
Panel Discussion: “Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture”

Welcome: Mr. Frederick Kempe, President, Atlantic Council

Moderator: Mr. Banning Garrett, Director, Program on Asia, Atlantic Council

Panelists:

Mr. Mathew Burrows, Counselor, National Intelligence Council, ODNI

Mr. Giovanni Grevi, Former Senior Research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies

Mr. William Burke-White, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Closing Remarks: Mr. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Director, European Union Institute for Security Studies

Location: Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C.

Date: September 20, 2010
FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for coming to this public release of the Global Governance 2025 at a critical juncture. This is pretty unique. It’s the first time that the National Intelligence Council has jointly developed and produced this kind of report with a non-U.S. body. So just in terms of novelty, you are experiencing a first today.

The report is jointly developed and produced by the U.S. National Intelligence Council and the EU Institute for Securities Studies. In addition to thanking the NIC and the EUISS, I’d also like to thank James Elles and the Transatlantic Policy Network for cooperating with us to organize the international consultations that fed into this report.

James is one of the most influential members of the European Parliament and also happens to be a member of the Atlantic Council. Global Governance 2025 is a follow-on study on the NIC’s 2008 report, Global Trends 2025.

Let me just say a couple of things about the Atlantic Council relationship with the NIC and with this report just to put it into context for you, and why we got involved in this process.

First of all, the Atlantic Council believes quite strongly that we need to reinvigorate the Atlantic relationship for global challenges; that the trans-Atlantic community will lose its verve, its vigor and its ability to influence future events if we don’t work more closely on global issues. So right at the core of our mission is working on these sorts of global trends and global issues.

The global trends report that the NIC has done take a long term view of the future and then offer a fresh look to recently elected or reelected president on how key global trends might develop over the next 15 years to influence world events. So they produce one of these public reports every four years for an incoming president, the last having been the 2025 report.

What we did in preparing for that report is we took their previous thinking on the road to 16 or so countries around the world – our major partners all around the world – from China and Japan and South Korea to Chile and Brazil and Mexico to South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and of course Brussels, Russia, Turkey, the places you would expect also in the Euro-Atlantic community.

And it really was the U.S. government at its best: listening to our partners, leasing the smartest people saying this is the way we look at the future, what do you think. And it was a very interesting report.

This is a side report. This is not another global trends report. But as I said, it is the first report of this sort jointly developed and produced with a non-U.S. partner. You’ll see the wording at the bottom of the first paragraph in the preface: “First time NIC has jointly developed and produced an unclassified report.” And it also provides an important step for the view to the future joint projects on matters of common interest.

The report is also the result of a highly inclusive process. And here, the Atlantic Council played a role in both animating and convening. So it was just NIC and the EUISS, but we went on the road with the work on this report involved consultations with government officials, media
representatives and business, academic, NGO, think tank, in eight countries. And those countries included Brazil, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Africa and UAE.

Global Governance 2025 concludes that the growing number of issues on the international agenda and their complexity is outpacing the ability of international organizations and national governments to address these changes. I’ll leave it to the experts here to talk more deeply in this.

But clearly, three areas are crucial in underpinning this argument. One of them is the growing economic interdependence.

Number two, the interconnected nature of challenges on the international agenda and then interwoven domestic and foreign challenges. There are very few problems any longer that can be of importance that can be solved on a national basis.

The shift to a multipolar world complicates the prospect for effective global governance over the next 15 years. But particularly the rise of regional powers shifts that world. Frank Fukuyama has talked about multi-multilateralism. You’ll hear other expressions of how the world is going. But let’s just say we’ve got a rising host of issues and a shrinking capability of international institutions to deal with them.

Today, we will first hear from the primary authors of Global Governance 2025, Matthew Burrows and Giovanni Grevi, who will present the key findings of the study. I will provide a very short introduction of both of them right now.

Following that and Giovanni’s presentations, William Burke-White of the State Department Policy Planning Staff will make brief remarks about that. Again, I’m going to give a quick introduction of him here. And that way, I’ll clear the deck for them just to get into the report with Banning Garrett, the directors of our Asia programs and also the person who’s directed these global projects from the Atlantic Council view. He’ll moderate.

And then finally, Alvaro de Vasconcelos, the Director of EUISS since May 2007 will close, and I’ll also give you a quick introduction. And so bear with me as I go through this.

Matt was appointed counselor to the NIC in July 2007. He’s has served as the director of the analysis and production staff in the NIC since May 2003. Now, that’s a pretty important position because in that capacity he’s responsible for managing a staff of senior analysts and production technicians who guide and shepherd all the national intelligence estimates. But even beyond, all the other NIC projects from inception to dissemination. And he was the principal drafter for the NIC publications, Mapping the Global Future 2020 and Global Trends 2025. A Ph.D in European History from Cambridge.

Giovanni’s a Senior Researcher at FRIDE – or do you just use the acronym?

GIOVANNI GREVI: Just the acronym.
MR. KEMPE: FRIDE – FRIDE. Before joining FRIDE, Giovanni served as senior research fellow at EUISS in Paris between 2005 and 2010 and, prior to that, European Policy Center as a policy analyst and associate director of studies. He holds an MSE from the London School of Economics and Ph.D from the Free University of Brussels.

Then following Matt and Giovanni’s presentation, Bill Burke-White will return to Cambridge yet again. He holds a Ph.D and M. Phil in International Relations from Cambridge University – another good American in that respect. Joined the Foreign Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State in 2009. And his portfolio includes the Russian Federation and other issues at the director’s discretion. He’s on leave from the University of Pennsylvania Law School where he teaches international law and human rights and rights on international relations.

And finally, Alvaro has been Director of the EUISS, as I said. Prior to that, he headed the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Lisbon. And he’s cofounder of that institute and he directed it from 1981 to 2007.

And he’s a network launcher. He’s launched several of them including the Euro-Latin American Forum and others as well as being a regulator columnist in Portuguese and international press and co-author of countless books. So you’ve got a lot of brain power in front of you. And because of that, I will hand over to them.

MATTHEW BURROWS: Well, thank you, Fred. I want to first begin by thanking the Atlantic Council particularly for their help and support not only in hosting this session with you but also in helping us organize meetings all over the world on this project.

Now as Fred has indicated, this goes back to a common program that the NIC – National Intelligence Council – and the European Union’s Institute for Securities Studies have had, and that is looking at global trends. We call ours “The Last Iteration: A World Transformed.” Giovanni’s the author, as Fred said, of The Global Puzzle which is a similar work and came out in 2006.

And the themes in both of them, as you probably remember, as first the shift from West to East in relative power and wealth and the beginnings of multipolar world. And we talked about particularly in the NIC publication that in this transition period particularly that governance was going to be a key issue on how this new world order turned out.

And so we thought of several different scenarios of how that could take shape. We wanted in this publication to delve a little bit deeper and also to go outside the U.S. and Europe to talk about how others saw this process unfolding.

Now, in some ways, it’s a propitious period in that just shortly before we started the project, you had the sudden, really, reestablishment of the G-20 as a body now encompassing a larger number of powers appearing to be more legitimate in terms of setting the course for global developments. That had been reestablished, it looked like. We were seeing in some ways that agenda beginning to develop beyond purely economic and financial.
At the same time, you know, there are the countervailing forces. And this is something that we may want to talk about more of. Really, much more emphasis domestically on maintaining financial and economic position in the developing world, much more of a focus on continuing that process and on stability. And these are a lot of the themes that we found when we started to go around the world.

