Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

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Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: Six Years after 9/11

Statement for the Record

of

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Director of National Intelligence
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Director of National Intelligence, 10 September 2007  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs  
“Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: Six Years After 9/11”

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and members of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs: Thank you for your invitation to appear before the committee to provide a status report on the nation’s efforts to confront terrorist threats to the nation and to describe the implementation of institutional reforms mandated by Congress and by Presidential directive since September 11, 2001.

It is my privilege to be accompanied by Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Vice Admiral John Scott Redd, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.

Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland

I would like to begin my statement with a discussion of the findings of the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland. An NIE is the most authoritative written judgment of the Intelligence Community (IC) on a particular subject and a declassified version of this NIE’s key judgments was made available on the Internet. It assessed the following:

- The US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.
- Greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11.
- We are concerned, however, that this level of international cooperation may wane as 9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge.
• Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.

• As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat environment.

• We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qa’ida will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qa’ida in Iraq.

• We assess that al-Qa’ida’s Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the US population.

• We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability.

• We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-US attacks outside the United States in the past, may be more likely to consider attacking the Homeland over the next three years if it perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the group or Iran.

• We assess that the spread of radical—especially Salafi—Internet sites, increasingly aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the West’s Muslim population is expanding, including in the United States.

• We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist groups probably will conduct attacks over the next three years given their violent histories, but we assess this violence is likely to be on a small scale.

• We assess that globalization trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable even small numbers of alienated people to find and connect
with one another, justify and intensify their anger, and mobilize resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.

The analytic effort that culminated in this NIE was strengthened by many of the intelligence reforms realized since September 11.

**Intelligence Reforms Since 9/11**

I turn now to the transformation we have undertaken in the IC to meet the challenges of today and the threats of tomorrow.

The Intelligence Community has made significant strides in addressing the underlying deficiencies exposed by the attacks of 9/11. This morning, I would like to first highlight a few of the flaws in America’s intelligence system that existed before 9/11; second, detail the steps we have taken thus far to build a stronger Community; and, finally, turn our gaze to initiatives that will further these reforms.

Generally speaking, before 9/11 America’s Intelligence Community was structured to win the Cold War—a traditional struggle between two great powers. The Community was downsized during the 1990s and while it consisted of over a dozen agencies with unique mandates and competencies, we lacked a national-level intelligence apparatus to manage effectively the Community and synthesize information from across the government to support a host of customers—policymakers, warfighters, and law enforcement officials—with various, and often competing, requirements. This construct led often to the “stovepiping” of information within agencies that guarded their cultures and their secrets. Data was provided on a “need to know” basis. “Information sharing” was considered more an exposure to foreign espionage than a path to a smarter intelligence enterprise. Accordingly, analysts in one agency were not encouraged to work with analysts in others. There were few processes in place to collaborate, share lessons learned and best practices, and manage the Community as an enterprise.

In the past, policy barriers also prevented the government from attracting young people of promise with the skills and backgrounds needed to strengthen our national defense. Too often, agencies became so focused on protecting sources and methods that they made it nearly impossible for first- and second-generation Americans to serve the intelligence enterprise. This was a serious deficiency that denied the country the efforts of those with the language fluencies, political,
scientific, and technical skills, and cultural insights that we need to bolster our workforce and improve our intelligence.

Structurally, the Community was also largely divided between domestic and foreign intelligence.

The end of the Cold War and the advance of globalization enabled the acceleration of threats stemming from international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, failed states, and illegal drug trafficking. These threats, among others, move at increasing speeds due to technology and across geographic and organizational boundaries, blurring the distinction between foreign and domestic, and between strategic and tactical events. As we witnessed on 9/11, radical extremist movements continue to use global terrorism to further their causes by attacking innocent people without regard to national boundaries and state and non-state actors continue to demonstrate their intent to acquire WMD through illicit means.

To confront today’s threats, we have made many changes in the way we conduct intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, diplomatic, and defense activities. Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) along with the recommendations from various in-depth studies—such as the 9/11 Commission Report, the WMD Commission Report, internal Executive Branch reviews and reports by both houses of Congress—the Community received direction and the mandate and many of the tools needed to build an effective, results-oriented enterprise. The Intelligence Reform Act provided a mechanism for overhauling the IC by providing a new office, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), with the tools and mandate to unify and direct the efforts of our 16 intelligence agencies.

With these new mechanisms, we are working to forge an integrated Intelligence Community that spans the historical divide between foreign and domestic intelligence efforts. Far from being a buzz word, integration means ensuring that our various specialized intelligence missions operate as a single enterprise. An integrated and collaborative Community is a critical advance because no single agency has the capacity to evaluate all available information—lest we forget that over one billion pieces of data are collected by America’s intelligence agencies everyday.

While we recognize that much more must be accomplished, the professionals of the Intelligence Community take pride in the notable progress we
have made over the past six years. I would like to describe our accomplishments thus far in four main areas: our efforts to **structure** the Intelligence Community to meet 21\textsuperscript{st} century challenges; **improve** analysis through cross-agency integration and technical initiatives; develop a **collaborative** Community that provides the right information to the right people at the right time; and **build** a dynamic intelligence enterprise that promotes diversity to gain and sustain a competitive advantage against our adversaries.

*Structuring the IC*

The principal legacy of the IRTPA was the establishment of the office of the Director of National Intelligence with assigned responsibilities to serve as the chief intelligence advisor to the President and National and Homeland Security Councils and to head the IC to ensure closer coordination and integration. The DNI is afforded responsibility to determine the National Intelligence Program and significant authority over personnel policy. In a larger sense, the creation of the DNI allows one person to see across the wide American Intelligence Community, identify gaps, and promote a strategic, unified vision.

I will leave to my colleagues with me here today the discussion of the specifics of their efforts, but I would like to highlight the key structural changes, in addition to the establishment of the ODNI, that have been undertaken since 9/11.

