(U) SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES ISSUED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, SUBMITTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Reporting Period: June 1, 2016 – November 30, 2016

December 2017
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(U) FACT SHEET

(U) Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

Joint Assessments

(U) This Fact Sheet provides an overview of the Semiannual Assessments of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. These assessments are commonly referred to as “Joint Assessments,” and are submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). As of December 2017, seventeen joint assessments have been submitted.

(U) Joint Assessment Basics:

- **(U) Why is the Joint Assessment required?** The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (50 U.S.C. § 1881(l)(1)) requires the Attorney General and the DNI to assess compliance with certain procedures and guidelines issued pursuant to FISA Section 702.

- **(U) What period is covered by a Joint Assessment?** Each Joint Assessment covers six-month periods: December 1 – May 31 or June 1 – November 30.

- **(U) Who receives it?** Each Joint Assessment is submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and relevant congressional committees.

- **(U) What is being assessed?** The Attorney General and the DNI must jointly assess the government’s compliance with FISC-approved “targeting procedures” and “minimization procedures.”

- **(U) What are targeting procedures and minimization procedures?** Section 702 allows for the targeting of (i) non-United States persons (ii) reasonably believed to be located outside the United States (iii) to acquire foreign intelligence information. To ensure that all three requirements are appropriately met, Section 702 requires targeting procedures. Targeting is effectuated by tasking communications facilities (such as telephone numbers and electronic communications accounts) to U.S. electronic communications service providers. Section 702 also requires minimization procedures to minimize and protect any non-public information of United States persons that may be incidentally collected when appropriately targeting non-United States persons abroad for foreign intelligence information.

(U) Highlights from 17th Joint Assessment:

- **(U) No intentional violations.** Consistent with previous Joint Assessments, no instances of intentional circumvention or violation of those procedures were found.

- **(U) Continued focused efforts to implement Section 702 in a compliant manner.** The Joint Assessment reports that the agencies continued to implement the procedures in a manner that reflected a focused and concerted effort by Intelligence Community (IC) personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702.

- **(U) Compliance incident rate remains low.** The compliance incident rate remained low, which is consistent with the compliance incident rate reported for other reporting periods. The majority of incidents were caused by a misunderstanding of the procedures, failure to conduct the required checks, technical issues and inadvertent human errors.

(When this 2-Page Fact Sheet is Separated from this Assessment, this Fact Sheet is Unclassified.)
• (U) **What compliance and oversight efforts underlie the Joint Assessment?** Agencies employ extensive compliance measures to implement Section 702 in accordance with procedural, statutory, and constitutional requirements. A joint oversight team consisting of experts from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) oversee these measures. Each incident of non-compliance (i.e. compliance incident) is documented, reviewed, and reported to the FISC and relevant congressional committees. The Joint Assessment summarizes trends and assesses compliance (including calculating the compliance incident rate for the relevant reporting period) and may include recommendations to help prevent compliance incidents or increase transparency.

• (U) **What government agencies are involved with implementing Section 702?** The National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Each Joint Assessment discusses how these agencies implement the authority.

• (U) **Why is the Joint Assessment classified?** The Joint Assessment is classified to allow us to provide the congressional oversight committees a complete assessment of the Section 702 program while at the same time protecting sources and methods. They are carefully redacted for public release in the interest of transparency.

• (U) **What is the format of the Joint Assessment?** The Joint Assessment generally contains an executive summary, five sections, and an appendix. Beginning with the 16th Joint Assessment is this fact sheet about the joint assessments. Sections 1 and 5 provide an introduction and conclusion. Section 2 details internal compliance efforts by the agencies that implement Section 702, interagency oversight, training efforts and efforts to improve the implementation of Section 702. Section 3 compiles and presents data acquired from compliance reviews of the targeting procedures and minimization procedures. Section 4 describes compliance trends. The Joint Assessment describes the extensive measures undertaken by the government to ensure compliance with court-approved targeting and minimization procedures; to accurately identify, record and correct errors; to take responsive actions to remove any erroneously obtained data; and to minimize the chances that mistakes will re-occur.

• (U) **What are the types of compliance incidents discussed?** Generally, the Joint Assessment groups incidents into six or seven categories. Categories 1-4 (tasking incidents, detasking incidents, notification delays, and documentation errors) discuss non-compliance with targeting procedures. Category 5 discusses incidents of non-compliance with minimization procedures such as erroneous queries of 702 information using U.S. person identifiers. Sometimes a category discussing overcollection incidents are included. And finally, the last category is a catch-all category for incidents that do not fall into one of the other categories. The actual number of the compliance incidents is classified; the percentage breakdown of those incidents is unclassified and reported in the Joint Assessment. Additionally, because Section 702 collection occurs with the assistance of U.S. electronic communications service providers who receive a Section 702(h) directive, the Joint Assessment includes a review of any compliance incidents by such service providers.

*(When this 2-Page Fact Sheet is Separated from this Assessment, this Fact Sheet is Unclassified.)*
(U) Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence

December 2017

Reporting Period: June 1, 2016 – November 30, 2016

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (hereinafter “FAA”) requires the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to assess compliance with certain procedures and guidelines issued pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., as amended, (hereinafter “FISA” or “the Act”) and to submit such assessments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and relevant congressional committees at least once every six months. Section 702 authorizes, subject to restrictions imposed by the statute and required targeting and minimization procedures, the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States in order to acquire foreign intelligence information. The present assessment sets forth the seventeenth joint compliance assessment of the Section 702 program. This assessment covers the period from June 1, 2016 through November 30, 2016 (hereinafter the “reporting period”) and accompanies the Semiannual Report of the Attorney General Concerning Acquisitions under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as required by Section 707(b)(1) of FISA (hereinafter “the Section 707 Report”). The Department of Justice submitted the Section 707 Report on March 9, 2017; it covers the same reporting period as the Joint Assessment.

(U) This Joint Assessment is based upon the compliance assessment activities that have been jointly conducted by the Department of Justice’s National Security Division (NSD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

(U) This Joint Assessment finds that the agencies have continued to implement the procedures and follow the guidelines in a manner that reflects a focused and concerted effort by agency personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702. The personnel involved in implementing the authorities are appropriately focused on directing their efforts at non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information. Processes are in place to implement these authorities and to impose internal controls for compliance and verification purposes. The compliance incidents that occurred during this reporting period represent a very small percentage (0.88 percent)\(^1\) of the overall collection activity. This represents an increase from the last Joint Assessment’s rate of 0.45 percent but still remains below 1 percent; we have carefully examined the causes surrounding this

\(^1\) Although the compliance incident rate increased to 0.88 percent during this reporting period, the joint oversight team notes that the compliance incident rate significantly decreased in the next reporting period to 0.37 percent. The decrease in the compliance incident rate in the next reporting period will be discussed in the next joint assessment. As discussed throughout this joint assessment and previous joint assessments, the compliance incident rate fluctuates from reporting period to reporting period; each joint assessment attempts to assess the underlying causes of the compliance incidents and the trends.
current assessment’s compliance incidents and provide a detailed explanation later. In summary, a majority of this period’s incidents resulted from two particular types of incidents, which the oversight team assesses have subsequently been remediated. Individual incidents, however, can have broader implications, as further discussed herein and in the Section 707 Report and the government takes each incident seriously. Based upon a review of these compliance incidents, the joint oversight team believes that none of these incidents represent an intentional attempt to circumvent or violate the Act, the targeting or minimization procedures, or the Attorney General’s Acquisition Guidelines.

(U) SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

(U) The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (hereinafter, “FAA”) requires the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to assess compliance with certain procedures and guidelines issued pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., as amended (hereinafter, “FISA” or “the Act”), and to submit such assessments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and relevant congressional committees at least once every six months. As required by the Act, a team of oversight personnel from the Department of Justice’s National Security Division (NSD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) have conducted compliance reviews to assess whether the authorities under Section 702 of FISA (hereinafter, “Section 702”) have been implemented in accordance with the applicable procedures and guidelines, discussed herein. This report sets forth NSD and ODNI’s seventeenth joint compliance assessment under Section 702, covering the period June 1, 2016 through November 30, 2016 (hereinafter, the “reporting period”).

(U) Section 702 requires that the Attorney General, in consultation with the DNI, adopt targeting and minimization procedures, as well as guidelines. A primary purpose of the guidelines is to ensure compliance with the limitations set forth in subsection (b) of Section 702, which are as follows:

An acquisition authorized under subsection (a)—

(1) may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States;
(2) may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States;
(3) may not intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
(4) may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States; and

2 (U) Without those incidents, the incident rate would have been 0.40 percent.

3 (U) This report accompanies the Semiannual Report of the Attorney General Concerning Acquisitions under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was previously submitted on March 9, 2017 as required by Section 707(b)(1) of FISA (hereafter Section 707 Report). This seventeenth Joint Assessment covers the same reporting period as the seventeenth Attorney General’s Section 707 Report.
(5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The Attorney General’s Guidelines for the Acquisition of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (hereinafter “the Attorney General’s Acquisition Guidelines”) were adopted by the Attorney General, in consultation with the DNI, on August 5, 2008.

(U) During this reporting period, the Government acquired foreign intelligence information under Attorney General and DNI authorized Section 702(g) certifications that targeted non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States in order to acquire different types of foreign intelligence information. Three agencies are primarily involved in implementing Section 702: the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). An overview of how these agencies implement the authority appears in Appendix A of this assessment. The other agency involved in implementing Section 702 is the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which currently has a limited role, as reflected in the “Minimization Procedures Used by NCTC in connection with Information Acquired by FBI pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as amended.”

(U) Section Two of this Joint Assessment provides a comprehensive overview of oversight measures the Government employs to ensure compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures, as well as the Attorney General’s Acquisition Guidelines. Section Three compiles and presents data acquired from the joint oversight team’s compliance reviews in order to provide insight into the overall scope of the Section 702 program, as well as trends in targeting, reporting,

5 (U) Under these limited minimization procedures, during this reporting period, NCTC was not authorized to receive unminimized Section 702 data. Rather, these procedures recognize that, in light of NCTC’s statutory counterterrorism role and mission, NCTC has been provided access to certain FBI systems containing minimized Section 702 information, and prescribe how NCTC is to treat that information. For example, because NCTC is not a law enforcement agency, it may not receive disseminations of Section 702 information that is evidence of a crime, but which has no foreign intelligence value; accordingly, NCTC’s minimization procedures require in situations in which NCTC personnel discover purely law enforcement information with no foreign intelligence value in the course of reviewing minimized foreign intelligence information that the NCTC personnel either purge that information (if the information has been ingested into NCTC systems) or not use, retain, or disseminate the information (if the information has been viewed in FBI systems). Subsequent to this reporting period, NCTC was authorized by the FISC to receive unminimized Section 702 data. Specifically, in an opinion issued by the FISC on April 26, 2017, the FISC approved new minimization procedures for NCTC (2016 NCTC Minimization Procedures). The 2016 NCTC Minimization Procedures reflect that NCTC may now receive unminimized Section 702 information.
and the minimization of United States person information. Section Four describes compliance
trends. All of the specific compliance incidents for the reporting period have been previously
described in detail in the Section 707 Report. As with the prior Joint Assessments, some of those
compliance incidents are analyzed here to determine whether there are patterns or trends that might
indicate underlying causes that could be addressed through additional measures, and to assess
whether the agency involved has implemented processes to prevent recurrences. Finally, this Joint
Assessment contains an Appendix. Appendix A, also contained in previous joint assessments,
details how each agency implements Section 702 and includes a general description of the oversight
at each agency.

(U) In summary, the joint oversight team finds that the agencies have continued to
implement the procedures and follow the guidelines in a manner that reflects a focused and
concerted effort by agency personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702 during this
reporting period. As in the prior Joint Assessments, the joint oversight team has not found
indications in the compliance incidents that have been reported or otherwise identified of any
intentional or willful attempts to violate or circumvent the requirements of the Act. The number of
compliance incidents remains small, particularly when compared with the total amount of targeting
and collection activity. In its ongoing efforts to reduce the number of future compliance incidents,
the Government will continue to focus on measures to improve (a) inter and intra-agency
communication, (b) training, and (c) systems used in the handling of Section 702-acquired
communications, including those systems needed to ensure that appropriate purge practices are
followed and that certain disseminated reports are withdrawn as required. Further, the joint
oversight team will also continue to monitor agency practices to ensure appropriate remediation
steps are taken to prevent, whenever possible, reoccurrences of the types of compliance incidents
discussed herein and in the Section 707 Report. As appropriate, this Joint Assessment provides
updates on these on-going efforts.

