Features

Features

National Counterintelligence and Security Center

Form SF 312:

Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement

Last revision date 07/2013

 

Form SF 714:

Financial Disclosure Report

Last revision date 02/2015

 

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in accordance with EO 13467, is responsible, as the Security Executive Agent (SecEA), for the development, implementation, and oversight of effective, efficient, and uniform policies and procedures governing the conduct of investigations and adjudications for eligibility for access to classified information and eligibility to hold a sensitive position. While the DNI is focused primarily on the Intelligence Community (IC), as SecEA his responsibilities are further extended to cover personnel security processes within all agencies, government-wide.

The Special Security Directorate (NCSC/SSD), NCSC’s Special Security Directorate serves as the Executive Staff for all Security Executive Agent functions and responsibilities on behalf of the DNI.

The Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (PAC) is responsible to the President for driving implementation of the Security and Suitability Reform Effort and for “ensuring accountability by agencies, ensuring the Suitability Executive Agent and the Security Executive Agent align their respective processes, and sustaining reform momentum.”

Executive Order 12333 as Amended, 30 July 2008 

 

Goals, Directions, Duties, Responsibilities and Conduct with respect to the United States Intelligence Efforts.

 

Reforms the Intelligence Community and creates the Director of National Intelligence.

 

Establishes the National Counterintelligence Executive, the National CI Policy Board, and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive with title IX of the FY 2003 Intelligence Authorization Act.

 

Authorized intelligence and intelligence-related activities for FY 2003.

 

 

Reforms the Intelligence Community and creates the Director of National Intelligence.

 

Authorized intelligence and intelligence-related activities for FY 2004.

 

Authorized intelligence and intelligence-related activities for FY 2005.

 

"Uniting and strengthening America by providing appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism."

 

 

Statutes
Presidential Issuances
National Policies
Intelligence Community Directives
Intelligence Community Policy Guidance
Intelligence Community Standards

 

Additional Links

 

Supply Chain Risk Management

 

NCSC leads its mission partners in assessing and mitigating activities of foreign intelligence entities and other adversaries who attempt to compromise the global network of pathways – supply chains – that provide mission-critical products, materials and services.  Supply chain risk management (SCRM) bridges expertise from acquisition, information management, logistics, intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and cyber to share threat assessments, vulnerabilities, and mitigation information.  NCSC works closely with counterparts in government, the private sector, and academe to identify and advise of threats to key national supply chains.

 

Relevant Reports, Briefings & Reading Material

 

 

 

Insider Threat

 

NCSC co-leads the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) with the FBI.  The NITTF helps the Executive Branch build programs that deter, detect, and mitigate actions by insiders who may represent a threat to national security.  The NITTF develops guidance, provides assistance, assesses progress and analyzes new and continuing insider threat challenges.  It is important to note that insider threat programs target anomalous activities, not individuals, so the NITTF’s work is coordinated with the relevant organization’s records management office, legal counsel, and civil liberties and privacy officials to build-in protections against infringing upon employees’ civil liberties, civil rights, privacy and whistleblower protections.

 

 Insider Threat Websites

 

 

 

Relevant Reports, Briefings & Reading Material:

 

Economic Espionage

 

America's adversaries throughout history have routinely taken their competitive efforts beyond the battlefield. They frequently avoid using standing armies, shirk traditional spy circles, and go after the heart of what drives American prosperity and fuels American might. Nazi spies during World War II tried to penetrate the secrets behind our aviation technology, just as Soviet spies in the Cold War targeted our nuclear and other military secrets.

 

Today, foreign intelligence services, criminals, and private sector spies are focused on American industry and the private sector. These adversaries use traditional intelligence tradecraft against vulnerable American companies, and they increasingly view the cyber environment—where nearly all important business and technology information now resides—as a fast, efficient, and safe way to penetrate the foundations of our economy. Their efforts compromise intellectual property, trade secrets, and technological developments that are critical to national security. Espionage against the private sector increases the danger to long-term U.S. prosperity.

 

Without corrective action that mobilizes the expertise of both the Federal Government and the private sector, the technologies cultivated by American minds and within American universities are at risk of becoming the plunder of competing nations at the expense of long-term U.S. security.

 

The private sector alone lacks the resources and expertise to thwart foreign efforts to steal critical American know-how. This is in large part because counterintelligence is not a typical corporate function, even for well-trained and well–staffed security professionals.

 

Counterintelligence is a challenge for corporations for two reasons. Cost is the first reason. CI measures absorb company resources that would otherwise be used for growth. The second CI challenge is tied to the nature of public corporations. American companies are driven into developing markets by shareholders, growth ambitions, and the desire to beat Wall Street's quarterly earnings expectations. The requirement to move quickly and unabashedly leaves American companies vulnerable as they flock into spy-rich developing nations. China and Russia are our most aggressive and capable adversaries using economic espionage.

 

China and Russia are not the only perpetrators of espionage against sensitive US economic information and technology. Some US allies abuse the access they have been granted to try to clandestinely collect critical information that they can use for their own economic or political advantage.

Reports, Briefings & Reading Material:

Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace Protecting Key Assets: A Corporate Counterintelligence Guide

 

National Counterintelligence and Security Center