First, the governance concept itself was greeted somewhat with suspicion. Was this a Western conspiracy? You know, for U.S. and the EU particularly here, we are coming shoulder to shoulder out to these countries trying to maintain our position in the world but yet get the others to contribute. To what degree basically do they have the power both in their region and in the globe really to put attention on this issue when they have such crying needs in terms of poverty, development, stability in their own neighborhood in their own backyard?

And we went – on this project, we went to all of the major regions in the world. We had meetings in Tokyo, Beijing, Dubai, South Africa, Pretoria, in Brazil, San Paulo, and Brasilia and Moscow as well as meetings in Europe and Washington.

The consensus in terms of governance was a tug, really, between agreeing to work on these larger issues even though we recognized – and I’ll get a little bit into recognizing what the growing risks are – the degree to which we have the ability really to cooperate and the degree to which they saw themselves welcomed at the international high table.

Because one of the issues we did encounter a lot was on the legitimacy side, worry that, A, you may have much more representative body in the G-20, but how powerful was that going to be, how much was that going to look at issues that were close to their interests, to what degree was that going to feed into the formal institutions? Suspicion that, again, it would be much more led by the West and actually have an agenda that was set by merging countries. So that was a continual theme.

But the second one was also – I don’t mean to be pessimistic here, but actually on the opposite side much more optimistic was that there was an understanding of the growing risks. So throughout, and you’ll see in the publication, an understanding, really, that these issues on resources – and this is the water and energy and food prices – that these are major risks and the scale on these could actually undermine globalization but undermine the domestic prosperity that they were enjoying. For them, the problem was how to tackle this, how to tackle it, too, without disrupting their own domestic development.

And then you had a lot of other issues dealing with conflict failing states which they also recognized in a broad sense were major issues: One, that were not being tackled by the international system.

The problem again was how to do it given their own priorities, given, too, that the system for them wasn’t one that was exactly made for their participation. So this was the quandary.

I’m going to turn it over to Giovanni to talk a little bit about other devices that they and we saw in terms of how to deal flexibly with these issues and also with the scenarios that we came up
with when we actually were meeting with people how to imagine what will happen in the next 15 years. Those are all in the reports that you have. Giovanni, did you want to?

MR. GREVI: Thank you, Matt. And I should also say myself to thanking the Atlantic Council, the NIC, the TPN for these cooperation with you. I assess this is a first. It worked out really well. It was a pleasure to work with you on these projects. So I look forward to new opportunities.

The subject of our joint work was of sheer importance from a European perspective – European Union has stated multilateralism as a priority of its foreign policy international action and would appear state therefor in the development and success of a global governance framework over the short and long term future.

We say in the future that global governance and multinational cooperation is struggling to keep the pace with the complexity and accumulation of the challenges which are out there and facing all major global actors. The world grows more heterogeneous. Major global powers have different world views, different sets of priorities. There is an acknowledgement of the need to cooperate. But then of course, there is an elitos(sp) on what comes first, how and of course the tradeoffs that are said of that.

So a sort of gap between the demand and the supply of global governance that may be widening but at the same time in this dialogue we had across the world the sense that something is moving, that some progress is going on a little bit experimental in some ways. We even say probably trial and error kind of effort at discovering new ways of cooperating, and we highlight three in particular not by way of being exhaustive but by way of pointing at those that could become particularly promising introspective.

One is of course the whole example of the G-20 but more generally a group of leading countries, of countries that make the difference on global affairs coming together. After the financial crisis, of course, we had the G-20, national debts. There is a G-8 which is still there and is experimenting with thus associating different countries depending on the issues at stake. But there are also formats. There are the Greeks, there are the Basic, there are the IPSA (ph), and you name it.

Now all of these had in common that you want to sort of trigger – bring together collective leadership, and you also want to reflect the shifting balance of power. On the one hand, you want to go functional to address a problem. On the other hand, you have to achieve political compromise among leading countries. These two logics coexist in these informal groupings and will play out in future in different ways and very much determine the eventual success of these particular model of governments.

Bringing together leaders is certainly necessary. The question of trust came up very, very much in our discussions and there is a component of confidence building, of course. These governments can sort of bring together separate problems which are sort of addressed by different multinational organization: energy prices, food prices, health and migration or climate chance can be connectors.
But of course the big question is whether these are the shape of things to come, whether they can actually deliver in the end. Questions for on the G-8 in that respect and of course questions are emerging on the G-20 as well. There have been questions raised and doubts raised in our debates as to the ability of these informal groupings to ultimately succeed in achieving concrete tangible outcomes beyond the crisis management firefighting stage after the financial crisis in the case of the G-20, and there is certainly an interesting subject for the future.

Then there is the question we try to address and to discuss in different continents of the perspectives for regional cooperation. Now obviously a lot of focus has been going to emerging countries to major powers. It seemed to us that certainly there is no clear trend pointing in a definitive fashion to more regional cooperation, and there is certain potential.

There is certain momentum for that in East Asia, to an extent in South America and in different ways also in Africa. Once again, no clear trend but potential, dissatisfaction with the way in which global multinational institutions have been working, financial crisis, more regional self-reliance on a monetary level, currencies agreements in East Asia. Domestic and regional markets in increasingly important to sustain consumption and growth.

And people (sp) to regional and global players edging their strategies and choosing to also engage in regional cooperation for a variety of reasons certainly – not only for the sake of cooperation but also to confirm their leadership, but nevertheless investing in these formats as well which can provide a platform for dialogue and conversation.

And thirdly, the role of civil society – the role of civil society and know state actors more broadly, business and the private partnerships growing and as yet to grow. As yet to grow because there is a clear demand for that in different services, shall we say, that it can provide to global governance, in framing issues, in bringing new issues to the fore, sometimes bypassing governments in providing expertise and knowledge and in many of the issues that we refer to in the report, of course, expertise and knowledge are going to be increasingly fundamental for sound decision making at the national and even more so at the international level to send a political debate against a clear background of facts and data.

And in terms of implementation, civil society, business implementing standards, shaping them also. A public/private partnerships becoming increasingly important, some of the, for example, management of the resource issues that we see as essential to global governance.

So these are some of the sort of dimensions of progress and innovation that we have highlighted in the report. Depending on how they play out and depending, of course, on the convergence or not of the strategic outlook of major global players, we have tried to imagine as Matt was saying some scenarios, some ways in which the future may look 10 or 15 years down the line. And we have proposed four fictionalized set events.

One is the sort of, shall we say, business as usual, barely keeping afloat kind of scenario whereby we don’t have a crisis that is big enough to rock the boat. International cooperation continues.
But these sort of status quo or just progressive modest reform type of scenario we feel is unsustainable. It’s unsustainable that would be a kind of reactive international cooperation. It would address the sort of symptoms and not the root causes of the challenges we face. And in the presence of a big enough crisis, it would probably fall apart with consequences that are unpredictable.

Nevertheless, actually it is quite probable that in the very near future this is also going to be the most likely scenario – this muddling through as opposed to being architecture new designs of global governance.

We have a scenario from a patient which is actually a scenario of introversion and introspection of all the largest international actors established and emerging ones. We point an importance of the link between domestic politics and the international debate and the call for negotiation at the international level and the sort of two-level gain that could be the case where domestic politics turn sour in advance countries, in emerging ones which would create, of course, serious constraints which would exacerbate tensions and perhaps lead to more protectionism.