(U) SECTION 2: OVERSIGHT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 702

(U) The implementation of Section 702 is a multi-agency effort. As described in detail in
Appendix A, NSA and FBI each acquire certain types of data pursuant to their own Section 702
targeting procedures. NSA, FBI, and CIA\(^6\) each handle Section 702-acquired data in accordance
with their own minimization procedures.\(^7\) There are differences in the way each agency implements
its procedures resulting from unique provisions in the procedures themselves, differences in how
these agencies utilize Section 702-acquired data, and efficiencies from using preexisting systems to
implement Section 702 authorities. Because of these differences in practice and procedure, there
are corresponding differences in each agency’s internal compliance programs and in the external
NSD and ODNI oversight programs.

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\(^6\) (U) As discussed herein, CIA receives Section 702-acquired data from NSA and FBI.

\(^7\) (U) Each agency’s Section 702 targeting and minimization procedures are approved by the Attorney General and
reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. On May 11, 2017, the DNI released, in redacted form, the
current 2016 minimization procedures for NSA, FBI, CIA, and NCTC, as well as the current 2016 targeting procedures,
in redacted form, for NSA and FBI. These procedures are posted on ODNI’s IC on the Record website. Past years’
versions of the minimization procedures have been previously released and remain on IC on the Record as part of the
DNI’s commitment to the IC’s Principles of Transparency.
A joint oversight team was established to conduct compliance assessment activities, consisting of members from NSD; the ODNI Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency (ODNI CLPT), the ODNI Office of General Counsel (ODNI OGC), and the ODNI Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence Integration/Mission Integration Division (ODNI DD/II/MID). The team members play complementary roles in the review process. The following describes the oversight activities of the joint oversight team, the results of which, in conjunction with the internal oversight conducted by the reviewed agencies, provide the basis for this Joint Assessment.

I. Joint Oversight of NSA

Under the process established by the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence’s certifications, all Section 702 targeting is initiated pursuant to the NSA’s targeting procedures. Additionally, NSA is responsible for conducting post-tasking checks of all Section 702-tasked communication facilities8 (also referred to as selectors) once collection begins. NSA must also minimize its collection in accordance with its minimization procedures. Each of these responsibilities is detailed in Appendix A. Given its central role in the Section 702 process, NSA has devoted substantial oversight and compliance resources to monitoring its implementation of the Section 702 authorities. NSA’s internal oversight and compliance mechanisms are further described in Appendix A.

NSD and ODNI’s joint oversight of NSA’s implementation of Section 702 consists of periodic compliance reviews, which the NSA targeting procedures require,9 as well as the investigation and reporting of specific compliance incidents. During this reporting period, NSD and ODNI conducted the following onsite reviews at NSA:

Figure 1: NSA Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Review</th>
<th>Taskings/Minimization Reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 26, 2016</td>
<td>June 1, 2016 – July 31, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 28, 2016</td>
<td>August 1, 2016 – September 30, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16, 2016</td>
<td>October 1, 2016 – November 30, 2016</td>
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</table>

Reports for each of these reviews document the relevant time period of the review, the number and types of communication facilities tasked, and the types of information that NSA relied upon, as well as provide a detailed summary of the findings for that reporting period. These reports have been provided to the congressional committees with the Section 707 Report, as required by Section 707(b)(1)(F) of FISA.

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8 (U) Section 702 authorizes the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. This targeting is effectuated by tasking communication facilities (i.e. selectors), including but not limited to telephone numbers and electronic communications accounts, to Section 702 electronic communication service providers. The oversight review process, which is described within this joint assessment, applies to the targeting of every communication facility regardless of the type of facility. A fuller description of the Section 702 targeting process may be found in the Appendix. This assessment uses the terms facilities and selectors interchangeably and is not attempting to make a substantive distinction between the two terms.

9 (U) The NSA targeting procedures require that the onsite reviews occur approximately every two months.
(U) The joint oversight review process for NSA targeting begins well before the onsite review. Prior to each onsite review, NSA electronically sends the tasking record (known as a tasking sheet) for each facility tasked during the reporting period to NSD and ODNI. Members of the joint oversight team initially review the tasking sheets, with ODNI team members sending any questions they may have concerning the tasking sheets to NSD, who then prepares a detailed report of the findings, including any questions and requests for additional information. NSD shares this report with the ODNI members of the joint oversight team. During this initial review, the joint oversight team determines whether the tasking sheets meet the documentation standards required by NSA’s targeting procedures and provide sufficient information for the reviewers to ascertain the basis for NSA’s foreignness determinations and that the tasking was in conformity with the targeting procedures and statutory requirements. For those tasking sheets that, on their face, meet the standards and provide sufficient information, no further supporting documentation is requested. The joint oversight team then identifies the tasking sheets that did not provide sufficient information and requests additional information.

(U) During the onsite review, the joint oversight team examines the cited documentation underlying these identified tasking sheets, together with the NSA Office of Compliance for Operations (OCO) (formerly known as the NSA’s Signals Intelligence Directorate [SID] Office of Oversight and Compliance), NSA attorneys, and other NSA personnel as required. The joint oversight team works with NSA to answer questions, identify issues, clarify ambiguous entries, and provide guidance on areas of potential improvement. Interaction continues following the onsite reviews in the form of electronic and telephonic exchanges to answer questions and clarify issues.

(U) The joint oversight team also reviews NSA’s minimization of Section 702-acquired data. NSD generally reviews all of the serialized reports (with ODNI reviewing a sample) that NSA has disseminated and identified as containing Section 702-acquired United States person information. The team also reviews a sample of serialized reports that NSA has disseminated and identified as containing Section-702 acquired non-United States person information. NSD and ODNI also review a sample of NSA disseminations to certain foreign government partners made outside of its serialized reporting process. These disseminations consist of information that NSA has evaluated for foreign intelligence and minimized, but which may not have been translated into English.

(U) With respect to queries of Section 702-acquired content using a United States person identifier, the joint oversight team reviews all approved United States person identifiers to ensure compliance with the minimization procedures. For each approved identifier, NSA also provides information detailing why the proposed use of the United States person identifier would be

10 (U) NSA’s SID O&C section was replaced by NSA’s Office of Compliance for Operations (OCO) on August 31, 2016, as part of NSA’s internal reorganization.

11 (U) On May 2, 2017, the DNI publicly released ODNI’s third annual Transparency Report[s]. Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities for Calendar Year 2016 (hereafter the 2016 Transparency Report). Pursuant to reporting requirements proscribed by the USA FREEDOM Act (see 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(A)), the 2016 Transparency Report provided the “estimated number of search terms concerning a known United States person used to retrieve the unminimized contents of communications obtained under Section 702” (emphasis added) for the entire calendar year of 2016.
reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information, the duration for which the United States person identifier has been authorized to be used as a query term, and any other relevant information. In addition, with respect to queries of Section 702-acquired metadata using a United States person identifier, NSA’s internal procedures require that NSA analysts document the basis for each metadata query prior to conducting the query. NSD reviews the documentation for 100 percent of the metadata queries that NSA provides to NSD.12

(U) Additionally, the joint oversight team investigates and reports incidents of noncompliance with the NSA targeting and minimization procedures, as well as with the Attorney General Acquisition Guidelines. While some of these incidents may be identified during the reviews, most are identified by NSA analysts or by NSA’s internal compliance program. NSA is also required to report certain events that may not be incidents of non-compliance. For example, NSA is required to report all instances in which Section 702 acquisition continued while a targeted individual was in the United States, whether or not NSA had any knowledge of the target’s travel to the United States.13 The purpose of such reporting is to allow the joint oversight team to assess whether a compliance incident has occurred and to confirm that any necessary remedial action is taken. Investigations of all of these incidents sometimes result in requests for supplemental information. All compliance incidents identified by these investigations are reported to the congressional committees in the Section 707 Report and to the FISC.

(U) II. Joint Oversight of CIA

(U) As further described in detail in Appendix A, although CIA does not directly engage in targeting or acquisition, it does nominate potential Section 702 targets to NSA. Because CIA nominates potential Section 702 targets to NSA, the joint oversight team conducts onsite visits at CIA, and the results of these visits are included in the bimonthly NSA review reports discussed above. CIA has established internal compliance mechanisms and procedures to oversee proper implementation of its Section 702 authorities.

(U) The onsite reviews also focus on CIA’s application of its Section 702 minimization procedures. For this reporting period, NSD and ODNI conducted the following onsite reviews at CIA:

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12 (U) Also pursuant to reporting requirements proscribed by the USA FREEDOM Act (see 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(B)), the 2016 Transparency Report provided the “estimated number of queries concerning a known United States person used to retrieve the unminimized noncontents (i.e. metadata) information obtained under Section 702” (emphasis added) for the entire calendar year of 2016.

13 (U) If NSA had no prior knowledge of the target’s travel to the United States and, upon learning of the target’s travel, immediately “detasked” (i.e. stopped collection against) the target’s facility as is required by NSA’s targeting procedures, the collection while the target was in the United States would not be considered a compliance incident under NSA’s targeting procedures, although the collection would generally be subject to purge under the applicable minimization procedures. The joint oversight team carefully considers, and where appropriate, obtains additional facts regarding every reported detasking decision to ensure that NSA’s collection and detasking complied with its targeting and minimization procedures.
Figure 2: (U) CIA Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Visits</th>
<th>Minimization Reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 20 and 23, 2016</td>
<td>June 1, 2016 – July 31, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2 and 4, 2016</td>
<td>August 1, 2016 – September 30, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 6 and 11, 2017</td>
<td>October 1, 2016 – November 30, 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Figure 2 is UNCLASSIFIED.

(U) Reports for each of these reviews have previously been provided to the congressional committees with the Section 707 Report, as required by Section 707(b)(1)(F) of FISA.

(U) As a part of the onsite reviews, the joint oversight team examines documents related to CIA’s retention, dissemination, and querying of Section 702-acquired data. The team reviews a sample of communications acquired under Section 702 and identified as containing U.S. person information that has been minimized and retained by CIA. Reviewers ensure that communications have been properly minimized and discuss with personnel issues involving the proper application of CIA’s minimization procedures. The team also reviews all disseminations of information acquired under Section 702 that CIA identified as potentially containing U.S. person information. NSD and ODNI also review CIA’s written foreign intelligence justifications for all queries using United States person identifiers of the content of unminimized Section 702-acquired communications.

(S//NF) CIA may receive 4 unminimized Section 702-acquired communications. Such communications must be minimization pursuant to CIA’s minimization procedures. As further described in detail in Appendix A, CIA nominates potential Section 702 targets to NSA. The joint oversight team conducts onsite visits at CIA to review CIA’s implementation the results of these visits are included in the bimonthly NSA review reports discussed above. CIA has established internal compliance mechanisms and procedures to oversee proper implementation of its Section 702 authorities. These processes are further described in Appendix A.

(U) In addition to the bimonthly reviews, the joint oversight team also investigates and reports incidents of noncompliance with CIA’s minimization procedures, the Attorney General Acquisition Guidelines, or other agencies’ procedures in which CIA is involved. Investigations are coordinated through the CIA FISA Program Office and CIA’s Office of General Counsel (CIA OGC), and when necessary, may involve requests for further information, meetings with CIA legal, analytical, and/or technical personnel, or the review of source documentation. All compliance incidents identified by these investigations are reported to the congressional committees in the Section 707 Report and to the FISC.

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15 (U) Insofar as CIA nominates facilities for tasking and reviews content that may indicate that a target is located in the United States or is a United States person, some investigations of possible noncompliance with the NSA targeting procedures can also involve CIA.
(U) III. Joint Oversight of FBI

(U) FBI fulfills various roles in the implementation of Section 702. First, FBI is authorized under the certifications to acquire foreign intelligence information. These acquisitions must be conducted pursuant to FBI’s Section 702 targeting procedures.

(S//NF) Second, FBI also provides

Pursuant to its

own authority, FBI is authorized from electronic communication service providers by targeting facilities that NSA designates (hereinafter “Designated Accounts”). FBI conveys from the electronic communications service providers for processing in accordance with the agencies’ FISC-approved minimization procedures.

(S//NF) Third, FBI may receive unminimized Section 702-acquired communications. Such communications must be minimized pursuant to FBI’s Section 702 minimization procedures. Like CIA, FBI has a process for nominating to NSA new facilities to be targeted pursuant to Section 702.

(U) FBI’s internal compliance program and NSD and ODNI’s oversight program are designed to ensure FBI’s compliance with statutory and procedural requirements for each of these three roles. Each of the roles discussed above, as well as FBI’s internal compliance program, are set forth in further detail in Appendix A.

