From the brothers in the Shura Council whom we gave your previous message for discussion: Brother ‘Abd-al-Majid aka Abu-al-Miqdad al-Masri, and Mahmud wrote this note to me (sic)

May peace, prayers and mercy of Allah be upon you

Esteemed brother Shaykh Mahmud,

I reviewed the contents of the discussion message, and my opinion supports everything in it. However, I would like to explain some points, which are:

1. Basir’s message:
   - I think we should wait a little while, until we consult and discuss this issue once we meet; each one of us will pose suggestions, information and ideas in order to reach a decision in light of the latest events and the killing of Shabwah tribe’s leader and his companions, as well as people blowing up places, and attacking government facilities in several locations in Yemen. To go in now with Sabr to the frontline as we suggested, during these new changes, might cause him a shock because he would foresee that the situations now are more available than before.

   - In light of the operational environment in Yemen: I am providing you this message from the internet, which includes the following:

   “Talks increased among Yemeni youth, as well as the number of doubtful people, as a result of the escape of our brothers from the political security prison in Sana’a. The Yemeni government proposed to release all inmates in its Political Security and National Security prisons, in exchange that the youth stop all types of operations in Yemen. And, whoever desires to leave Yemen to head to Iraq, Afghanistan or any country; he will get what he chose...

   The brothers were happy to hear this news, and said that Allah granted them victory by releasing their brothers who were in prisons. But, Nasir al-Wuhayshi and Abu-Harirah al-Rimi’s youth, and the mountain youths who are with them, absolutely refused this offer!!... This refusal created a split among the youth in Yemen. And of course, the Yemeni government was aware of this issue and tried to add oil to the fire, to the point that the situation became dangerous
as the brothers begun to accuse each other as infidels, turned their backs on each other, and had many similar issues between them... Of course this situation is no longer present, but the signs of this split is still present until this day.

This perhaps helps us to understand the situation there, and make a decision about it.

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2. The subject of Iran:

We (nfi) evaluated the opinion that we received regarding the Iran subject, and then I added a simple point to it, which is the necessity to alert jihadi electronic forums to strongly instigate this issue. Second, we should form a simple Da'wa committee, consisting of two to three individuals in all concerned countries, in order to carry Da'wa duties against Rafidites; whether through verbal lectures or written publications, and also by asking the help of our brothers everywhere who wish to participate in the duties of Da'wa and jihad, based on what we plan for them.

Iran proposed to release our brothers, the prisoners there. However, these latter have concerns about the routes - as we heard from some who were already released. We can’t neglect their coming, because this issue might not be guaranteed in the future, and we don’t want the issue of the brother prisoners one day to be used against us as a card to pressure us with unknown future issues.

During the execution of the Da’wa campaign against the Rafidites, this stance will be nurtured by ceasing operations in the Peninsula, and this way the brothers would focus on this matter. There is a especially large susceptibility in the Arab Peninsula towards the Rafidites, and this is going to receive a great success with Allah’s will. The public and scholars of the Peninsula, even many of scholars who are not accountable on our jihadist current, would meet the organization’s goal.

3. The external work:
As to the equation of balancing the horror; I absolutely agree on carrying out attacks inside America “The American People”, and pressure on the White House, Congress and
Pentagon would not be achieved unless they are attacked inside America.

It is certain that there are administrative centers and branches in several countries to be in charge of arranging and launching external operations inside America, especially unforeseeable countries, in order to avoid surveillance.

It is a necessity to activate and stimulate open fronts, to receive youths and train them to become experienced, in order to participate in operations. The reason is that these fronts are considered as:

A: Our front lines against the enemy.
B: Our rear lines to supply us with manpower and experience.
C: To continue the circle of jihad “that is very, very important” (sic) to deplete the enemy with it.

- To try to stimulate Iraq’s front again, because a concentration of the enemy on one front congregates their efforts, which would not benefit jihad. The demand for jihad there is needed more than any other because the enemy is still present there...

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Explanations:

This is a very significant issue; we consider that the jihad work against the Zionist-Christians is less than it should be in comparison to the capability of this enemy. Anything that is not surplus is a shortfall. So, we must prepare programs and find ways to receive mujahidin, train them, then deploy them to open fronts. We learned in the previous phase that, when we felt we were progressing, we started to regress; consequently the work decreased, the production lessened. So, our predominant feeling now is that we are not comfortable with the work management style and the shrinkage of the organization...

The Shaykh talked about the fear of our organization aging, and reaching decrepitude like other organizations, when he spoke about developing the organization’s work. This latter suggest that the thinking in this stage is how to improve the organization’s work in the upcoming phase, based on the
important points that we received in the message, that requires branching out.

When we talk about focusing the external jihadist work in this phase against the American enemy, we must specify it: Is Pakistan’s front destined for conciliation for the interest of the principal front “America” or not? Based on this, we must specify the work of groups that belong to us and that are working inside Pakistan. Should we make them just preventive groups based on the main strategy, and switch the remaining power to work against the Americans, or should they continue as the same groups as they started; because we must employ these powers.

As for appointing Shaykh ‘Atiyah and the list of some associates; I agree with what came in the message:

Explanations:

I would like you to provide me with an explanation for the statement “On a condition that they did not gave a promise to America not to cause harm to it”. I urge you to clarify the type and form of this promise, because some of them consider the residency, visa or citizenship as a promise.

This is an opinion to add it to yours.

I ask almighty Allah to grant us success and to lead us to what it pleases Him.

Your brother