There a third scenario sort of new shape, new fashion of concern of Europe which is the most optimistic one perhaps not a particularly probable one in the short term at least, but perhaps one we should try and aim for at least in some ways where you have a sort of meeting of minds of the most significant international actors around some of the sort of structural cross-cutting challenges. We picked energy climate change to exemplify this. But it could apply to many other matters for example, energy, that we look at quite closely in the report.

In that case as well, not necessarily a sort of overarching one of big reform, some trial and error but with a clear sense of direction and purpose and clear meeting of strategic priorities. There is a worst-case scenario conflict which I would say goes beyond the second scenario insofar as there is not only a sort of introspection but also a real alienation between the major global players pointing a charter for their own difficulties, competing for resources and in this case by the way a question that not only concerns the relation between established and emerging powers but also could very well concern emerging powers between them better ration of regional insecurity in the Middle East for example, arms races.

This is a scenario that we don’t consider as particularly likely because actually, as Matt was saying, there is a general acknowledgement of the fact that there has to be cooperation between big players to address some actually shared concerns. But you never know. This is a word of emerging risk that blow at one point and could determine, could trigger unpredictable political consequences if you don’t have the sort of background of an adequate platform for dialogue, for consultation, for trust building that enables you to challenge all the shocks. Well, scenario number four conflict cannot be completely ruled out. I would say this is about it insofar as I can tell for the moment.

MR. BURROWS: So I want to approach this from the policy side for a moment, and I am grateful to the NIC and the EUISS for sort of trying to make sure that when the report came out, it did have policy relevance by working with the Department of State Office of Policy Planning and of course also with the European Parliament.
And as I participated in all the meetings leading up to the publication of the report and read the report, I think it has a couple of very important policy messages that we need to be hearing in Washington. The first one is the need for more global governance, and I think if you look at the Secretary of State’s Council on Foreign Relations second speech last – two weeks ago, you see a real attention to international architecture. That’s an intention that needs to continue as I think one of the real messages of the report.

We have done a lot in the last 18 months in this phase whether it’s rejoining the Human Rights Council, elevating the G-20, working on Asian architecture. I think there is a danger at this moment that many will say, well, we’ve done the governance, we’ve done the architecture stuff, that’s taken care of. I think the message here is that it is not a done project, that there are very scary scenarios that may emerge if we don’t continue to do more in this phase. So I think that also bumps into a potentially troubling domestic political trend which is that these terms of global governance and international architecture don’t resonate well in the current political space. So figuring out ways to make sure that they don’t fall off the agenda and lead us to the conflict or crisis scenarios that are painted in the report.

A second big theme or lesson on the policy side that I think we need to draw here is some thoughts about how to deal with new regional centers of influence. The thing that struck me most in all of our consultations around the globe is that, while I think if you put a list of the 10 priorities of each of the sort of countries we were in next to each other, you would see many similar issues on those lists but very different ranking ordering of preferences, and that one of the things we need to be thinking more about is how we get the rising centers of influence not just on the same page of what those preferences are but working more or less toward the same items on that list. And that requires some flexibility of our side and some flexibility on their side.

But if we don’t figure out new mechanisms to ensure that when climate changes, the thing that we’re thinking about, everybody’s moving forward on that and not focused on something else, and you can sort of do that same calculation with a range of issues. We need different ways of doing that on our side and new institutional structures to do it on other sides.

The third big lesson I would draw from this – again, this relates to rising powers is sort of the willingness to use the capabilities they have. One of the things that we heard a lot as we were talking that I think comes through in the report is that many of these countries were in want to be part of these discussions. Fewer of them are willing to take actions to do something about those problems. And this again points me back to the need for more structures that are able to encourage those countries to actually contribute and to be responsible in these government structures.

The final policy lesson that I want to draw on and my comments will be very brief are largely about U.S.-E.U. relations, and I think this project was quite extraordinary in its ability to bridge the Atlantic. I think we need to be doing more of this, and I think one of the real lessons from this is when the U.S. and Europe talk to one another, work together and actually engage jointly, you get very different kinds of responses. And I think you get a much greater ability to kind of
build the governance structures we need to make sure we don’t end up in the conflict scenario but do end up in the kind of concert scenario.

So I hope this process as much as the outcome can be a lesson that both sides of the Atlantic look to when we’re looking for sort of concrete ways that we can work together to advance an agenda that engages with rising powers to solve or at least think about the common challenges we face today.

So overall I think there are some really important policy lessons here. The biggest one is that we have a lot of work cut out for us and that across both the U.S. and Europe we need to keep the governance issue on the agenda as we move forward. And so thanks very much.

BANNING GARRETT: Thanks, Bill. We had a really extraordinary time, the four of us and others who went on these trips around the world. I want to thank them for all that I learned and just the really good companions and a common task that I think we did – the report shows that a great deal was accomplished. I’d just like to open with one question or kind of a two-part question and then go to the audience.

To what – I know there’s great concern especially in the trans-Atlantic community about western values, about interest in rule of law, multilateral institutions. There’s a whole set of things of great concern to us that we want to see maintained in the world order. And my question is to what degree do you think that those people, those other countries, particularly, say, China, India, Brazil, others went to that they really disagree with those values and the desire – the kind of order we want. Is that a real obstacle or a fundamental split, or is the problem more about suspicion of what the intentions are behind it?

Is this an effort just to maintain western dominance? Do they really believe them, and in fact the differences in what we actually want to do and what we value, even though there may be a difference in priorities as Bill pointed, is really not as great as it may seem sometimes because these other questions get in the way, of suspicions of intentions especially.

And the second piece is the urgency question. Giovanni outlined the four scenarios with the last one being the really scary one of degeneration into conflict over the resources or whatever it might be because we have no institutions in agreement how to do things, and that on a timeline were the resource scarcity and resource issues can become a greater and greater problem – not enough oil on the planet for everyone to consume well like Americans. China alone could take more oil than the world produces right now – a hundred million barrels a day. If we don’t solve those, we could have great conflict.

But is this a timeline problem? In other words, if we fester we don’t develop global governance, then scenario four becomes much more likely. If we move ahead more quickly, see this as an urgent problem, are effective in taking steps in these outcomes are less likely. Is it kind of a time sequencing problem here as well as these random four possible scenarios. So maybe Matt –

MR. BURROWS: Well, I’ll take the first stab at it and say that first, as I think both Giovanni and I said and you can find this also in the report, is that most of the people we talked with admit
that there is something that the international system is not really up to dealing with these major issues and these major risks.

That said, there is an enormous amount of suspicion, and it is just not a western intentions but also in countries between different regional – emerging regional powers. So you’ll find in the publication that the Indians are very suspicious of what Chinese intentions are in their neighborhood. And so I think this issue is something that we can’t minimize at all.

I think there is a feeling of urgency but, that said, the domestic priorities are way out there. And in many cases for all of us I can say this for the Western side and also the developing countries that I think those domestic priorities have risen since the financial crisis, and there is the possibility that they really will push aside some of the more larger multilateral issues or this sense of urgency for multilateral cooperation.

WILLIAM BURKE-WHITE: So one comment on urgency. I do think there is an urgency problem here, and I think part of it stems from the fact that we had a financial crisis that got us the G-20. For better or worse, we didn’t have a financial crisis that gave us the political sort of momentum to completely remake the international system, and we saw what it took to get the United Nations in 1945 and we certainly don’t want to have to have a repeat of that to get the new structure.