(U) NSD and ODNI generally conduct monthly reviews at FBI Headquarters of FBI’s compliance with its targeting procedures and bimonthly reviews at FBI Headquarters of FBI’s compliance with its minimization procedures. Reports for each of these reviews have previously been provided to the congressional committees with the Section 707 Report, as required by Section 707(b)(1)(F) of FISA. For this reporting period, onsite reviews at FBI Headquarters were conducted on the following dates:

Figure 3: (U) FBI Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Visit</th>
<th>Targeting and Minimization Reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 2 and 3, 2016</td>
<td>June 2016 targeting decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 8 and 9, 2016</td>
<td>July 2016 targeting decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 4 and 5, 2016</td>
<td>August 2016 targeting decisions and June 1 through August 31, 2016, minimization decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 9 and 10, 2016</td>
<td>September 2016 targeting decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 6 and 8, 2016</td>
<td>October 2016 targeting decisions and September 1 through November 30, 2016, minimization decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 10 and 11, 2017</td>
<td>November 2016 targeting decisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) Figure 3 is UNCLASSIFIED.

(U) In conducting the targeting review, the joint oversight team reviews the targeting checklist completed by FBI analysts and supervisory personnel involved in the process, together
with supporting documentation. The joint oversight team also reviews a sample of other files to identify any other potential compliance issues. FBI analysts, supervisory personnel, and attorneys from FBI’s Office of General Counsel (FBI OGC) are available to answer questions, and provide supporting documentation. The joint oversight team provides guidance on areas of potential improvement.

(U) At the FBI Headquarters reviews, with respect to minimization, the joint oversight team reviews documents related to FBI’s application of its Section 702 minimization procedures. The team reviews a sample of communications that FBI has marked in its systems as both meeting the retention standards and containing United States person information. The team also reviews all disseminations by the relevant FBI Headquarters unit of information acquired under Section 702 that FBI identified as potentially containing non-publicly available information concerning unconsenting U.S. person information.

(U) In addition to conducting minimization reviews at FBI Headquarters, during this reporting period, NSD continued to conduct minimization reviews at FBI field offices in order to review the retention and dissemination decisions made by FBI field office personnel with respect to Section 702-acquired data. During those field office reviews, NSD reviewed a sample of retention decisions made by FBI personnel in Section 702 cases and a sample of disseminations of information acquired under Section 702 that FBI identified as potentially containing non-publicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons. At those field office reviews, NSD also reviewed a sample of queries by FBI personnel in FBI systems that contain raw (unminimized) FISA-acquired information, including Section 702-acquired information. Those reviews are to ensure that the queries complied with the requirements in FBI’s FISA minimization procedures, including its Section 702 minimization procedures. In addition, as a result of a Court-ordered reporting requirement in the FISC’s *November 6, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order* for queries conducted after December 4, 2015, NSD reviews those queries to determine if any such queries were conducted solely for the purpose of returning evidence of a crime. If such a query was conducted, NSD would seek additional information from the relevant FBI personnel as to whether FBI personnel received and reviewed Section 702-acquired information of or concerning a U.S. person in response to such a query. Pursuant to the FISC’s opinion and order, such queries must subsequently be reported to the FISC.

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16 (S//NF) Supporting document includes, among other things, the joint oversight team reviews every file identified by FBI. The joint oversight team reviews every file identified by FBI.

17 (U) The FISC’s November 6, 2015 Opinion and Order approved the 2015 FISA Section 702 Certifications. On April 19, 2016, the DNI, in consultation with the Attorney General, released in redacted form, this November 6, 2015 Opinion and Order on the ODNI public website IC on the Record.

(S//NF) This November 6, 2015 FISC opinion’s formal, but classified, title is...
(U) As detailed in the attachments to the Attorney General’s Section 707 Report, NSD conducted minimization reviews at 13 FBI field offices during this reporting period and reviewed cases involving Section 702-tasked facilities.\(^{18}\) ODNI joined NSD at a subset of these reviews; ODNI receives written summaries regarding all the reviews from NSD regardless of whether ODNI was in attendance or not. These reviews are further discussed in Section IV below.

(S//NF) Separately, in order to evaluate the FBI’s acquisition and provision of , the joint oversight team conducts an annual process review with FBI’s technical personnel to ensure that these activities comply with applicable minimization procedures. The most recent annual process review occurred in April 2016.\(^{19}\)

(S//NF) As further described in detail in Appendix A, FBI nominates potential Section 702 targets to NSA. established internal compliance mechanisms and procedures to oversee proper implementation of its Section 702 authorities. These processes are further described in Appendix A.

(U) The joint oversight team also investigates potential incidents of noncompliance with the FBI targeting and minimization procedures, the Attorney General’s Acquisition Guidelines, or other agencies’ procedures in which FBI is involved.\(^{20}\) Those investigations are coordinated with FBI OGC and may involve requests for further information, meetings with FBI legal, analytical, and/or technical personnel, or review of source documentation. Compliance incidents identified by these investigations are reported to the congressional committees in the Section 707 Report and to the FISC.

(U) IV. Joint Oversight of NCTC

(U) As noted above, NCTC is also involved in implementing Section 702, albeit in a limited role, as reflected in the “Minimization Procedures Used by NCTC in connection with Information Acquired by the FBI pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, as amended.” During this reporting period, under these limited minimization procedures, NCTC was not authorized to receive unminimized Section 702 data, but NCTC had access to certain FBI systems containing minimized Section 702 information. As part of the joint oversight of NCTC to ensure compliance with these procedures, NSD and ODNI conduct reviews of NCTC’s access, receipt, and processing of Section 702 information received from FBI. NSD conducted the most recent review at NCTC for this reporting

\(^{18}\) (S//NF) During those field office reviews, NSD reviewed \(\) cases involving Section 702-tasked facilities.

\(^{19}\) (S//NF) A more recent review was conducted in March 2017, which falls outside this Joint Assessment’s reporting period.

\(^{20}\) (U) Insofar as FBI nominates facilities for tasking and reviews content that may indicate that a target is located in the United States or is a U.S. person, some investigations of possible noncompliance with the NSA targeting procedures can also involve FBI.
period in May 2016. As referenced in footnote 3, subsequent to this reporting period, NCTC was authorized to receive unminimized Section 702 information. NCTC’s processing, retention, and dissemination of such information is subject to its 2016 Minimization Procedures.

(U) V. Interagency/Programmatic Oversight

(U) Because the implementation and oversight of the Government’s Section 702 authorities are a multi-agency effort, investigations of particular compliance incidents may involve more than one agency. The resolution of particular compliance incidents can provide lessons learned for all agencies. Robust communication among the agencies is required for each to effectively implement its authorities, gather foreign intelligence information, and comply with all legal requirements. For these reasons, NSD and ODNI conduct twice monthly telephone calls and quarterly meetings (in addition to ad hoc calls and meetings on specific topics as needed) with representatives from all agencies implementing Section 702 authorities to discuss and resolve interagency issues affecting compliance with the statute and applicable procedures. Additionally, NSD and ODNI conduct weekly telephone calls with NSA to address outstanding compliance matters and work through the process of understanding those matters and reporting incidents to the FISC.

(U) NSD and ODNI’s programmatic oversight also involves efforts to proactively minimize the number of incidents of noncompliance. For example, NSD and ODNI have required agencies to demonstrate to the joint oversight team new or substantially revised systems involved in Section 702 targeting or minimization prior to implementation. NSD and ODNI personnel also continue to work with the agencies to review and, where appropriate, seek modifications of their targeting and minimization procedures in an effort to enhance the Government’s collection of foreign intelligence information, civil liberties protections, and compliance.

(U) VI. Training

(U) In addition to specific instructions to personnel directly involved in certain incidents of noncompliance discussed in Section 4, the agencies and the joint oversight team have also continued their training efforts to ensure compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures. NSA updated its compliance training course in November 2016. All NSA personnel are required to complete this course on an annual basis in order to gain or maintain access to raw Section 702 data. Additionally, NSA continued providing training on a more informal and ad hoc basis by issuing training reminders and compliance advisories to analysts concerning new or updated guidance to maintain compliance with the Section 702 procedures. Those training reminders and compliance advisories are e-mailed to individual analysts and maintained on an internal agency website where personnel can obtain information about specific types of Section 702-related issues and compliance matters.

(U) CIA continues to provide regular FISA training at least twice a year to all of the attorneys it embeds with CIA operational personnel. Additionally, CIA has a required training program for anyone handling raw Section 702-acquired data that provides hands-on experience with handling and minimizing Section 702-acquired data, as well as the Section 702 nomination process;

21 (U) On August 23, 2017, NSA’s training course transcript FISA Amendments Act Section 702, along with other NSA training documents pertaining to Section 702, were posted, in redacted form, on IC on the Record.
during this reporting period, CIA continued to implement this training, which is required for all personnel who nominate facilities to NSA and/or minimize Section 702-acquired communications.

(U) FBI has similarly continued implementing its online training programs regarding Section 702 nominations, minimization, and other related requirements. Completion of those FBI online training programs is required of all FBI personnel who request access to Section 702 information. NSD and FBI have also conducted in-person trainings at multiple FBI field offices. For example, during this current reporting period, NSD and FBI continued to provide additional focused training at FBI field offices on the Section 702 minimization procedures, including training FBI field personnel on the attorney-client privileged communication provisions of FBI’s minimization procedures. 22  NSD training at FBI field offices also included training on the reporting requirement from the FISC’s November 6, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Order regarding the 2015 FISA Section 702 Certifications. As discussed above, this reporting requirement applies to queries conducted after December 4, 2015, that were conducted solely for the purpose of returning evidence of a crime and returned Section 702-acquired information of or concerning a U.S. person that was reviewed by FBI personnel.

(U) SECTION 3: TRENDS IN SECTION 702 TARGETING AND MINIMIZATION

(U) In conducting the above-described oversight program, NSD, ODNI, and the agencies have collected a substantial amount of data regarding the implementation of Section 702. In this section, a comprehensive collection of this data has been compiled in order to identify overall trends in the agencies’ targeting, minimization, and compliance.

(U) I. Trends in NSA Targeting and Minimization

(U) NSA provides to the joint oversight team the average approximate number of facilities that were under collection on any given day during the reporting period. Because the actual number of facilities tasked remains classified, 23 the figure charting the average number of facilities under collection is classified as well. Since the inception of the program, the total number of facilities under collection during each reporting period has steadily increased with the exception of two reporting periods that experienced minor decreases. 24

22 (U) This specific training began before and continued after the current reporting period of June 1, 2016 – November 30, 2016.

23 (U) The provided number of facilities, on average, subject to acquisition during the reporting period remains classified and is different from the unclassified estimated number of targets affected by Section 702 released by the ODNI most recently in its 2016 Transparency Report. The classified numbers estimate the number of facilities subject to Section 702 acquisition, whereas the unclassified numbers provided in the Transparency Report estimate the number of Section 702 targets. As noted in the Transparency Report, the number of 702 ‘targets’ reflects an estimate of the number of known users of particular facilities, subject to intelligence collection under those Certifications. The classified number of facilities account for those facilities subject to Section 702 acquisition during the current six month reporting period, whereas the Transparency Report estimates the number of targets affected by Section 702 during the calendar year.

24 (U) One of the reporting periods in which the total number of facilities under collection decreased occurred prior to 2010 and is not reflected in the Figure 4.
Figure 4 is classified TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

More specifically, NSA reports that, on average, approximately facilities were under collection pursuant to the applicable certifications on any given day during the reporting period. This represents a 17.1 percent increase from the approximately facilities under collection on any given day in the last reporting period.

(U) The above statistics describe the average number of facilities under collection at any given time during the reporting period. The total number of newly tasked facilities during the reporting period provides another useful metric. Classified Figure 5 charts the total monthly numbers of newly tasked facilities since 2010.

25 (S//NF) The applicable certifications for this reporting period were

26 (U) The term newly tasked facilities refers to any facility that was added to collection under a certification. This term includes any facility added to collection pursuant to the Section 702 targeting procedures; some of these newly tasked facilities are therefore facilities that had been previously tasked for collection, were detasked, and now have been retasked.
Figure 5: (TS//SI//NF) New Taskings by Month (Yearly Average for 2010 through 2015)

(S//SI//NF) Specifically, NSA provided documentation of new taskings during the reporting period. This represents a 22.4 percent increase in new taskings from the previous reporting period.

(S//SI//NF) NSA tasked an average of telephony facilities in 2015. During the first eleven months of 2016, NSA has tasked an average of telephony facilities. This represents a percent increase in the average monthly telephony facilities in the first eleven months of 2016 compared to 2015.

(S//SI//NF) NSA tasked an average of electronic communications accounts in 2015. During the first eleven months of 2016, NSA tasked an average of electronic communication accounts (a percent increase from the 2015 monthly average).