Working closely with the Department of Justice and the FBI, we supported the creation of the FBI’s National Security Branch to integrate the FBI’s counterterrorism, counterintelligence, WMD, and intelligence programs. We also supported the creation of Field Intelligence Groups in every FBI field office—a major step in the FBI’s effort to transform itself into a preeminent domestic counterterrorism agency. Furthermore, the Executive Assistant Director of the National Security Branch now works closely with me and my leadership team, ensuring close coordination on addressing the FBI’s intelligence mission.

We established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the government’s hub for all strategic level counterterrorism intelligence assessments, which draws on collected terrorist intelligence from agencies across the U.S. Government with access to more than 30 different networks carrying more than 80 unique data sources to produce integrated analysis on terrorist plots against U.S. interests at home and abroad. This kind of fusion is conducted nowhere else in government—and it was only an aspiration prior to 9/11.
The results are tangible. NCTC produces a daily threat matrix and situation reports that are the Community standard for current intelligence awareness. In addition, NCTC hosts three video teleconferences daily to discuss the threat matrix and situation reports to ensure the intelligence agencies and organizations see all urgent counterterrorism information.

We also established the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the mission manager for counterproliferation, which has developed integrated and creative strategies against some of the nation’s highest priority targets, including “gap attacks” (focused strategies against longstanding intelligence gaps), “over the horizon” studies to address potential future counterproliferation threats, and specialized projects on priority issues such as the Counterterrorism-Counterproliferation Nexus.

ODNI Mission Managers for high-priority topics, such as North Korea, Iran, counterintelligence, and Cuba and Venezuela, have also made considerable progress by identifying intelligence priorities, gaps, and requirements and engaging in strategic planning and collection management in the larger context of other intelligence collection and analytical priorities.

In the last few months, we also established an Executive Committee (EXCOM) to advise the DNI in the discharge of his responsibility for the coordination of all intelligence activities that constitute the domestic and foreign intelligence efforts of the country. This EXCOM is composed of the heads of all major intelligence producers and consumers and provides a biweekly forum for the key stakeholders to gather and provide common guidance on the development, implementation, and evaluation of activities of the IC.

Within the past six months, we also named a Deputy Director of National Intelligence (DDNI) for Acquisition to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of our acquisitions. The DDNI for Acquisition has drafted a strategy to improve the acquisition process and recommended modifications to acquisition authorities. We are also in the process of standing up the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity to create synergy and innovation across the IC by harnessing technology in new ways to create strategic advantage.

These three initiatives were highlighted by the Intelligence Community’s 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration, which we launched in April and concluded in August. The 100 Day Plan identified 24 specific initiatives and tasks to be accomplished on a rigorous timeline; of those 24, 17 tasks were achieved in
that timeframe and the remaining tasks are scheduled to be met in the coming weeks. The Plan was designed to build on the successes so far—many of which I will discuss here—and to jumpstart further efforts. Initiatives were aligned to six integration and transformation focus areas:

1. Create a Culture of Collaboration
2. Foster Collection and Analytic Transformation
3. Build Acquisition Excellence and Technology Leadership
4. Modernize Business Practices
5. Accelerate Information Sharing
6. Clarify and Align DNI’s Authorities.

I have discussed the specifics of this Plan in other forums and will not detail it today, although I note that the focus on accountability and achieving identified targets has given a renewed emphasis to transforming the Community and executing these reform initiatives. I will speak again of our planning process at the conclusion of my testimony.

Improving Analysis

Cross-Agency Integration

Two of the main goals of intelligence reform are to build a sense of community among foreign, military, and domestic intelligence agencies and, through that kind of collaboration, improve the quality of analysis. For greater collaboration to occur, however, analysts must be able to identify and contact peers and counterparts working on related topics.

Prior to the creation of the ODNI, analysts had no easy way to obtain contact information on analysts from other agencies. Today, they have the Analysts Yellow Pages. Launched in February 2006, the Analysts Yellow Pages is a classified, web-based phonebook and a single stop for obtaining contact information on analysts in all IC agencies. It is accessible on the Joint World-wide Intelligence Communications System and allows users to search for analysts across the Intelligence Community by name, by intelligence topic, country, or non-state actor, or by agency. Search results provide contact information including name, agency, phone number, and email address. Our ODNI Chief Information Officer (CIO) is developing a common method to identify, in perpetuity, all the individuals across the IC.
The Information Sharing Environment

Created by IRTPA, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), operating in coordination with the interagency under guidelines issued by the President and statutory authority—a well as with strong support from this Committee—has led the charge with our state, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partners to transform government-wide terrorism-related information sharing policies, processes, procedures, and most important, workplace cultures, to normalize the sharing of terrorism-related information as part of how we do business.

Section 1016 of the IRTPA and as amended by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, established the Office of the Program Manager and provided it with government-wide authority to plan, oversee and manage the ISE. The ISE is a trusted partnership among all levels of government that facilitates the sharing of information relating to terrorism. Creating the ISE is not about building a massive new information system; it is policies, processes/protocols and technology that enable the sharing of this information among Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector entities and our foreign partners.

To guide efforts to establish the ISE and implement the requirements of Section 1016 of IRTPA, on December 16, 2005, the President issued a Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment. In this Memorandum the President prioritized efforts that he believes are most critical to the development of the ISE and assigned to relevant Cabinet officials the responsibility for resolving some of the more complicated issues associated with information sharing.