But the danger is if there is not some kind of inflection point that sort of puts everyone’s agenda – harmonizes everyone’s agenda and puts things back on the sort of level of urgency that we might have seen in 2007 or 2008 on the financial side, we end up in a muddle through scenario.

But I see as the problem of urgency is you need some catalytic event or moment or political initiative that gets you to the concert rather than the muddle through. And as I look down the horizon, I don’t see that event arising and in many ways I hope it doesn’t but want it to, and I don’t know how you get there without it happening.

MR. GREVI: Just one point on the question of values. Clearly, there are differences on values on domestic political systems and so on and so forth. There are questions concerning sovereignty, the way you approach it, the way you can sort of – the limit or adjust sovereignty to the needs of cooperation and those debates are clearly out there.

It seems to me that the crux of the matter is really to sort of foster and reform ways of international cooperation in the future to be smart about it and try to be really innovative. To give an example, we worked all on the sort of development agenda. Western powers tend to feel that good governance is the starting point and good governance will enable economic growth and development.

Others, for example, China would believe – have economic growth and that way eventually deliver better governance and better administration, better services, so on and so forth. Well, frankly, I mean both of these statements are correct. You cannot have good sustainable good political governance in the absence of social economic development, in the absence of finding
sources of growth, more investment and you cannot have sustainable growth without an appropriate framework of public institutions and public structures.

In these cases, is there a fundamental conflict of values? There is a fundamental difference perhaps or an important difference in the starting points in the way of looking at these issues. But if one looks at the concrete metrics, in often cases questions of developments, questions of states’ fragility, then there are interesting ways of cooperating – questions of, for example, engaging transnational networks, networks of officials, all the not, say, stopping at the headlines, at the slogans, at the different world views but looking actually at what our shared interests can be and try to cooperate on those

I have the feeling that if we addressed issues in this way, there is more scope and more potential for cooperation.

MR. GARRETT: Thank you, Giovanni. Now I’d like to open to questions and please identify yourself and your affiliation if you would. Pauline?

Q: Pauline Baker from the Fund for Peace. It seems to me that – is this on – that one of the major themes is political inclusion if you want to wrap it all up in a package. I wonder how much your conversations worldwide included people who are in the Muslim world who speak for the more radical elements, who are deriving some of the conflicts in the world and some of the elements that are driving the divisions that you identified and how some of the people you did talk to, the more moderate elements, regard the issues that the Muslim world are raising questions of justice, inequality, anti-Western values, et cetera.

And the second thing is there’s been no real mention of the U.N. The MDGs are on the front page today. This is a very controversial issue. People – there’s an article in the Washington Post today saying the U.N. is becoming less and less effective. Do the countries that you’ve talked to, the emerging powers see the U.N. as a vehicle that can be reformed and be a more effective instrument, or is it simply going to be the only forum through which you can get some political legitimacy but not very effective in their eyes?

MR. GARRETT: Who wants to take that one? (Those on ?).

MR. BURROWS: I can start maybe, Giovanni and even Bill add in. I mean, you know, one of the problems we have when we go out is I mean here we are two linked governments. So the kind of exposure we would have to real radicals is, you know, absolutely zero. We do and we certainly that was the effort in the Dubai meeting is to understand the divisions within the Middle East.

And I think there were some very important messages there that in some ways surprise us. I mean certainly we had quite a few women in that session who felt very let down by the U.S. on U.S. not in their mind anyways pushing hard enough on democratic values. And so that in a sense they’re not being somebody on the outside that could push for equality within.
At the same time, I think generally this issue of legitimacy more than, you know, on the western side it’s the problems, the risks and so on, but then it’s still very much the legitimacy which gets back to your inclusion question. And so, yes, I think in some ways on the U.N. when we talked about that, they still see that as the legitimate body. There wasn’t as much talk about the effectiveness but more, you know, who is in the Security Council, who has the powers there, when are we going to get invited to the high table.

And to an extent, you know, we came out with the message of the G-20, here’s a flexible body agenda setting. I mean they were much more this is a cross, a lot that means fixated much more on this issue of legitimacy and actually being there at the table in the formal institutions.

MR. GREVI: Yep, I mean, this is the case. I mean we have pride in the space of this report to look at some of the developments, evolution of global governance there. So as in novelty promising, we were not comprehensive in dealing with all institutions in a sense with the debate that has been going on for a while on the U.N. reform.

But Matt is absolutely right: We have not seen an alternative plan to the U.N. We have not seen a sense that the U.N. will fade into irrelevance. We have seen instead a considerable sort of confidence in the U.N. as the most legitimate body and as a body which has to be brought into cooperation with some of the more informal structures of governance which we have mentioned – for example, the G-20. There, I think, there is an important dimension of evolution, the extent to which the U.N. family and these informal groupings can cooperate, can talk to one another, can find a good division of tasks or perhaps completion of tasks between them, I think, is very important.

But certainly the U.N. features quite high in the world views of most of our interlocutors and of course in the case of the European Union, too, with the ambition of a more rule-based international order.

But there is a sense that the U.N. had not only to undergo considerable reform and not necessarily at the top level of the U.N. Security Council including through its departments, and that the U.N. will be all the better able to deliver to the extent to which it would be able to cooperate with different sort of formats of global governance – some of which we have mentioned.

MR. GARRETT: Back there.

Q: Thank you. Sonya Michelle (sp), director of U.S. studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center. We’ve heard a lot about the brain drain in the past. But there’s an emerging problem and that’s the problem of the care drain – that is, the migration of women from developing to developed countries to perform care work with children and elders, which is becoming an increasing need as more and more women move into the labor force in the developed world.

I wonder if that was an issue that you addressed at all, and, if so, do you see any sites where global governance might be emerging on that issue.
MR. BURROWS: We – I wouldn’t say we addressed directly the caregiver, I mean, other than of course we talked in this work and the other about the aging societies in the west. But we did, if you look in the section deal with migration and this issue really of which was, I’d say, in the brain drain category, lots of societies losing enormous numbers of skilled and highly trained to the developed world and then how, you know, this is double-edged because in many ways they are the ones also sending back remittances, so giving a boost to development at home.

But over the longer term, that drain, particularly if it gets up – I think we have a figure of 15 percent or more, gets over a certain limit, then it actually becomes a drag over the long term on development.

So that’s the kind of look we were at that particular issue. And I think the point we were trying to make is that the discussions on migration in this kind of general above the domestic is one that we really have not had and where we actually maybe need to address much more. But that politically and in a domestic sense, I mean this is usually a highly explosive issue and it’s very hard to boost it up to this multilateral level.

MR. GARRETT: Burt?

Q: Thank you. I’m Bert Keidel (sp) with the Atlantic Council and Georgetown University. I want to ask a question about the urgency issue. It seems as if I read through the report quickly, and I don’t see any sort of headings on who takes the lead. It’s as if we all get together in a group and decide what to do when the preponderant power in the world that could lead is the United States.

And so I wonder if there isn’t some way to gear our thinking about the future and what it can bring away from one that sees China as perhaps a cheater – it’s the one that’s emerging most rapidly, but rather as a natural spread of the scientific and industrial revolution and that, therefore, the United States’ own national security depends on recognizing this sort of natural evolution and taking leadership in reforming institutions, giving up some of its sovereignty, and doing the kinds of things that serves its interests in the longer term.