(U) With respect to minimization, NSA identified to the joint oversight team the number of serialized reports NSA generated based upon minimized Section 702-acquired data, and provided NSD and ODNI access to all reports NSA identified as containing United States person information. Figure 6 contains the classified number of serialized reports and reports identified as

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27 (U) Previous joint assessments referred to those reports containing minimized Section 702- or Protect America Act (PAA)-acquired information. However, given that Section 702 of FAA replaced the PAA in 2008, the Government no longer disseminates minimized information that was previously acquired pursuant to PAA. However, Figure 6 provides
containing United States person information over the last ten reporting periods. The NSD and ODNI review revealed that the United States person information was at least initially masked in the vast majority of circumstances.\textsuperscript{28} The number of serialized reports NSA has identified as containing United States person information slightly decreased for the third consecutive reporting period.

\textbf{Figure 6: (S//NF) Total Disseminated NSA Serialized Reports Based Upon Section 702-Acquired Data and Number of Such Reports NSA Identified as Containing USP Information}

Specifically, in this reporting period NSA identified to NSD and ODNI serialized reports based upon minimized Section 702-acquired data. This represents a 7.6 percent decrease from the serialized reports NSA identified in the prior reporting period. Figure 6 reflects NSA reporting over the last ten reporting periods; this is the first and only decrease for these ten reporting periods.

\textbf{(S//NF)} Figure 6 also shows the number of these serialized reports that NSA identified as containing United States person information. During this reporting period, NSA identified serialized reports as containing United States person information derived from Section 702-acquired

\textsuperscript{28} (U) NSA generally “masks” United States person information by replacing the name or other identifying information of the United States person with a generic term, such as “United States person #1.” Agencies may request that NSA “unmask” the United States person identity. Prior to such unmasking, NSA must determine that the United States person’s identity meets the applicable standards in NSA’s minimization procedures.
data. The percentage of reports containing United States person information was lower this reporting period (8.4 percent) than the 8.5 percent, 9.0 percent, and 9.7 percent reported in the three prior reporting periods.

(U) II. Trends in FBI Targeting

(U) Under Section 702, NSA designates and submits facilities to FBI for acquisition of communications from certain facilities that have been previously approved for Section 702 acquisition under the NSA targeting procedures. FBI applies its own targeting procedures with regard to these designated accounts. FBI reports to the joint oversight team the specific number of facilities designated by NSA and the number of NSA designated-facilities that FBI approved. As detailed below, the number of facilities designated for acquisition has increased from the past reporting period, which is consistent with the general trend in prior reporting periods.

(U) As classified Figure 7 details, FBI approves the vast majority of NSA’s designated facilities and this percentage has been consistently high. The high level of approval can be attributed to the fact that the NSA-designated facilities have already been evaluated and found to meet the NSA targeting procedures. FBI may not approve NSA’s request for acquisition of a designated facility for several reasons, including withdrawal of the request because the potential data to be acquired is no longer of foreign intelligence interest, or because FBI has uncovered information causing NSA and/or FBI to question whether the user or users of the facility are non-United States persons located outside the United States. Historically, the joint oversight team notes that for those accounts not approved by FBI, only a small portion were rejected on the basis that they were ineligible for Section 702 collection.

(U) Between 2010 and December 2013, the yearly average of designated facilities approved by FBI steadily increased. The yearly average of designated facilities approved by FBI in 2014 slightly decreased, and then increased again in 2015. Between January and November 2016, the number of designated facilities approved by FBI each month has varied. NSD and ODNI have continued to track the number of facilities approved by FBI in 2016 and will incorporate this information into future Joint Assessments.
(U) Figure 7 is classified SECRET//NOFORN.

(S//SI//NF) Specifically, FBI reports that NSA designated [redacted] accounts [redacted] during the reporting period – an average of [redacted] designated accounts per month. This is a [redacted] percent increase from the [redacted] accounts designated in the prior six-month reporting period.

(S//NF) FBI approved [redacted] requests [redacted].

(U) As indicated in prior Joint Assessments, the Government was previously able to provide figures regarding the number of reports FBI had identified as containing minimized Section 702-acquired United States person information. However, in 2013, FBI transitioned much of its dissemination of Section 702-acquired information from FBI Headquarters to FBI field offices. NSD conducts oversight reviews at multiple FBI field offices each year, some of which ODNI attends, and during those reviews, NSD reviews a sample of the Section 702 disseminations issued by the respective field office. Because every field office is not reviewed every six months, NSD no longer has comprehensive numbers on the number of disseminations of Section 702-acquired United States person information made by FBI. FBI does, however, report comparable information on an annual basis to Congress and the FISC pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l)(3)(i).
(U) **III. Trends in CIA Minimization**

(U) CIA only identifies for NSD and ODNI disseminations of Section 702-acquired United States person information. Classified Figure 8 compiles the number of such disseminations of reports containing United States person information identified in the last ten reporting periods (December 2011 – May 2012 through the current period of June - November 2016). In the first five reporting periods, the number of CIA-identified disseminations containing United States person information, while always low, decreased. In the sixth reporting period, the number of CIA-identified disseminations containing United States person information, while still low, increased. In the seventh and eight reporting periods, the number of CIA-identified disseminations containing United States person information again decreased. In this reporting period and the prior reporting period, the number of CIA-identified disseminations containing United States person information increased.

**Figure 8:** (S//NF) Disseminations Identified by CIA as Containing Minimized Section 702-Acquired United States Person Information (Excluding Certain Disseminations to NCTC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Disseminations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2011</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2012</td>
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<td>June 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(U) Figure 8 is classified **SECRET//NOFORN**.

(S//NF) During this reporting period, CIA identified [redacted] disseminations of Section 702-acquired data containing minimized United States person information. This is a [redacted] percent increase from the [redacted] such disseminations CIA made in the prior reporting period and is the highest number of such disseminations since the June 2011 through November 2011 reporting period. [redacted], and as reported in prior Joint Assessments, CIA also permits some personnel with NSD and ODNI, however,
review all data containing Section 702-acquired information that CIA has identified as potentially containing United States person information to ensure compliance with CIA’s minimization procedures.

(U) CIA also tracks the number of files its personnel determine are appropriate for broader access and longer-term retention. The CIA minimization procedures must be applied to those files before they are retained or transferred to systems with broader access.\textsuperscript{33} Classified Figure 9 details the total number of files that were either retained or transferred, as well as the number of those retained or transferred files that contain identified United States person information.\textsuperscript{34} Beginning in the middle of the reporting period covered by the thirteenth Joint Assessment (dated September 2015), CIA began reporting the number of files CIA transferred to systems with broader access, instead of the number of files retained in systems of limited access, as the number of transferred files provides a more accurate portrayal of CIA’s use of Section 702-acquired information. This current assessment reports the total number of files CIA transferred from May 2016 through November 2016. For reference, however, the number of files retained from prior assessment periods is also displayed in the Figure below.\textsuperscript{35} In all reporting periods, the number of retained or transferred files identified by CIA as potentially containing United States person information has been consistently a very small percentage of the total number of retained or transferred files.

\textsuperscript{33} (S//NF) In making these retention decisions, CIA personnel are required to identify any files potentially containing United States person information.

\textsuperscript{34} (U) As reported in the eleventh Joint Assessment (October 2014), CIA determined in September 2014 that characterizations in prior assessments of the number of files having been “transferred” was not the most appropriate term as some files had been retained for long term retention but had not been transferred to systems of broader access. Consequently, the numbers of files for which CIA had made a retention decision were re-characterized as having been “retained.” Because the terms transferred and retained attempt to describe the same authorized actions under CIA’s Minimization Procedures, this Joint Assessment just refers to retention decisions.
(S//NF) For this reporting period, CIA analysts transferred a total of [REDACTED] of which were identified by CIA as containing a communication with potential United States person information. This is a [REDACTED] percent increase in the number of files transferred when compared with the previous reporting period when [REDACTED] of which contained potential United States person information.

(U) SECTION 4: COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT – FINDINGS

(U) The joint oversight team finds that during this reporting period, the agencies have continued to implement the procedures and follow the guidelines in a manner that reflects a focused and concerted effort by agency personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702. The personnel involved in implementing the authorities are appropriately directing their efforts at non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States for the purpose of

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36 (S//NF) The Government mistakenly reported the number of files CIA transferred that contain identified United States person information [REDACTED] between June 2015 and November 2015 in the Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (Nov. 2016). The Government inadvertently counted for part of the reporting period [REDACTED] Thus, the correct number of files CIA transferred that contain identified United States person information between June 2015 and November 2015 [REDACTED]
acquiring foreign intelligence information. Processes have been put in place to implement these authorities and to impose internal controls for compliance and verification purposes.

(U) The compliance incidents during the reporting period represent a very small percentage of the overall collection activity. Based upon a review of the reported compliance incidents, the joint oversight team does not believe that these incidents represent an intentional attempt to circumvent or violate the procedures required by the Act.

(U) As noted in prior reports, in the cooperative environment the implementing agencies have established, an action by one agency can result in an incident of noncompliance with another agency’s procedures. It is also important to note that a single incident can have broader implications.

(U) Each of the compliance incidents for this current reporting period is described in detail in the corresponding Section 707 Report. The Joint Assessment provides NSD and ODNI’s analysis of those compliance incidents in an effort to identify existing patterns or trends that might identify the underlying causes of those incidents. The joint oversight team then considers whether and how those underlying causes could be addressed through additional remedial or proactive measures and assesses whether the agency involved has implemented appropriate procedures to prevent recurrences. The joint oversight team continues to assist in the development of such measures, some of which are detailed below, especially as it pertains to investigating whether additional and/or new system automation may assist in preventing compliance incidents.

(U) I. Compliance Incidents – General

(U) A. Statistical Data Relating To Compliance Incidents

(S//NF) As noted in the Section 707 Report, there were a total of compliance incidents that involved noncompliance with NSA’s targeting or minimization procedures and compliance incidents involving noncompliance with FBI’s targeting and minimization procedures, for a total of incidents involving NSA and/or FBI procedures. During this reporting period, there were identified incidents of noncompliance with CIA’s minimization procedures. There was one identified instance of noncompliance by an electronic communication service provider issued a directive pursuant to Section 702(h) of FISA.

(U) Figure 10 puts those compliance incidents in the context of the average number of facilities subject to acquisition on any given day during the reporting period:

37 (U) As is discussed in the Section 707 report and herein, some compliance incidents involve more than one element of the Intelligence Community. Incidents have therefore been grouped not by the agency “at fault,” but instead by the set of procedures with which actions have been noncompliant.

38 (S//NF) The Attorney General’s Section 707 report provides further details with respect to any particular incident.
Figure 10: Compliance Incident Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance incidents during reporting period (June 1, 2016 – November 30, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of facilities on average subject to acquisition during the reporting period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance incident rate: number of incidents divided by average facilities subject to acquisition</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) The compliance incident rate continues to remain below one percent, with the current rate of 0.88 percent representing an increase from the 0.45 percent compliance incident rate in the prior reporting period. This increase is largely attributable to an increase in two types of incidents (discussed in detail later in this report): (1) tasking incidents with a common fact pattern whereby certain NSA personnel misunderstood—and thus consistently misapplied—one of the requirements of NSA’s targeting procedures and (2) minimization errors involving United States person identities being queried in Section 702 upstream collection. Both types of incidents included errors that largely occurred before this reporting period but were reported during this reporting period. If these two types of incidents are not included in this current reporting period, the compliance incident rate would have been 0.40 percent (as opposed to 0.88 percent). In addition, although the compliance incident rate increased to 0.88 percent during this reporting period, the joint oversight team notes that the compliance incident rate significantly decreased in the next reporting period to 0.37 percent.

(U) The decrease in the compliance incident rate in the next reporting period will be discussed in the next joint assessment. The number of notification delays increased during this reporting period to more than double the number reported in the last several reporting periods. If the notification delays incidents are not included in the calculation, the overall compliance incident rate for this reporting period is 0.82 percent. This information is explained below and detailed in Figure 11.

(U) While the incident rate remains below one percent, this percentage in and of itself does not provide a full measure of compliance in the program. A single incident, for example, may have broad ramifications and may involve multiple facilities. Other incidents, such as notification delays (described further below) may occur with frequency, but have limited significance with respect to United States person information.

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39 (U) The FISC’s April 26, 2017, Opinion addressed the latter type of error.