The PM-ISE in consultation with the Information Sharing Council, State, local, and tribal governments, and private sector partners have made significant progress against the President’s priorities in the following areas:

- Development of proposed Common Terrorism Information Sharing Standards (CTISS). The CTISS program develops and issues functional standards that document the rules, conditions, guidelines, and characteristics of business processes, production methods, and products supporting terrorism-related information sharing. (Presidential Guideline 1)
• Establishment of a Federally-sponsored interagency capability in the NCTC to enable the production and dissemination of Federally-coordinated terrorism-related information to state, local, and tribal authorities and the private sector. (Presidential Guideline 2)

• Establishment of a national, integrated network of State and major urban area fusion centers that optimizes our capacity to better support the information needs of State and local authorities, as well as efforts to gather, analyze, and share locally generated information in a manner that protects the information privacy and legal rights of Americans. (Presidential Guideline 2)

• Development of the Presidential Guideline 3 Report: Standardize Procedures for Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) Information. The Report will recommend to the President a new Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Framework for rationalizing, standardizing, and simplifying procedures for SBU information in the ISE. (Presidential Guideline 3)

• A repository of information on over 400 unclassified and SBU international information sharing agreements with foreign governments. (Presidential Guideline 4)

• PM-ISE publication of ISE Privacy Guidelines, including development of an implementation guide for Federal agencies. (Presidential Guideline 5)

Although the effort to implement the ISE is well underway, it is essential that implementation activities take place within a broader strategic context of enhancing our Nation’s ability to combat terrorism. The ultimate goal is not simply information sharing for the sake of sharing information. The objective is to improve our national capacity to protect the nation from future attack.

*Information Sharing Initiatives within the IC*

Initiatives in support of information sharing specifically within the IC include the efforts of the CIO and the ODNI Analysis directorate, to profoundly change how IC components collaborate with each other. We have integrated Internet technologies into the Intelligence Community’s secure and unclassified Intranets, giving individuals the ability to collaborate as groups, peer-to-peer, and in self-identified teams. We are also developing virtual communities of analysts who can securely exchange ideas and expertise across organizational boundaries. Through our pilot Library of National Intelligence initiative, we are providing analysts across the Community a searchable database of disseminated Intelligence products. In a later phase, even if a particular user does not have the clearances to
review a desired document, he or she will (in most cases) be advised of the product’s existence and offered the opportunity to request access to it.

And analysts are also increasingly using interactive, classified blogs and wikis, much as the tech-savvy, collaboration-minded user would outside the Community. Intellipedia, the IC’s version of Wikipedia, and “A-Space” a common workspace environment likened in the press to the commercial website “MySpace,” are perhaps the best-known examples. Such tools enable experts from different disciplines to pool their knowledge, form virtual teams, and quickly make complete intelligence assessments.

Efforts to improve collaboration do not stop at the water’s edge—literally. Under CIO auspices, we have created the capability for US persons to communicate via email with their Allied counterparts overseas. The solution does not require special networks or equipment but has dramatically changed our capability to share information in a timely manner. The Allied Collaborative Shared Services program and email projects have improved how the US Intelligence Community shares intelligence with our partners.

The underlying principle here is a simple one: no one has a monopoly on truth.

Much the same principle animates our engagement with outside professionals who can challenge our analytic assumptions, provide deep knowledge, insights, and new ways of thinking. Through the Analytic Outreach Initiative, ODNI is expanding networking opportunities for IC analysts and encouraging them to tap expertise on key issues wherever it resides through conferences, seminars, workshops, and exchanges. These outside experts—whether academics, business people, journalists, technical experts, or retired intelligence officers—contribute to proof and validation exercises and to lessons learned processes. They also provide a critical surge capability, especially in areas where IC resources are slim.

We have also taken steps to safeguard the impartiality of our analytic products. As mandated by the IRTPA, the ODNI established an Assistant Deputy for Analytic Integrity and Standards, who serves as the focal point for analysts who wish to raise concerns regarding politicization, bias, or the lack of objectivity, appropriate alternative analysis, or dissenting views in intelligence products. The Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards challenges the IC to evaluate its work and enforce standard that will produce the best possible analytic product for our
customers. The AIS is also promoting the use of diverse analytic methodologies. For example, AIS has developed an Introductory Analysis course for new IC analysts, who will receive instruction in critical skills, establish contacts in other agencies, and gain better appreciation of the diversity within the IC.

Many of these improvements would be of little use if they did not reach our customers, including the policymakers of this Committee. Specifically, you may have noticed the qualitative improvements to our National Intelligence Estimates, the IC’s most authoritative written judgment on a particular subject. Specifically, NIE Key Judgments no longer contain a list of conclusions but are written to explore more thoroughly the implications of our critical underlying conclusions. Appendices and annexes now provide full transparency of their analytic judgments through the careful identification of sources and intelligence gaps, and by “showing our homework”—essentially, describing the analytic train of reasoning we use to arrive at our conclusions. The main text now highlights the full range of analytic judgments and their implications, bringing dissenting opinions to the fore so policymakers have the benefit of the full picture. We applied many of these lessons learned to the NIE on Homeland Security Threats that I discussed earlier.

*Developing a Collaborative Community with a Responsibility to Provide*

In the years since 9/11, multiple studies have attributed our inability to prevent the terrorist attacks to the inability or unwillingness of government organizations to share critical information and intelligence fully and effectively. Our success in preventing future attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding those who would do us more harm. The intelligence and information sharing structures that enabled the winning of the Cold War need greater flexibility and resilience to confront today’s threats from transnational terrorists. Most important, the long-standing policy of only allowing officials access to intelligence on a “need to know” basis should be abandoned for a mindset guided by a “responsibility to provide” intelligence to policymakers, warfighters, and analysts, while still ensuring the protection of sources and methods.

In short, those responsible for combating terrorism must have access to timely and accurate information regarding our adversaries. We must:

- Identify rapidly both immediate and long-term threats;
- Identify persons involved in terrorism-related activities; and
Implement information-driven and risk-based detection, prevention, deterrence, attribution, response, protection, and emergency management efforts.

Accomplishments Thus Far

In the aftermath of 9/11, our Nation began the historic transformation aimed at preventing future attacks and improving our ability to protect and defend our people and institutions at home and abroad. As a result, we are now better informed of terrorist intentions and plans and better prepared to detect, prevent, and respond to their actions. Improved intelligence collection and analysis has helped paint a more complete picture of the threat, and more robust information sharing has provided us a greater capacity for coordinated and integrated action. Several information sharing successes since 9/11 include the following:

• The enactment of the “USA PATRIOT Act” helped remove barriers that once restricted the effective sharing of information and coordination between the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

• The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis has enhanced the sharing of information between federal, state, and local government agencies, and the private sector which in turn has enhanced our ability to detect, identify, understand, and assess terrorist threats both to and vulnerabilities of the homeland to better protect our Nation’s critical infrastructure, integrate our emergency response networks, and link state and federal governments. The Chief Intelligence Officer of DHS is now responsible for integrating the intelligence activities of that Department, providing overall guidance on homeland security-specific issues.