Otherwise, you get just the muddle with everybody looking out for themselves. Is there somewhere in the report or in your thinking about taking leadership and doing the kinds of things that the United States is leader of, the creator of the United Nations and other institutions in the past?

MR. BURROWS: If you actually look at the conclusion of the report, we basically say that it’s going to be up to the West and roughly principally the U.S. to take the lead – that, as I said before, there’s this – everyone agrees that the international system isn’t up to the task. But their interests tend to be more domestically focused.

But the problem, you know, as we were just discussing, is even for the U.S. there’s some domestic questions how to proceed and that our own domestic priorities are in some ways getting in the way – and could be getting in the way.
MR. BURKE-WHITE: Just let me say one brief word on that one which is to say that at the same time there was a perception that we heard a lot of, well, the U.S. leadership is somewhat skeptically viewed in some of the countries we were talking with. So on the one hand, they’re looking to the U.S. to lead. And then on the other hand, as soon as the U.S. does, that in some ways can buy us their perceptions of whatever the thing the U.S. is leading is.

So if there is a tension there and we need to find ways of making sure that sometimes the U.S. is leading but at other times other states are also playing a leadership role.

Q: I was looking at the – Dieter Detg (sp) at Georgetown University. I was looking with some fascination at a chart here on page 11, and it talks about the new international lineup in 2025: “Power is a percentage of global power.” And it shows a fascinating picture.

You have a decline of the United States quite dramatically, you have a decline of the E.U. in power, and you have a rise and growth of Chinese and Indian power – everybody else, a little even and not as dramatic. But I want you to comment on this because what makes you so sure that Chinese growth of power is going to be linear, and would you have to somehow add some qualifications to it? Same I would say about India.

And the other question is, too, why is the assumption of a linear decline in the case of the United States so sure and also in the case of Europe? And I’m looking forward to your comments. Thank you.

MR. BURROWS: Yes. Well, you know, obviously when you look at this as a model that a colleague of ours at the University of Denver has put together, we have used it before on the global trends work and it’s based upon different factors. And obviously, you know, you’re looking at linearly on these factors. And you can construct ways, yes, that China could falter, the U.S. could falter, or be boosted back up in terms of growth and those changes would be different.

I don’t – I think there’s a, you know, in terms of the consultations we have, there’s over 15 years, the trends in terms of continued Chinese and Indian development look pretty good. So that I think overall, you know, in our estimation and in the estimation of a lot of people, it is more likely to be in that role than in some other.

And I think, you know, this is a case always that you have to weigh risk. I mean if you want to wait around hoping that China collapses or India collapses and you may not have to deal with the inclusion problem, you know, I don’t think that’s a risk you want to take. So and this is a representation. We know it’s not going to work out exactly that way. I would say also where I would have some personal problems with the graphic is that because it factors in the military, you’ll notice that Brazil, the amount of increase in powers is fairly small. If you change some of those variables, you’ll actually see Brazil and some of these other states outside of just India and China that actually are likely to grow in power.

MR. GREVI: Just to have a word on this, I agree with Matt. Essentially, that gives you a sense of direction and perhaps one may say of destination. Then exactly how you get there, it could be bumps, there could be busts, there could be ups and downs.
But whatever breakdown of the sort of growth part of China and India may happen, it should be a pretty catastrophic and traumatic one, really major tectonic turmoil and shift at the domestic level to interrupt what is the sort of overarching trend of economic growth and raising living standards, what is being called the sort of convergence of GDP per capita and living standards between emerging countries and advanced ones.

And, likewise, without perhaps dramatic shifts, there is a certain trend which I think is presumably a reasonable one of relative decline or slower growth, shall we say, of U.S. and European Union. But then, of course, once you say that and once you have those types of indicators, the really interesting question is, what will power be used for? I mean, once you have accumulated 20 percent of global power, what kind of country will you actually be and what kind of international behavior will you actually undertake?

In the case of China, for example, the question as to whether and how this growth path will continue is a very important and interesting one. Sometimes I have the feeling in our debates we forget in 15, 20 years – assuming that more or less Chinese growth continues – China will be age-wise will have a structure which is not too dissimilar from the structure of the United States and some countries in the European Union; that is, a median age that grows considerable problems of support of welfare state, considerable social issues to deal with, retirements, perhaps more of a country relatively at ease with itself and more prepared to work for the preservation of the functioning multilateral system that we may envision now.

So that graph gives you sort of the beginning of a picture. But then the interesting thing is, of course, not least with a view to the scope for global governance to look at the type of power that those countries will represent and the way they grow is a major component of that.

MR. GARRETT: He’ll be next. You go first and then your neighbor will be next.

Q: I’m Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report, and I want to ask a two-part question. The first has to do with process and the second has to do with a substantive issue on which you touched but not much more than that.

The question about process is whether in the process of doing this work you consulted with or incorporated the thinking of efforts very much like this that have preceded yours. And I was thinking about the Managing Global Insecurity Initiative that Brookings and Stanford and NYU put together that had a very first rate international and national panel and came up with quite substantive agenda. I can’t comment on whether it was the right stuff or not. But the point is there was a huge amount of thinking that went into this very same set of issues it seems to me that you’re looking at.

So I’m interested to the extent to which that has been part of the process or will or should going forward. The second has to do with the question of climate change. And I reference just briefly an exchange I happened to watch this morning on a show I try to watch not too much called “Morning Joe” in which two giant egos were discussing the same subject, Dick Holbrooke and Jeffrey Sachs. And the subject was the floods in Pakistan, and Richard was acting as you would
Sachs, of course, took it as an opportunity to say we know that these kinds of disasters are going to be a central part of our future certainly through 2025 and owing to climate change, and that we’ve seen a raft of them. We’re going to continue to see more and more of them. And I guess – and the question that I want to ask is, is that something that this group in its discussions found to be a topic of major concern, minor concern or somewhere in between – the overall impact of these kinds of global disasters.

MR. BURROWS: Okay, I can begin and say first on the process that, yes, and if you can look in your book there you’ll see Bruce Jones and Alex Evans and David Steven, who were very much part of Brookings, and we relied on them for some of the analysis dealing with resource and climate change issues and a lot of what is in one of the annexes has to deal with it.

We also quote them in terms of some of the surveys that they conducted in the emerging countries about – which dovetailed with what we were getting in our sessions is growing worries about the resilience of the international system. And I think on a disasters, again I would say, you know, a lot of these meetings happened before the Pakistan floods. In fact, most all of them I guess did that, yes, we talked about it and, yes, they certainly agreed.

Some of them have, you know, a lot greater understanding and a lot more fears and concerns. But I think it is one of several different issues that they are thinking about and, again, we got a lot on the inclusion issue, the degree to which were their concerns really being taken into consideration. I’ll leave it. Giovanni or Bill?

MR. GREVI: Just briefly on this question of climate change and the consequences and the impact of climate change and the need to meet and mitigate that, yes, I would say on the whole featuring very, very high on the list of priorities.

But, interestingly, this is one of those subjects where once you state this is a problem, the ways of going about it have a strong political dimensions. There are questions that I would define as substantial legitimacy as opposed to procedural legitimacies – not a question of being represented on a panel on climate change.