40 (U) The Joint Assessment has traditionally compared the number of compliance incidents to the number of average tasked facilities. Using the number of average facilities subject to acquisition as the denominator provides a general proxy for an activity level that is relevant from a compliance perspective. That is, the joint oversight team believes that the number of targeted facilities generally comports with the number of activities that could result in compliance incidents (e.g., taskings, detaskings, disseminations, and queries). Tracking this rate over consecutive years allows one to discern general trends as to how the Section 702 program is functioning overall from a compliance standpoint.
(U) The joint oversight team assesses that another measure of substantive compliance with the applicable targeting and minimization procedures is to compare the compliance incident rate excluding these notification delays. Figure 11 shows that adjusted rate:

Figure 11: (U) Compliance Incident Rate (as the number of incidents divided by the number of average facilities tasked), Not including Notification Delays

(U) Figure 11 is UNCLASSIFIED.

(U) As Figure 11 demonstrates, the adjusted compliance incident rate calculated without the notification delays is 0.82 percent, which is higher than what was reported in the prior reporting period (0.42 percent), but still below 1 percent. While the underlying causes of the compliance incident rate are discussed later in this assessment, especially those that impacted this period’s noticeably higher rate, as the Director of National Intelligence explained on June 7, 2017, during an open hearing in front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ODNI and DOJ’s reviews have revealed an extremely low incident rate. The DNI explained that, while mistakes have occurred, “any system with zero compliance incidents is a broken compliance system because humans make mistakes.” The DNI emphasized that when the government finds compliance incidents, those incidents are reported and corrected.

(U) The joint oversight team assesses that the consistently low compliance incident rate of less than 1 percent is a result of training, internal processes designed to identify and remediate potential compliance issues, and a continued focus by internal and external oversight personnel to ensure compliance with the applicable targeting and minimization procedures.

(U) B. Categories of Compliance Incidents

(U) Most of the compliance incidents occurring during the reporting period involved non-compliance with the NSA’s targeting or minimization procedures. This largely reflects the centrality of NSA’s targeting and minimization efforts in the Government’s implementation of the
Section 702 authority. The compliance incidents involving NSA’s targeting or minimization procedures have generally fallen into the following categories:

- **(U) Tasking Issues.** This category involves incidents where noncompliance with the targeting procedures resulted in an error in the initial tasking of the facility.

- **(U) Detasking Issues.** This category involves incidents in which the facility was properly tasked in accordance with the targeting procedures, but errors in the detasking of the facility caused noncompliance with the targeting procedures.

- **(U) Overcollection.** This category involves incidents in which NSA’s collection systems, in the process of attempting to acquire the communications of properly tasked facilities, also acquired data regarding untasked facilities, resulting in “overcollection.”

- **(U) Notification Delays.** This category involves incidents in which a facility was properly tasked in accordance with the targeting procedures, but a notification requirement contained in the targeting procedures was not satisfied.

- **(U) Documentation Issues.** This category involves incidents where the determination to target a facility was not properly documented as required by the targeting procedures.

- **(U) Minimization Issues.** This category involves NSA’s compliance with its minimization procedures.

- **(U) Other Issues.** This category involves incidents that do not fall into one of the six above categories.

In some instances, an incident may involve more than one category of noncompliance.

(U) These categories are helpful for purposes of reporting and understanding the compliance incidents. Because the actual number of incidents remains classified, Figure 12A depicts the percentage of compliance incidents in each category that occurred during this reporting period, whereas Figure 12B provides that actual classified number of incidents.

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41 (U) The overcollection category was not included in the previous joint assessment because there were no such incidents during that reporting period. It is included in this joint assessment because there was one overcollection incident during the current reporting period.

42 (U) As described in the Section 707 Report, not all documentation errors are separately enumerated as compliance incidents.
Figure 12A: (U) Percentage Breakdown of Compliance Incidents Involving the NSA Targeting and Minimization Procedures

June 1, 2016 - November 30, 2016

- 35.3% Tasking
- 42.5% Detasking
- 7.5% Minimization
- 5.9% Documentation
- 1.9% Notification
- 0.1% Other
- 6.8% Other

(U) Figure 12A is UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 12B: (S//NF) Number of Compliance Incidents Involving the NSA Targeting and Minimization Procedures

(U) Figure 12B is classified SECRET//NOFORN
(U) As Figures 12A and 12B demonstrate, the proportion of notification delays, which used to constitute the predominant share of incidents, remains low. Tasking and detasking incidents often involve more substantive compliance incidents insofar as they can (but do not always) involve collection involving a facility used by a United States person or an individual located in the United States. Furthermore, incidents of noncompliance with minimization procedures are also a focus of the joint oversight team because these types of incidents may involve information concerning United States persons.

(S//NF) More specifically, the number of tasking incidents increased; detasking incidents slightly increased; minimization incidents increased; documentation incidents increased; and “other” category incidents increased. The number of notification delays increased. There was one overcollection incident in this period, which is higher than the zero overcollection incidents reported for the prior period.

(U) Figure 13 depicts the compliance incident rates, as compared to the average facilities on task, for tasking and detasking incidents over the previous reporting periods. While these tasking and detasking incidents are grouped in a single chart for a comparison, the tasking and detasking incidents are not relational to each other, i.e. an increase or decrease in the rate of tasking incidents does not result in an increase or decrease in the detasking incident rate.

Figure 13: (U) Tasking and Detasking Incident Compliance Rates

(U) Over the time periods covered in the above chart, the tasking and detasking incident compliance rate has varied by fractions of a percentage point as compared to the average size of the collection. Tasking errors cover a variety of incidents, ranging from the tasking of an account that the Government should have known was used by a United States person or an individual located in...
the United States to typographical errors in the initial tasking of the account that affect no United States persons or persons located in the United States.\textsuperscript{43} The tasking incident compliance rate involving facilities used by United States persons was less than 0.01 percent, which was substantially lower than the overall tasking incident compliance rate. Detasking errors more often involve a facility used by a United States person or an individual located in the United States, who may or may not have been the targeted user.\textsuperscript{44} The percentage of compliance incidents involving such detasking incidents has remained consistently low.\textsuperscript{45} The detasking compliance incident rate involving facilities used by United States persons was also less than 0.01 percent.

(U) With respect to FBI’s targeting and minimization procedures, the total number of identified targeting and minimization errors also remained low, as consistent with past reporting periods.\textsuperscript{46} Because the fluctuation in FBI’s compliance incident rate has remained so low (from less than 0.01 percent to 0.01 percent), the joint oversight team assessed that it would be helpful to include a new chart in this Joint Assessment showing the classified number of incidents for each of the last several reporting periods. This classified chart better illustrates the small changes from period to period. The joint oversight team assesses that FBI’s overall compliance with its targeting and minimization procedures is a result of FBI’s training and the processes it has designed to effectuate its procedures.

\textsuperscript{43} (U) As discussed in detail in the 15th Joint Assessment, the significant increase in tasking errors during that reporting period was substantially caused by one particular NSA targeting office’s misunderstanding of the requirements of the targeting procedures. As a result, that particular targeting office was required to retake the formal NSA Section 702 online training. See The 15th Joint Assessment, pp. 35 – 36. The current reporting period’s increased tasking error was not caused by a single targeting office’s misunderstanding of the rules, but a number of the tasking errors consisted of a common fact pattern. Section II below discusses in detail the cause of the increased tasking errors during this current reporting period; however many of the taskings errors identified and counted during this reporting period actually occurred in pervious reporting period(s). These tasking errors that involved a common fact pattern almost exclusively involved facilities used by non-United States persons who were located outside of the United States.

\textsuperscript{44} (U) NSD and ODNI note that the above incident rates fluctuate by hundredths of a percentage point. Any perceived significant fluctuation is due to the scale of the graph (.00 to .25 percent). If, for example, the chart used a 0% to 1% scale to show fluctuations, the chart would show two virtually flat lines hugging the bottom. NSD and ODNI do not believe that the different incident rates are statistically significant and note that the incident rate is consistently quite low.

\textsuperscript{45} (U) NSD and ODNI note that the above incident rates fluctuate by hundredths of a percentage point. Any perceived significant fluctuation is due to the scale of the graph (.00 to .25 percent). If, for example, the chart used a 0% to 1% scale to show fluctuations, the chart would show two virtually flat lines hugging the bottom. NSD and ODNI do not believe that the different incident rates are statistically significant and note that the incident rate is consistently quite low.
II. Review of Compliance Incidents – NSA Targeting and Minimization Procedures

(U) As with the prior Joint Assessment, this Joint Assessment takes a broad approach and discusses the trends, patterns, and underlying causes of the compliance incidents reported in the Section 707 Report. The joint oversight team believes that analyzing the trends of those incidents, especially in regard to their causes, helps the agencies focus resources, avoid future incidents, and improve overall compliance. The Joint Assessment primarily focuses on incidents involving NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures, the volume and nature of which are better-suited to detecting such patterns and trends. The following subsections examine incidents of non-compliance
involving NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures. Most of those incidents did not involve United States persons, and instead involved matters such as typographical or other tasking errors, detasking delays with respect to facilities used by non-United States persons who may have entered the United States, or notification delays. Some incidents during this reporting period did, however, involve United States persons. United States persons were primarily impacted by: (1) tasking errors that led to the tasking of facilities used by United States persons; (2) delays in detasking facilities after NSA determined that the user of the facility was a United States person; and (3) non-compliance with the NSA’s minimization procedures involving the unintentional improper dissemination, retention, or querying of Section 702 information.

(U) In the subsections that follow, this Joint Assessment examines some of the underlying causes of incidents of non-compliance, including focusing on incidents in this period that contributed to the increased compliance incident rate of 0.88 percent. In the previous reporting period, the compliance incident rate was 0.45 percent. While the current incident rate still remains under 1 percent, the joint oversight team determined that the overall incident rate was significantly impacted by two types of errors. This Joint Assessment first begins by examining those two subsets of errors that contributed significantly to the increased overall incident rate. It then focuses on examining and explaining other incidents that have the greatest potential to impact United States persons’ privacy interests, even though those incidents represent a minority of the overall incidents.

(U) A. Errors That Resulted in the Increased Number of Incidents

(U) During this reporting period, the joint oversight team attributed the overall increase in incidents to a significant increase in a particular type of tasking error and minimization error that occurred prior to and during this reporting period. First, NSA’s tasking errors increased in this reporting period as a result of discussions between NSA and the joint oversight team on a certain type of tasked facilities consisting of a similar fact pattern that the oversight team identified as potentially inappropriate. Those incidents were reported during this reporting period; however the actual tasking of these facilities occurred both prior to and during this reporting period. Second, incidents related to compliance with NSA’s standard minimization procedures significantly increased in this reporting period because an NSA investigation, which revealed a systemic problem regarding queries using United States person identifiers, identified new compliance incidents involving queries conducted as early as 2014. Absent these tasking and query incidents, which occurred both during and outside this reporting period, the compliance incident rate for this reporting period would have been 0.40 percent, rather than 0.88 percent, representing an overall decrease in compliance incidents from the last reporting period.

(U) 1. Tasking Errors that Contributed to the Increase in Compliance Incidents

(U) During this reporting period, the joint oversight team attributed the overall increase in tasking incidents to agency personnel misunderstanding and, thus, consistently misapplying one of
the requirements of NSA’s targeting procedures; these particular errors accounted for 50 percent of all tasking incidents.  

If this group of tasking errors that consisted of a common fact pattern were excluded, the total number of tasking errors would have decreased from the prior reporting period. As it pertained to those 50 percent of tasking errors, at the time of tasking, NSA had sufficiently established that the users were non-United States persons located outside the United States.  In tasking these facilities, NSA intended to acquire foreign intelligence information related to a specific group listed in Exhibit F of a particular certification. On further review, NSD and ODNI concluded that NSA could not have reasonably expected the users of those tasked facilities to possess, receive, or likely communicate foreign intelligence information as required by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) related to an Exhibit F group. The majority of those incidents were discovered through the joint oversight team’s bi-monthly reviews of all newly tasked Section 702 selectors. Most of these facilities were tasked between June 2014 and January 2016, but were reported during this reporting period following NSD and ODNI’s review of additional information provided by NSA regarding these facilities and following further discussion with NSA. After discussing those tasking errors and the surrounding facts with NSA, the joint oversight team worked with NSA to develop guidance to help proactively address those types of future taskings. Additionally, NSA detasked the facilities subject to this compliance matter and purged any collection as required by their minimization procedures.

