

(U//FOUO) APPLICABLE LAW:


ISSUE PRESENTED: Whether engaged in labor mischarging in violation of law.

(U//FOUO) ANALYSIS:

(U//FOUO) The initial analysis identifying contract employees in ODNI facilities led to a specific analysis of her location during the discrepant hours. These steps led to a preliminary finding of approximately 228 discrepant claimed hours and formal investigation into time and attendance. Additional information provided by Boeing resulted in a reduction of the discrepancy to 208.25 hours.

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV interviewed on 13 March 2015, during which her 208.25 discrepant hours were discussed. did not dispute the analysis of discrepant hours. provided that she sometimes visits the Boeing facility in Herndon but that she uses a badge to gain access each time she visits. stated that her visits to Boeing were to service her Boeing laptop, which was used for unclassified work unrelated to the contract. acknowledged that her typical work hours are from about 10.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m., and that she has to usually leave by 5.15 p.m. to pick up her children. She stated that she puts 8 hours on her timesheet every day out of routine. provided a sworn written statement wherein she admitted that she submitted inaccurate timekeeping records.

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV interviewed, Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative, who is responsible for the Boeing contract with NCTC Mission Systems. provided that all contractor employees in Mission

* Boeing badge records were collected in this investigation and used in this analysis.

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Systems were notified as of October 2013 that their billable hours would only be performed at the facility. (b)(3)

(U//FOUO) Based on the information gathered during this investigation, allegations that mischarged labor costs for 208.25 hours are substantiated.

CONCLUSION:

(U//FOUO) falsified approximately 208.75 hours from 2 October 2013 to 30 September 2014. She had a billing rate of $114.85 per hour from 2 October 2013 to 31 December 2014 and 45.5 discrepant hours ($5,225.67), and a billing rate of $115.15 per hour from 1 January 2014 to 30 September 2014 and 163.25 discrepant hours ($18,798.23). The total amount of mischarging is approximately $24,023.90.

PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

Investigator

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

31 March 2015

CASE NUMBER: 2014-0025

SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) [Redacted]

ALLEGATION: (U//FOUO) Contractor Employee Time & Attendance Fraud

BACKGROUND:

(U//FOUO) The Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) Investigations Division (INV) identified [Redacted] during data analysis of ODNI contractor employee personnel [Redacted] at Maryland Square 2 (MS2). At the time of the review, [Redacted] was an employee of SCITOR, working on ODNI contract [Redacted]. She was previously employed by Booze Allen Hamilton (BAH) on ODNI contract [Redacted]. The data analysis indicated that [Redacted] was not likely present at her assigned worksite for the full period in which she billed the contract. A [Redacted] from 31 October 2013 to 29 September 2014, showed that [Redacted] billed the government for 433 hours during which she was not present at her worksite.

SCOPE:

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV conducted this investigation pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3033, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, effective

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7 October 2010; ODNI Instruction 10.34, Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, dated 22 September 2013; and, Quality Standards for Investigations, dated 15 November 2011, set forth by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

([U//FOUO]) APPLICABLE LAW:


ISSUE PRESENTED: Whether engaged in labor mischarging in violation of law.

([U//FOUO]) ANALYSIS:

([U//FOUO]) The initial analysis identifying data of all contract employees in ODNI facilities led to a specific analysis of her discrepant hours. These steps led to a preliminary finding of approximately 436 discrepant claimed hours and formal investigation into time and attendance. A detailed analysis of reduced the preliminary discrepancy to 348 hours. Because work conditions and requirements changed with her transition to the SCITOR contract in August 2014, this investigation focused on the period of employment with BAH from 31 October 2013 to 31 July 2014.

([U//FOUO]) IC IG INV interviewed on 18 March 2015 and 20 March 2015, during which her discrepant hours were discussed. is the BAH team lead for the IARPA RIM Task. She is responsible for accounting for the task hours that are submitted to the government for the records management subtasks. stated in both interviews that she was authorized to work at offsite locations by her BAH Program Lead . stated that this included time she spent working on her BAH laptop or answering email from her phone while at home. maintained that if she left early for class or an appointment, she made it up by working from home later that day. could not provide an explanation for how she kept track of her time for each task, but stated that she understood her hours were directly billable to the government.
contract. She also stated her belief that she worked more hours than she actually billed the government.

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV interviewed BAH Program Manager on 19 March 2015. She provided that the work on the RIM task couldn’t be done from home and that the bulk of the task had to be completed at MS2. She stated that she never levied a requirement for to be available outside of normal business hours at either the IARPA or BAH facility.

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV interviewed BAH Deputy Program Manager on 24 March 2015. She stated that she only authorized to work at home during the government shut down or when the government was closed for inclement weather. According the RIM task was required to be completed at MS or occasionally at the BAH facility in College Park, MD. She stated that she did not require to work after hours and would not authorize her to bill for time spent answering emails from a phone or BAH laptop at home.

(U//FOUO) IC IG INV interviewed several IARPA officers, including the Chief Acquisition Officer, the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative, and the Government POC for the RIM task. No government manager was aware of an authorization to work offsite or recalled providing any authorization for telework, and all agreed that IARPA support contractors on the RIM task should be performing billable work at MS2.

(U//FOUO) Based on the information gathered during this investigation, allegations that mischarged labor costs for 304.5 hours are substantiated.
CONCLUSION:

(U//FOUO) falsely charged approximately 304.5 hours from 31 October 2013 to 31 July 2014. She had a billing rate of $116.61 per hour. The total amount of mischarging is approximately $35,508.

PREPARED BY:  

APPROVED BY:

Investigator

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Correction to INV-2014-0026 Case-Closing Memorandum

[U/FOUO] The file for case number INV-2014-0026 contains an incorrectly identified case number on the Case-Closing Memorandum. This Memorandum For The Record corrects the case number identified as INV-2014-0027 to INV-2014-0026. Additionally, this document corrects the subject name incorrectly named within the text as [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], as it appears otherwise in the Case-Closing Memorandum subject line.

(U) No further action is required.

Assistant Inspector General, Investigations

Date

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(U//FOUO) On 3 DEC 14, the IC IG opened an investigation regarding ___ Integrity Applications Incorporated employee on subcontract to LEIDOS, following a preliminary inquiry which found 72 possible discrepant hours from 1 OCT 13 through 30 SEP 14. Analysis of the badge records and it activities of the employee reduced the discrepancy to 59 hours.

(U//FOUO) After further review of the data associated with this investigation, I recommend that this case be closed and referred to LEIDOS.
[U//FOUO] MEMO FOR: AIGI

[U//FOUO] FROM: INV


[U//FOUO] On 3 Dec 14, the IC IG opened an investigation regarding [REDACTED] KPMG contract employee, following a preliminary inquiry which found 157 possible discrepant hours from 1 Oct 13 through 30 Sep 14. Upon further review of additional evidence, the IC IG found that the contractor employee’s place of performance was the Contractor Facility. The Contractor provided [REDACTED] records to account for the contract employee’s absences.

[U//FOUO] After further review of the data associated with this investigation, I recommend that this case be closed without further action by this office.

INVESTIGATOR