It’s a question of who’s responsible, who should do what, who should pay for what, technology transfers, and the fairness and equity and equanimity that you see in all these that came up which is part of what I tried to say is the difficult equation between a functional approach, going about problem solving and the political considerations that come into play when you look at these issues.

Having said that, yet another dimension where I think many of our partners appreciated the role of the nonstate actors, in particular in the – not only of course in the position of expertise because that’s the typical case with the International Panel on Climate Change (sic), where that’s topical, but also implementation of measures because after all great decisions and guidance at the global level have to be implemented. And often times in developing countries, the most exposed one at
the local level and there an opportunity for international cooperation by known state actors that shouldn’t be missed.

MR. GARRETT: Yes.

Q: Thank you. David Colaho (sp) from SAIS. I wonder to what extent it would be fair to say that there’s a certain presumption in this study that these kinds of international problems are resolvable in a fashion that is reasonably satisfactory to all sides.

Whether the extent to which you considered the possibility that – well, I mean, for example, in the economic relations between the West and China – given the enormous difference in living standards that still exist and given the environmental constraints on growth, which may or may not dominate the future but certainly it’s not unreasonable to imagine they might; whether the economic conflicts can be resolved simply by more meetings, more structures or whether some of the more integration – some of the presumptions that we’ve all grown up with that the world gets better if there’s more free trade and more integration; whether these things still apply at least to the same extent; and whether we should be concerned and trying to manage these conflicts not only with mutual integration but perhaps with a certain amount of mutual insulation that the old shivalis (ph) of integration are maybe not – will not be so dominant in the kind of future that may evolve.

I mean, to say it may evolve is not to say you would like it to evolve, but it certainly seems to be a possibility.

MR. BURROWS: Yeah, thanks for the question. I would say that we approached the project, you know, with that presumption, I mean, just that you would be able to solve these. I think personally speaking I mean when you get in and I think when you were talking about the environmental issues and these are the ones that we talk about in terms of resource issues that they are so large and so complicated that the worry is that, you know, they could tip the world over into either much more conflictual or as you were suggesting much more fragmented, much more fortress, everything around the world, and that it’s very hard to really militate against that. And you know, the effort in all these reports when you’re doing them is to try to stay optimistic. So in a sense you stay on the presumption side. I think I was gratified that there was a lot more awareness of the threats, you know, in – when we went to these meetings. And that even though as we’ve been talking about all these problems of inclusion and so on rose up a lot, but there was an understanding not just about, you know how as we put in the title, how critical a juncture this is.

MR. GREVI: Just a brief footnote to what Matt says: Whether we had a presumption that these problems are manageable, can we resolve them, whether we can therefore continue to have an assumption of a better future and definite growth and growing exchanges, it seems to me that at least what I came up with from this project is that things may get worse before they get better in some ways.
And the question is whether we let them really get much worse. And on that, I have the optimism that I share with my colleagues whereby I think things will certainly become more complicated, controversial, contested than they used to be on a number of issues of international cooperation. It seems to me that the degree of vested interest of shared assessment of the big challenges – although with many different advances – is sufficient to lead us to believe that the main international actors will not let things slide into a deterioration from which there is no way back.

But, yes, more complicated international environment, more complicated international negotiation – that is part of the game for the near future, I would think.

MR. GARRETT: Joe?

Q: Joe Snyder (sp), formerly with the Atlantic Council. I was sitting here listening to this discussion and wondering to myself how it would play in the “tea party”. And I’m saying it a little bit facetiously, but it goes to the point that Matt has alluded to a little bit is when we get into this more complicated, more difficult world, many countries are not looking outward on how to solve them but becoming much more inward looking.

I mean, the G-20 was the product of the recent economic crisis, but so was the huge American deficit that looks like a big obstacle to our position in the future and the politics that goes along with it. Certainly, Europe’s reaction seems to me to have been much more fragmentation, much more nationally inward looking.

And the question I have is during the discussions that you had with people all over the world, how much was that considered to be an issue. That is, you know, people like us pay attention to these big international questions and international cooperation. And yet, certainly in the democracies but even in a place like China, the focus often just turns inward and not outward towards cooperation. How much of that came up in your discussions?

MR. BURROWS: Quite a bit. I mean, particularly in the China case, we were, you know, at one point told getting our house in order is what we consider our contribution to global governance. And I think, you know, in one degree or another that most every other place, you know, had the same sort of worries and concerns as the domestic was really trumping anything on a more multilateral and international. But please – Bill, maybe, or Giovanni?

MR. BURKE-WHITE: I mean, I think it absolutely came up. It also comes up in the – the flipside of that, which is, you go to – like in India, for example, concern about the domestic political constraints in the U.S. affecting our ability to lead.

So I think it is – it was going both directions and it is sometimes hard to be able to tell a compelling story of what more the U.S. can do in this space. And I think that came up especially on climate change, where there was a sense of domestic constraint and the U.S. had precluded us from doing more on an issue that was very important to a lot of countries.
So those constraints are certainly there. I don’t know quite how we overcome that. I mean, we can talk a lot about what we have done and try to push others to do more but I think those constraints are very true and ever more so when we’re in an election cycle, six weeks from it. I think this is probably not the ideal moment to tout global governance as the goal of the administration but something that we have to figure out also how we frame to our own country is critically important whether it relates to jobs or some of the things that maybe have more political salience at home.

MR. GARRETT: Yes, Alan.

Q: Alan Loeb (sp), local attorney. The last couple of questions have focused on legitimacy and issues such as that, political issues. And I haven’t heard any discussion about whether theoretical issues were considered at all in writing the report. I see that it’s on a very tangible, practical basis. But it occurs to me that underlying some of the legitimacy questions is the issue of political doctrine or economic doctrine. In other words, if you rely on the free market philosophy that has had a resurgence in the last year, for example, and sort of has its continuation in the American political sphere you end up with “muddle through.”

And it’s because there are essentially doctrines that start with the ideal of the market as being a perfect model for behavior except for designated market failures. And it presents a model where, unless you can identify a market failure then you simply let the market go forward.

This economic theory, which is essentially taken as ideology in the United States, is something that creates a great deal of momentum. If you can think of it as physics, you have momentum for some physical thing travelling in space that won’t deviate from its path unless there is a large force that causes it to deviate.

So I was curious how much you considered the sort of theoretical issue underlying whether you can actually get political legitimacy to use institutions other than the market.

MR. GREVI: My quick reaction is simply to say that in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, we have found, I think, in a majority of our interlocutors a sense that regulation is going to be more and not less important than in the past. And the role of public authorities in the supervision of economic activities – of capital flows, of markets, and so on and so forth.

So we have not started out with framing our approach and our dialogues in theoretical terms one way or the other. To respond to your question, my sense is that perhaps an exclusively or largely market-based approach has been put a little bit in perspective by the impact and the perception of the consequences of the economic crisis. Which also, actually, in some ways applies when one mentions the future of regional corporation and the extent to which free trade agreements at a regional level, increasing volumes of investment in trade at a regional level, the relevance of domestic and regional markets to support growth.

All of that which has been stressed to us as an important, let’s say, development of the crisis may take us in a direction that detracts perhaps a little bit from globalization, the way in which it has been talked of and defined and supported in the ’90s.
But, once again, that is more my sort of reaction based on what I drew from our meetings but, no, there has not been a sort of doctrinal framing of the issue itself.

MR. GARRETT: I think we’ll leave it there. Yes?

