On March 18, 2026, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard delivered opening remarks at a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) hearing for the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The opening statement as delivered is below.

 

Opening Statement As Delivered by

The Honorable Tulsi Gabbard,

Director of National Intelligence

 

Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community

March 18, 2026

 

Thank you, Chairman Cotton, Vice Chair Warner, and members of the committee. Good morning. I'm here today to present the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, joined by the directors of the CIA, FBI, DIA, and NSA. Before I continue, on behalf of the intelligence community, I want to extend our thanks to General Hartman for his 37 years of service in uniform and closing out his 37 years with tremendous leadership of the NSA.

This briefing is being provided in accordance with ODNI’s statutory responsibility. I'd like to remind those who are watching what I am briefing here today conveys the intelligence community's assessment of the threats facing US citizens, our homeland, and our interests, not my personal views or opinions.

In this assessment, we're following the structure of priorities that were laid out in the President's National Security Strategy, starting with threats to our homeland and then shifting to global risks. The defense of our homeland is of the utmost importance to the American people, and efforts by this administration have shown over the last year the results of bolstering homeland defense in the security of the American people.

For example, the strict enforcement of US policies at the US-Mexico border and regionally has served as a deterrent, drastically reducing illegal immigration. Based on Customs and Border Patrol data, January 2026 monthly encounters are down 83.8% compared to January 2025. Encounters declined at 79% compared to 2024; the drivers of migration are likely to continue. Potential worsening instability in countries like Cuba and Haiti risks triggering migration surges, and smugglers, who have long operated as transnational criminal organizations, continue to view chaos as an opportunity for profit and will continue to look to profit from illegal immigration flows.

These transnational criminal organizations continue to pose a daily and direct threat to the health and safety of millions of US citizens, primarily and directly by producing and trafficking in illegal drugs. Under President Trump's leadership, fentanyl overdose deaths have seen a 30% decrease from September 2024 to September 2025. President Trump's aggressive efforts to more directly and actively target these transnational criminal organizations and reduce the inflow of fentanyl precursors have already had a significant impact, which is likely to continue. We've seen fentanyl potency also decrease, likely due to disruptions to the production supply chain.

US efforts to work with China and India to halt the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals to North America are demonstrating some improvement, but there is more work to be done, as sadly, there are still tens of thousands of fentanyl-related deaths in America every year.

Mexico-based TCOs, like the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel, dominate the production and smuggling of fentanyl, heroin, meth, and cocaine into the United States. Colombia-based TCOs and illegal armed groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army are responsible for producing and trafficking large volumes of cocaine to the US and European markets, with some indicators of attempts to expand their markets to the Asia-Pacific region. Colombia remains the world's largest producer of cocaine, and Colombian criminal groups have expanded their trafficking relationships with neighboring Ecuadorian and Brazilian gangs.

As you know, MS-13 is well established in cells within the United States and uses violence to intimidate the Salvadoran diaspora, engaging in murder, extortion, retail drug trafficking, firearms offenses, and prostitution, fueling increased violence and instability. These and other TCOs continue to present a very tangible and individualized risk of violent crime to everyday Americans and contribute to regional instability. As the president increases his focus on counter-drug and counter-cartel pressures, they are likely to seek ways to try to adapt their operations, including shifting production locations, trafficking routes, and methods.

The United States continues to face a complex and evolving threat landscape with a geographically diverse set of Islamist terrorist actors seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm Americans, even as Al-Qaeda and ISIS remain weaker today than they were at their respective peaks. The spread of Islamist ideology, in some cases led by individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, poses a fundamental threat to freedom and the foundational principles that underpin Western civilization. Islamist groups and individuals use this ideology for recruiting and financial support for terrorist groups and individuals around the world and to advance their political objectives of establishing an Islamist caliphate which governs based on Sharia.

There are increasing examples of this in various European countries, and President Trump's designation of certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organizations is a mechanism to secure Americans against this threat. In response to setbacks to their capabilities of conducting large-scale, complex attacks, Islamist terrorist groups have shifted toward focusing on executing information operations to spread propaganda and inspire or enable individuals located in or with access to the West.

US counterterrorism efforts, primarily in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria in 2025, were instrumental in removing key terrorist leaders and operatives, degrading the ability of Al-Qaeda and ISIS to quickly reconstitute its leadership and plan large-scale attacks against the homeland and US interests abroad. Strict US border enforcement measures and increased deportations of individuals with suspected links to Islamist terrorists have reduced access to the homeland and removed some potential sources of future terrorist attacks.

Since January, US officials have only had a handful of encounters at our borders with individuals associated with terrorist groups. This is a positive trend. However, our interagency coordinated efforts to continue to identify, locate, and remove known or suspected terrorists who may already be in the United States continue with vigilance.