(U) NSA ultimately determined that two of the tasked facilities were used by U.S. persons and promptly detasked those facilities. The joint oversight team assesses that NSA’s tasking of these facilities was not in error with respect to its foreignness determinations and assessments of non-U.S. person status of the users at the time of tasking.
2. Minimization Errors that Contributed to the Increase in Compliance Incidents

(U) As reported in the previous Joint Assessment, the joint oversight team learned of a substantial number of improper queries discovered by NSA’s OCO and Office of the Inspector General (OIG) involving United States person identifiers queried in Section 702 upstream collection. Because the joint oversight team learned of the queries discovered by NSA’s OCO and OIG during the previous Joint Assessment reporting period, they were discussed in the previous Joint Assessment, but not considered when calculating the compliance incident rate for that reporting period since many of them fell outside that joint assessment’s reporting period. Thus, this joint assessment continues the discussion and counts the applicable errors towards the compliance incident rate for the current reporting period. Specifically, the improper queries discovered by NSA’s OCO and OIG account for 88 percent of all minimization incidents during this current reporting period.53

(U) As background, NSA’s Section 702 minimization procedures in effect prior to April 26, 2017, prohibited NSA from conducting queries of Internet upstream data using identifiers of known United States persons. In light of the restructuring of the Section 702 upstream collection program and the elimination of “abouts” communications from Section 702 upstream collection,54 NSA’s 2016 Section 702 Minimization Procedures, approved by the FISC on April 26, 2017, no longer prohibit the use of United States person identifiers to query Internet communications acquired through NSA’s upstream collection techniques. The NSA query incidents discussed in this Joint Assessment were governed by NSA’s minimization procedures that were in effect prior to April 26, 2017.

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54 (U) On April 28, 2017, NSA publicly posted on its website at www.nsa.gov the statement, “NSA Stops Certain Section 702 ‘Upstream’ Activities,” in which NSA explained its upstream activities under Section 702.
(U) Many of the improper upstream queries were initially identified by the NSA OIG in a study conducted between January and March 2015 and reported in January 2016. See Report on the Special Study of NSA Controls to Comply the FISA Amendments Act §§ 704 and 705(b) Targeting and Minimization Procedures, dated January 7, 2016 (hereafter the January 2016 OIG Report).\(^{55}\)

The study included queries of United States person identifiers associated with Section 704 or 705(b) targets. The January 2016 OIG Report noted that NSA’s former Oversight and Compliance (O&C) section assessed that the upstream queries of Section 702 were conducted because analysts had not removed Section 702 upstream authority from their search criteria that had automatically defaulted based on the analysts’ access credentials\(^{56}\) or had not included other appropriate limiters to prevent Section 702 upstream data from being queried. See January 2016 OIG Report, p. 8.

\(^{(S//SI//NF)}\) NSA then initiated additional compliance verification studies of queries of upstream data to address the OIG findings. NSA determined that human error was the primary factor in all of the improper queries identified, even though the analysts were knowledgeable of the prohibition against querying United States person identifiers in Section 702 upstream data.\(^{57}\) Specifically, the majority of the improper queries were caused when an analyst failed to de-select Section 702 upstream data from the list of authorities even though the analyst knew that he or she was conducting a query using a United States person identifier. For some of the other improper queries, analysts conducted reasonable due diligence to determine whether their queries included one or more United States person identifiers and evidence of United States person status was returned by NSA systems, but due to the amount or complexity of information presented by some of the NSA systems, analysts overlooked the evidence of United States person status and failed to limit the subsequent query accordingly. The remaining identified improper upstream queries resulted from a lack of due diligence by analysts. Before conducting any query, NSA analysts are trained to take certain steps to determine whether an identifier to be queried is associated with a United States person. For those queries, the analysts failed to take all of the necessary steps before conducting the query.

\(^{(TS//SI//NF)}\) NSA conducted another study (between November and December 2016) to further understand the scope of the issue. In that study, NSA reviewed known United States person identifiers not associated with Section 704 or 705(b) targets that were approved for querying in connection with certain terrorism-related events that occurred in the United States to determine whether those identifiers were improperly queried in Section 702 upstream data. As a result, NSA determined that United States person identifiers were improperly queried against upstream data.

\(^{55}\) (U) NSA publicly released, in redacted form, the January 2016 OIG Report on May 11, 2017, on the ODNI website IC on the Record.

\(^{56}\) (S//NF) Specifically, the included all authorities to which analysts were entitled access on the basis of their credentials. NSA now knows that issue occurred not only in legacy systems, but in its modernized systems as well.

\(^{57}\) (U//FOUO) Only one analyst was unaware of the prohibition. That analyst received the Section 702 training, but did not take away from the training the rule that United States person identifiers cannot be queried in Section 702 upstream data. This analyst has since received additional guidance.
NSA determined that a significant number of the improper queries were a result of human error. In addition, [S//SI//NF] the NSA OIG conducted another review of queries – this time of certain known United States person identifiers in Section 702 data for the period of January through March 2016. The OIG found that the root causes of the improper upstream queries identified through this review were similar to the causes previously identified in its January 2016 report – analysts had not removed the Section 702 upstream authority from their query criteria or had not included other appropriate limiters to prevent Section 702 upstream data from being queried.
(U) NSA completed a number of actions during this reporting period to address those compliance incidents. In September 2016, NSA issued a compliance advisory to its workforce highlighting best practices to avoid non-compliant queries. In late November 2016, NSA issued another compliance advisory to its workforce explaining the relevant query restrictions when querying Section 702 data. In addition, NSA issued a compliance advisory advising analysts not to use certain systems to conduct queries using known United States person identifiers. NSA also conducted training for analysts and query auditors and provided a compliance advisory to the workforce that requires analysts to include in their query justifications the fact that an identifier is known to be associated with a United States person when that is the case.

(U) NSA has also implemented technical improvements to address this issue. NSA deployed a change to how analysts select Section 702 data in a particular tool. Analysts must now affirmatively select datasets in creating a query. As of December 2016, NSA analysts who are using this tool are required to make an affirmative, conscious decision as to which data sources the query will run against. This change applies to all interfaces in the tool. NSA deployed technical adjustments to certain frequently used interfaces of this tool that requires analysts to affirmatively specify when their intent is to make a query using a United States person identifier. If an analyst indicates that the intent is to include a U.S. person identifier, these interfaces do not provide the option to query Section 702 upstream data.

(U) Subsequent to this review period, the NSA OIG conducted another study that revealed additional improper queries of Section 702-acquired information. The results of that study have not been finalized. The joint oversight team will provide an update on that study in a future joint assessment after the OIG report has been finalized.

(U) In addition, subsequent to this reporting period, NSA restructured its Section 702 collection program to no longer include any upstream Internet communications that are solely “about” a foreign intelligence target. As NSA explained in a public statement, the changes to its Section 702 program were “designed to retain the upstream collection that provides the greatest value to national security while reducing the likelihood that NSA will acquire communications of U.S. persons or others who are not in direct contact with one of the Agency’s foreign intelligence targets.”

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61 (U) As a result of this incident and as previously described, the FISC twice extended its examination of the government’s application for the 2016 certifications pursuant to 50 U.S.C.§1881a(j)(2). Originally, the 2015 certifications were set to expire on November 6, 2016, but due to the FISC’s extensions, the 2015 certification stayed in effect through April 2017, at which time the FISC approved the 2016 certifications.

(U) Because NSA no longer acquires communications where the targeted selector is found within the content of a communication (commonly referred to as “abouts” collection) the government submitted to the FISC revised versions of NSA’s Section 702 targeting and minimization procedures to address the change to its upstream Internet collection program. NSA also notified the appropriate congressional committees regarding its change to its Section 702 upstream Internet collection. The FISC subsequently approved the 2016 certifications in its opinion, dated April 26, 2017, concluding that NSA’s revised targeting and minimization procedures complied with statutory requirements and were consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

(U) B. Effect of Human Error

(U) As reported in previous Joint Assessments, human errors caused some of the identified compliance incidents. Each of the agencies has established processes to both reduce human errors and to identify such errors when they occur. These processes have helped to limit such errors, but some categories of human errors are unlikely to be entirely eliminated. For example, despite multiple pre-tasking checks, instances of typographical errors or similar errors occurred in the targeting process that caused NSA to enter the wrong facility into the collection system. Such typographical errors accounted for approximately 6 percent of the tasking errors made in this reporting period, which is a decrease from the previous reporting period, in which typographical errors accounted for 18 percent of the tasking errors.63 Approximately 5 percent of tasking errors arose from incidents where an analyst requested administrative updates to the tasking record for a facility, and the incorrect processing of the request resulted in NSA retasking the facility pursuant to Section 702 without fully applying its targeting procedures.64 Approximately 27 percent of the detasking delays from this reporting period were the result of inadvertent errors,65 such as an NSA analyst detasking some, but not all, of a target’s facilities that required detasking.66 As with other compliance incidents, any data acquired as a result of such tasking and detasking errors - regardless of whether or not the user proves to be a United States person or person in the United States - is required to be purged.

(U) 1. Errors Caused by Misunderstandings of Processes or Procedures That Can Be Addressed Through Training

(U) NSA’s Section 702 targeting procedures require analysts to conduct due diligence to assess whether a target is a non-United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States based upon the totality of the circumstances available. During this reporting period, some of the incidents involving the failure to exercise due diligence prior to the tasking of a facility impacted United States persons. For example, in one incident, NSA personnel did not understand what research efforts they were required to undertake prior to tasking to establish a reasonable belief that a targeted user was a non-United States person located outside the United States; because the analyst did not sufficiently complete pre-tasking research, the analyst mistakenly tasked a facility that was used by a United States person, which resulted in a tasking incident. In another incident, NSA personnel failed to discover reporting from another agency prior to tasking, which indicated that a targeted user of a facility was a United States person. In both incidents, NSA detasked the facilities and ensured that all necessary purge requirements were completed. NSA

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65 (U//FOUO) This percentage is slightly higher than the percentage of those types of detasking delays reported in the prior Joint Assessment.
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(U) During this reporting period, a number of incidents involved the failure to conduct necessary foreignness checks prior to the tasking of a facility. Approximately 23 percent of the tasking errors in this reporting period involved instances in which NSA did not take sufficient pre-tasking steps to try to find information regarding the location of the targeted user or otherwise did not properly establish a sufficient basis to assess that the targeted user was outside the United States. These incidents did not impact identified United States persons, as in the case of the due diligence foreignness check errors discussed above, or persons located in the United States. The
two most common examples include situations in which the analyst did not conduct a necessary pre-tasking check or there was too long of a delay between the necessary pre-tasking checks and the actual tasking of the account.\textsuperscript{67} In an attempt to prevent these types of tasking errors in the future, NSA sent out multiple reminders or compliance advisories to its analysts and tasking adjudicators, reminding them of the pre-tasking requirements. Those reminders have also been posted on NSA’s internal websites for personnel who handle Section 702 collection. Furthermore, NSA updated its Section 702 training to emphasize the issues contributing to these tasking errors.

\textit{During this time period, NSA also fully deployed a new query tool to help reduce tasking errors. This tool provides appropriately trained NSA personnel with a broad range of relevant information in NSA’s possession regarding facilities proposed for foreignness determinations. In November 2016, NSA updated one of its core Section 702 training courses to include information on the use of this tool. Several in-person training sessions focused on this tool were also held for tasking adjudicators.}

\textit{Additionally, during the reporting period, the joint oversight team noted a significant increase in compliance incidents resulting from instances in which NSA neglected to provide the required notice to NSD and ODNI within the specified timeframe required by the targeting procedures. Reporting delays accounted for nearly 7 percent of all incidents during the reporting period.\textsuperscript{68} Some of the notification delays were due to administrative errors within the relevant agency, and some notification delays were due to an error in the way the incident was submitted to the NSA Incident Reporting Tool (IRT). A substantial notification delay in one incident occurred because the NSA target office failed to respond to NSA compliance personnel’s questions regarding the incident, and the compliance personnel failed to promptly follow-up with the target office. NSA advises that the increase in reporting delays for incidents of non-compliance may be attributable to the following circumstances: (1) NSA’s transition, during the fourth quarter of 2016, from a legacy incident reporting tool to a new compliance incident reporting tool used to report potential compliance incidents to NSD and ODNI, (2) internal NSA Compliance Group communication challenges, and (3) NSA agency restructuring that resulted in limits on human capital. As appropriate, NSA is addressing how these issues may affect the reporting delays and assessing ways in which those issues have been or can be remediated.}

\textit{NSA’s minimization procedures include several restrictions on querying raw Section 702 collection. First, queries of raw Section 702 collection must be designed in a manner “reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information” to prevent overly broad queries. In addition, although NSA’s Section 702 minimization procedures permit queries of raw Section 702 collection using United States person identifiers, such queries are to first be approved in accordance with United States law.}

\textit{Minimization Errors That Can Be Addressed Through Training and Technical Improvements}

\textit{NSA’s minimization procedures include several restrictions on querying raw Section 702 collection. First, queries of raw Section 702 collection must be designed in a manner “reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information” to prevent overly broad queries. In addition, although NSA’s Section 702 minimization procedures permit queries of raw Section 702 collection using United States person identifiers, such queries are to first be approved in accordance with United States law.}
with NSA’s internal procedures. Also, NSA’s Section 702 minimization procedures in effect during this reporting period prohibited using United States person identifiers to query Internet communications acquired through NSA’s upstream collection techniques. During this reporting period, while NSA’s minimization procedure errors comprised 42.5 percent of the overall 0.88 percent compliance incident rate, approximately 99 percent of the minimization procedure errors involved non-compliance with NSA’s minimization rules regarding queries (compared to approximately 86 percent in the previous reporting period).