Q: Hi. My name is Michael Baranofsky (sp) with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Thank you very much for a very interesting presentation and report. One of the policy messages that you mentioned towards the end was U.S.-EU cooperation. A couple of questions here: First, what kind of cooperation would you envision? Would you go as far as to suggest some kind of EU-U.S. caucus within the G-20 or is it something that would be not palatable to the other G-20 members?

Second question is connected to it: How do you think this cooperation would be viewed by others? And the third is, you know, how much appetite have you seen on both sides of the Atlantic for this kind of cooperation, some of the key issues that you identify in your report? Thank you very much.

MR. BURKE-WHITE: Perhaps I can start and others can then jump in. First of all, what I think it offers is a model for thinking about how we engage outward, which is to say that the U.S. and Europe share a deeper and more common set of values and ways of thinking about these challenges, I think, than anybody else that we talk to when we go out there. So having those conversations first I think makes a great deal of sense internally.

However, I don’t think that should be done as a caucus within the G-20. I think the G-20 is a space where the last thing we want is caucuses, right? We don’t want – and everywhere we went we had conversations about bricks and basics and IPSAs (ph) and every other possible configuration. And all of those configurations have some value to the members of them but those should not get imported into the G-20 because then the G-20 breaks down into blocs of various sorts.

So keeping U.S.-European cooperation is a routine part of what we do but not focusing it as a caucus within any other body I think makes a lot of sense.

How is it viewed by others? I think was actually surprisingly well-received. When we came to talk with – whether it was the Indians or the Chinese or the Brazilians, I think it was – you know, they appreciated that we were coming together, that we had ideas but we also had differences. And where we had differences we were, I think, willing to articulate that.

I think it allowed them to sort of recognize some of the similar trajectories in a way that, if the U.S. and particularly some of the parts of the world where the European footprint isn’t as strong to sort of recognize the commonalities of our thinking on some of these. So I think overall it was well-received.

Was there appetite for this in Europe and the United States? We had a similar – not really a launch meeting but a process meeting in Paris. When was it? May perhaps, beginning of the
project meeting also in Paris. And so I think we have made efforts to engage and reach out on both sides of the Atlantic.

I think the danger arises when that may be seen as exclusive of other kinds of engagement, which it shouldn’t be. So ultimately, I think it was a very successful model of how to do this. It doesn’t work for every issue but I think, particularly on this kind of a topic, a joint project with lots of conversation and consultation on both sides of the Atlantic and then outreach collectively can be a useful model.

MR. BURROWS: I’d just make a comment: When we took the Global Trends 2020 report around the world back in 2006 and ’7 that it was disarming to people around the world that that report issued by the U.S. government looked at the United States as in relative decline and the rise of other powers. And that was just seen – I mean, an honest statement but they didn’t expect that.

And I think the fact that – and it was certainly followed through in the discussions we had where the kind of honesty about it and the desire to learn from them, include them in how we think about it, how we evolve it, was rather disarming. And I think it was a good approach, but surprising and I think gave legitimacy to what we were trying to do.

MR. GARRETT: Yes? Get your mike there.

Q: (Inaudible, off mike) – consultant. And I wonder if the approach to the – any consideration was given to the geopolitical ramifications of the end of the Cold War. Did you consider that narrative and what did the various other countries – did they weigh in on what the significance of the end of the Cold War was? You see, we’re looking for a continuity here into the future kind of thing.

MR. BURROWS: Well, we of course got a lot of – I mean, there was a lot of focus among our Russian partners on the end of the Cold War – the feeling on their side of a unfairness of how this worked out. But surprisingly, I would say – and we had – this was far different than it was two years ago when we were there – not on this report but on a similar consultation. And in these meetings, I mean, they had figured out in a way that they are going to have to move forward. And their worry much more was how to fit into this globalized world and not be marginalized.

So they recognized it and you’ll see this in the report that China is going to be the biggest economic power. They talked a lot about reorganizing as they have put forward in their own proposals the Euro-Atlantic space. But essentially, it was a far different reception than, as I said, we got two years ago when, at that point, the first thing that we briefed – this was the 2025 report – we briefed it in the Kremlin. And it started off with you’re sitting in the seat where NATO Sec.-Gen. Werner (ph) promised us that NATO would never expand to the east. We never got that on this trip.

MR. GARRETT: Well, I think this is the last question. I think you’re –
Q: Nick Ballasy with CNSNews. Just wanted to ask, since you said the U.S. will have to take the lead on this – have any of President Obama’s policies done anything, in your mind, to advance a global governance? And going forward, what recommendations do you have for the White House?

MR. BURKE-WHITE: So I think that one’s mine to take. And I would say, President Obama has done an extraordinary amount to advance the sort of issues of global governance, recognizing the political constraints that I mentioned earlier in response to a different question. I think some of the things that are most obvious there is obviously the decision at Pittsburgh to elevate the G20 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation. That was not a foregone conclusion by any means. And that decision was made.

Secondly, a real engagement in the Asian architecture space, which is critical to global governance, because it’s the space where I think the governance institutions are most contested and in need of a great deal of work. In the human rights space, the decision to reengage and become a member of the Human Rights Council – and again in the U.N. space there. And a lot of attention from Ambassador Rice to trying to make the United Nations’ structures more effective.

So on all of those, absolutely. But I think more broadly, it has been the president’s sort of willingness to talk and engage and question openly how we – you know, what the role of the United States ought to be in leading these institutions and in being parts of them. And you know, right up to Copenhagen where we – you know, he had to go and personally put a great deal of political capital on the line to get any agreement at all, which both showed the possibility of what can happen when the United States takes these kind of governance questions seriously but also the limits of the architectures that we have available.

So absolutely, recommendations going forward – keep this issue on the agenda. Look at the institutions we haven’t yet dealt with, whether it’s the IMF or the Bank where work still needs to be done or New York, where we’re looking at a general assembly right now and saying, hey, we have GA meetings this week obviously. Where does the U.N. go and what’s its role in this? How does the G-8 and G-20 and U.N. work to advance these issues? So there’s much more work to be done would be my message to my friends across town.

MR. GARRETT: Any other comments on that? Alvaro de Vasconcelos, would you like to make some closing comments, the director of the European Union –

ALVARO DE VASCONCELOS: Should we switch?

MR. BURKE-WHITE: Oh, I was thinking you’d go right to the podium if you like. It’s all yours. (Laughter.)

MR. DE VASCONCELOS: Okay, good morning. Let’s say, first off, my pleasure to be here and to have been able – our institute – to cooperate with National Intelligence Council and with Atlantic Council on this very interesting project. And as I was asked to close this very
interesting debate, I thought to bring forward – let’s say – a more political orientation or recommendations or conclusions that I took from this report and from this debate.

Those recommendations have to do with something that I think is at the heart of this report and of this initiative that it’s very well-kempt. It’s understanding in Europe and in United States that we need to adapt to a world in which the EU-U.S. alliance is no more decisive. We have spent years thinking that when the Europeans and the Americans would come together, most of the problems of the world would be solved. And today, I think we came to the conclusion that this alliance is not decisive; there are problems of the world that cannot be solved just by Europeans and Americans together.

But more perhaps that there will be moments – and we should accept that in Europe; perhaps it will be more the case for the Europeans to accept than for the Americans – where this said alliance will not even be indispensable, that there will be topics where the America perhaps will need more China to solve a number of problems than the European Union. And we need to accept that as part of this extraordinary change that took place.