In 2025, there were at least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the United States. Law enforcement disrupted at least 15 US-based Islamists. Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some online contact with Islamist terrorists inspired by Islamist Foreign Terrorist Organizations abroad. For example, in the recent attempt to attack a synagogue in Michigan, the shooter had familial ties to a Hezbollah leader. Al-Qaeda and ISIS pose the biggest threat to US interests overseas in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, where these groups operate.

In the Middle East, AQAP in Yemen, ISIS-K in South Asia, and ISIS in Syria are among the most likely groups conducting external plotting. ISIS in Syria is likely seeking to rebuild its ranks, expand support networks, and solicit funds by re-engaging with and recruiting from the likely hundreds of ISIS detainees and thousands of ISIS-linked women and children who were either released or escaped from prisons and displaced person camps that were previously run by the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria.

Meanwhile, state actors present a risk broader in scope by seeking new capabilities in kinetic and cyber warfare. The United States secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure safety in the homeland against strategic threats. However, the intelligence community assesses that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan have been researching and developing an array of novel, advanced, or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland within range.

The IC assesses that threats to the homeland will expand collectively to more than 16,000 missiles by 2035 from the current assessed figure of more than 3,000 missiles. The IC assesses that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems meant to be capable of penetrating or bypassing US missile defenses. North Korea's ICBMs can already reach US soil, and the IC assesses that it is committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with a range capable of striking the homeland.

The IC assesses that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch and other technology it could use to begin to develop a militarily viable ICBM before 2035, should Tehran attempt to pursue that capability. However, these assessments will clearly be updated as the full impact of Operation Epic Fury, devastating strikes on Iran's missile production facilities, stockpiles, and launch capabilities, is determined.

These nations collectively will likely seek to understand US plans for advanced missile defense for the homeland, probably for the purpose of shaping their own missile development programs and assessing US intentions regarding deterrence.

Shifting to the cyber domain, the IC assesses that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state ransomware groups will continue to seek to compromise US government and private-sector networks, as well as critical infrastructure, to collect intelligence, create options for future disruption, and for financial gain. The IC assesses that China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats and are continuing their R&D efforts.

North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. In 2025 alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole $2 billion, which the IC assesses is helping to fund the regime and includes further development of its strategic weapons programs. Financially or ideologically motivated non-state actors are becoming more bold, with ransomware groups shifting to faster, high-volume attacks that are harder to identify and mitigate.

Innovation in the field of artificial intelligence will likely accelerate these threats in the cyber domain. The IC assesses that it will increasingly shape cyber operations, with both cyber operators and defenders using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. For example, in August of 2025, cyber actors used an AI tool to conduct a data extortion operation against international government, health care, and public health emergency service sectors, as well as religious institutions.

Moving to the Arctic, the IC assesses that Russia and, to a lesser extent, China aim to strengthen their presence in the region through increased maritime trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity. Russia, which has the longest coastline in the Arctic, has long sought recognition of its polar great power status and is deploying more military forces and building new permanent infrastructure. China, though not an Arctic country, is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its own strategic and economic interests.

The IC assesses that China is the most capable competitor in the field of artificial intelligence. The IC assesses that AI capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing the threat landscape, as this is a defining technology that enables computers and machines to simulate human learning, comprehension, problem-solving, creativity, and autonomy. It will be critical to ensure that humans remain in control of how AI is used and of the machines that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests of the American people across all domains.

AI adoption at scale across the spectrum of usage poses serious risks. AI has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design, and has been used in recent conflicts to influence targeting and streamline decision-making, underscoring the risk and likely threats that could manifest on the battlefield.

Early developers of quantum computers will give countries an extraordinary technological advantage over others to quickly process national security information and break current encryption methodology used to protect sensitive finance, health care, and government information.

The global security landscape is volatile and complex, with armed conflict growing more common and posing potential threats against US interests. Strategic competition and regional and smaller powers are becoming more willing to use force to pursue their interests, heightening the risk of conflict. The IC assesses that the space domain is becoming increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counter-space capabilities to challenge US space efforts.

The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological warfare capabilities continues to grow.

I'll turn now to our neighborhood in the Western Hemisphere, where flagging economies, high crime rates, pervasive organized crime, migration flows, corruption, narcotics trafficking, all of these present a spectrum of risks to US interests, and where strategic competitors seek to gain greater influence in the region.

The IC assesses that Latin America and the Caribbean almost certainly will see hotspots of volatility in the coming year. Since Maduro was arrested, the IC assesses a shift in Venezuela's leadership towards cooperating with the US to open its economy to develop the country's oil and gas extraction capability, and we've seen their movement in releasing political prisoners.

The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement review in 2026 will likely increase uncertainty in many Latin American countries, especially those that rely on Mexico as an export destination for intermediate goods, for manufacture and onward export to the US. China, Russia, and Iran are likely seeking to sustain economic, political, and military engagement with Latin America.