(U) During this reporting period, only 2 percent of minimization errors involved overly broad queries. These overly broad query errors are typically traceable to a typographical or comparable error in the construction of the query terms. For example, an overly broad query can be caused when an analyst mistakenly inserts an “or” instead of an “and” in constructing a Boolean query, and thereby potentially received overly broad results as a result of the query. As with previous reporting periods, there were no incidents of an analyst purposely running a query for non-foreign intelligence purposes against Section 702-acquired data identified during the reporting period.

(U) Furthermore, one incident involved improper queries conducted through a tool designed to search certain NSA repositories. Due to the analyst’s misunderstanding of the query tool, certain queries were run against data in which United States person queries were not authorized, including Section 702 data. To address that compliance incident, NSA issued a compliance advisory and modified the banner on the tool to further emphasize the restriction on querying United States person selectors. The remaining query incidents involved NSA analysts: (a) using United States person identifiers that had not been approved pursuant to NSA’s internal procedures to query Section 702-acquired data; and/or (b) using approved United States person identifiers to query Internet communications acquired through NSA’s upstream collection techniques. As discussed in detail above, a significant majority of NSA’s minimization errors were discovered from a study of improper queries of upstream collection conducted by NSA’s OCO and OIG spanning a period of two years.

(U) In prior Joint Assessments, the joint oversight team recommended that certain modifications be made to NSA’s querying tool. Specifically, the joint oversight team recommended that:

NSA assess modifications to systems used to query raw Section 702-acquired data to require analysts to identify when they believe they are using a United States person identifier as a query term. Such an improvement, even if it cannot be adopted universally in all NSA systems, could help prevent compliance instances with respect to the use of United States person query terms.
See The 13th Joint Assessment dated September 2015 at. 41.⁷¹

(U) The joint oversight team assessed that such an improvement could help prevent compliance instances with respect to the use of United States person query terms. In response to this recommendation, NSA developed a solution that involved technical adjustments to certain frequently used interfaces of a commonly used tool for querying certain repositories containing raw Section 702-acquired information that requires analysts to affirmatively specify when their intent is to make a query using a United States person identifier. If an analyst indicates that the intent is to include a U.S. person identifier, those interfaces do not provide the option to query Section 702 upstream data. Although that change does not apply to all NSA systems, NSA assesses that this will assist in reducing compliance incidents, as this is a commonly used tool for querying raw Section 702 information. Prior joint assessments, which noted that NSA had adopted a solution to this recommendation, stated that once the query is executed, the details concerning the query will be passed to NSA’s auditing system of record for post-query review and potential metrics compilation and that, as part of the testing, NSA would evaluate the accuracy of reporting this number in future Joint Assessments. NSA continues to evaluate the validity of compiling post-query review metrics.

(U) D. Inter-Agency and Intra-Agency Communications

(U) Section 702 compliance requires good communication and coordination within and between agencies. In order to ensure targeting decisions are made based on the totality of the circumstances and after the exercise of due diligence, those involved in the targeting decision must communicate the relevant facts to each other. Analysts also must have access to the necessary records that inform such decisions. Good communication among analysts is also needed to ensure that facilities are promptly detasked when it is determined that the Government has lost its reasonable basis for assessing that the facility is used by a non-United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information. Furthermore, query rules regarding United States person identifiers and dissemination decisions regarding United States person information require inter- and intra-agency communications regarding who the Government has determined to be a United States person.

(U) In this reporting period, miscommunications resulted in errors, and the joint oversight team assessed the need for continued improvement: approximately 14 percent of the detasking delays that occurred were attributable to miscommunications or delays in communicating relevant facts.⁷² As with all detasking delays, these detasking delays typically involved travel or possible travel of non-United States persons to the United States. Significantly, however, less than 1 percent

⁷¹ (U) As previously reported, the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) requested, in a letter dated October 27, 2015, (hereafter the HPSCI October 2015 letter) that the Director of National Intelligence submit a report including, among other things, information pertaining to the “status of the proposed changes [DOJ] suggested the [NSA] make to its tasking tool for Section 702 queries” as referenced in the September 2015 Joint Assessment. On February 16, 2016, ODNI provided HPSCI with a report in response to the HPSCI October 2015 letter. The ODNI report, Assessment of Oversight and Compliance with Targeting Procedures (hereafter the ODNI February 2016 report), included, among other information, an update on the status of proposed modifications DOJ and ODNI suggested that NSA make to its querying tool. The text above provides a further update.

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of tasking errors involved situations in which intra-agency miscommunications resulted in the erroneous tasking of a facility used by a United States person, and less than 3% of detasking delays involved situations in which inter-agency miscommunications resulted in the delayed detasking of a facility used by a United States person.

(U) The joint oversight team assesses that agencies should continue their training efforts to ensure that appropriate protocols continue to be utilized. As part of its on-going oversight efforts, the joint oversight team will also continue to monitor NSA, CIA, and FBI’s Section 702 activities.
and practices to ensure that the agencies maintain efficient and effective channels of communication.

(U) E. Incidents Resulting from Technical Issues

(U) A number of compliance incidents resulted from technical issues during this reporting period. Technical issues potentially have larger implications than other incidents because technical issues: often involve more than one facility; can remain undetected and uncorrected for a long period of time; and can proliferate dramatically in a short time period, including across numerous interconnected systems. Accordingly, all agencies involved in the Section 702 program devote substantial resources towards the prevention, identification, and remedy of technical issues. Collection equipment and other related systems undergo substantial testing prior to deployment. The agencies also employ a variety of monitoring programs to detect anomalies in order to prevent or limit the effect of technical issues on acquisition. As a result of those efforts, potential issues have been identified, the resolution of which prevented compliance incidents from happening and ensured the continued flow of foreign intelligence information to the agencies. The joint oversight team determined that the historically limited number of overcollection incidents was the result of the efforts of all of the involved agencies. Although technical issues can potentially have larger implications, that potential was largely avoided during this reporting period.

(U) Specifically, the technical issues that resulted in delayed detaskings were caused by system errors, system outages, and data not being properly processed due to a server backlog. In those instances, the technology and systems failed to function as designed, and, thus, the systems failed, resulting in delayed detasking incidents whereby NSA was unable to timely detask facilities. NSA subsequently corrected those technical issues. One incident had more substantial implications, as it involved the overcollection of certain information.
(U) III. Review of Compliance Incidents – CIA Minimization Procedures

(S//NF) During this reporting period, there were [redacted] incidents involving noncompliance with the CIA minimization procedures, all of which involved the improper retention of U.S. person information.\(^7\) In all of these incidents, CIA deleted the improperly retained information and then properly minimized the information.

(U) IV. Review of Compliance Incidents – FBI Targeting and Minimization Procedures

(U) There were a minimal number of incidents involving noncompliance with the FBI targeting and minimization procedures in this reporting period.\(^7\)

(S//NF) One of the minimization incidents\(^8\) involved unauthorized access to raw FISA-acquired information by a private entity.
This compliance matter was discussed in the FISC’s April 26, 2017, Opinion and Order.

(U) V. Review of Compliance Incidents – Provider Errors

(S//NF) During this reporting period, there was one incident (as opposed to [redacted] incidents during the last reporting period) of noncompliance by an electronic communication service provider with a Section 702(h) directive. Given that errors by the service providers can result in the acquisition of United States person information, the Government must actively monitor the acquisitions that the providers transmit to the Government. The joint oversight team assessed that the historically low number of compliance incidents caused by service providers reflected, in part, the service providers’ commitment to comply with the law while protecting their customers’ interests. However, the low number of those incidents also reflected the continued efforts by the Government and service providers to ensure that lawful intercept systems were effective and compliant with all applicable laws and other requirements. The Government must continue to work with the service providers to prevent future incidents of non-compliance.

(U) SECTION 5: CONCLUSION

(U) During this reporting period, the joint oversight team found that the agencies continued to implement the procedures and follow the guidelines in a manner that reflects a focused and concerted effort by agency personnel to comply with the requirements of Section 702. As in previous reporting periods, the joint oversight team identified no indications of any intentional or willful attempts to violate or circumvent the requirements of the Act in the compliance incidents assessed herein. Although the number of compliance incidents continued to remain small, particularly when compared with the total amount of collection activity, a continued focus is needed to address the underlying causes of the incidents that did occur. The joint oversight team assesses that such focus should emphasize maintaining close monitoring of collection activities and continued personnel training. Additionally, as part of its on-going oversight responsibilities, the joint oversight team and the agencies’ internal oversight regimes will continue to monitor the efficacy of measures to address the causes of compliance incidents during the next reporting period.
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APPENDIX A

(U) IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 702 AUTHORITIES - OVERVIEW

(U) I. Overview - NSA

(U) The National Security Agency (NSA) seeks to acquire foreign intelligence information concerning specific targets under each Section 702 certification from or with the assistance of electronic communication service providers, as defined in Section 701(b)(4) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (FISA). As required by Section 702, those targets must be non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.

(S//NF) During this reporting period, NSA conducted foreign intelligence analysis to identify targets of foreign intelligence interest that fell within one of the following certifications:

1 (U) Specifically, Section 701(b)(4) provides:

The term ‘electronic communication service provider’ means -- (A) a telecommunications carrier, as that term is defined in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153); (B) a provider of electronic communication service, as that term is defined in section 2510 of title 18, United States Code; (C) a provider of a remote computing service, as that term is defined in section 2711 of title 18, United States Code; (D) any other communication service provider who has access to wire or electronic communications either as such communications are transmitted or as such communications are stored; or (E) an officer, employee, or agent of an entity described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D).

2 (U) Section 101(i) of FISA defines “United States person” as follows:

a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)]), an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3).
(U) As affirmed in affidavits filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), NSA believes that the non-United States persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States who are targeted under these certifications will either possess foreign intelligence information about the persons, groups, or entities covered by the certifications or are likely to receive or communicate foreign intelligence information concerning these persons, groups, or entities. This requirement is reinforced by the Attorney General’s Acquisition Guidelines, which provide that an individual may not be targeted unless a significant purpose of the targeting is to acquire foreign intelligence information that the person possesses, is reasonably expected to receive, and/or is likely to communicate.

(U) Under NSA’s FISC-approved targeting procedures, NSA targets a particular non-United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States by tasking facilities used by that person who possesses or who is likely to communicate or receive foreign intelligence information. A facility (also known as a “selector”) is a specific communications identifier tasked to acquire foreign intelligence information that is to, from, or about a target. A “facility” could be a telephone number or an identifier related to a form of electronic communication, such as an e-mail address. In order to acquire foreign intelligence information from or with the assistance of an electronic communications service provider, NSA first uses the identification of a facility to acquire the relevant communications. Then, after applying its targeting procedures (further discussed below) and other internal reviews and approvals, NSA “tasks” that facility in the relevant tasking system. The facilities are in turn provided to electronic communication service providers who have been served with the required directives under the certifications.

(U) Once information is collected from these tasked facilities, it is subject to FISC-approved minimization procedures. NSA’s minimization procedures set forth specific measures NSA must take when it acquires, retains, and/or disseminates non-publicly available information about United States persons. All collection of Section 702 information is routed to NSA. However, the NSA’s minimization procedures also permit the provision of unminimized communications to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relating to targets identified by these agencies that have been the subject of NSA acquisition under the certifications. The unminimized communications sent to CIA and FBI, in accordance with NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures, must in turn be processed by CIA and FBI in accordance with their respective FISC-approved Section 702 minimization procedures.

(U) NSA’s targeting procedures address, among other subjects, the manner in which NSA will determine that a person targeted under Section 702 is a non-United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, the post-targeting analysis conducted on the facilities, and the documentation required.
(U) A. Pre-Tasking Location

(U) 1. Telephone Numbers

(S//SI//NF) For telephone numbers, NSA analysts

(U) 2. Electronic Communications Identifiers

(S//SI//NF) For electronic communications identifiers, NSA analysts

(U) Analysts also check this system as part of the “post-targeting” analysis described below.
(U) B. Pre-Tasking Determination of United States Person Status

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA also requires that tasking analysts review information collected from the facilities they have tasked. With respect to NSA’s review of ___________, a notification e-mail is sent to the tasking team upon initial collection for the facility. NSA analysts are expected to review this collection within five business days to confirm that the user of the facility is the intended target, that the target remains appropriate to the certification cited, and that the target remains outside the United States. Analysts are then responsible to review traffic on an on-going basis to ensure that the facility remains appropriate under the authority. Should traffic not be viewed in at least once every 30 business days, a notice is sent to the tasking team and their management, who then have the responsibility to follow up.