• The Terrorist Screening Center was created to consolidate terrorist watch lists and provide around the clock operational support for federal and other government law enforcement personnel across the country.

• The growth and maturation of the 101 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in major jurisdictions throughout the United States, with support from Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), has substantially contributed to improved terrorism-related information sharing and operational capabilities at the state and municipal levels.

Through these and other efforts, the United States and its coalition partners have made significant strides against al-Qa’ida, its affiliates, and others who threaten us. Collaboration and information sharing have helped limit the ability of al-Qa’ida and like-minded terrorist groups to operate. We have uncovered and eliminated
numerous threats to our citizens and to our friends and allies. We have disrupted terrorist plots, arrested operatives, captured or killed senior leaders, and strengthened the capacity of the Nation to confront and defeat our adversaries.

**Building a Dynamic Intelligence Enterprise**

**Joint Duty**

Building a collaborative intelligence enterprise goes beyond merely sharing information. It also means fostering a new, Intelligence Community-wide culture without destroying the unique perspectives and capabilities of each agency. In this effort, the IC has a useful model in the Defense Department, which was revolutionized by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. That Act unified the military establishment and laid the foundations for a “joint” military by establishing incentives for interservice collaboration (such as requiring a joint duty assignment to achieve flag rank) and promoting joint training and development.

Recently, we took a dramatic step toward realizing a similar bedrock shift within the Intelligence Community. Through the authorities granted to the DNI by the IRTPA, I signed a directive mandating civilian joint duty for intelligence officers across the IC. This was a key accomplishment of our 100 Day Plan. Now, if an up-and-coming officer aspires to the senior-ranks of the Community, he or she will have to serve a tour of duty at a different agency during his or her career. The experience provides the officer with a broader perspective and brings the Community a long ways toward the collaborative and unified ideal.

**Recruitment Initiatives**

Since the establishment of the ODNI, we have been working vigorously to recruit intelligence officers with the backgrounds and skills that will strengthen our security.

The Intelligence Community’s 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration highlighted the need to recruit and retain first- and second-generation Americans with diverse background, critical language skills, and a nuanced understanding of foreign cultures to strengthen the nation’s security. In accordance with initiatives specified in this Plan, the ODNI hosted an inaugural IC Heritage Summit and the first IC Leadership Colloquium in June 2007, beginning a dialogue with national and regional Heritage Community organizations and internal IC affinity groups and special emphasis program leaders. The results from these two events, and the
feedback from the external and internal groups, were the foundation for developing the first IC Heritage Community Recruitment, Hiring, and Retention Strategy for first- and second-generation Americans. These groups, as well as our legacy communities, provide a rich pool of diverse talent that has not been consistently tapped into as a source to enable the IC to more accurately reflect the “face” of the American people.

In addition, we have established a formal Intelligence Community Recruiting Subcommittee, consisting of IC Agency Recruitment organizations, that meets regularly to discuss common issues, share best-practices and recruiting successes, plan annual IC collaborative recruiting events, network with leading external recruiting companies and consultants, and recommend solutions to individual IC Agency challenges.

We also developed a centrally funded IC corporate recruiting strategy to recruit collaboratively at national- or high-priority IC target events. Since 2005, the number of events at which we have recruited has more than doubled from 10 to about 25. We pursue a wide-range of applicants by recruiting at a broad array of national career fairs and conferences, including those hosted by: the Society of Hispanic Professional Engineers (SHPE), the National Society of Black Engineers, the American Indian Science and Engineering Society, the Thurgood Marshall Leadership Institute, Women for Hire, and Asian Diversity Career Expos. The IC is also a major sponsor of SHPE and events for the Careers for the Disabled.

Since the enactment of the IRTPA, the IC has established an IC-wide resume database that allows the sharing of resumes from collaborative events and IC Agency referrals and allows recruiters to search for highly-qualified applicants, especially those with desirable backgrounds or language fluencies.

We also established an annual campaign to recruit students from universities deemed Centers for Academic Excellence (CAE). The IC CAE program was established in 2004 to increase the diversity of the IC’s applicant pool for entry-level professional positions. The program provides technical and financial support to a diverse cohort of ten specially-selected American colleges and universities so they can develop and deliver degree programs that prepare their graduates for IC jobs in the sciences, information systems and technology, regional studies, and foreign languages.

These initiatives will require follow-on implementation to recruit and hire personnel with the backgrounds and skills considered essential to improve the
diversity and ability of the IC workforce, but with continued emphasis and support from the Administration and the Congress, I believe we are well positioned to succeed.

**Focused Emphasis on Diversity**

I would like to make special mention of the strong support we have received from the Congress in our efforts to diversify our workforce. Representative Silvestre Reyes, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), has, in particular, worked closely with us to promote the recruitment of traditionally underrepresented groups. Chairman Reyes and I both addressed the first IC-wide Affinity Group and Special Emphasis Program Leadership Colloquium in June 2007, and the Chairman hosted a panel on diversity and the Intelligence Community last month in El Paso, Texas with Jose A. Rodriguez, the outgoing director of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service.

We have also completed the first IC EEO and Diversity Strategy (Five-Year Plan for 2007-2012) as a priority initiative in our 100 Day Plan, responding to the HPSCI mark draft language and addressing a fundamental need to ensure that the IC workplace continues to be characterized by fairness and equality. Without such assurance, we cannot expect to attract and retain a workforce that looks like America and can operate in a global threat environment. Furthermore, our IC hiring and promotion practices must at least equal, and preferably surpass, other government agencies in transparency and equity if the American people are to willingly extend to us the latitude absolutely necessary to protect our nation.

