

UNCLASSIFIED



Director of National Intelligence

ES 2024-00114

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Declassification of Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

REFERENCES:

- A. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, as amended, 4 December 1981
- B. Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, as amended, 29 December 2009

Pursuant to Section 1.3(b)(10) of Reference A and Section 3.1(d) of Reference B, and after consulting with the relevant intelligence agencies, I hereby declassify the attached report.


Tulsi Gabbard

June 12, 2025
Date

Attachment:

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

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Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in Section 506I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C § 3105), which states:

- (a) “IN GENERAL. —The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of—
- (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
 - (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.
- (b) UPDATES.—Not less frequently than annually, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.”

Section 506I(a)(1), intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) by the Department of Defense.

Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay Detainees as of 1 October 2024			
	Total	Pre-22 January 2009 ^a	Post-22 January 2009
Detainees Transferred	739*	532	207
Confirmed of Reengaging	137 ^b of 739 (18.5%)	122 of 532 (22.9%)	15 of 207 (7.2%)**
Deceased	39	37	2
In Foreign Custody	23	21	2
At Large	75	64	11

^a Executive Order (E.O.) 13492, *Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities*, signed on 22 January 2009, directed members of the interagency to determine the disposition of the detainees remaining at GTMO to accelerate closure of the facility. Following the issuance of this E.O., all transfer agreements between the United States and host nations have included concurrence on a set of security assurances designed to lessen the likelihood of detainee reengagement and ensure humanitarian treatment.

^b The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses 140 former detainees are confirmed of reengagement.

Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay Detainees as of 1 October 2024			
Suspected of Reengaging	97 ^c of 739 (13.1%)	79 of 532 (14.8%)**	18 of 207 (8.7%)**
Deceased	5	2	3
In Foreign Custody	12	12	0
At Large	80	65	15

*An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one is imprisoned in Kentucky.

**Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order.

Section 506I(a)(2), an assessment of the likelihood that current and former detainees will engage in terrorism.

Based on trends identified during the past 20 years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as recruitment by terrorist or insurgent organizations could pose an increased risk of reengagement. While enforcement of transfer conditions probably has deterred many former detainees from reengagement, some detainees determined to reengage have and will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions.

Section 506I(a)(2), an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees to be transferred in the future probably would communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged.

^c The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses 95 former detainees are suspected of reengagement.

Definitions

Terrorist Activity: Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist activities: active membership in a terrorist organization, leading or planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack, financing terrorist operations, recruiting terrorists, or facilitating the movement of individuals or materiel for terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—on issues unrelated to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements.

Confirmed Activities: A preponderance of information—biometrics (fingerprints, conclusive photographic match, or other similar information) and/or reliable, verified, or well-corroborated intelligence reporting—that identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as being directly involved in terrorist activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist activity.

Suspected Activities: Plausible, but unverified, or single-source reporting that indicates a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist activity.