This being said, I think we all agree that if the Europeans and Americans would agree, that will have an external impact. So I think still it’s a very important relation but not the decisive one and not always indispensable. And I think this is the (advice ?) of this very interesting exercise is to accept this idea and to start looking, how do others see the problems of the world and how they could be engaged in solving them.

And from that, I took five basic ideas. The first is the need to define the right agenda. This was part of this discussion. What is the global agenda? We have lived in a period some years ago where the security agenda was overwhelming, that everything was concentrated on the fight against terrorism. And when we go to these countries – and as you have done and as we have done with this exercise – we realize that more or less we have all the same strategy today. That is not a security strategy; we are not preparing to the next war with our neighbors among the big powers.

We have – I would say – more or less the same strategy than China. China has a strategy of peaceful rise where it puts the accent on economic development and becoming strong power through development. And I would say this is the strategy of the European Union clearly. It’s one of soft power, of peaceful rise – if the European Union is rising; and I think so. So is that a strategy of India? Certainly it is, even if India has a lot of problems with its neighbors.

And is that the strategy of the United States? That’s the big question. But if you look now to the new American security strategy, I would say that is also the strategy of the United States. I’d put accent on how to face the financial crisis, how to create jobs in America – jobs, jobs, jobs is perhaps the main priority today. So in a certain sense, there is a convergency of economic, development agendas between Europe, the United States, China, India.

Russia is perhaps a different case. But certainly it is the case of Brazil too. And if this is the case, the agenda is what I could – the basic agenda is no more the security agenda. It is a soft agenda. It is an agenda that is concentrated on climate change, economic development,
innovation, competitiveness, energy, on a number of soft issues that we are very comfortable in Europe with that because this is in fact the international agenda of the European Union.

And I think that is in a certain way my first conclusion, you know, to find the right agenda. Because we can go wrong completely if we define – (inaudible). For instance, if we think that our agenda is to prepare to the next war between the democratic nations and the authoritarian regimes, we’ll be creating a kind of new bipolarity between the Western world, India, Brazil, on one side; China and Russia on the other. So to get right the agenda, I think, is very important.

The second is that we need to define a strategy, if possible a common strategy, between the European Union and the United States to deal with this global problems. And we say in Europe that this right strategy is what we call effective multilateralism.

We have not invented – in fact, this was a term in a certain way transformation of the agenda that Madeleine Albright has called assertive multilateralism. It is a multilateralism that is turn to solution of problems. It’s not to balance power. It’s not to balance the power of the United States or create norms and rules that will make it more difficult to act. It’s to create norms and rules that will allow us to deal with major global challenge and global problems.

And this is a very difficult agenda that we can take from the report, from other exercise, with the new global players, because for them, multilateralism is still a very sovereignty driven approach. They look to multilateralism as a way to balance power of the most powerful, in a certain way, of the United States. They have a very traditional vision of multilateralism.

But the reason there are now a very interesting debate about responsibility. Should China and India, as they rise, and Brazil – also this Brazil, debate exists in Brazil – assume more international responsibility? And you add all this very interesting debate about responsibility to protect. Should China assume more responsibility in relation to Sudan, to Darfur, to South Sudan? Or should – and how to engage China and India in the same perspective of multilateralism, of a common strategy for global governance, I think is a major – or should be a major objective of the U.N. and the U.S. because on this I think there is clear agreement between the U.N. and U.S. today that this should be the strategy.

The third recommendation that I would take is to accept to share power. I put this in a slogan if you want. It’s “no participation without representation.” It’s very clear that these states, as they rise, they want to share power. They want to have a stronger say in international organizations, even if they do it in a cautious way.

You know, for China, the world is still a world in transition. They don’t say it’s a multipolar world. They say, and they have a Chinese word for it, it is unipolar-multipolar world at the same time. They think the United States is still the most relevant power, and that the American power in a certain way – or American benign hegemony – is in the present circumstance favorable to China’s peaceful rise; but this being said, they want to have more say in the international organizations.
And we cannot ask India to play a greater role on international security and peacekeeping and responsibility to protect and not to give a greater say on India on the U.N. Security Council. The same we can say for China and India and Brazil on the IMF and World Bank.

And of course, this reform of the international institutions to bring these countries in and to give them a greater say is more painful for the Europeans than for the Americans, I must say, because for the Europeans, that will mean to lose this number of presence that we have in all these institutions – you know, our presence on the IMF, even on G-20 – you know, six member states are members of G-20. So this overwhelming presence of the Europeans needs to be transformed into a single European voice in many of these organizations, and of course this is more painful for the Europeans than for the Americans.

On this idea of bringing more inclusion to the international system, I think that we should – and that’s something I am more and more realizing as I am engaged on this exercise on multipolarity – is that we are fascinated with the big powers’ rise. And we – our concentration today is on big powers – what does China think, what India, what they are going to do, what does – Brazil does and would like to do?

And we forget that there’s many other states in the world that are essential for solution of many of these problems, small and big states, regional – very important regional powers. You know, the role that Turkey can play in the Middle East is very, very important. How to engage Turkey? How to engage South Africa? How to engage other players? If we are speaking of the Arab world, how to engage Morocco, how to engage Egypt? And if we want to have an effective multilateral system, we need to go from fascination with bigger power rise to a more, you know, inclusive approach to multilateralism.

The fourth is that I feel – and I think this is also shared outside Europe – that we have a window of opportunity for this. And two aspects on this window of opportunity: One is that we are in this transition period and these states are still putting the priority on the peaceful rise. We don’t know how it will be in 10 years’ time or in 2025. We try to understand, but we don’t know.

But more and more important, we have an American president that is in favor of multilateralism, and this is accepted as being some – very welcome in many parts of the world, and certainly very strongly in Europe.

Is this window of opportunity stay there forever? I am not sure at all. And so perhaps it’s the moment to move for what some have called a great bargain, that take the G-20 process to seeing really reform of multilateral institutions.

I just have heard Brazilian diplomats agreeing that this should be the case, and that this is a very particular moment because of the pro-multilateral approach of the United States, and this, what we have called the Obama moment, is a window of opportunity for Europe and certainly for the other rising powers if we want really to move to a more effective multilateral system.
And last, because it’s more linked to actuality, is that we are going to have a NATO – we are going to have a new NATO strategic concept, and we are also having a EU-U.S. summit, more or less, in the same time, back to back.

Now, we should get it right, first in relation to NATO strategic concept, that needs to integrate this extraordinary exchange that took place and not – and we should not move to ideas of a global NATO that will be perceived as a kind of Western organization against the rest if we want to integrate the rest.

And second, we need to give substance to the U.S. relations. And this, of course, is very important, if we are thinking of the EU-U.S. summit, is how to give substance to the U.S. relations. In a certain sense, it is to place the U.S. bilateral relations on this global perspective, is try to understand how Europe and the United States can contribute in a more effective way to the solution of this global challenge that are in your report and how we can work with the others to make this an effective strategy. And I hope this will be the result both of the NATO summit and of EU-U.S. summit that are back to back.

And thank you very much, all of you. And thank you in particular to the authors of this very interesting report. (Applause.)

MR. GARRETT: And do you have any more comments you want to make? I think, on behalf of the Atlantic Council, I’d like to thank all of you for this. I think it’s been a very interesting day. So thank you very much for coming.

(END)