**Security Reform**

The recruitment and hiring of first- and second-generation Americans brings into sharp relief a weakness that has plagued the Intelligence Community for decades: the onerous security clearance process required to work in the IC. The IRTPA mandated the reformation of security clearance procedures, and it remains one of our top priorities.

As someone who has worked in the private sector and been exposed to the other side of the security clearance process, I can speak from experience of the frustration that often accompanies lengthy and seemingly unnecessary delays in getting individuals cleared for duty.
Accordingly, we identified security clearance reform as a top priority for the 100 Day Plan and established a Tiger Team at the ODNI Special Security Center to lead this crucial reform. We are undertaking this security reform initiative jointly with the Department of Defense. We have designed a transformed clearance process and developed a plan to assess the validity of this process.

The comprehensive reform of the security clearance process remains our ultimate goal in order to deliver high-assurance security clearances, fairly, efficiently, and at the lowest possible cost. The new process will be based upon end-to-end automation, new sources of data, analytical research, and best practices. Some of these pieces already exist in the Community but they need to be integrated into a single process.

*Foreign Language Initiatives*

To build a strong foundation for the future of the Intelligence Community, we must also increase foreign language capacity among our workforce and support the study of languages among America’s youth. To that end, ODNI is sponsoring a major Intelligence Community study of how to optimize foreign language staffing, taking into account language and proficiency requirements, retention, training, and cost, and comparing the roles played by civilian, military, and contractor personnel in performing foreign language tasks. The study is being conducted by the RAND Corporation and initial results are expected in 2008.

The ODNI also purchased a Community license for on-line language training software in 150 languages. All IC personnel will be able to utilize this resource. We are also supporting several research projects to improve the effectiveness of foreign language training, including evaluations of both commercially-developed and government-sponsored on-line language training programs.

Furthermore, ODNI has initiated a new collaborative program, called the Language Education and Resources Network to share best teaching practices and learning materials in critical languages developed in language schools throughout the U.S. government. Major workshops have been held in Chinese and Arabic, with additional workshops planned in Persian, Hindi, Urdu, and Korean within the next year.

We have also sponsored conferences and facilitated information sharing to enhance key capabilities in human language technology, such as machine
translation and content extraction. ODNI is developing a Human Language Technology Roadmap, to guide and prioritize investment across the IC.

To fill critical gaps, ODNI is spearheading an initiative to create temporary hiring billets, to speed up the on-boarding process for applicants with outstanding foreign language skills, including heritage community applicants. Temporary billets could be used to hire personnel who are awaiting clearance and allow them to work in unclassified settings, such as open source research, or to permit placement of personnel who have been cleared, but for whom no permanent billet is immediately available.

Finally, ODNI—in partnership with the National Security Agency—leads STARTALK, a new program in summer language education. A part of a Presidential initiative to improve critical language skills, STARTALK will provide funding for programs in over 20 states and Washington D.C. to educate both students and language teachers. The classes focus on Arabic or Chinese and range from week-long tutorials to nine-week immersions. Through this program, hundreds of young people will receive education that will enrich their lives, enhance their futures, and strengthen our nation’s global competitiveness—yielding substantial returns for an initial investment of only five million dollars.

**Looking to the Future**

The passage of the IRTPA and the creation of the DNI were important steps toward building an integrated and collaborative Intelligence Community that is well positioned to defend the nation—but they must be part of a larger reform effort.

To support the IC vision of integration and collaboration we initiated a deliberate planning process based on the principles of transparency, accountability, deadlines, and deliverables. The first phase of these efforts—the recently completed 100 Day Plan—was designed to jump-start the process and build momentum. The next phase—the 500 Day Plan—is intended to sustain and accelerate that energy with an expanded set of initiatives and a greater level of participation. This latter plan was developed through a Community-wide effort beginning last May through the use of working groups, blogs, and wikis to solicit input from the Community. During our coordination process, we identified several core priorities and over 30 supporting initiatives. The core initiatives represent major long term impact projects that will be monitored and reported on a biweekly
basis to my office and reviewed by the EXCOM monthly; they represent “major muscle movements”—something required for this transformational effort.

The 500 Day Plan will be executed through cross-organizational and Community-wide engagement and collaboration. Working groups for each initiative will include key stakeholders from throughout the Community. It is through implementation of these initiatives that the IC will continue to increase its efficiency and effectiveness and further meet the national security challenges of the 21st century.

Protect America Act of 2007

Finally, I would like to make note of an issue on which I hope the Congress takes action in the coming months. The recent enactment of the Protect America Act of 2007 provided a necessary update to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This critical legislation has already assisted the IC in closing a critical gap in the IC’s ability to provide warning of threats to the country. This Act sunsets in less than six months, and I believe that making its changes permanent will be an important step toward ensuring the protection of our Nation. Importantly, the Act provides for meaningful oversight of activities. The Department of Justice’s National Security Division, IC general counsel offices, and the ODNI Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, in addition to existing oversight mechanisms within the IC, will all be involved in overseeing implementation of the Act's authorities.

I am committed to keeping the Congress fully and currently informed of how this Act has improved the ability of the Intelligence Community to protect the country and look forward to working with the Congress to obtain lasting FISA modernization.

Conclusion

In closing, we have come a long way over the past six years developing a more integrated, more collaborative intelligence enterprise, and I believe the result has been a stronger Community better positioned to know the world and anticipate surprise. While we have seen success in our efforts to structure the Intelligence Community to meet 21st century challenges; improve analysis; develop a collaborative Community that provides the right information to the right people at the right time; and build a dynamic intelligence enterprise that promotes diversity
to gain and sustain a competitive advantage against our adversaries, our work is far from done.

With your support, I look forward to building a legacy of reform that will outlast our own time and provide for the protection of the Republic in the decades to come.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I welcome any questions you may have. Thank you.
Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland:
Six Years after 9/11

to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs

10 September 2007

Honorable John Scott Redd

Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.)

Director

National Counterterrorism Center
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on our nation's efforts to confront the terrorist threat to the homeland since 9/11.