11 (S//NF) NSA’s automated notification system to ensure analysts have reviewed collection is currently implemented only for ___________, not ___________. NSA is attempting to develop a similar system for ___________.

(U) C. Post-Tasking Checks
(U) D. Documentation

(S//NF) The procedures provide that analysts will document in the tasking database a citation to the information leading them to reasonably believe that a targeted person is located outside the United States. The citation is a reference that includes the source of the information, enabling oversight personnel to locate and review the information that led the analyst to his/her reasonable belief. Analysts must also identify the foreign power or foreign territory about which they expect the proposed targeting will obtain foreign intelligence information.

(S//NF) NSA has an existing database tool, for use by its analysts for Section 702 tasking and documentation purposes. This tool has been modified over time to accommodate the requirements of Section 702, to include, for example, certain fields and features for targeting, documentation, and oversight purposes. Accordingly, the tool allows analysts to document the required citation to NSA records on which NSA relied to form the reasonable belief that the target was located outside the United States. The tool has fields for the certification under which the target falls, and for the foreign power as to which the analyst expects to collect foreign intelligence information. Analysts fill out various fields for each facility, as appropriate, including the citation to the information on which the analyst relied in making the foreignness determination.

(U) NSA’s targeting procedures also require analysts to identify the foreign power or foreign territory about which they expect the proposed targeting will obtain foreign intelligence information and provide a written explanation of the basis for their assessment, at the time of targeting, that the target possesses, is expected to receive, and/or is likely to communicate foreign intelligence information concerning that foreign power or foreign territory.

(U) NSA also includes the targeting rationale (TAR) in the tasking record, which requires the targeting analyst to briefly state why targeting for a particular facility was requested. The intent of the TAR is to memorialize why the analyst is requesting targeting, and provides a linkage between the user of the facility and the foreign intelligence purpose covered by the certification under which it is being tasked. The joint oversight team assesses that the TAR has improved the oversight team’s ability to understand NSA’s foreign intelligence purpose in tasking facilities.

(S//NF) Records are reviewed before a tasking can be finalized. Records from this tool are maintained and compiled for oversight purposes. For each facility, a record can be compiled and printed showing certain relevant fields, such as: the facility, the certification, the citation to the record or records relied upon by the analyst, the analyst’s foreignness explanation, the targeting rationale, These records, referred to as “tasking sheets,” are reviewed by the Department of Justice’s National Security
Division (NSD) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as part of the oversight process.

(S//NF) The source records cited on these tasking sheets are contained in a variety of NSA data repositories. These records are maintained by NSA and, when requested by the joint team, are produced to verify determinations recorded on the tasking sheets. Other source records may consist of “lead information” from other agencies, such as disseminated intelligence reports or lead information.

(U) F. Internal Procedures

(U) NSA has instituted internal training programs, access control procedures, standard operating procedures, compliance incident reporting measures, and similar processes to implement the requirements of the targeting procedures. Only analysts who have received certain types of training and authorizations are provided access to the Section 702 program data. These analysts must complete an NSA OGC and OCO training program; review the targeting and minimization procedures as well as other documents filed with the certifications; and must pass a competency test. The databases NSA analysts use are subject to audit and review by OCO. For guidance, analysts consult standard operating procedures, supervisors, OCO personnel, and NSA OGC attorneys Group.

(U) The NSA targeting and minimization procedures require NSA to report to NSD and ODNI any incidents of non-compliance with the procedures by NSA personnel that result in the intentional targeting of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States, the intentional targeting of a United States person, or the intentional acquisition of any communication in which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located within the United States, with a requirement to purge from NSA’s records any resulting collection. NSA must also report any incidents of non-compliance, including overcollection, by any electronic communication service provider issued a directive under Section 702. Additionally, if NSA learns, after targeting a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States, that the person is inside the United States, or if NSA learns that a person who NSA reasonably believed was a non-United States person is in fact a United States person, NSA must terminate the acquisition, and treat any acquired communications in accordance with its minimization procedures. In each of the above situations, NSA’s Section 702 procedures during this reporting period required NSA to report the
incident to NSD and ODNI within the time specified in the applicable targeting procedures (five business days) of learning of the incident.

(U) The NSA targeting and minimization procedures also require NSA to conduct oversight activities and make any necessary reports, including those relating to incidents of non-compliance, to the NSA Office of the Inspector General (NSA OIG) and NSA OGC. NSA’s OCO reviews all Section 702 taskings and conducts spots checks of disseminations based in whole or in part on Section 702-acquired information. The Directorate of Operations Information and Intelligence Analysis organization also maintains and updates an NSA internal website regarding the implementation of, and compliance with, the Section 702 authorities.

(U) NSA has established standard operating procedures for incident tracking and reporting to NSD and ODNI. Compliance officers work with NSA analysts and CIA and FBI points of contact, as necessary, to compile incident reports that are forwarded to both the NSA OGC and OIG. NSA OGC forwards the incidents to NSD and ODNI.

(U) On a more programmatic level, under the guidance and direction of the Compliance Group, NSA has implemented and maintains a Comprehensive Mission Compliance Program (CMCP) designed to effect verifiable conformance with the laws and policies that afford privacy protections during NSA missions. The Compliance Group complements and reinforces the intelligence oversight program of the NSA OIG and oversight responsibilities of NSA OGC.

(U) A key component of the CMCP is an effort to manage, organize, and maintain the authorities, policies, and compliance requirements that govern NSA mission activities. This effort, known as “Rules Management,” focuses on two key components: (1) the processes necessary to better govern, maintain, and understand the authorities granted to NSA and (2) technological solutions to support (and simplify) Rules Management activities. The Authorities Integration Group coordinates NSA’s use of the Verification of Accuracy (VoA) process originally developed for other FISA programs to provide an increased level of confidence that factual representations to the FISC or other external decision makers are accurate and based on an ongoing, shared understanding among operational, technical, legal, policy and compliance officials within NSA. NSA has also developed a Verification of Interpretation (VoI) review to help ensure that NSA and its external overseers have a shared understanding of key terms in Court orders, minimization procedures, and other documents that govern NSA’s FISA activities. The Compliance Group has developed a risk assessment process to assess the potential risk of non-compliance with the rules designed to protect United States person privacy. The assessment is conducted and reported to the NSA Deputy Director and NSA Senior Leadership Team biannually.

(U) II. Overview - CIA

(U) A. CIA’s Role in Targeting

(S//NF) Although CIA does not target or acquire communications pursuant to Section 702, CIA has put in place a process, in consultation with NSA, FBI, NSD, and ODNI, to identify foreign intelligence targets to NSA (hereinafter referred to as the “CIA nomination process”). Based on its foreign intelligence analysis, CIA may “nominate” a facility to NSA for potential acquisition under one of the Section 702(g) certifications.
targeting officer’s first line manager, a component legal officer, a senior operational manager and the FISA Program Office prior to export to NSA for tasking.

(S//NF) The FISA Program Office was established in December 201 and is charged with providing strategic direction for the management and oversight of CIA’s FISA collection programs, including the retention and dissemination of foreign intelligence information acquired pursuant to Section 702. This group is responsible for overall strategic direction and policy, programmatic external focus, and interaction with counterparts of NSD, ODNI, NSA and FBI. In addition, the office leads the day-to-day FISA compliance efforts. The primary responsibilities of the FISA Program Office are to provide strategic direction for data handling and management of FISA/702 data, as well as to ensure that all Section 702 collection is properly tasked and that CIA is complying with all compliance and purge requirements.
(U) B. Oversight and Compliance

(U) CIA’s FISA compliance program is managed by its FISA Program Office in coordination with CIA OGC. CIA provides small group training to personnel who nominate facilities to NSA and/or minimize Section 702-acquired communications. Access to unminimized Section 702-acquired communications is limited to trained personnel. CIA attorneys embedded with operational elements that have access to unminimized Section 702-acquired information also respond to inquiries regarding nomination and minimization questions. Identified incidents of noncompliance with the CIA minimization procedures are generally reported to NSD and ODNI by CIA OGC.

(U) III. Overview - FBI

(U) A. FBI’s Role in Targeting – Nomination for Acquiring Communications

(S//NF) Like CIA, FBI has developed a formal nomination process to identify foreign intelligence targets to NSA for the acquisition of communications. In particular, FBI requires that NSA first apply its own targeting procedures to determine that the user of the Designated Account is a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States and is not a United States person. NSA is also responsible for determining that a significant purpose of the acquisition it requests is to obtain foreign intelligence information. After NSA designates accounts as being appropriate, FBI must then apply its own, additional procedures, which require FBI to review NSA’s conclusion of foreignness.

(S//NF) More specifically, after FBI obtains the tasking sheet from NSA, it reviews the information provided by NSA regarding the location of the person and the non-United States person status of the person.
(S//NF) Unless FBI locates information indicating that the user is a United States person or is located inside the United States,

(S//NF) If FBI identifies information indicating that NSA’s determination that the target is a non-United States person reasonably believed to be outside the United States may be incorrect, FBI provides this information to NSA and does not approve.
(U) C. Documentation

(S//NF) The targeting procedures require that FBI retain the information in accordance with its records retention policies. FBI uses a multi-page checklist for each Designated Account to record the results of its targeting process, as laid out in its standard operating procedures, commencing with extending through and culminating in approval or disapproval of the acquisition. In addition, the FBI standard operating procedures call for depending on the circumstances, which are maintained by FBI with the applicable checklist. FBI also retains with each checklist any relevant communications regarding its review of the information. Additional checklists have been created to capture information on requests withdrawn or not approved by FBI.

(U) D. Implementation, Oversight, and Compliance

(S//NF) FBI’s implementation and compliance activities are overseen by FBI OGC, particularly the National Security Law Branch (NSLB), as well as FBI’s Exploitation Threat Section (XTS), and FBI’s Inspection Division (INSD). XTS has the lead responsibility in FBI for XTS personnel are trained on the FBI targeting procedures and FBI’s detailed set of standard operating procedures that govern its processing of requests for XTS also has the lead responsibility for facilitating FBI’s nominations to NSA communications. XTS, NSLB, NSD, and ODNI have all worked on training FBI personnel to ensure that FBI nominations and post-tasking review comply with the NSA targeting procedures. Numerous such trainings were provided during the current reporting period. With respect to minimization, FBI has created a mandatory online training that all FBI agents and analysts must complete prior to gaining access to unminimized Section 702-acquired data in the FBI’s In addition, NSD conducts training on the Section 702 minimization Procedures at multiple FBI field offices each year.

(S//NF) The FBI’s targeting procedures require periodic reviews by NSD and ODNI at least once every 60 days. FBI must also report incidents of non-compliance with the FBI targeting procedures to NSD and ODNI within five business days of learning of the incident. XTS and NSLB are the lead FBI elements in ensuring that NSD and ODNI received all appropriate information with regard to these two requirements.
(U) IV. Overview - Minimization

(U) After a facility has been tasked for collection, non-publicly available information collected as a result of these taskings that concerns United States persons must be minimized. The FISC-approved minimization procedures require such minimization in the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of foreign intelligence information. As a general matter, minimization procedures under Section 702 are similar in most respects to minimization under other FISA orders. For example, the Section 702 minimization procedures, like those under certain other FISA court orders, allow for sharing of certain unminimized Section 702 information among NSA, FBI, and CIA. Similarly, the procedures for each agency require special handling of intercepted communications that are between attorneys and clients, as well as foreign intelligence information concerning United States persons that is disseminated to foreign governments.

(U) Section 702 minimization procedures do, however, impose additional obligations or restrictions as compared with the minimization procedures associated with authorities granted under Titles I and III of FISA. For example, the Section 702 minimization procedures require, with limited exceptions, the purge of any communications acquired through the targeting of a person who at the time of targeting was reasonably believed to be a non-United States person located outside the United States, but is in fact located inside the United States at the time the communication is acquired, or was in fact a United States person at the time of targeting.

(U) NSA, CIA, and FBI have created systems to track the purging of information from their systems. CIA and FBI receive incident notifications from NSA to document when NSA has identified Section 702 information that NSA is required to purge according to its procedures, so that CIA and FBI can meet their respective obligations.