The IC assesses that China's demand for raw materials is likely to continue to drive its economic outreach, while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua.

The IC assesses that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, military, and technological power to increase its own regional positioning, global influence, to fend off threats to their interests. While there are challenging areas where interests diverge, President Trump's diplomatic engagements with President Xi to work towards US interests have enabled progress where those interests align.

The IC assesses that China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces across all domains in pursuit of its goal to achieve world-class status by mid-century. This includes building a force with the aim of being capable of deterring US and allied forces in the region and to achieve their stated objective of developing the ability to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. However, the IC assesses that China likely prefers to set the conditions for an eventual peaceful reunification with Taiwan, short of conflict.

The IC assesses that an increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern regionally and globally. Its weapons of mass destruction, its conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities, and demonstrated willingness to use asymmetric capabilities pose a threat to the US and its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan.

North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing, and in 2025, Kim took steps to improve ties with China, still North Korea's most important trading partner and economic benefactor. The IC assesses that North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine has increased North Korea's capabilities, as their forces have gained combat experience in 21st-century warfare, along with equipment.

In 2024, North Korea deployed more than 11,000 troops to Russia to support combat operations in Kursk. Pyongyang continues to develop and expand its strategic weapons programs, including missiles that can evade US and regional missile defenses. It is continuing to work to increase its nuclear warhead stockpile and maintain biological and chemical weapons capabilities.

Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge US interests globally by military and non-military means. The IC assesses that the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the US is the potential of an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict, such as Ukraine, or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including the potential deployment of nuclear weapons.

The IC assesses that Putin continues to invest in Russia's defense industrial base, as well as novel capabilities that may pose a greater threat to the US homeland and forces abroad than conventional weapons. Russia has advanced systems, hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities designed to negate US military advantage. Moscow also relies on other tools to exert pressure, using gray-zone tactics to further its goals and compete below the level of armed conflict.

Russia is also building extensive counter-space capabilities to contest US space dominance. The development of a nuclear counter-space weapon poses the greatest single threat to the world's space architecture.

During the past year, the IC assesses that Russia has maintained the upper hand in the war against Ukraine. US-led negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv are ongoing. Until such an agreement is met, Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow war of attrition until they view their objectives have been achieved.

In the Middle East, conflict and instability will shape security, political, and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. The IC assesses that Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change in the region that began with Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and continued with the 12-day war last year, resulting in weakening Iran and its proxies.

The IC assesses that the regime in Iran appears to be intact but largely degraded due to attacks on its leadership and military capabilities. Its conventional military power-projection capabilities have largely been destroyed, leaving limited options. Iran's strategic position has been significantly degraded.

The US-led maximum pressure campaign and snapback of European sanctions added additional pressure to an already bleak Iranian economy, resulting in mass protests earlier this year that Tehran suppressed by killing thousands of protesters. Even if the regime remains intact, the IC assesses that internal tensions are likely to increase as Iran's economy worsens.

Even so, Iran and its proxies continue to attack US and allied interests in the Middle East. The IC assesses that if a hostile regime survives, it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort to rebuild its military missiles and UAV forces.

Prior to Operation Epic Fury, the IC assesses Iran was trying to recover from the severe damage to its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-day war and continued to refuse to comply with its nuclear obligations, with the IAEA refusing them access to key facilities.

The IC assesses that China, Russia, and North Korea see the United States as a strategic competitor and potential adversary. Iran has long viewed the US as an adversary and is engaged in active conflict with the US.

As of today, these four countries, the IC assesses, are likely to continue their selective cooperation with each other, which could bolster their individual capabilities and threats to US interests more broadly. However, currently, these relationships are primarily bilateral on selective issues and depend on broader circumstances, divergent sovereign interests, and, in some cases, concerns over directly confronting the United States. These factors, the IC assesses, are likely to constrain their relationships.

Finally, conflicts on the continent of Africa are likely to persist through 2026 due to poor governance, economic demands, and external support. Tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which could rapidly accelerate conflict. Contentious national elections in Somalia could distract the federal government away from counterterrorism actions against Al-Shabaab, which continues to conduct terror attacks while providing funding and propaganda support to other elements of al Qaeda in Yemen.

The civil war in Sudan continues even as external negotiations occur. ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel have increased the intensity of their attacks against local security forces, expanding their areas of operation and moving closer to cities with US presence.

The IC assesses that African governments will likely use their wealth and critical minerals to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefits. Concurrent conflicts and crises across the continent will continue to put US citizens at risk and cause further instability.

In closing, as leaders of the intelligence community, we remain committed to providing the president and policymakers with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to inform decision-making and to ensure the safety, security, and freedom of the American people.

 

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