Since 9/11, sweeping legislative and organizational changes—many of which are attributable to this committee—have fundamentally altered how we protect and defend U.S. interests at home and abroad against terrorism. In particular, the U.S. Government has made substantial progress in building our counterterrorism (CT) capability, developing a strategy based on a detailed understanding of al-Qa'ida and the global movement of violent extremists, and reorganizing the government to remedy the shortfalls revealed by the 9/11 attacks. I will discuss some of these developments with you today.

None of what I will say should be understood to mean that we do not continue to face real and significant challenges. We must continue to improve our intelligence collection on the hardest targets. We must continue to mature our coordination with state and local officials so that the federal government supports their efforts and benefits from their many capabilities. We must better coordinate departmental efforts to counter radicalization both at home and abroad. And we must ensure that departmental planning and budgeting is done in a manner consistent with a U.S. Government-wide effort to counter the terrorist threat we face now and are likely to face in the future.

I would like to briefly review the role NCTC is playing, and will play, to further sustain this progress through enhancing the U.S. Government’s capability to detect, disrupt, and deter the threat of terrorism against U.S. interests both at home and abroad.
Today, as directed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), NCTC performs two significant functions in the War on Terror. The first, Intelligence, is a familiar one and one in which I report to the DNI. The second is Strategic Operational Planning. As you are well aware, in this second role I report to the President and am responsible for producing the U.S. Government's overall War Plan for the War on Terror (WOT).

In both roles, NCTC's work is truly an interagency effort. We are part of the ODNI and benefit from his authorities. Our staff includes some 400 U.S. Government employees, the vast majority of whom are on rotation from one of 16 federal departments and agencies, including CIA, DoD, and FBI. This rotational structure is deliberate and embodies the model of "Joint Duty" that has proven so successful within the Department of Defense. By bringing so many departments and agencies together at NCTC, we are able to capitalize on the diverse talents and perspectives that only a truly joint workforce can provide.

I would now like to highlight just a few of the areas in which we've seen improvement over the last few years. I'll speak first to the changes in intelligence and then to those related to strategic operational planning.

In the intelligence area, we have made significant progress translating into action the lessons learned from 9/11 and WMD Commissions. An effective intelligence enterprise requires analysis, information sharing, and interagency collaboration, and NCTC continues to lead the counterterrorism community in all three areas.

**Analysis.** Analysis is at the heart of the counterterrorism intelligence process, and therefore also at the center of NCTC's mission. Our officers involved in the analytical process understand that their insights and judgments may figure directly in the defense of our nation and our allies. Analysis literally *counters terrorism*: it surveys the battlefield, identifies enemy forces and their intentions, and lays the groundwork for an effective offense and defense that use every instrument of national power—from military force to public diplomacy, and everything in between.
NCTC's analytic mission, as defined by IRTPA, is a broad one. As the primary organization in the United States Government for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism, with the exception of purely domestic terrorism, our mandate crosses the foreign and domestic divide, and requires us to support the full spectrum of intelligence customers. Central to performing this critical responsibility is providing all of our analysts with intelligence from throughout the U.S. Government. This is, as you know well, a revolutionary concept within the Intelligence Community. But today that concept is reality at NCTC; analysts can and do see sensitive intelligence from the CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and other organizations.

This base of knowledge enables us to provide our customers with all-source, integrated analysis. NCTC, in collaboration with a wide array of government partners, generates a spectrum of integrated, analytic products – tailored to the needs and interests of our customers, including the President, Departments and Agencies, and the Congress. Our products range from immediate reports providing situational awareness about largely unevaluated intelligence—for example a daily Threat Matrix and twice daily Situation Reports—to in-depth finished intelligence such as the National Terrorism Bulletin and the President's Daily Brief. Significantly, virtually all of these reports for senior policy makers are coordinated by NCTC, as the DNI’s Mission Manager. The purpose of that is to ensure that differing views are not only represented, but that they are also put in context.

NCTC's analytic efforts are not just focused on today's most pressing issue. While we spend significant time analyzing current threat streams to ensure that policy makers are kept fully informed, we also analyze longer-term trends in homegrown terrorism, radicalization, terrorists' use of the Internet, and future terrorists' tactics and weapons. In short, we seek to inform on the full range of terrorism topics.

One of the ways in which we ensure policymakers are informed by the best intelligence possible is to provide Intelligence Community-wide coordinated analysis that includes different agencies' views when such differences exist. The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) serves as our primary forum to do this. Although the IICT
existed before 9/11, it has expanded and improved its activities since that time. The 
chairmanship has also been elevated so it rests with the Director of NCTC. We take very 
seriously our responsibility to ensure that IICT products fully and faithfully represent 
dissenting views—should they exist—among agencies.

Finally, NCTC—in conjunction with the DNI—has over the past year sought to best 
leverage the Intelligence Community’s finite analytic resources for counterterrorism. One 
important corollary to this is to avoid having every agency cover the same issues. To that 
end, we have identified agency-specific missions, designated lead responsibility for 
subject areas, and ensured appropriate competitive analysis so that the Intelligence 
Community is not single-threaded on important issues. This alignment, called the Analytic 
Framework for Counterterrorism, is a tangible recognition that not every agency can cover 
every topic all the time—and that to try to do so would not serve the U.S. Government 
well.

The Analytic Framework is focused on four counterterrorism mission areas:

- **Tactical Offense**: Analysis supporting direct action against the terrorist enemy – 
  led by department and agency analytic elements.

- **Tactical Defense**: Analytic warnings of planned terrorist attacks and operations – 
  led by NCTC, and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the case of threats to U.S. 
  military targets.

- **Strategic Offense**: Analysis to guide national policy and policymakers in 
  countering violent extremism and radical ideology as a threat to our way of life – led 
  by NCTC.

- **Strategic Defense**: Analysis supportive of efforts to reduce our vulnerability to 
  terrorist attacks and future terrorist capabilities – led by NCTC for strategic 
  warnings, and relevant departments and agencies for vulnerability assessments.
One immediate impact of the Framework’s adoption has been the shift of some CIA resources to NCTC so that the former can focus on operational support and the latter can concentrate on strategic analysis, such as the “War of Ideas.”

**Information Sharing.** Let me now turn to the second critical piece of our intelligence enterprise—information sharing. NCTC is committed to sharing information quickly, effectively, and consistently.

Under the IRTPA, NCTC has the responsibility “to ensure that agencies, as appropriate, have access to and receive all-source intelligence products needed to execute their counterterrorism plans or perform independent, alternative analysis,” and “to ensure that such agencies receive intelligence needed to accomplish their assigned activities.” Today I’ll highlight four of our principal efforts: sharing intelligence within the federal government, sharing intelligence with state, local, and tribal governments; bringing together departments and agencies to discuss current threats; and, comprehensive watchlisting of individuals of concern.

At the core of our mission is ensuring that all our federal partners have the intelligence they need. Prior to 9/11 there was no comprehensive place to go if an analyst or operator wanted to find all disseminated terrorism intelligence available to the U.S. Government. Today, NCTC Online (NOL) allows more than 60 U.S. Government elements to share information electronically. It serves as a key classified repository and collaboration tool, reaching intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, foreign affairs and other federal organizations with a counterterrorism mission. It now hosts more than 8,000 authorized users and holds over seven million terrorism documents.

NOL is also available at different levels of classification. This means that even if users are not permitted to see everything, they can automatically see those materials that fit their security clearances. And this capability is particularly important in helping us with the next information sharing initiative—sharing with state, local, and tribal officials.
NCTC’s information sharing responsibilities go beyond that of the Federal Government. IRTPA states that the Director of NCTC is responsible for “supporting the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, and other appropriate agencies, in fulfillment of their responsibilities to disseminate terrorism information to State and local governments.” More recently, with the recent passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, NCTC has been given additional responsibilities to tailor CT-related information and products for timely passage to state, local, and tribal governments.

As initially proposed as part of the President’s ISE Guideline implementation and later directed by the legislation, we are working with FBI, DHS, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment and state and local officials to establish, within NCTC, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG). Led by a DHS detailee, with a deputy from FBI, this group will provide additional counsel and subject matter expertise to the federal Intelligence Community and facilitate the sharing of intelligence products tailored to the needs of state, local and tribal entities. It will further strengthen the overall national counterterrorism and homeland security effort.

Our information sharing responsibilities also require us to facilitate robust interagency communication about ongoing operations and events. NCTC chairs regular video teleconferences to maintain U.S. Government-wide situational awareness. Intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, military, and diplomatic officials from roughly 17 U.S. Government organizations come together three times a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, to exchange information and collaborate on response options. This is a fundamental change: Before 9/11, there was no routine mechanism to maintain situational awareness across the U.S. Government.

Finally, NCTC also plays a pivotal role in the terrorist watchlisting process. For the past four-plus years, NCTC has served as the U.S. Government’s central repository for information on international terrorist identities, known as the “Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment,” or TIDE for short. The TIDE database includes, to the extent permitted by law, all information the U.S. Government possesses on the identities of individuals known
or appropriately suspected to be or to have been involved in activities constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to international terrorism.

The establishment of TIDE marked a major milestone in the nation's CT effort, compiling into one database information on all known and suspected international terrorists. Before 9/11, watchlisting efforts were spread across multiple databases managed by multiple agencies, a significant vulnerability in the nation's efforts to defend against terrorist attack.

Each day, TIDE sends the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) a sensitive but unclassified subset of terrorist identifiers to populate the U.S. Government's consolidated watchlist. This consolidated watchlist, in turn, supports efforts to screen, detect, and interdict the travel of known and suspected terrorists here and overseas. These screening efforts encompass the work of consular officers at embassies, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel, law enforcement organizations across the United States, and foreign and domestic air carriers that fly to the United States. So today, an applicant for a State Department visa is checked against the watchlist at a consulate overseas. At U.S. ports of entry, a border crosser's passport, visa, or driver's license is also checked against the CBP's subset of the consolidated watchlist. And at a routine traffic encounter inside the United States, a suspect's identity is checked against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) through the National Crime Information Center. Finally, airline screening personnel review passenger lists for all flights traveling to the United States to identify individuals who are believed to be a threat to civil aviation or the homeland or who should have additional screening prior to boarding a plane.

Examples of the types of activity that warrant an individual's entry into TIDE and terrorist screening systems include:

- Commission of an international terrorist activity;
- Preparation for or planning of international terrorist activity;
- Collection of information on potential targets for international terrorist activity;
- Collection or solicitation of funds or other items of value on behalf of international terrorist organizations or activity;
• Recruitment of members into international terrorist organizations;
• Provision of material support (e.g., safe houses, transportation, communications, funds, false documentation, weapons, or training) to international terrorist organizations; and,
• Membership in or representation of an international terrorist organization.

While the number of names contained in TIDE has grown since its inception in 2003 from approximately 100,000 to over 500,000, this figure represents every identity associated with individuals entered in the database. This distinction is significant because of the multiple aliases and name variants of terrorism suspects. As a result, the number of actual individuals recorded in TIDE is closer to 400,000. And although TIDE continues to grow, individuals' names are also regularly removed when it is determined that they no longer meet the criteria for inclusion. As a result, more than 10,000 names were removed from TIDE in 2006.

**Interagency Collaboration.** You will note that NCTC's analytic and information sharing efforts are but a part of the larger CT intelligence effort. Let me now turn, then, to the third piece of NCTC's support for CT intelligence—its coordination of the larger counterterrorism intelligence community. As the DNI's "Mission Manager" for counterterrorism, I am responsible for ensuring that all parts of Intelligence Community work toward a coherent, cohesive counterterrorism vision. Let me give you some of examples of IC-wide efforts that NCTC is leading.

First, NCTC orchestrates the counterterrorism National Collection Plan, which identifies information needs and requirements, assesses collector capabilities, and feeds CT requirements into the collection mechanisms. Second, NCTC has conducted the first-ever comprehensive CT analytic workforce analysis. In March of this year, we published *The Counterterrorism Analytic Posture of the Intelligence Community: A Baseline Report*, which gives us a foundation for evaluating the Community of today and developing recommendations for how to position the Community of tomorrow. The results are now being used to implement improved training and retention plans for the Intelligence
Community. We have also developed a systematic “lessons learned” process to capture best practices to improve the efficacy and efficiency of our efforts. We believe that by creating mechanisms to conduct lessons learned studies the CT Community has, over the past year, taken significant steps towards fostering a culture of learning.

Thus far I have addressed NCTC’s intelligence responsibilities; I would like to turn now to our second role—Strategic Operational Planning (SOP) for the War on Terror.

SOP involves a wide spectrum of planning functions. It bridges the gap between coordinated interagency policy and strategy and tactical operations by departments and agencies to implement that strategy. Essentially, SOP takes interagency planning to a new and much more granular level than we have historically undertaken as a government.

In this role we lead an interagency planning effort that brings all elements of national power to bear in the War on Terror. That includes the full weight of our diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security and law enforcement activities. The strategic operational planning effort is new to the U.S. Government. It involves a three-part continuous process: planning, implementation and assessment. NCTC is leading an interagency effort to build processes for all three phases. We've completed the first phase of planning by the CT community, and we're now in the process of guiding the implementation of the plan and assessing its effectiveness.

NCTC's planning efforts span a spectrum from strategic, deliberate planning to more dynamic planning.

The National Implementation Plan (NIP), which was approved by the President in June 2006, is the keystone document for our strategic—or deliberate—planning. The NIP is truly an unprecedented effort to bring together disparate parts of the U.S. Government that have a role in countering terrorism. Building on the President's unclassified National Strategy for Countering Terrorism (NSCT), it incorporates five years of planning, analysis, operations, and successes in the War on Terror. Each of the strategic objectives is further
divided into specific tasks assigned to a Cabinet-level officer for action and other Cabinet officers for support.

The primary value added of the NIP is that it provides a comprehensive, coordinated plan of action that clearly assigns responsibility, sets priorities, illuminates areas of coordination, and provides a framework for assessing success and, ultimately, assigning resources.

In the spectrum of plans, the NIP is overarching and strategic, both in the scope of tasks it contains and the planning process that it initiates for the U.S. Government. Other interagency strategic operational plans have a more focused functional or regional scope—such as the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel—but follow the same process of planning, implementing, assessing, and adjusting.

At the more tactical end of the planning process are dynamic planning efforts, including those established to address emerging threat streams—for example what we have assessed to be the current heightened strategic threat window. For this reason, the White House directed NCTC to establish and lead an Interagency Task Force (ITF) to develop additional options and measures to increase intelligence collection and disrupt potential al-Qa'ida planning. Although led by NCTC, the ITF comprises a core group of representatives from the departments and agencies with the greatest responsibility for implementing new activities in the near term—including the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security and Justice.

Each week senior White House and Departmental officials review the actions proposed by the ITF, consider alternative options, and provide further direction on particular activities or measures recommended by the task force. Although I am unable to publicly describe specific actions taken by any single agency or department without undermining their effectiveness, I can report that the ITF has implemented a number of coordinated offensive and defensive measures designed to decrease the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack against the United States and our interests abroad. In addition, the ITF is continuously evaluating intelligence to recommend the most appropriate actions, assess
ongoing operations, and ensure that U.S. Government resources are aligned to most effectively address the threat.

After we have developed a plan to address a specific CT issue or challenge, and taken it through NSC’s policy approval process, we move into the implementation phase. NCTC’s role in this implementation process is not directive; as clearly delineated in the IRTPA, we do not tell agencies and departments how to do their jobs or when to execute specific actions. Instead, the legislation charges us with the "interagency coordination of operational activities." In practice this means monitoring the key elements of the plan to ensure execution by the relevant departments and agencies. It means working through the obstacles to implementation that inevitably arise. It means identifying the gaps in the plan that are only apparent when execution begins or when the enemy adapts to ongoing activities. Finally, it means highlighting resource issues so that we can match our limited resources to our most urgent CT priorities.

The strategic planning process is less than glamorous. However, as the former Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (DJ-5) for the Joint Staff, I believe it is absolutely critical to the long term success of our government as we prosecute the long war on terror. It is, in short, a revolutionary new way of doing business for the U.S. Government.

Throughout this process, all of our SOP efforts are designed to provide the context and the connective tissue to link the President’s CT strategy with the operations and activities on the front lines of the War on Terror.

In closing, I would reiterate that we have come a long way in the last two years as a Center and in the last several years as a Community despite our continued challenges, six years after 9/11, I believe the United States is better prepared to fight this war than at any time in our history. Let me list seven reasons why I believe that.

First, our intelligence is better. Terrorists are clearly a difficult target, but our collection, analysis and production are significantly improved.
Second, we have made major strides in information sharing – in getting that intelligence to the people who need it.

Third, we have taken the fight to the enemy and achieved significant successes in the field. Thousands of terrorists have been taken off the field of battle and dozens of plots have been disrupted.

Fourth, we are attacking every element of the terrorist life cycle, including travel and finance.

Fifth, this is not only an American effort. We are working more closely and more effectively with a greater number of allies around the world to defeat the terrorists.

Sixth, and of special interest to this committee, we have taken significant steps to make the homeland a hostile place for terrorists to enter and operate.

Finally, through a new strategic planning effort, we are laying the groundwork to take the efforts already underway to a new level of integration and effectiveness.

All of this means we are safer than we were on September 11, 2001.

But we are not safe. Nor are we likely to be for a generation or more. We are in a long war, and we face an enemy that is adaptable, dangerous, and persistent and who always has a vote. While we have won many battles since 9/11, there are many battles yet to be fought and setbacks are certain to come along the way.

Thank you. This concludes my remarks.